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XII intersectorai Management of River Basins 
Message from the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 
of the Republic of South Africa 
The  international workshop on  "Integrated Water Management in 
Water-Stressed River Basins in Developing Countries: Strategies for 
Poverty Alleviation and Agricultural Growth" dealt with an  issue that 
is  fundamental  to the  implementation of  South  Africa's new water 
policy.  I regret  I was  unable to attend and  not only address the 
participants, but also listen and  learn from  such a distinguished set 
of  participants.  I am  pleased that the  Department of Water Affairs 
and  Forestry was  able to assist in  organising the  workshop,  and  I 
know participating members of the Department learned a great deal. 
I would also like to say that I welcome the establishment of IWMI's 
new African regional office in  South Africa.  The office was officially 
launched shortly after this workshop, and is now well-established.  Its 
establishment is propitious.  We face many challenges as we proceed 
to implement South Africa's national water policy and will be seeking 
help and counsel from those who have faced similar challenges.  My 
Ministry looks forward to a long-term collaborative relationship with 
IWMI,  which  will  benefit South Africa,  and  will  also contribute to 
improving water management throughout Africa. 
H.E. Ronnie Kasrils 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 
Republic of South Africa 
March,2001 
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Foreword 
Managing Water in River Basins 
This book contains the  proceedings of an international workshop conducted  in 
South Africa, at Loskop Dam, in October 2000. The book gives the full texts of 20 
papers that were prepared in advance of the meeting, and 12 reports that were 
outputs of working groups, developed during the meeting. 
The subject of the workshop was "Integrated water management in water-stressed 
river basins in developing countries: strategies for poverty alleviation and agricultural 
growth." 
The title is rather complex,  and  it reflects a number of current concerns in  the 
evolution of policies towards the management of water resources. Historically, in 
many countries, the management of water services has been put in the control of 
several agencies of government whose tasks were to deliver specific services to 
the  people: domestic water supply,  irrigation,  power generation,  navigation,  and 
so forth. In recent times, as economic activities increase and diversify, as population 
numbers increase,  and as th'e  balance between  rural  and  urban people and 
activities changes, many countries are  now perceiving a need to integrate these 
water services. 
Countries are also facing problems of water stresses, which usually arise from two 
causes: insufficient quantity of water, in relation to the numbers of people and the 
uses that they want to make of water; and reduced quality of water, due most often 
to pollution that is brought to it by return flows of used water. 
These problems do not arrive uniformly or simultaneously everywhere. Some 
countries are much nearer to the limits of their available water resource qJ.lantities 
than others. Within countries, some river basins are under much more stress than 
others. This means that the socio-political pressures to bring about change in our 
water management arrangements are also not uniform.  In  some places,  people 
perceive a great need for early and  rapid changes, while in other places people 
feel content to continue traditional styles of management. 
The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) has adopted the useful term 
"closure" to mean the condition in which all the accessible water resources in  a 
river basin (or even in a country) are already in use or have been allocated to users. 
In a "closed" or "closing" basin (which means one at or approaching this state) the 
pressures are different; the vested interests of those with use rights, and the likely 
anger of those without, make this a divisive condition, in which negotiations are 
likely to be difficult. It is desirable, therefore, that countries should try to formulate 
their management systems well in advance of that situation, when the attitudes of 
water users are still somewhat relaxed and agreements on sharing and co-operation 
are easier to achieve. 
In recent times the phenomenon of sectoral change has become highly significant. 
This refers to the emergence or growth of new water-USing sectors of the economy, 
espeCially industry and hydropower, and the rapid expansion of others, such as 
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the domestic sector through  urbanisation. These trends  in  the  latter twentieth 
century were particularly noticeable in the developing countries. They were 
accompanied by declines in some traditional sectors such as navigation, and they 
put new pressure on  other traditional  sectors,  especially irrigation, to  improve 
efficiency.  All  of these broad  socio-economic changes  have  put  in  doubt the 
appropriateness of many traditional  processes of allocating water among users, 
but often this has left an unfilled void in the institutional process, where traditional 
customs, although found  inadequate, have  not yet been  replaced. 
Water is not  a  very "transportable" substance,  in comparison to  that other 
economically important liquid, oil. Water flows in rivers according to the natural slope 
of the ground, which forms river basins; and people put it into canals or pipes to 
send it in other directions, sometimes into neighbouring basins. But we do not often 
move it between countries in large ships, like oil, whose price is in the order of a 
thousand times greater, and for which we therefore feel  (rightly or wrongly) that 
we can afford more expensive facilities. This relative lack of transportability means 
that many countries have addressed their water problems separately, rather than 
collaboratively,  and this contributes to the wide variety of policies,  economic 
frameworks, and rules in general, for water management in different countries. 
Countries also have  other reasons for  different perceptions and attitudes about 
co-operation over water. Island countries, and  countries that consist of complete 
river basins,  have a different perspective from those that must share rivers with 
neighbours. Those who share have varied locations: upstream, downstream, or on 
either side of the  shared waterway. These differences of situation  are  apt to 
influence their people's views. 
For all these reasons and many others, countries' experiences of managing water 
and  of managing river basins are very varied. Some of the papers in  this book, 
therefore,  describe specific experiences of individual countries or basins. These 
are taken from countries whose economic and geographical situations are diverse: 
Mexico, France, Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, United States of America, and 
Turkey. Other papers describe experiences on internationally shared river basins: 
the Danube, Rhine, Limpopo, and the Southern African Development Community. 
There are four papers focusing on the special recent experience of South Africa, 
as it replaces former inequitable water laws with  a new one tq reflect its major 
pOlitical  reorientation,  and at the same time takes this opportunity of change to 
bring in  several other principles of modern thinking about water,  with a focus on 
participation by stakeholders, on the river-basin as management unit, on financial 
principles such as "users pay" and "polluters pay;' and on the potential role of access 
to water in addressing social issues such as poverty and gender discrimination. 
The existence of these issues,  and  the South  African  government's use of 
transparent and participatory means in  devising the new framework for 
management, were  major reasons why South  Africa  was  the location for these 
discussions. The venue of the workshop lay in the basin of the Olifants River, one 
of the 19 water management areas into which the new law divides the country. 
The Olifants basin is already under water stress, and there is competition for water 
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access among many groups and for many kinds of use. One of the South African 
papers describes the processes used to develop a new catchment management 
structure to face  such circumstances. 
Because of the diversity of national situations, just discussed,  it  is  not easy to 
find generic principles of management for river basins. Five of the papers here 
attempt to do that,  addressing different fields:  water accounting,  stakeholder 
identification and participation, financing of management, methods of institutional 
assessment, and the extent to which ideas and experiences may be transferable 
between different countries. 
The workshop was attended by about 80 people, coming from 26 countries. This 
amount of expertise was used in three rounds of working group discussions on 
a  range  of widely-felt issues. The  reports made by these working groups are 
assembled in the latter part of the book. 
Charles L  Abernethy 
XVII Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
Acknowledgements 
Four organisations joined together to promote this workshop.  They were the Food 
and Agriculture Centre (ZEL) of the  German Foundation for  International 
Development (DSE: Deutsche Stiftung fOr  Internationale Entwicklung),  based at 
Feldafing near Munich; the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), whose 
headquarters is  in  Sri  Lanka; the Department of Water Affairs (DWAF) of South 
Africa; and the Water Research Commission (WRC), also of South Africa. 
Each of these organisations has developed significant expertise in the area of water 
management analysis and institutional reform in recent years.  IWMI has recently 
opened its new African regional office in South Africa. 
The DSE promoted a workshop on "Strategies for intersectoral water management 
in developing countries: Challenges and consequences for agriculture" at Berlin in 
1996, which provided some of the impetus and some indications of the necessary 
agenda for the Loskop Dam workshop. 
IWMI has undertaken a number of multi-country studies of these issues. Several of 
the papers presented here were generated under two such projects. The "Institutional 
support systems project for sustainable local management of irrigation in water­
short basins," funded by the German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (BMZ) and supervised through the German Agency for Technical Co­
operation (GTZ), facilitated studies in Turkey, Mexico and South Africa.  BMZ also 
provided the support that made the workshop possible.  A "Regional study on 
development of effective water management institutions" was funded by the Asian 
Development Bank, and has involved studies in the People's Republic of China, 
Indonesia, the Philippines,. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Australia and Japan. 
The experience and contributions of the South African sponsors of the meeting are 
different.  South Africa has accumulated in the past decade a special degree of 
hands-on, direct experience of reform, and its difficulties, as well as the optimising 
of procedures for achieving people-centred changes of policy.  The consultative 
processes used in the middle 1990s for framing the republic's new water law were 
widely noticed and admired. The DWAF has been the major implementing agency 
of water reform, and the WRC the main organisation for reviewing and analysing 
the lessons learned. 
Special thanks are due to the 29 authors of papers, and the 80 participants, who 
gave their ideas in the framework of the workshop. 
The organising group is also especially grateful to the DWAF,  whose staff took 
responsibility for logistical arrangements of the workshop. 
Much more now remains to be done, in many countries, and the urgency for water 
reforms is great and is probably increasing.  It may be hoped that the contents of 
this book, derived from this wide set of national and international experiences as 
well as from generic theorising, will be found useful to other countries involved in 
these processes. 
XIX Section  A 
Key-note address 
At the  start of the Workshop on 

16 October 2000, 

the  key-note address was  given  by 

Mr A M Muller 

Director General of the  Department of 

Water Affairs and  Forestry 

Republic of  South  Africa 

The address shows how reforms of water 
policy are an  integral part of social and 
political transformation Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
How National Water Policy is Helping to Achieve South 










1. Introduction: a product of political transition 
The simple goal of South Africa's new democracy was captured in the slogan "a 
better life for aiL" Since the first democratic elections in  1994, the challenge for 
all sectors,  including water,  has been to translate that goal into social reality. 
Policy reform since 1994 has, for obvious reasons of history, been focussed upon 
the promotion of basic human rights and the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and  freedom  throughout the  society.  In  the water sector,  these values 
have had to be given effect within a demanding physical environment as well as 
at a time of dramatic social and political change. As a consequence, it has been 
possible  to  introduce  radical  approaches  in  an  environment  normally 
characterised by a relatively slow pace of change. 
The objective of presenting this paper is to  offer South Africa as  a case study, 
illustrating the  context within  which  South  Africa's  new  water policy has  been 
developed  and,  in  particular,  to  describe the  innovative  approaches and 
instruments which have been developed to reflect the values and principles upon 
which the new society is based. It is hoped that both the process and the specific 
instruments may be  of value in the discussions that follow. 
2.  Historical perspective: the development context 
To understand the approaches taken, it is perhaps helpful to begin with the recent 
past and the vision for the future. South Africa entered a new phase in its history 
with the election of its first non-racial democratic government in  1994. The new 
government was elected on  the  promise of "a better life  for all".  It had a vision 
for South  African society encapsulated in  its  Reconstruction and  Development 
Programme (RDP) which was described as "an integrated programme based on 
the people, that provides peace and security for all and  builds the  nation, links 
reconstruction and development and deepens democracy." 
The RDP  thus emphasised that growth and development are  not two opposing 
goals but  essential  components of a  common  strategy;  that  without an 
improvement in  the quality of life of the majority of South Africans, the political 
conditions for  growth  would  not exist and  that without growth,  the  economic 
conditions needed for an improved quality of life and to sustain the political system 
could not be created. 
The RDP  was thus not primarily about houses, services and education but first 
and foremost about opportunities. It was intended to tackle the development crisis 
3 Muller: National Water Policy and South Africa's Development Vision 
in South Africa that found more than 30 percent of the working population without 
jobs and many without the  basic skills they  need to  be  gainfully employed.  It 
addressed the fact that the most needy people live in rural areas or informal peri­
urban settlements,  often  artificially created  in  areas that offer the  least 
opportunities. 
In the final  analysis, it was about achieving a vision of a South Africa in  which 
people have opportunities to develop their skills and opportunities to use them 
productively to work and earn an  income with which they can  meet their basic 
needs.  It  was  about a vision of a country in  which,  because  there are these 
opportunities, people could live at peace with one another, in dignity and security; 
where, because of our wise management, the environment in which we live, work 
and relax is healthy and pleasant and can be kept so. 
The ambitions of the RDP  were  underpinned by  the adoption of a  new 
constitution. In  the two years following  1994, the whole nation engaged in  the 
process of drafting a Constitution, which  entrenched a Bill of Rights,  including 
extensive social,  economic and  environmental  rights.  It also allocated 
responsibility for the governance of water to government at a national level and 
the function of providing water services to local government. While providing very 
clear direction to government, the Constitution also recognised that social rights 
cannot be realised overnight. The state is required "to take reasonable legislative 
and  other measures,  within  its available  resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights:' 
3. Water management reaches the political crossroads  ... 
The ambitions of the RDP and the requirements of the Constitution would present 
a formidable challenge for any country, the more so for one which has so recently 
emerged from a history of oppression and division, exploitation and deprivation 
which has left South Africa with huge inequalities between extremes of poverty 
and substantial wealth. 
To  address this challenging agenda,  aU  sectors of society have had  to  review 
their poliCies  and  programmes and,  for  the  water sector as in  many,  the 
implications have been dramatic. At this juncture, it is helpful to look further back, 
to get some broader historical context through which to understand the specific 
reforms in the water sector. 
The political transition of  1994 was the culmination of a long process which 
included the colonisation  of South  Africa in  the  17th century and  subsequent 
subjugation of the  indigenous peoples,  its transformation through the South 
African war 100 years ago into an independent.settler state; the transfer of power 
to the  nationalist majority of the  white  minority in  1948, the state's continued 
aggressive and painful exclusion of the majority of the population from political 
(and  economic)  life and  the  inevitable,  but  no  less stressful,  transition to 
democratic government. 
As in all countries, the governance of the water sector over that period reflected 
the political changes in  the  society. Water  management moved  from  the pre­
colonialist collective realm  to  become a publicly regulated resource in terms of 
Roman-Dutch law, and then, under Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and the pressures 
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for settler expansion and economic development, was captured as a private resource 
for the minority. 
In  support of these processes, institutions were developed which increasingly 
intervened in the development of water resources in favour of the white agricultural 
community. Meanwhile, the development of water services, the supply of pure water 
and the provision of sanitation, were devolved to local level. This allowed white 
communities to serve their needs using the financial base of industry and commerce 
in  the white cities while black communities depended on budgetary handouts. It 
ensured an inheritance, in 1994 of profound inequalities whether in access to water 
as a resource or to the domestic services it provides  . 
...  as  water managers seek new legal  instruments to  cross the physical 
watershed 
In parallel with the political developments, another equally important drama was being 
played out in the physical realm. South Africa is a relatively arid country. As in many 
parts of the developing world, its rainfall is also extremely variable and erratic in time 
as is reflected even in  its largest rivers whose total flow can vary ten-fold from one 
year to the next and a further ten-fold from one month to the next. (There was a 
dramatic demonstration of this during the February 2000 floods when two years of 
average flow passed down the Limpopo at Beit Bridge in just eight days.) 
The social and economic development of South African  society was inevitably 
accompanied by a  continued increase in the demands placed on  the  nation's 
capricious water resources. By 1994, almost 50 percent of the rainfall that reaches 
the country's rivers was being captured and used. This is a very high proportion and 
can only be achieved and reliably sustained by means of extensive storage reservoirs 
and transfer systems. 
There is a limit, however, to how far storage and transfer can be taken. While water 
resources are relatively plentiful, the water manager's ~ask is to harness them. We 
build dams to store the flood for the drought, canals, aqueducts and pumping stations 
to move it to where we need it. As the resources are developed (and the floodwater 
becomes too costly or too unreliable to be worth storing) the task is to manage with 
the resources available and within the constraints that are given. That is the stage 
which South Africa has now reached. In physical terms, water resource development 
has reached its own watershed. 
The policy framework and management approaches needed in the two phases, that 
of plenty and that of scarcity, are necessarily different. There is a very real danger 
that  if the transition from  resource development to resource management is not 
provided for,  the instruments used in the first phase may become obstacles to the 
application of instruments appropriate for management in the second phase. 
South Africa's historic approach to water allocation provides a classic case that is 
reflected,  to a  greater or lesser extent,  elsewhere. The riparian  principle,  which 
underlay water allocation, made some sense while the country needed to encourage 
landowners to use water to develop their land and thus the broader economy. It 
provided landowners with  security and guarantees of access to water for use on 
their land. 
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Such a riparian system makes less sense when there is growing competition from 
consumers who are far more productive in their use of water but do not have riparian 
access. Industry generates far more jobs per kilolitre,  the value added by  each 
kilolitre they use is orders of magnitude greater than in agriculture. Yet a riparian 
system gave historic agricultural users (from whose activity society derived relatively 
less benefit) entrenched rights to use the most reliable proportion of the nation's 
water. Further, under  the old law, riparian users were not usually allowed to transact 
water so that it could be applied for more productive purposes, away from the land 
to which it is attached. Other users were compelled to invest in storage and transfer 
schemes. 
Further, as the pressure on the resource grows, it becomes increasingly important 
to focus on activities which indirectly impact upon the availability of water. So, in 
South Africa, controls were placed on pollution (which impacts on "usability"), which 
were in many cases stricter than similar controls in developed countries. Measures 
were introduced for the regulation of commercial afforestation since its impact on 
the water resource had been demonstrated as early as the 1970s. 
This highlights the fact that the post-94 development of South Africa's water policy 
has been driven not just by the demands of equity and social transformation. Even 
without the political change, the basic reality would still have to be addressed; the 
same amount of water has to be shared between a larger number of users and the 
growing needs of our developing society. 
4.  Approaches taken in South Africa's water policy review 
The review of the water policy was guided by a set of basic principles developed 
through an intensive process of consultation. One was that the use of water, in all 
its dimensions, should be for the optimal benefit of society as a whole. The right of 
all  citizens to have access to basic water services was emphasised and it was 
stated that the water required for basic human needs as well as for the environment 
should enjoy priority of use by right, while use of water for all other purposes would 
be subject to authorisation. 
The basic physical realities were addressed by recognising that all water, wherever 
it occurs in the water cycle, is a resource common to all. The principles emphasised 
that resource development and management should, where possible, be done at a 
catchment or regional level. They also further clarified the role and objectives of the 
state in the management of the nation's water and recognised the importance of 
ensuring that the interests of those whose livelihoods depended on water use and 
who had invested to achieve this were protected. They indicated that institutions for 
water management should as far as possible be self-driven with minimum need for 
state intervention. 
Driven by the constitutional distinctions,  the management of water as  a  natural 
resource- crudely,  natural water in  rivers,  lakes and underground-was treated 
differently to the management of water services, the activity of providing a pure 
water supply and using water for sanitation purposes-water in  pipes-although 
the link between the two was noted. 
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The  specific nature of  water services and  the  fact  that responsibility for their 
management was dealt with  in  a different manner to  water resources in  the 
Constitution,  led  to  further considerations. Thus it was  recognised that water 
services must be  regulated  in  a manner consistent with  and supportive of  the 
aims and approaches of the broader local government framework and that, where 
water services are provided in a monopoly situation, the interests of the individual 
consumer and the wider public must be protected and the broad goals of public 
policy promoted. 
Finally,  it was stated that international water resources, specifically shared river 
systems, would be managed in a manner that optimises the benefits for all parties 
in  a spirit of mutual co-operation. Allocations agreed for downstream countries 
would be respected. 
5. Key instruments 
A number of key instruments and concepts were introduced to give effect to these 
principles in policy and legislation: 
the concept of the  Reserve,  through which  water requirements to 
meet basic  human  needs and  sustain  the environment are given 
priority; 
a  system  to classify  water  resources  in  terms  of  desired 
environmental protection  levels which  will  guide the technical 
determination of the environmental reserve; 
a flexible allocation system that allows changes of  use  to achieve 
equity and  meet changing  social  and  economic priorities by 
regulation rather than administration or expropriation, but limits the 
duration of use rights to a maximum of 40 years; 
institutional arrangements to  manage water at a catchment level 
within a national framework articulated in a National Water Strategy; 
a pricing  strategy to  ensure that payment for water use covers 
development, operational costs and resource management costs and 
reflects the value of water while still achieving equity objectives; 
separate  legislation for water resources and  water services, 
distinguishing between the regulation and management of water in 
rivers and water in pipes. 
6. From principle to policy, legislation and implementation 
These principles were translated,  first into a statement of policy (White  Paper 
on  a National Water Policy,  1997) and thence to legislation (Water Services Act 
(1997) and National Water Act (1998». The resource management framework is 
currently being implemented. 
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Considerable effort is currently being expended to  develop the detailed 
instruments required. These  include regulations governing the process of 
registration of existing water uses as a precursor to allocation; the development 
of regulations for  classification of  rivers and other resources to enable the 
determination of the  Reserve.  New institutional arrangements and  the pricing 
framework have also to be established and regulated. 
The basic approach is for water resource management to occur at the catchment 
level,  and  an  institutional framework is being  established for this purpose. But 
the policy recognises the need for such  management to fall  within  a national 
strategy. Based on experience in other countries, provision has been made for a 
national water strategy to provide the overall framework within which catchment 
management can  be carried out and this is currently in  preparation. 
In  the  field  of services,  the  National Water Policy  specifically provided  for a 
distinction to be made between the role of local government (as the authority for 
ensuring access to water services) and that of direct service provision. Legislation 
has also been  passed which  provides for  the  application  of best practice 
instruments such as water services development planning (or facilities planning 
as  it would  be known  in  other countries) in  a manner which  is  integrated with 
broader local government development planning. Technical norms and standards 
as well as approaches to tariff setting are also now regulated. Finally, since the 
services legislation formally enables the participation of private-sector providers, 
provision is  made for these contracts to be  regulated, a delicate task in view of 
the contentious nature of water supply privatisation. 
Given the fact that democratic local government is a new, still fragile institution, 
the focus of the National Department is at this stage on support-through capital 
and technical assistance rather than the enforcement of regulation. 
7. The outcome so far 
The measure of any policy must be the extent to which it successfully achieves 
its objectives. To what extent has desirable economic activity been promoted­
or hindered? Has the state of the environment improved-or deteriorated? Have 
objectives of equity such as access to water and water services been realised­
or has inequity been reinforced? 
A definitive evaluation of such impacts in a field as complex and diverse as water 
can  necessarily only be made over a long period. The preliminary indicators of 
the  response to South Africa's new water policy are however encouraging. 
There  is always the  danger that  far-reaching  policy of  this  nature will  have 
unintended consequences. In particular, it was suggested that the approach taken 
could discourage investment in  critical areas of agriculture and industry, that it 
could foment conflict rather than promote co-operation. 
Happily the  reverse has so far proved to be true. 
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Since 1994, over nine million people, 20 percent of the nation's population, have 
had their access to basic water supply services significantly improved, albeit often 
still to a relatively low standard. Despite the acute  resource shortages in  many 
areas  and  the  residual  conflicts,  access to  water resources to  provide  basic 
services has hardly ever been an  issue. 
Within the  framework of the  policy,  new  partnerships are  being  developed to 
ensure the  expansion  of water services. Two  private concessions  have  been 
awarded  and  others  are .under study  including  one  for Johannesburg,  South 
Africa's premier city. In the (publicly managed) city of Durban, application of new 
approaches made possible under the Water Services Act  has seen free  basic­
needs water supplied without undermining the  financial  viability of the  service 
provider. 
Meanwhile, in the area of water resources, the careful distinction made between 
unacceptable expropriation of  water use  rights  and  the  gradual  regulatory 
deprivation  of  less  productive  uses  seems to  have  been  accepted. There has 
been extensive investment in  private sector water-related projects. Hundreds of 
millions  of  rand  has  been  spent by  private farmers  in  dams and  other 
infrastructure for the expansion of high value irrigation, in vineyards, sub-tropical 
fruit and sugar helped by post-1994 opening of export markets. The switch from 
low value field  crops  to  high  value perennials  is  invariably associated with 
substantial gains in  employment, contributing directly to  government's broader 
development strategies. 
In  addition,  investors  have  often  included a substantial  component of social 
investment, giving access to newly irrigated land or other opportunities to formerly 
disadvantaged communities  as  well  as  using  water more efficiently. This 
investment has been explicitly encouraged by the recognition that investment in 
water infrastructure is an important criterion to be taken into account when water 
allocations are reviewed. 
Innovative approaches are  being used to address water quality problems. The 
multi-million rand Amanzi project, being promoted to treat gold mining wastewater 
to potable quality, has attracted extensive international investor interest. A scheme 
to provide an important Northern Province town with water, and use the treated 
domestic wastewater for other mining  process  purposes,  is  also  under 
consideration.  In  Durban,  a  substantial  investment  has  been  made  in  water 
reclamation, delaying the need for expansions in  river abstractions. 
The continued expansion of the scope of water management to include land use 
activities, which impact on the water cycle,  is also proceeding successfully. The 
plantation forestry industry co-operates actively in  restricting their activity so as 
not to impact negatively on other water users, although it still contests the fairness 
of being the only dry-land water user to be charged for its water use. 
The picture is thus an  encouraging one. 
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8. Conclusions 
For South Africa, political transition has provided a window of opportunity for the 
radical transformation of the country's water policy. In a broader context, it would 
be unwise to propose that the reforms necessary to achieve the goals of water 
security and sustainability should wait for such momentous periods of national 
history. The nature of the policy process is likely to be different in  each national 
context. 
What the South African case does serve to highlight are certain specific principles 
and instruments that may usefully be applied to the management and use of water 
resources in other countries with  resource constraints similar to ours. 
These include recognition of the role  of the state as custodian of the resource, 
as well as of the need to manage water as a unitary resource, while distinguishing 
between service provision and resource management. The systematic recognition 
of the right of access to basic services and of environmental -requirements is also 
critical. In  a country where the resource is close to full  utilisation, the provision 
of a framework that allows for flexibility in allocation between uses must be  put 
in  place if the needs of a changing society are to be  met. 
While some of these issues might not be seen as critical to resource management 
in their own right, there is no doubt that the detailed attention to the provision of 
basic water services contributed substantially to the sector's political  mandate 
and the legitimacy of its resource management proposals. 
Success in achieving water security will depend on effective co-operation through. 
new institutions, as well as the establishment of practical systems to allow both 
environmental protection and the justifiable economic development provided for 
in our Constitution. 
Perhaps the key message for this presentation is that the success or failure of 
South  Africa's  water policy will  depend on  our ability to  address the practical 
challenges imposed on  us by our physical realities in a manner which enables 
us to meet the social imperative of a better life for all. So far,  we can report that 
we  have  used the  window of opportunity provided  by our political transition to 
lay the foundation we need. 
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South Africa's  recent experiences 
The three papers in  this section 
present aspects of changes in  water 
policy and water law,  which  have 
been occurring in  South Africa  in  the 
past decade and  are under active 
development and testing 
The papers describe: 

the overall  legal and policy innovations; 

the consultation processes being 





and the inter-relation of water 

management with equity issues including 

poverty and gender 
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South Africa's water policy is going through a period of rapid changes, following 
the  country's radical political changes of the  early 1990s.  The  paper describes 
the principal aspects of these changes,  which are based on  the  new National 
Water Law of 1998. The law divides the country into  19 Water Management Areas, 
and prescribes processes by which strategies and management institutions will 
evolve  for these Water Management Areas,  using the principle of stakeholder 
participation to  ensure that each such area can develop  its  Institutional and 
management systems to satisfy its own specific situation. The institutional roles 
of Catchment Management Agencies,  Catchment Management Strategies,  and 
Water Users' Associations are explained in  this context. 
1. Introduction 
Change is  not always so exciting. Often change is a scary concept that brings 
with it uncertainty and fear of the unknown. However, change has become part 
and parcel of South Africa and, in many ways, its people see a bright future amidst 
all  the  changes that  have  swept across this beautiful  land. Certainly,  these 
changes will provide improvements to the lives of present and future generations 
of South Africans. 
The National Water Policy, the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and the Water 
Services Act (Act 108 of  1997) are transformational  masterpieces that will  not 
only redress the problems of the past, but will also help to build a better future. 
This is very much embodied in the purpose of the National Water Act,  which is 
to  ensure that the  nation's water resources are protected,  used,  developed, 
conserved,  managed, and controlled in  ways that take into consideration such 
factors as,  inter alia,  meeting the  basic human  needs of  present and future 
generations, promoting equitable access to water, redressing past discrimination, 
facilitating  social  and  economic development,  and protecting  aquatic and 
associated ecosystems. 
The slogan of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) is "Viva water 
pure and clean, Viva forests rich and green". The statement "Viva water pure and 
clean" celebrates the  meaning  of water to  life  and the importance of water to 
South Africa; however, whilst'Celebrating, we  have to consider carefully how we 
use this precious resource, how we ensure that everyone has access to this and 
how we ensure that future generations can also shout "Viva water pure and clean." 
This paper looks at aspects of the National Water Policy and National Water Act 
and how the goals of efficiency, equity and sustainability can be  achieved. 
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2.  Policy and  legal context 
The far-reaching  political  and social changes that swept  across South  Africa 
during the early 1990s only added to the tension caused by the chasm between 
outdated policy and  the  realities of resource  management. With time  it  had 
become very clear that the approaches of the  1956 Water Act,  that of water 
resource development and riparian rights, were not sufficient to meet the rapidly 
changing political,  social,  and  economic environments. Furthermore, our 
understanding of the importance of ecological integrity and the role this plays in 
maintaining resource quality demanded new approaches. It was therefore, high 
time for policy and legislation that was integrative, flexible and more dynamic. 
The White Paper on National Water Policy (DWAF,  1997) set out new integrated 
policy positions for protection, use, development, conservation, management and 
control of South Africa's water resources. It did this in plain English and explained 
how this would be implemented. This remains a remarkable document. 
The National Water Act is often described as an "enabling" piece of legislation. 
It provides little in the way of regulatory procedures, standards and tools which 
will be used for the integrated approaches that were emphasised in the National 
Water Policy. The strength of this approach is that it enables the flexibility that is 
required in  regulating a dynamic world. 
The framework for the integrated management of water resources is provided in 
the National Water Act via water resources strategies. 
3. Water resource strategies 
The  National Water Act provides a  two-tier approach to the  development of 
strategies to facilitate the management of water resources. 
At the national level, the Act provides for the Minister to progressively develop a 
National Water Resource  Strategy (NWRS). This  strategy  must set  out  the 
objectives,  plans,  guidelines and  procedures of the  Minister and  institutional 
arrangements relating to the  protection,  use,  development,  conservation, 
management and control of water resources. The NWRS provides the framework 
within which water will be managed at regional or catchment levels, in 19 defined 
Water Management Areas (WMA)  that were  established  in  October 1999. It 
provides this framework as follows: 
The ecological component, via: 
the Reserve (the water required to maintain ecological sustainability); 
setting out of water conservation and water demand management 
principles; and 
stating objectives for water quality to be achieved. 
The social and economic component, via: 
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the Reserve (the water required for basic human needs); 

international rights and obligations; 

estimates of present and future water requirements; 

stating WMA surpluses and deficits; 

stating the quantity of water available in  each WMA; and 

providing for inter-catchment transfers. 

Integrated management, via: 
objectives for the establishment of institutions; 
determination of the inter-relationships between institutions involved 
in  water resource management; and 
promoting the management of catchments in a holistic and integrated 
manner. 
At a  regional  level,  the  NWA provides for the  progressive development of 
Catchment Management Strategies. The Catchment Management Strategy (CMS) 
must be in harmony with the NWRS and in developing the CMS, the co-operation 
and  agreement of stakeholders and  interested  persons  must  be  sought  with 
regard to water related matters. 
The OMS must set out the strategies, objectives, plans, guidelines and procedures 
for the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of 
water resources in the WMA. As  with the NWRS, the CMS 'also addresses the 
ecological,  social and economic imperatives as  well  as making provision  for 
integrated approaches, as follows. 
The ecological imperatives, via: 
the class of the water resources, the resource quality objectives and 
the requirements of the Reserve; and 
taking into account the geology, climate and vegetation. 
The social and economic imperatives, via: 
considering international obligations; 
taking into account demography, land use and waterworks; 
water allocation plans; and 
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taking into consideration the needs and expectations of existing and 
potential water users, 
Integrated management, via: 
taking into account any relevant national or regional plans prepared 
in terms of any other law; 
enabling the public to participate in managing water resources; and 
setting out the institutions to be established. 
Often,  when  these  strategies  are  discussed,  it  is  said  that they  can  be 
summarised as working towards equity, efficiency and sustainability. In a complex 
way the v<;irious components do.  But,  to try and make the picture Simpler, these 
strategies  are about finding  a  balance between  socio-ecological  needs for 
resource  protection  and  socio-economic needs for  resource development and 
utilisation. by involving stakeholders via various institutional arrangements. 
4. Water management institutions 
The  National Water Act  provides for  the  establishment of  a variety of water 
management institutions. The aim of establishing these institutions is to delegate 
water resources  management to  more regional  and  localised levels,  to  involve 
stakeholders in water resources management and thereby give effect to integrated 
water resources management. 
4.1  Catchment Management AgenCies 
These agencies will be established progressively throughout the country, within 
the Water Management Areas defined by the National Water Resource Strategy. 
Whilst certain water resource  management functions  may  be assigned or 
delegated to these agencies,  there  are  initial  functions that all Catchment 
Management Agencies must perform upon establishment. These include, amongst 
others: 
Playing  a co-ordinating  role  regarding  water-related  activities and 
water management institutions; 
Developing and implementing a Catchment Management Strategy; 
Encouraging public participation. 
A range of organisational models for these agencies will be required to suit the 
differing needs of the various Water Management Areas.  Furthermore.  the 
organisational structure will  depend largely on  the functions that are  assigned 
or delegated to it. Certainly, the structure will need to be sustainable in terms of 
both  human  and  financial  resources. The aim  is  for  Catchment Management 
Agencies is to be focussed and  responsive and  not to be  bureaucratic hurdles. 
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The Governing Board of the Catchment Management Agency will be accountable 
to the  Minister for the  Agency's  performance,  and  will  be  primarily responsible 
for setting the vision,  mission and strategic direction. This Board will  reflect the 
relevant sectoral,  demographic and  gender profiles,  as  well  as  possess the 
appropriate expertise and experience. 
The  Governing  Board  will  ultimately be  responsible for  implementing the 
Catchment Management Strategy. Therefore, this Board  will  be  responsible for 
ensuring that the balance between  socio-ecological  protection  and  socio­
economic development is  maintained in  the Water Management Area. This will 
mean that the Governing Board will have to ensure, via the staff of the Catchment 
Management Agency,  that stakeholders have their say  with  regard to resource 
protection and  resource development and  that the  strategy reflects their needs 
and requirements. 
4.2 Catchment Management Committees 
The National Water Act provides specifically for the establishment of committees 
by the Catchment Management Agency "to perform any of its functions within a 
particular area or to  advise  it."  It  also  provides for  powers to  be  delegated to 
Committees. Catchment Management Committees provide an  important means 
by which Catchment Management Agencies can broaden their management and 
technical capacity. They also provide a mechanism through which a broader range 
of stakeholders can  be  included in  water resource management. 
4.3 Water User Associations 
A Water User Association (WUA) is a statutory body established by the Minister 
in terms of the National Water Act. WUAs are, in effect, co-operative associations 
of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their 
mutual benefit. 
The broad  role  of a WUA  is to enable people within a community to pool their 
resources  (money,  person-power and  expertise)  to carry out water-related 
activities more  effectively. The  establishment of a WUA  must also  assist  in 
achieving the purposes of the Act. WUAs, firstly, enable members to benefit from 
addressing local needs in terms of local priorities and resources. Secondly, they 
provide a mechanism through  which  a CMA (or the  Minister)  can  devolve the 
implementation of aspects of the Catchment Management Strategy to the local 
level. 
WUAs will  normally operate at a localised level.  However there will  be  exceptions, 
such  as  when  the  length  of a river managed  by  a WUA is  so  long  that  it  relates 
more to  a regional  than  a local  interest. A WUA  may  be  concerned with  a single 
purpose, such  as controlling  recreational activities on  a river or providing water for 
emerging farmers. Alternatively, a WUA may be multi-sectoral, dealing with a variety 
of water uses within its area of operation. WUAs may derive their functions through 
a process of delegation from the Minister or the CMA. The WUA is accountable, for 
exercising a delegated function, to whoever gave the specific delegation. 
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The DWAF has for some time been busy with a process of transforming Irrigation 
Boards which,  constituted  under the auspices of the  1956 Water Act,  were 
essentially exclusive in their nature. Typically,  these Boards did not include the 
participation of previously disadvantaged groups in the management of the water 
resources, and also had limited human and financial support. The transformation 
and establishment of these WUAs with  regard to the participation of previously 
disadvantaged groups have certain constraints and difficulties that need to  be 
overcome. One of many  issues that need  to addressed  is  ensuring  that  the 
historically disadvantaged become empowered sufficiently to have their say and 
not be overpowered by those who are economically stronger. Much is to be done, 
also, in bringing people together so as to learn and understand each other's needs 
and requirements. It is strongly believed that institutions such as WUAs can play 
an  important role  in  ensuring that water resource management becomes more 
integrated. 
4.4 Institutional linkages 
Naturally one  of the questions that arises when  looking at these various Water 
Management Institutions  is,  how  do they  relate to  each other and  who is 
responsible for what?  For sound, and  maybe obvious,  reasons the  relationship 
between a CMA and DWAF is likely to be a very close one. DWAF is responsible 
for the development 'and  implementation of the National Water Resources 
Strategy,  whereas the  CMA  will  be  responsible  for the  development and 
implementation of the CMS within its Water Management Area. The Minister is 
ultimately accountable for the  management of the nation's water resource. He 
or she must therefore ensure that CMAs carry out their functions effectively. 
A WUA,  together with other water management institutions and water services 
institutions, will be responsible for executing the Catchment Management Strategy 
at a local level. 
Therefore, the establishment of these water management institutions will provide 
a more effective conduit for stakeholders to voice their needs and requirements 
for socio-ecological protection and socio-economic development. 
5. Co-operative governance and public participation-a road to 
sustainability 
CMAs will manage activities impacting on  the water resources of their WMA.  In 
doing so they will  have  to actively work with  these various water management 
institutions as  well  as other national departments,  provincial  and  local 
government,  non-governmental organisations  and  so  on.  Co-operative 
governance will have to be the order of the day to enable successful integrated 
water resource management. 
The  various  dimensions of  integration  present an  exciting challenge to  water 
management institutions as  South  Africa's  environmental,  water and  land-use 
legislation and administration is typically characterised by fragmentation  (Gorgens 
et ai, 1998). However, the Constitution provides that all spheres of government and 
all  organs  of the  state must co-operate with  each  other in  mutual  trust  and  good 
faith  by co-ordinating their actions and legislation with each other (DWAF,  1997). 
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Therefore,  co-operative  governance  is  not  only  a policy matter,  it  is  in  fact 
constitutionally mandated (see  Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The constitution mandates co-operative governance and 
integration, and this is carried through into the National Water Act 
Dent  (2000)  made  the  pertinent observation that  successful  integrated  water 
resource management will require interaction between individuals, organisations 
and disciplines, thereby enabling the collective, timeous, wise and cost-effective 
assessment of proposed, present and past actions. Therefore, integration is also 
about interaction and therefore, the need for co-operative governance and public 
participation is carried through to the NWA via the water resource strategies. 
The NWA  provides a number of legal requirements for public participation in  a 
number of sections throughout the Act. Words often used include: co-operation 
and agreement; public to participate; consult with any persons or organisation; 
co-operation and consensus; and community participation. However, despite the 
legislative  requirement,  integrated water resource  management will  not be 
achieved  without  public participation  and,  therefore,  it  should  not  be  seen  as 
regulatory "add-ons". This is supported by Jendroska (1998) who contends that 
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"public control,  enhanced by transparency,  is  not only considered 
important; it is,  in relative terms,  the least expensive of all instruments 
for implementing environmental policies and enforcing environmental 
legislation." 
Water resource issues are complex and large amounts of technical information 
are often required to assist the process. Further, due to the complexity of issues 
many stakeholders are typically involved. Some of these stakeholders are lay 
people, some are experts. Often these people see things very differently. Certainly 
the public participation and stakeholder involvement processes have to take into 
account these dynamics (DWAF,  2000). The processes  may be  awkward, time­
consuming and expensive, but Behr (1999) noted that without exception all models 
indicate that involving stakeholders achiev:es  greater consensus about methods 
for appropriately managing the environmenfHe went on to note that the success 
of these processes depends on identifying stakeholders,  involving them in 
informational and decision-making processes, and ultimately implementing 
programmes in co-operation with community groups.  . 
However, the respons.ibility for the success of this approach does not just lie at 
the door of central government. Zazueta (1995) pOinted out that civil society ,also 
has a responsibility and that it needs to. move beyond the paradigm of critiCising 
government action,  or inaction,  aflc{botld its own capacities to propose viable 
options that address the problems they  articulate. They must also learn how to 
work together better to generate a broader range of choices and options10r people 
to assess as participatory democracies evolve. 
It is, therefore, the Ilolicy of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to strive 
for integrated water resource management arm-in-~rm with its stakeholders; both 
aware of each other's importance. For yvithout each other we will not be able to 
ensure that our water resources are managed in a manner that is sustainable, both 
in -terms of the environment and of process. If we ensure that the sustainability of 
the resource is ensured by means of Resource Quality Objectives, and if we ensure 
that the approaches of involving stakeholders in water resource management are 
also sustainable, then as a "team" we can work towards ensuring that the allocatable 
water resources of South Africa are used equitably and efficiently. 
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Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
Mpumalanga Regional Office, Nelspruit, South Africa 
South Africa's Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)  started the 
process of establishing a Catchment Management Agency (CMA) in  the Olifants 
Water Management Area (WMA) in March  1998. The  emphasis during the early 
stages was  on getting representatives  from  water users in the  catchment,  and 
sharing information on the new water legislation (specifically related to the proposed 
catchment management agencies) and existing DWAF projects in the catchment. 
At that stage DWAF already identified that a special effort would have to be made 
to involve emerging farmers and potential water users through water related and 
water unrelated community structures. Such an effort was taken forward in  1999/ 
2000 with  the appointment of consultants to identify and brief these users and 
potential users before meetings,  and to  assist them in attending the relevant 
meetings. The  consultants would also assist DWAF in establishing suitable 
structures for drafting the proposal to the Minister of  DWAF for establishing a CMA 
in the Olifants, assist in building capacity of participants, prepare the proposal to 
the Minister and manage the project up to the formal establishment of the Olifants 
CMA. 
During the process frustrations regarding lack of water (domestic supply, irrigation 
supply) were prevalent. Those were noted but DWAF was of the opinion that they 
could not be addressed through the project but would get high priority when the 
strategy would be developed as part of the next phase of the management of the 
Olifants  water resource  where all could then  participate. Concerns  were  also 
referred to  relevant sections in DWAF where appropriate. 
A smaller team of consultants started the establishment of a small-scale irrigation 
farmers forum. They started the process by having nine workshops throughout the 
catchment where emphasis was put on getting the expectations of the participants 
and then briefly looking at existing structures and how those could be used as 
vehicles for participation of the people in the CMA process, and in the longer term, 
as formalised structures where small-scale farmers could be represented to get 
their needs addreSSed. The expectations mentioned centred around getting water 
(access  to  drinking water and water for domestic use,  water for agricultural 
purposes) and then using it efficiently and effectively (assistance from government 
in providing water and sanitation, and  agriculture-related finances, equipment, land, 
training,  market information,  etc.). This now has to go forward. 
The approach used during the process was  to get the public involved through two 
rounds of  public meetings held in the five sub-catchments in the WMA. Consultants 
familiar with the area assisted in identifying relevant stakeholders and assisted them 
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(\j Ligthelm: Establishing a Catchment Management Agency 
representatives who could bring the perspective of the users during the drafting 
of the proposal. The idea was to work with a single smaller group of  people (the 
OHfants  Reference Group) who would participate in the drafting of the proposal 
and then give feedback,  to  the people they represent and to  the team drafting 
the proposal. Other components of  the process included discussions with a DWAF 
Reference Group (established because the process is so new), a review by IWMI, 
and the  establishment of an advisory committee to  advise the  Minster on the 
composition of the proposed CMA  governing Board. 
A  proposal is being drafted,  containing the proposed name and water 
management area; description of the significant water resources in the WMA and 
information about the existing protection.  use,  development.  conservation, 
management and control of those  resources; proposed functions;  funding; 
feasibility of proposed CMA in respect of technical,  financial and administrative 
matters; and details on the consultation already undertaken and the result of the 
consultation. 
As a consequence of the deliberations on the functions that a CMA  would do, 
but also when discussing "where" and "how" (through  which structures)  water 
users and interested parties would participate.  the proposed structures to  be 
established for future water resource management were discussed. These would 
include a Governing Board; Regional Catchment Management Committees; Task 
Committees and an Operational. Technical and Social Support structure. Where 
funding is concerned. the idea is that the costs associated with the functioning 
of the CMA  would be paid by the water users according to the policy explained 
in the National Pricing Strategy. Provision is made in the strategy for subsidising 
poor water users.  Details on  financial support from  government is still being 
discussed. 
A new institlltion is thus being developed for management of the water resources 
in the Olifants WMA.  Water users and other interested parties in the WMA  would 
be part of this institution to which the responsibility for WRM could be delegated 
where possible and appropriate. 
Acronyms used: 
CBOs:  Community Based Organisations 
CMA:  Catchment Management Agency 
DWAF:  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
GB:  Governing Board of the CMA 
NGOs;  Non-Governmental Organisations 
NWA:  National Water Act,  1998 (Act 36 of  1998) 
WMA:  Water Management Area 
WRM:  Water Resource Management 
WUA:  Water User Association 
24 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
1. Introduction 
South Africa went through major political changes in 1994 with the first democratic 
elections being held. Since then radical changes have been made in promulgation 
of new  or amended legislation to give effect to the  political changes. The new 
water legislation  reflected  the changes that  have  to take  place  to equal the 
imbalances created previously and to lay the foundation for a society based on 
democratic values,  social justice and  fundamental  human  rights.  Significant 
additional changes were also made in how water resource management (WRM) 
would be done. All new requirements were reflected in the purpose of the National 
Water Act (NWA), promulgated in 1998 (Box 1). 
Box 1:  Purpose of the National Water Act, 1998 (section 2) 
The purpose of the  Act  is  to  ensure that the  nation's water resources 
are protected, used,  developed, conserved, managed and controlled in 
ways which take into account amongst other factors the following: 
(a) 	 Meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations; 
(b) 	 Promote equitable access to water; 
(c) 	 Redressing the  results of past racial and gender discrimination; 
(d) 	 Promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water in the 
public interest; 
(e) 	 Facilitating social and economic development; 
(f) 	 Providing for growing demand for water use; 
(g) 	 Protecting aquatic and associated ecosystems and their biological 
diversity; 
(h) 	 Reducing and preventing pollution and degradation of water resources; 
(i)  Meeting international obligations; 
U)  Promoting dam safety; 
(k) 	 Managing floods and droughts; 
and for achieving this purpose, to establish suitable institutions and  to 
ensure that they  have  appropriate community,  racial  and gender 
representation. 
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Slogans used by the  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)  when 
administering and implementing the act are "Ensuring some for all forever"  and 
"Viva water pure and clean:' The words "efficiency", "equity", "sustainability" and 
"representativity" give the essence of the purpose of the act. 
An important new concept contained in the NWA, 1998, is the establishment of 
catchment management agencies (CMAs) within delineated water management 
areas (WMAs). One of the main objectives for the establishment of the CMAs 
would be to provide institutions where stakeholders can  participate in  the 
management of the water resource. 
Some of the principles and objectives of relevance to new envisaged institutions 
as decided early on in the process when the new water law was drafted are shown 
in  Box 2. 
Box 2:  Fundamental principles and objectives for a new 
water law in South Africa: water institutions (OWAF, 1997) 
Principle 22:  The institutional framework for water management 
shall as far as possible be simple,  pragmatic and 
understandable. It shall be self-driven and minimise 
the necessity for state intervention. Administrative 
decisions shall be subject to appeal. 
PrinCiple 23:  Responsibility for the development,  apportionment 
and management of available water resources shall, 
where possible and appropriate, be delegated to a 
catchment or regional level in such a manner as to 
enable interested parties to participate. 
Principle 24:  Beneficiaries of the water management system shalf 
contribute to the cost of its establishment and 
maintenance on an equitable basis. 
The boundaries of the WMAs were established through legislation in  October 
1999 and are indicated in  Figure 1. The Olifants is one of these 19 areas (WMA 
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The definition of a WMA as contained in the NWA,  1998, is given in  Box 3. 




"water management area" is an  area established as a management 
unit in the national water resource strategy within which a catchment 
management agency will  conduct protection,  use,  development, 
conservation, management and control of water resources. 
2. The process 
2.1  Initial and later process 
The  process to establish the  CMA started in  March  1998 when  the  idea was 
deliberated at a joint meeting of committees established previously in 1994. These 
committees  were  co-ordinating  and  technical  advisory committees for the 
Middelburg and  Witbank dams and  the  Klipspruit  River and  consisted  of the 
following stakeholders: DWAF, mining houses, individual mines, power generation 
(Eskom),  industry,  city councils and  government departments. An  interim task 
team was formed to take the process of water resources management (including 
the  establishment of the CMA) forward in  the catchment and  the  first meeting 
was  to  be  convened  by the  Olifants  River  Forum.  This was  an  existing  body 
creating awareness on river management with the mines and nature conservation 
(Kruger National Parks) as the main participants. 
The task team focussed on  getting a representative group of people together 
with the main aim of setting up the CMA. Various meetings were held with different 
stakeholders where  information was shared on  the main  aim  and to get input 
from them. 
During the process it  became apparent that a special effort had to be  made to 
involve civil society at large and emerging farmers or potential new farmers. This 
transpired as large areas of the WMA were part of the former homelands where 
very little services were provided and limited agricultural development took place. 
Newly elected transitional  local councils  struggled to provide these services 
immediately and  conflict was  also created between them  and the  traditional 
authorities in the areas, on this and other matters. All newly elected parties and 
existing old  structures thus  had  to  become  part of  the  process for the 
establishment of the CMA. 
The DWAF decided to fund the process for the establishment of the CMA and to 
appoint consultants to assist with getting representative committees in place that 
could draft the proposal. The latter is a requirement of the NWA when establishing 
CMAs. 
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In May 1999 a team of consultants were appointed to assist DWAF with the above 
and the establishment of the governing board-the first body to be appointed by 
the Minister when establishing the CMA. The team consisted of managers of the 
project,  experts on  the  water use and  impacts associated  with  mining  and 
irrigation, people with experience in agricultural use of water by emerging farmers, 
facilitation  of public meetings and  social aspects.  Two  newly developed 
consultants,  Bavumile  Community  Development  Initiative  and  KMI 
Communication, consisting of people who are very familiar with the catchment, 
were part of the team. 
Important elements of the later process are: 
establishing a representative stakeholder reference group; 
drafting of the proposal for the establishment of the CMA; 
discussing the  process with  a DWAF  reference group-in view of 
the implementing the new act where all the supporting policies and 
legislation are not yet developed; 
reviewing  of the CMA process-reviewed in  terms  of international 
and the new national developments. 
To  get a representative  stakeholder group,  an  existing group of stakeholders 
(established as  part of the  consultative process to determine the Olifants river 
ecological reserve) was expanded.  For the latter, public meetings were held in 
five areas  in  the  WMA (the  boundaries  of  sub-catchment areas were  used to 
determine the five areas). 
The whole process is shown in  Figure 3. 
2.2 Stakeholder identification and participation 
As mentioned, existing structures were involved in the process and included the 
DWAF advisory committees in the Upper Olifants catchment and the Olifants River 
Forum.  Other existing  structures that were11  contacted  to  nominate 
representatives  for the  process  included  the  irrigation  boards,  water boards, 
transitional local councils, district councils, traditional authorities, NGOs and the 
South African National Civic Association. Other civil society structures contacted 
included Community Based Organisation (CBOs) and the youth. 
Meetings were also held with different sectors and information was shared in an 
informal and formal  manner when people were contacted for meetings. People 
who were not familiar with the new process were briefed beforehand and in later 
instances pre-meetings  were  held  if  people felt that they could  not participate 
meaningfully due to lack of understanding or inability to attend previous meetings. 
Material used  in  the  process included workbooks (documents prepared for the 
workshops containing information and "exercises" that would be done during the 
workshops), newsletters, letters and press releases. 
30 Intersectoral Management ofRiver Basins 
Figure 3:  Process followed for the establishment of the Olifants CMA 
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Various  methods  were  used  during  meetings  to  enable  people to  participate. 
These included discussions in  smaller groups on  identified topics and plenary 
sessions. Translations were provided in  the public meetings. 
2.3 Small-scale farmer forum 
A special effort is being made to involve small-scale farmers in the process. The 
issues surrounding their involvement are touched on  in the next section. These 
farmers often do not yet have access to irrigation water and are not organised 
into boards or water user associations. They thus have to be contacted almost 
on an individual baSis.  It was decided to try to assist them to form a forum that 
could  then  nominate  people to  act as  spokespersons during  the  CMA 
establishment  process.  The questions  stated  in  Box 4 were  put  as terms of 
reference to the consultants who assisted in the process. 
This process has just started and only one round of workshops has been held 
throughout the catchment. During the workshops an initial effort has been made 
to obtain answers to the questions posed in the terms of reference (Box 4). This 
process will be taken forward during 2001. 
BOX 4:  Small-scale farmer forum 
Do they exist? 

Where are they? 

What are their current activities? 

How could they be defined? 

Are they interested in forming a forum? 

What functions could it perform? 

What would be the structure and functions of the forum? 

Would they require a budget? 

Transport was organised and paid for,  for people who could not afford or whose 
constituent could not afford to pay for it. 
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3. Issues 
3.1  Representation 
A major question asked during the process is  how do you  identify and  involve 
potential water users in the process. The inequality in South Africa is so extensive 
that new water users will probably have to emerge with time. These potential users 
will  probably come from the civil society and small-scale sectors and that was 
also why so much effort was put into involving them. The CMA would probably 
be one of the main vehicles through which the NWA would be implemented and 
its purpose fulfilled. 
Another question raised was to what extent should people at grass roots  level 
be involved in the process. Again the idea was to involve people if they expressed 
interest and to concentrate from the DWAF's side on  existing structure such as 
local  municipalities, civil organisations (SANCO), traditional leaders and CBOs 
for nominating representatives. A special effort was made in the specific case of 
small-scale farmers to  go to grass roots to get  representation  and spread the 
message. 
Another concern especially of DWAF is that by far the largest volume of water is 
still used by white-owned companies and farmers. These structures are also well 
organised around water usage and thus also well represented. They are also well 
positioned to participate in  processes. 
3.2 Problem to participate meaningfully: awareness, capacity-building 
and empowerment 
The  public generally has little knowledge on  water resource  management and 
legislation. They,  however,  now have the  opportunity to  partiCipate  in  the 
management of this  resource.  Thus,  there  is  a  huge  need for awareness, 
empowerment and capacity-building in general. 
Many of the  existing water users are well  established and  have the means to 
protect their interests well, while new users are still in a disadvantaged position. 
One of the main challenges facing DWAF would be to ensure that especially the 
previously disadvantaged people could participate meaningfully-peoples' voices 
must be heard and their participation must be  effective and influential. 
3.3 General 
There are still extensive conflicts, racism, lack of transformation and inequalities 
in  South Africa in  general. Examples of such conflicts are given in  Box 5. 
33 Ligthe/m: Establishing a Catchment Management Agency 
Box 5:  Examples of conflicts 
people who have water (and the associated improved quality 
of life), those who are in the process of getting water and 
those that do not yet have it; 
conflicts between traditional or tribal authorities and newly 
elected local councils or municipalities; 
conflicts between  communities  and newly elected local 
councils or municipalities; 
conflicts between water service providers (or non-providers) 
and communities; 
conflicts between water users and government departments 
on non-delivery of services in  general,  etc 
Not even people's basic needs  regarding  water and sanitation are fulfilled. 
Understandably, therefore a lot of tension is created when people are involved 
in water related projects. 
Some water users want to get the best deal possible for themselves in the process 
(at the cost of other water users). 
3.4 Other issues 
Other issues identified during the process included: 
an  urgent and  serious need  for water for especially  irrigation 
purposes for previously disadvantaged farmers 
water users do not want to  register and  pay the water use 
management charge (see point 4.6) 
tourism as a sector is not contributing to the water use management 
charge as a water "user" at this point in time and the other sectors 
feel  that they benefit financially by using the "goods and services" 
provided by the Olifants River 
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4. The proposal 
4.1 	Introduction 
The proposal is now under drafting (DWAF, 2000). Section 77 of the NWA contains 
the requirements on what should be contained in a proposal for the establishment 
of a CMA. The information contained in the section is provided in  Box 6. 
Box 6:  Proposal for the establishment of a CMA (NWA, 
section 77) 
77(1) A proposal to establish a CMA must contain'at least: 
(a) 	 a proposed name and a description of the proposed 
water management area of the agency; 
(b) 	 a description of the significant water resources in the 
proposed WMA,  and  information about the existing 
protection,  use,  development,  conservation, 
management and control of those resources; 
(c) 	 the proposed functions  of the CMA,  including 
functions to be assigned and delegated to it; 
(d) 	 how the proposed CMA will be funded; 
(e) 	 the  feasibility  of the  proposed  CMA in  respect  of 
technical, financial and administrative matters; and 
(f) 	 an indication whether there has been consultation in 
developing the  proposal  and  the  results  of  the 
consultation, 
(2) 	The  Director-General  may  assist a person to  develop 
such a proposal. 
4.2 Description of Olifants WMA 
Salient detail on the Olifants WMA is that 
it covers an  area of 54,388 km2 
it has a popuiation of about 3,400,000 
it had a water demand of 
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1,135.2 million m3 per annum  in  1995 and 
1, 375.2 million m3 per annum have been predicted for 2010 
it is a highly water-stressed catchment and has to import high-quality 
water from  the  Usutu (a  neighbouring catchment)  for power 
generation 
the catchment is highly developed 
pollution and  water quality problems arise from  mining  activities, 
industries, power generation and agriculture use of water 
another feature  is  that the lower part of the WMA forms  part of  a 
national park-the Kruger  National  Park-that is  a major tourist 
attraption in  South Africa 
it is an  international river-the Olifants flows into Mozambique 
4.3 Issues identified 
The proposal identifies the following major issues that DWAF already faces and 
that the new CMA when established, will also have to address: 
The WMA's resources will be  fully utilised by 2010. Strategies will 
have to  be  developed to address the  growing demand and  the 
imbalances evident throughout the WMA. These could include ­
Re-allocation of water amongst users; 
Rigorous management of demand; 
Importation of water from other basins 
The greatest growth will be in  urban demand, which is  predicted to 
increase from  12 percent to 17 percent of total demand. 
New irrigation allocations for emerging farmers will have to be done. 
The WMA is already highly regulated with 30 large dams and 2,500 
small dams. There is already a problem in  maintaining flows in the 
lower region of the WMA during winter and droughts. 
Water quality issues include point and diffuse pollution from mining, 
industrial and agricultural activities. Pollution includes high salinity, 
high concentrations of metals, low pH.  Poor land use practices are 
resulting in high silt loads in some areas in the catchment. 
Erosion and over-grazing occur in various parts of the catchment. 
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4.4 Functions: Water resources management 
The initial functions of CMAs are described in section 80 of the NWA, 1998, and 
are provided in  Box 7. 
7: Initial functions of CMAs (NWA. section 80) 
Subject to Chapter 2 and section 79, upon establishment of a CMA, 
initial functions of a CMA are: 
(a) 	 to investigate and advise interested persons on the protection, 
use, development, conservation, management and control of 
the water resources in its WMA; 
(b) 	 to develop a catchment management strategy; 
(c) 	 to  co-ordinate the related activities of water users and of the 
water management institutions within its WMA: 
(d) 	 to promote the co-ordination  of  its  implementation with the 
implementation of any applicable development plan established 
in terms of the Water Services Act, 1997 (Act 108 of 1997); and 
(e) 	 to promote community participation  in  the protection,  use, 
development,  conservation,  management and  control  of the 
water resources in  its water management area. 
Schedule 3 of the NWA,  1998, gives the powers which may be exercised and 
duties to be performed by CMAs on assignment or delegation. These are briefly 
given in  Box 8. 
Box 8:  Powers which may be exercised and duties to be 
performed by CMAs on assignment or delegation 
(NWA, Schedule 3) 
Power to  manage,  monitor,  conserve  and  protect 
resources and to implement catchment management 'Otr:"t.,ni",,,,, 
CMAs may make rules to regulate water 
CMAs may require establishment of management systems 
CMAs may require alteration to waterworks 
CMAs may  temporarily control,  limit or prohibit use 
during periods of water shortage 
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In  practice this also includes that CMAs can issue licences for water use and 
control  potential pollution sources through enforcement of development of 
Integrated Water Management Plans,  implementation of best management 
practices,  participating with  other government departments in  evaluating 
Environmental  Management  Programmes  and  Environmental  Impact 
Assessments. 
Another challenge will be for the CMA to actively assist DWAF in the protection 
of the resources as explained in Chapter 3 of the NWA. This entails determining 
and giving effect to the reserve, and determining and ensuring that the class of 
the water resource is  maintained. 
The definition of the reserve is provided  in  Box 9  and  the description of the 
classification of water resources and resource quality objectives given in Box 10. 
Box 9: Reserve means the quantity and quality of water 
required (NWA, section 1 [xviii]) 
(a) 	 to satisfy basic human  needs by  securing basic water supply,  as 
prescribed under the Water Services Act,  1997 (Act 108 of 1997), for 
people who are now or who will, in the reasonably near future, be: 
(i) 	 relying upon; 
(ii)  taking water from; or 
(iii) 	being supplied from the relevant water resource; and 
(b) 	 to protect aquatic ecosystems in  order to secure 
sustainable development and use of the relevant water 
eClolo'OI(~all 
Box 10: Classification of water resources and resource quality 
objectives (NWA, Chapter 3 part 2) 
...  the Minister is required to use the classification system established in Part 
1 to determine the class and resource quality objectives of all or part of water 
resources considered to be significant. The purpose of the resource quality 
objectives is to establish clear goals relating to the quality of the relevant water 
resources.  In  determining resource quality objectives a balance must be 
sought between the need to protect and sustain water resources on the one 
hand, and the need to develop and use them on the other. Provision is made 
for preliminary determination of the class and resource quality objectives of 
water resources before the formal classification system is established. Once 
the class of a water resource and the resource quality objectives have been 
determined they are binding on all authorities and institutions when exercising 
any power or performing any duty under this Act. 
4.5 Structure 
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The structure proposed is in line with what is required in the new legislation and 
guidelines already developed, but has not been tested in practice. The CMA would 
consist of: 
A Governing  Board  (GB)  consisting of  about  12  members. The 
members of this  board  have to  be  appointed by the  Minister who 
will do so with the object of "achieving a balance among the interests 
of water users, potential water users, local and provinCial government 
and environmental interest groups" (section 81 (1) of NWA, 1998). 
Regional Catchment Management Committees. The thinking at this 
point in  time  is  that there should  be  five  such committees,  one  in 
each of the five sub-catchments of the WMA. The different water use 
sectors of that sub-catchment would  mainly be  represented there. 
These committees have to be established by the GB  and can then 
perform any of the board's functions within a particular WMA.  It can 
also be established in an advisory capacity (section 82(5) of NWA, 
1998). 
Task Committees. These committees should also be established by 
the GB to perform specific functions (see previous point). Should the 
GB decide to delegate a power to such a committee it must consist 
only of members of the GB or employees of the CMA. A power to 
authorise the  use of water can  only be  delegated to a committee 
consisting of three or more members of its GB  (sections 82(5) and 
86 of NWA,  1998), 
Operational and technical support structure (staff). This part of the 
structure would  constitute the  employees of the  CMA and  would 
consist of the chief executive officer (CEO), executive and other staff 
required  to  do the  initial  and  delegated  or assigned functions  as 
appropriate. 
4.6 Funding 
The NWA,  1998, provides for water use charges to be  levied for the funding of 
the direct and  related costs of water resources management, development and 
use (NWA, Chapter 5).  Only the water resource management charge that could 
be used for the funding of water resource management is considered at this point 
in time when determining whether it would  be feasible to establish the Olifants 
CMA.  The functions that could be  funded from this charge are described in  "A 
Pricing Strategy for Raw Water Use Charges" (Government of South Africa, 1999) 
and  can include functions  performed by the  DWAF and/or management 
institutions exercising delegated or assigned powers under the NWA. 
Until such time as CMAs are established, the water use charge would  have to 
fund water resource management services being provided by DWAF. 
Box 11  explains the purpose of the levying of water use charges as explained in 
the NWA. 
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Box 11:  Financial provisions 

(NWA, Introduction to Chapter 3 and Part 1) 

Chapter 3: 	 This Chapter deals with the measures to finance the provision of 
water resource  management services as  well  as  financial  and 
economic measures to support the  implementation of strategies 
aimed at water resource protection, conservation of water and the 
beneficial use of water. 
Part 1:  In terms of Part 1 the Minister may from time to time, after public 
consultation, establish a pricing strategy which may differ among 
geographical areas, categories of water users or individual water 
users.  The  achievement  of  social  equity  is  one  of  the 
considerations in  setting differential charges. Water use charges 
are to be used  to  fund  the  direct and  related  costs  of water 
resource management,  development and  use,  and  may also be 
used to achieve an  equitable and efficient allocation of water.  In 
addition,  they may also be  used  to ensure compliance with 
prescribed standards and water management practices according 
to the user pays and polluter pays principles. Water use charges 
will be used as a means of encouraging reduction  in  waste,  and 
provision  is  made for incentives for effective and  efficient water 
use. Non-payment of water use will attract penalties, including the 
possible restriction or suspension of water supply from waterworks 
or of an authorisation to use water. 
A CMA must be funded from the levies mentioned above,  money appropriated 
by  Parliament and  money obtained from  any  lawful source for the  purpose of 
exercising powers and carrying out its duties in terms of the NWA. 
At the time of presenting this paper, the possible sectoral charges for the Olifants 
CMA have not been determined. The following information is compiled to assist 
in determining this charge: 
total existing water requirement for each sector and within the five 
sub-catchments; 
the assurance of supply associated with each sectoral use; 
the envisaged total budget needed to exercise original and delegated 
or assigned functions. 
An example of annual sectoral charges set for a WMA in terms of the raw water 
pricing strategy is given in Table  1. 
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Table 1:  Example of annual sectoral charges set for a WMA in  terms 












O.83c/m  0.83c/m  O.54c/m  0.49 elm 
Note: 1 South African cent", 0.13 US  cents  (October 2000) 
5. The way forward 
The proposal being prepared will be submitted to the Department and the Minister 
of DWAF in early 2001. The evaluation process will take about a year, after which 
the governing board will be appointed by the Minister. A separate parallel process 
will also have to be followed as the lVIinister has to be advised by an  advisory 
committee on  whom  he  should  appoint to the GB (section  81 (3)  of the  NWA, 
1998). This process will be initiated as soon as  more clarity is received on what 
is required. 
The Mpumalanga Regional  Office will  also  start the  process of drafting the 
catchment management strategy for the WMA during the second half of 2001. 
The intention is to distinguish between the process of drafting the strategy and 
the content of the strategy itself. A lot of effort will go into a preparation phase 
during which  stakeholders will  be  re-identified  where  necessary,  roles  and 
responsibilities of stakeholders will be determined, methods will  be developed 
to  ensure  proper two-way communication  between  water users and  their 
representatives on relevant structures drafting the strategy. During this stage key 
performance indicators will also be decided on for the drafting process. 
Another key objective would be to chart the drafting process and determine what 
would be decided by whom and when. 
The drafting of the strategy will probably occur within different phases ­
determine a vision for the catchment 
re-visit and re-identify water resource management issues 
determine strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for WRM 
in the WMA 
determine broad prioritised WRM  objectives for the WMA, 
catchments and sub-catchments regarding 
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situation assessment (DWAF,  2001); 
foundation strategies; 
supporting strategies; and 
integration between the above. 




The CMS then has to be  submitted to  the Minister of DWAF for approval after 
which it can be implemented. 
The CMA establishment process moves through different stages of participation 
of  the  public in  water  resource  management,  starting with  fairly  informal 
discussions, progressing into the establishment of the GB and other components 
of  the  CMA,  through to  ultimately having  a  high  level  of  awareness and 
participation at all  levels in  WRM. 
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Abstract 
Based on the South African experience of integrated water management under 
the new dispensation since 1994, this paper  proposes a new  paradigm for water 
management. Rather than as an end in itself,  water management is seen as a 
means to  eradicate poverty,  foster gender equity,  preserve the  resource base 
and,  thus,  achieve social and environmental justice. This paradigm is rooted in 
the strong linkages between water, poverty, and gender. Satisfying poor women's 
and men's unmet water needs for domestic and  productive uses,  while enhancing 
the productivity of water used by poor men and women,  is its primary aim. The 
far-reaching implications of the new paradigm are traced for mainstream policies 
and tools in the economic domain (water valuation and pricing), the legal domain 
(state's custody and legislation), and the governance domain (users' pertic/pation 
within basin boundaries). It is shown that policies proposed in international forums 
as blanket measures,  'equally' applicable in the North and South,  for the poor 
and non-poor,  and for men and women,  are bound to aggravate poverty and 
widen  race  and gender gaps.  especially under growing competition for water. 
Instead, the analysis ofboth failures and early positive experiences in South Africa 
and elsewhere indicate the directions for pro-poor and gender-inclusive economic, 
legal and governance policies and tools,  and the need for strong synergy with 
efforts to eradicate poverty beyond the government and beyond the water sector. 
1. Introduction 
A new water management paradigm 
Water management is  not an  end  in  itself,  but  a means  to  eradicate  poverty. 
guarantee basic human rights to all. ensure gender equity. and preserve the natural 
resource base for future generations. The primary objective of water management 
is to contribute to the transformation of society towards social and environmental 
justice. 
This statement reflects the  policies of the government of South  Africa and  of an 
increasing number of governmental and non-governmental water and development 
institutions today. However. the implications of this policy statement. especially under 
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growing water scarcity, are hardly recognised as yet:  it implies a paradigm shift 
in water management. This new paradigm is discussed in this paper, based on 
experiences in  South Africa,  a water-scarce country in  which,  in  a sense, the 
North and South co-exist in one nation, and social inequities along race,  class 
and gender lines are strong. 
In  the new paradigm, poor people's water needs for multiple purposes are the 
starting point. Conforming to the needs and aspirations of poor women and men 
themselves, action is taken from local to national and basin level to improve their 
access to water and their well-being. The  interests of people who still  have  to 
carry buckets to supply water to their homes or tiny plots for sub-minimal welfare 
are at the centre stage  of  integrated water management at basin  level.  In  the 
new water management paradigm, social divides along race,  class and gender 
lines are key determinants, and more relevant than analysis according to 'sectors', 
or any other entity that insufficiently highlights poverty and heterogeneity within 
the entity. Sections two and three give a sketch of the role of water in  poverty 
eradication under growing competition for water. 
The later sections of the paper highlight the far-reaching implications of the new 
paradigm for a wide  range  of policies and  intervention tools that are currently 
debated both in the international forums and in South Africa to address increasing 
competition over water. These measures encompass economic tools  (water 
valuation and pricing),  legal tools (the state as custodian and  legislator)  and 
governance issues (user participation and basin-level management institutions). 
Many professionals in  the  international community and  donor agencies still 
assume that there would be best single blanket measures applicable in the North 
and South alike. Just some mitigating "extra subsidies" or "special consideration" 
or "postponed phasing in" for the disadvantaged would sufficiently address poverty 
and gender issues of the South. The analysis in this paper, however, shows the 
opposite. 
The  inescapable conclusion, for each  of the mainstream economic,  legal,  and 
governance policies and  intervention tools,  is  that the proposed measures are 
often entirely Inadequate and  may,  in  fact,  aggravate poverty.  In  order to avoid 
negative impacts on  poor women  and  men  and  achieve  positive ones,  such 
blanket policies are to be  dismissed, thoroughly revised or nuanced. Moreover, 
if poverty eradication is the ultimate aim, synergy needs to be sought with other 
governmental and  non-governmental  endeavours within and  outside the  water 
sector, such as agricultural markets, that also aim to eradicate poverty, because 
water is often only one of the inputs in an income-generating activity like irrigated 
agriculture. Thus, this paper looks for a consistent and mutually reinforcing blend 
of multi-objective water management policies and other policies, in which meeting 
poor women's and  men's water-related basic needs for consumption and 
production have absolute priority. 
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2. Linkages between water scarcity, poverty, and gender 
2.1. Poverty 
Water scarcity, poverty, and deprivation 
A closer look at the linkages between water and poverty shows that the lack of 
access to water to meet multi-faceted basic needs is intrinsic to poverty. For poor 
people  water is  so  scarce that even  basic  human  needs,  for  which  water is 
needed. such as health and incomes, are not met. Moreover, poor people's costs 
for  water are often  exorbitantly high  either as  drudgery of fetching  water, 
especially for rural poor women, or as high purchase prices from vendors in areas 
where the subsidised piped systems do not reach. So, if water scarcity, or water 
deprivation, is defined as  the extent to which human needs for water remain 
unmet,  poor people suffer  most from  water scarcity. Water deprivation is  an 
intrinsic dimension of the general state of deprivation that poverty is. 
The primary cause of water scarcity for the poor is their lack of assets to access 
the  available  water resources.  even  when  water resources  are abundant.  If, 
moreover, all available water resources are developed and committed and "water 
scarCity", as usually defined by technical people, exists, a second cause of poor 
people's water deprivation  is  added:  non-poor competitors  with  stronger 
bargaining positions and more money to pay for water may directly deprive poor 
people of the water they already use. Any future access to water to meet their 
still unmet needs will be forfeited forever. Even under extreme "water scarcity" or 
competition the better-off still  use large quantities of water for secure  and 
comfortable living and incomes. Hence, under competition, poor people tend to 
suffer double, both from asset-related and competition-related water scarcity. 
Multi-faceted needs 
The human needs for which water is needed are multi-faceted, and so are poor 
people's needs that are still unmet. This is most straightforward for health, income, 
and lack of drudgery. All general definitions of poverty encompass lack of access 
to near and safe drinking water and sanitation, and its negative health impacts. 
In  South Africa this form of poverty is extensive. Twelve  million South Africans 
still  lack adequate facilities for domestic water,  especially in  the  rural  areas of 
former homelands where  the  majority of South Africa's  poor black  people are 
concentrated. 
Lack of income is the core component of poverty as it is commonly defined. What 
is often not acknowledged is that water is vital to increase incomes above one 
US  dollar. per day. This is especially the case for rural  areas where water is 
indispensable for agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishery, and small industries. Rural 
employment is important in South Africa, where the majority of the poor are rural 
and where the  rural population is expected to continue to increase (May 2000). 
One  of the  reasons  is that people  are reportedly returning  to  the  rural  areas 
because of growing off-farm unemployment. 
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Elsewhere, better access to irrigation infrastructure and water has proven to be 
a powerful means for income improvement among the poor in semi-arid or arid 
areas with  high rainfall variability, by enhancing yields during alonger period of 
the  year and  at  lesser risk.  But in  order to realise the  potential  of  income 
generation, a range  of  other factors that hamper poor smallholders from  using 
water productively,  must be taken into account as  well.  Poor farmers  in  South 
Africa, the majority of whom are women, lack access to markets, inputs, training, 
and  seasonal credits. Moreover,  although  irrigation-induced intensification of 
agriculture can have considerable income impacts on even the smallest plot, it 
is evident that access to more  land  helps better to escape poverty. The land 
distribution in South Africa is the second most skewed in the world, after Brazil. 
The slow  implementation of land  redistribution  also hampers the adoption of 
irrigated agriculture and  poverty eradication (Cousins 2000). Collaboration with 
other government departments, NGOs and private institutions beyond the water 
sector is clearly needed. 
Competition 
Under growing competition, when all available water resources in a (micro-)basin 
are developed and committed, water easily becomes even more scarce for poor 
people. Competition in several of South Africa's basins, such as the Olifants and 
Inkomati Basins,  is  growing  rapidly.  Poorer water users,  such  as the black 
emerging farmers in the Nkomati Basin, have limited negotiation power vis-a-vis 
the white large-scale farmers with whom they compete (Woodhouse and Hassan 
1999). Poor people's bargaining position with  mines and  industries is  weak as 
well.  In  the congested former homelands, the competition for scarce  water 
resources is  between smallholders and other water users,  as in the Tongwane 
micro-basin  in  Mathabathaland,  Northern  Province  (Van  Koppen,  Joubert and 
Grobbelaar forthcoming).  Increasing competition not only affects current users, 
but also inhibits potential new entrants from  even considering new investments 
in water infrastructure. If water management is to contribute to poverty eradication 
under direct competition for water, new rules and practices are needed in which 
former use, which is very unequal, ceases to be the main criterion for continuing 
use in the future. 
2.2 Gender 
Gender inequities in the domestic water sector 
Water deprivation affects poor women more strongly than poor men. Widespread 
global gender inequities-men dominating the productive and political spheres, 
relegating low-paid jobs and unpaid domestic chores to women (UNDP 1995)­
are reflected in water management policy and intervention  1 • 
'Gender·sensitive water management is neither "natural" expertise nor the sole responsibility of 
women professionals. Being female does not. in and of itself imply an understanding of or a com­
mitment to gender transformation-indeed there are men who are more committed to this pro­
cess than some of their female counterparts. The skewed gender composition in the staff of water 
institutions is another issue, but not further elaborated here. We focus on the interface between 
gender and  poverty. 
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The invisibility of women's work in domestic water provision is part and parcel 
of the general invisibility of unpaid domestic labour, across all classes, even 
though  it  represents a market value of  up  to  70  percent of the total  global 
output (UNDP 1995). Or,  in  daily life: 
The men do not know how clothes are washed. They just see the clean 
clothes and that is  good enough for  them  (Sinah Thibedi,  pers. 
communication 1999) 
Poverty critically impinges on women's workload in drinking water supply. Water 
has never been a "free good" for poor women. Whereas the  health aspects of 
improved drinking water supply and sanitation are well articulated at policy levels, 
the  need to  liberate poor women  from  this drudgery is  still  underestimated. 
Related to this, the status of the "female" domestic water supply sector as a whole 
is still lower than that of the "male" productive water sector. 
The burdens of the  responsibility  to  provide  the  family  with  water often  fall 
disproportionately on women. This is illustrated in a study in South Africa, in which 
paying an apparently meagre US$ 1.60 per month for water has resulted in the 
women having that much less money to spend on food for themselves and their 
children,  while their husbands maintain their drinking and  smoking allowances 
of about US$ 8 per month-allowances which  the women  dare not ask to  be 
reduced for fear,  inter alia, of being beaten. 
Emphasising poor women's heavy burden in domestic water supply is not to deny 
men's contributions to  this essential component of family  welfare.  Across the 
developing  world,  several  studies  report a gender division in  domestic water 
supply,  in which men take the responsibility for most of the construction work of 
village wells, ponds, or tanks and also dominate their management, while women 
are responsible to ensure daily supply from the water source to the house2 . 
Redressing gender inequities in the long-term would imply that water supply for 
household  welfare  becomes less drudgery and  that both  men  and  women 
contribute equally and share responsibilities for its provision. At community level, 
then,  women and men would also contribute more equally to  the management 
of water supply schemes. As women and men perform different tasks, they bring 
different 
2Gender divisions may also diverge from this rather stereotypical picture, as is the case in 
slightly better-off households in cultures where women's mobility is restrained. For example, 
in  Morocco's gravity irrigation schemes,  men  are the main  ones  responsible  for fetching 
water from larger distances for family use; both girls and boys perform much work in fetch­
ing  water as  well.  Another example is  in  the  Punjab  in  Pakistan  where  men  are  respon­
sible for bringing water from far during the annual period of canal closure for maintenance, 
when the wide range of canal water uses are stopped. Whatever the arrangements, these 
gender relations are not static or 'nature'-given but negotiated between the genders. In West 
Burkina Faso,  for example, women  refuse to marry into villages where the drinking water 
wells are inadequate. Elsewhere in Burkina Faso,  among the Gourounsi, women are sup­
posed to bring water for homesteads for free, but men pay when the women bring water to 
the fields where they are cultivating. 
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perspectives.  For  instance,  women  in  a drought-prone part of Gujarat,  India, 
insisted on a collective tap instead of connections in the homesteads, as the men 
had proposed. The reasoning was that a collective tap would enable them to keep 
a much better eye on the quantities that each of them used and, thus, on a fair 
distribution (Barot, personal communication). In this way, women's better inclusion 
in planning of drinking water schemes from the start onwards has proven to lead 
to better schemes· (UNDP 1999). 
Hence, domestic water supply policy and intervention entail two challenges for 
"social  transformation" (Khumbane,  personal  communication):  lessening or 
abolishing unpaid work  loads,  which  are now  mainly borne  by  women,  and 
fostering  gender equality in  the  provision  of water for family  welfare from 
household level to community and basin level. 
Gender inequities in the productive water sector 
1:he challenge of redressing gender inequities in the productive water sector is 
to improve incomes of  both  women  and  men,  rather than continuing to ignore 
women's income needs. Outside the water sector, the need to improve especially 
poor women's incomes is now widely recognised and  justified for the following 
reasons. Among the poor, the incomes of both men and women are required to 
meet basic family needs.  If  in  male-headed households women  and  men  are 
responsible  for different household needs,  both  types of needs must  be  met. 
Women's  incomes,  however,  benefit the family  relatively  more than  men's 
because, reportedly, women spend a higher proportion of their incomes on family 
expenditures than  men  do (Agarwal  1994). In  female-headed  households, 
women's incomes are usually the  major source of income. A last  reason  for 
making poor women's independent economic security a priority, is that women's 
own  economic security is the  crucial factor at  the  micro-level that  explains a 
reduction in fertility rates at the macro-level (Safiliou 1986). 
In the  case of irrigation, the focus of this paper,  women's needs as producers 
were systematically ignored. The allocation of newly developed irrigated land and 
water,  accompanying agricultural  inputs,  training and  marketing services has 
almost exclusively been  to  men,  as  critiCised  over a long period (Hanger and 
Morris 1973). Irrigation interventionists even seriously eroded women's existing 
land rights, productive capacities, and incomes by communicating and negotiating 
only with  men,  especially the male village elite  (Dey  1980; Carney  1988; Van 
Koppen 1990, 1998). Men also continue to be the privileged members of Water 
Users' Associations  and  particularly dominate in  decision-making committees 
(Chancellor 1996). Even  if women  are committee members,  this does  not 
necessarily  guarantee that they  have  any  say.  Male  committee  members 
reportedly gave  women's  names  as  committee members,  without the  women 
themselves even  knowing3 ,  to please an external agency, politician, or donor to 
get more money. 
"Reported in Water Users Associations in Nepal (Van Etten et al. 1999) and Andhra Pradesh, 
India (1999). 
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Irrigation planners still rarely consider women as being independent farm decision­
makers who manage the  production process,  and control the output,  and who, 
therefore,  are the ones primarily interested in  improving the productivity of their 
enterprise through irrigation. This is based on the stereotypical assumption that a 
whole family is engaged in farming, with the male household head as the manager 
and representative. In  reality,  however, farm  households often diversify incomes 
and encompass several production sub-units within a household, with specialisation 
along gender and age lines. Male- and female-managed cropping units co-exist, 
especially in  many ethnic communities in  Sub-Saharan Africa. In  areas with 
remunerative off-farm employment opportunities for men, farming often becomes 
the full-time activity of women. Then, farming does not provide one family income, 
but the income for one of its specialising adults (Safiliou 1988). 
The assumption that only landowners are  farmers also contributes to women's 
invisibility as farmers.  In  the  irrigation 'sector,  this is reflected in  the tendency to 
vest water rights in  the one with  the strongest land titles rather than in  the farm 
decision-maker and factual irrigator. This excludes all women farmers who cultivate 
land of their husband's family and have life-long tenure security to that land, but 
without owning it. In this respect, the South African National Water Act is unique 
in providing scope to vest water rights and membership in  the factual water user, 
irrespective of his or her type of land rights. 
A study in  South Africa that debunks the myth that women are just helping their 
husbands, rather than being farm decision-makers in their own  right, was done in 
the Tongwane  catchment in  Northern  Province.  It  was found that,  out of  176 
households with plots in  state-supported and self·initiated irrigation  schemes in 
this basin, women are the farm decision-makers on 62 percent of the irrigated plots, 
and in another 14 percent they decide jOintly with their husbandS. The proportion 
of women managers is highest in the government schemes, where women decide 
alone or jointly with  their husbands in  88 percent of the households. The lower 
proportion of women in the informal schemes is due to the fact that these schemes 
were recently started under the leadership of some men who lost their jobs in a 
nearby mine. The study also found that among women decision-makers, land was 
registered in their husbands' names in 36 percent of the cases. Among male farm 
decision-makers, 10 percent cultivated land registered in the names of their female 
kin. Overall, if in these schemes formal membership criteria were to be based upon 
land  titles,  28 percent of the  farm  managers would  be' excluded (Van  Koppen, 
Joubert, and Grobbelaar forthcoming). Similar results are found in other studies in 
Southern and Eastern African countries (Makhura and Ngqaleni 1996; FAO 1998; 
Safiliou 1985, 1994). These findings corroborate the need to develop irrigation and 
other support systems not only for men but also directly for women farmers. 
In cases in which both men and women farm on their own account, gender-sensitive 
measures, such as fostering full  representation in meetings and committees, 
reportedly led to women's positive responses, men's general acceptance, and thus 
broader farmers' support for scheme affairs. The impact of the policy change by 
the Provincial Irrigation Unit in the Nyanza Province, Kenya, is a well-documented 
example  (Hulsebosch and  Ombarra 1995). Traditional chiefs  and  agricultural 
extension workers in Northern Province, South Africa also favour women farmers' 
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stronger land rights. Giving women their own  land  rights would better motivate 
them to increase productivity, as it would protect them against men's appropriation 
of the fruits of their labour (Van  Koppen  1999). 
Women's  independent position as  members and their representative  inclusion 
in  committees will  also be  crucial for the formal  establishment of small-holder 
Water Users' Associations and  women's  participation in  higher-level  water 
management bodies like the Catchment Management Agencies in South Africa. 
Conclusion 
In  sum,  a pro-poor and  gender-sensitive (or people-sensitive) integrated water 
sector gives absolute priority to  meeting poor women's and men's water needs 
for domestic and productive uses. Further, it transcends the current boundaries 
between "male" and "female" domains by attaching equal importance to domestic 
and productive water uses, and by overcoming the artificial institutional separation 
and split in mindsets between water management for "men as producers" versus 
"women as housewives." 
As for any other policy, the policy of managing water to eradicate water deprivation 
among men and women requires clear definition and quantification. Goal-setting 
would specify the numbers of poor men and women affected and the dimensions 
of well-being,  such  as  incidence of water-related  disease,  hours spent on 
drudgery or absolute and relative amounts of money spent on water, and water­
related incomes gained through, for example, irrigated agriculture. Unambiguous 
quantified goals also allow  monitoring and  evaluation  of progress and  the 
assessment a-nd  comparison  of the  impact of different public and  private 
measures. 
Eradicating water deprivation is  the  challenge for  the  water sector. The  reality 
that competition for water is growing cannot become another fate against the poor. 
On the contrary, it brings the urgency to address poor people's water needs first 
even more strongly to the forefront. It implies that economic, legal and governance 
tools that are currently proposed in mainstream international forums need to be 
dismissed or fundamentally revised, as argued in  the remaining sections. 
3. Water allocation to poor women and men: economic tools 
3.1  Valuing water as an economic good 
Water as an economic good 
The  recognition  that water is an  increasingly  scarce good  has  contributed to a 
widespread agreement that water should be treated as an economic good. Economic 
analysis is more and more seen  as a "rational" and "objective" tool  to orient water 
allocation under growing scarcity. However, this statement that ''water is an economic 
good" has "the virtue of being sufficiently vague to allow agreement, while leaving 
the  implied operational content-over which  there  may  be  strong disagreement­
unstated" (Perry et al. 1997). Three aspects of the common interpretation of this 
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statement are especially contentious in the light of the new water management 
paradigm that aims to combat poverty. First, "value" is often interpreted in a very 
narrow sense and based on  an assumption that all  people are sufficiently able 
to pay for water. Second, only goods that are exchanged on the monetary market 
and  the Single main use of water tend to be  considered. And  third,  the crucial 
question "benefits for whom" and  the  distribution of wealth within society are 
ignored. The implications for pricing policies will be discussed in section 3;2. 
Which value reigns? 
In the discussion on "water as an economic good", Perry et al. (1997) argue that 
the issue is not whether water is an economic good,  as it is,  but what kind  of 
economic good water is, a private or public and social good, and hence which 
values govern analysis and  decision-making. Proponents of water as a private 
good define its value as the maximum amount that the user would be willing to 
pay for the use of the resource. The distribution of water should be determined 
by the overriding value (and not more than a value) of the consumer's sovereignty 
on a free market. However, their opponents find this a misleading analysis: it does 
not take into account that willingness to  pay depends largely on ability to pay 
and it ignores the unequal distribution of incomes (Perry et al. 1997). Thus, valuing 
consumer sovereignty is incompatible with another widely endorsed value of a 
society, in which all people's basic needs are met, including the basic consumptive 
and productive needs in which water plays a role. 
Valuing consumer sovereignty as primary allocation principle may make sense 
in Northern countries, where the ability to pay is generally sufficient to meet basic 
needs. but not in the South where poverty and the lack of assets to access water 
are still rampant. If poverty eradication is the primary goal, all water used to that 
end has by definition an  infinite value. In fact,  both the public-good and private­
good adherents tend to  agree  on  the  importance of the value  of poverty 
eradication for society. Whether private markets or public interventions, or a mix, 
are most effective in bringing about such a society is the question to explore. 
Only single-pu{pose market values? 
In  many valuation  studies,  the costs,  values and benefits of water tend to be 
narrowed down to the (opportunity) costs and gains of the main product that is 
exchanged on (male-dominated) monetary markets, such as irrigated crops or 
mining products. However, a more encompassing concept of costs, values and 
benefits would also include the huge benefits that are not exchanged on a market, 
and are often difficult to express in  monetary terms. The most obvious of such 
impacts are the "soft-sector" health impacts of safe drinking water or unpolluted 
water for agricultural use. Another example is the cost of labour that is  not 
exchanged on a market but within a household, as (female-dominated) fetching 
of household water is. 
Further, the focus of water valuation tends to be only on the main purpose of a 
water source. However, one water source is often used for multiple purposes, so 
all uses of the water source should be counted, giving equal importance to the 
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"male" affair of productive water use and  the "female" affair of domestic water 
use. The value of irrigation water, for example, becomes considerably higher if 
the use for livestock, fishing, homestead gardening, domestic purposes of that 
same water are included as well (Bakker et al  1999). 
Valuing  the  multiple purposes of  water both  within and  outside monetary 
markets has many  practical applications. One application would  be that new 
Water  Users' Associations,  which  are  world-wide  still  largely single-purpose 
Farmers' Associations focussing on irrigation, would open up to the many simple 
and  no-cost or low-cost opportunities to broaden the  ultimate benefits of 
investments in  irrigation infrastructure for  men and women.  Also,  many poor 
people, especially women, could get a much better deal if the development of 
mines, for example, as in  parts of South Africa, is accompanied by additional 
benefits. Here  the  potential exists to  issue licences to mines  by  negotiating 
strong added value for local poor people in a "quid pro quo" arrangement-the 
provision of water services from  the  new  pipelines to  the surrounding 
communities,  the  mine's commitment to  purchase agricultural  products from 
small-holders, micro-credit provision, training, etc. 
Values and benefits for whom? 
Perhaps the most serious flaw in  mainstream water valuation is the tendency 
to  focus  on  the value of water as such,  as an  abstract contribution to Gross 
National Product, without even considering the distribution of the created wealth 
within society. Distributive aspects are a critical part of any valuation study and 
absolutely crucial if water managers intend to redress social inequities and aim 
to alleviate poverty. In employment creation, for example, the crucial issue is 
for whom employment is created. The same volume of water,  if allocated to  a 
mine,  may give employment for a handful of highly qualified staff (some may 
be  expatriates) and a limited number of male workers. However,  if used in a 
smallholder scheme with a majority of women farmers, it may contribute to the 
alleviation of income poverty among a much larger group of beneficiaries, even 
if it created only half of the overall monetary value. So  any overall value  per 
unit of water remains  rather meaningless without the  analysis of distribution 
along race, class and gender lines, or "jobs per drop for poor women and men." 
This over-arching social divide is valid across all water sectors and uses. 
3.2 Water Pricing 
Capital and operational costs of infrastructure 
While water valuation is still a rather theoretical endeavour, the statement that 
"water should be  treated as an  economic good" already tangibly  reinforced 
the privatisation waves in which governmental and non-governmental agencies 
stop subsidising capital  and operational costs of water infrastructure, often 
under the euphemistic heading of "participatory water management." Higher 
payment by users is further assumed (rather than  proven) to be  an  effective 
way  to  promote water savings. The  South  African  government faces  this 
issue as well. The  Department  of  Water Affairs and  Forestry (DWAF) 
discusses the introduction of one overall strategy for full cost recovery from 
all water users for water development and  use and  also,  which  is  quite 
unique, for water resources management. The latter is currently carried 
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out by DWAF but  in  the long run  intended to be delegated to Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs). 
It is true that the huge subsidies in the past mainly benefited the large, non-poor 
water users. If water charges are proportional to volumetric water use, the larger 
consumers would pay considerably more than poor people who tend to be small 
water users. So better cost-recovery would lead better-off consumers to pay directly 
for services that were formerly financed from their taxes. Such pricing policies would 
free up' considerable funds for the government. But whether governments would 
use these newly available funds for poverty eradication is another question. 
It is also true that some private initiatives and public-private partnerships can better 
reach the poor than governmental and even NGO interventions. In fact, it is inherent 
to poverty that public interventions tend to fail  in reaching this group. Small water­
vendors are major suppliers of domestic water to the urban poor. Poor people in 
rural areas typically arrange their drinking water from wells or water management 
devices on their own. Competitive groundwater irrigation  markets in  India and 
Bangladesh provide good water service at competitive prices to even the poorest 
farmers. Much can be learned from such initiatives, about quality service provision 
and poor people's willingness to pay for good service.  But it may be that  other 
types or levels of subsidy,  such as subsidies for bulk water supply or for rural 
electricity supply, have influenced these private initiatives, and are still needed in 
current or future infrastructure uses by poor people. 
Generally speaking, pricing policies for cost-recovery of infrastructure development 
and operation applied as a blanket measure runs the serious risk of aggravating 
water deprivation and poverty. Sudden payment of high operational costs may cause 
some poor people to give up current water use. The creation of future new demands 
by  poor people through  subsidised new infrastructure development would be 
forfeited as well. Pushing poor people out of the water-business would be an ironic 
form of water conservation and demand management. Therefore, the South African 
government is embarking on  a differentiated pricing strategy. 
Domestic water use 
When  the  democratic government of South  Africa was elected  in  1994 it 
immediately recognised  access to drinking water as a basic right and  identified 
the lack of subsidised infrastructure development as the main reason for the fact 
that more than 12 million South Africans were still deprived of near and safe drinking 
water supply. The government adopted a Water Services Act in  1997 and the 
National Water Act in 1998. The former provides the framework for the provision 
of water services to  all,  while the latter guarantees, through  the  provision of a 
reserve, that sufficient water to provide a minimum of 25 litres per person per day 
is set aside before water is allocated for other purposes. The costs for the first-tier 
infrastructure to provide for these 25 litres are subSidised by the government or 
cross-subsidised by  well-off water users.  For larger quantities,  sliding tariffs are 
adopted. The option of individual vouchers, as sometimes recommended in global 
debates, is discarded as of little use for poor women, who have no supply system 
near their houses, nor 
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the  contacts and organisational power to  make the  suppliers come.  Massive 
implementation of new infrastructure development and stepped tariffs is underway. 
The need to provide minimum levels of water supply for free was illustrated in a 
village in  South Africa that was recently supplied with potable water but still for 
a fee. The  Minister of Water Affairs and  Forestry found  a woman  with  a baby 
tied on  her back,  digging for water near the bank of a river.  When  asked  why 
she was  not using the water from the communal standpipe,  her reply was that 
she could not afford the R10 required by the water committee to pay for the water. 
This example also  highlights that South African women  would  bear the  larger 
burdens of pricing of costs for the drinking water services for their families. 
An  important challenge is  to develop sustainable forms of cross-subsidisation. 
The Durban Metropolitan Council is pioneering this approach. The town  is sub­
divided into four neighbourhoods, encompassing both poor and non-poor water 
users. Everybody, whether rich or poor, receives the first 25 litres per person free 
of charge. This cost is paid for by cross-subsidisation from higher levels of water 
use and the  sliding tariff scale. This approach,  coupled  with  other customer 
service improvements has also raised levels of payment for water,  enabling the 
local authority to provide and maintain better levels of service. 
Productive water use in agriculture 
Withdrawal of state support and imposing even  partial cost-recovery in irrigated 
agriculture, whether farmers are poor or not. has proven to be very negative for 
poor small-holders in  South  Africa. While  impacts for better-off farmers were 
minimal if not positive, this policy aggravated poverty. 
The introduction of cost-recovery has been quite smooth for the white, large-scale 
farmers,  who occupy 95 percent of the  irrigated land. In the past, these  large­
scale  white farmers benefited from  substantive state  subsidies for capital 
investments and  agricultural  services.  Farmers also had  a strong voice  in  the 
design and operation of the scheme. While for a long time scheme operation and 
maintenance was  subsidised,  this started to be  phased out in  the mid-1990s. 
This was a well-prepared and transparent five-year process,  in  which farmers 
accepted the increases in their input costs. Further, in South Africa it is feasible 
to leave  new capital  investments to large-scale farmers because the private 
equipment that is now available on  the shelves,  such as pumps or high-tech 
sprinkler and  drip  irrigation systems,  fits the needs of large-scale farming. 
Moreover, banks continue to provide agricultural loans to large farmers as they 
did in the past. 
In  contrast, black small-holders, who occupy the other five percent of irrigated 
land, suffered seriously from the general agricultural liberalisation poliCies of the 
1990s, which included only partial cost-recovery for  irrigation. If on  top of this 
full cost-recovery at a par with the large-scale farmers isimposed,  the effects 
are bound to be even worse. 
Most small-holder irrigation schemes in the former homelands, and many other 
African countries as well, were designed and constructed for centralised state­
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management and uniform cropping patterns, typically maize and wheat. The state 
used to deliver highly subsidised services for ploughing, credit and input provision, 
irrigation, and marketing. Farmers, although bearing the risks, were often no more 
than labourers on their own  one- to two-hectare plots. The  withdrawal of most 
subsidies and services such as electricity payment, ploughing, inputs, and credit 
services, and mediation in marketing for the state-managed smallholder schemes 
in the late  1990s came very abruptly,  without guidance and training for gradual 
take-over. The  question was also  not addressed  as to  whether farmers' 
management of these schemes designed for highly subsidised, centralised state 
management is feasible at all. The impact of this partial abandonment of schemes 
has been extremely negative. Farmers' own  market linkages are still weak, the 
costs for water in these inefficient schemes are  relatively high,  and inputs and 
credits are still lacking, so net profits from irrigated farming dramatically declined. 
Many poor farmers gave up irrigated farming and returned to rainfed agriculture. 
Schemes are increasingly in a dilapidated state. This effect is not only reported 
for South Africa's small-holder schemes in  the former homelands,  but is also 
observed in other irrigation schemes in sub-Saharan Africa (Shah et al. 2000). 
Under these conditions, further withdrawal of the limited remaining subsidies for 
water bailiffs and for maintenance costs,  let alone imposing charges for water 
resources management for national and  basin-level management,  will further 
diminish net gains or push more poor people out of the business of irrigated 
agriculture. As long as the "value per drop" is sub-optimal because input provision 
and  marketing channels are lacking, concerted efforts with other agencies are 
needed to enhance the profitability of smallholder irrigated farming (Shah et al 
2000). This should be a precondition for any further implementation of recovery 
of even operational costs. 
BeSides the state-managed smallholder schemes, the South African government 
and civic society also financed and constructed an unknown number of smaller 
community gardens, and  continue to do so. These smaller schemes,  deSigned 
for self-management, are generally easier to  operate  and  manage by  farmers 
themselves,  although they  remain  dependent on  external  support for major 
rehabilitation or replacement of infrastructure. But in these schemes as well, lack 
of markets is the most general complaint. Although the output per unit of land or 
per unit of water on, for example, intensively cultivated micro-plots of poor women 
is considerably higher than on large-scale cereal farms, the real profits that can 
be realised are still relatively low as a result of lack of access to markets. So for 
these schemes as well,  stopping external  support for major rehabilitation  and 
replacement would mean the collapse of the scheme as long as the net profits 
are not sufficiently high for farmers to provide for such costs. Bringing poor 
farmers in upward ratchets of profitable farming is equally important for them. 
In answer to these realities, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry is now 
actively collaborating with  other government and  non-government agencies to 
address this key issue of the profitability of small-holder irrigated farming, and the 
issue of rural loan facilities. Moreover, subsidies for new scheme construction and 
for the upgrading of formerly state-supported schemes are made available, although 
the information about these subsidies is still not known widely enough. In the future, 
water charges may be minimised by introducing sliding tariff scales in irrigated 
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agriculture as well. In the absence of measuring devices for volumetric charging, 
the same purpose can be served by levying lower or no water charges for users 
of small-scale technologies, for example treadle pumps, and users of small plots 
of,  say,  less than five hectares. 
Last but not least,  pricing policies that leave all  responsibility for future capital 
investment to the user would certainly further widen the existing gaps in adoption 
and ownership of equipment. As for domestic water supply, the lack of subsidised 
infrastructure development targeted  at the  poor in  the  past has caused  highly 
skewed access to irrigation assets now.  Moreover, technologies appropriate for 
smallholders are simply not available on the shelves. Therefore, DWAF and other 
agencies  started to  promote irrigation technologies that are  appropriate and 
affordable for smallholders,  such as  treadle pumps and  bucket drip irrigation 
systems, or water harvesting techniques. More attention is also paid to the credit 
facilities that are indispensable for financing these technologies. Although private 
markets are expected to  be crucial for the  manufacturing and dissemination of 
these technologies, external support to catalyse these developments is needed. 
Conclusion 
The most tangible but analytically flawed implication of the statement that "water 
is an economic good;' pricing of the capital and operational costs of infrastructure, 
has been implemented as a blanket policy and proven to have considerable cost 
to society in  that water deprivation is  aggravated and inequities are amplified. 
The challenge is  to ensure that at least part of the funds that the government 
gains by charging the  non-poor and  large water consumers,  and introducing 
sliding tariffs and cross-subsidisation are used to combat water deprivation and 
redress inequities. This can be achieved, for example, by ensuring better access 
to new infrastructure by  poor people and  promoting the deSign,  testing  and 
dissemination of appropriate low-cost technologies and water service provision, 
and financing facilities. Last but not least, for the case of irrigation, more value 
per drop for the poor is to be recognised as the precondition for any recovery of 
a  small,  reasonable part of considerable profits.  Co-ordination  and  synergy 
between government agencies and between the government, the private sector 
and NGOs are indispensable. 
Pricing as a tool for water conservation and demand management is  not about 
poor people having to give up the use of water, but saving water where it can be 
saved without major implications for the beneficial use.  Demand measures are 
to address the larger farmers and the larger consumers-the "big fish" in terms 
of water use, wasting and polluting. 
4. Water allocation to poor women and men:  legal tools 
Formal water law in  South Africa 
Whereas economic tools steer water allocation indirectly, legal tools do so in a direct 
way.  Under growing competition for scarce water,  legal tools for water allocation in 
the new water management paradigm ensure that poor people's current water use 
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is  protected  and  that poor new entrants can  still access water as  new  entrants 
and  satisfy their unmet basic  water needs.  Pro-poor water  legislation not only 
implies that there should be a formal legal framework in which poor people's water 
needs have priority, but also that the law is implemented and enforced. The state, 
as custodian of the nation's water resources and legislator, has an important role 
to play,  but  collaboration  and  integration across governmental  and non­
governmental agencies and local social, political, and legal arrangements are vital 
as well. 
In South Africa, the Water Services Act (1997) and the National Water Act (1998) 
provide  various  legal  tools that are  potentially effective,  and  possibly the  most 
progressive in the world, to eradicate water deprivation under growing water scarcity. 
These tools are  the  following. As already  mentioned, the  Reserve sets aside  a 
minimum amount of water,  currently set at 25  litres per capita per day,  for basic 
human needs. The  Reserve also includes an  ecological element. After allocating 
the Reserve and water required to meet international obligations, the government 
authorises water use in  four ways.  Firstly, all users are,  in  any case and without 
registration or payment,  authorised to take  water for,  among other things, 
"reasonable domestic use,  watering gardens and  stock  watering," but not for 
commercial purposes, as stipulated in Schedule 1 of the Act. This component of 
the Act benefits all, including poor people. 
Secondly, the legislation authorises the continuation of "existing lawful use" (and 
thus the inequities in that use). New water uses are authorised by the government 
through, thirdly, general authorisations or, fourthly, licences. General authorisations 
concern relatively small uses in situations without current or expected water stress. 
They apply to a certain area, a particular water resource, a particular category of 
users, etc. As indicated in the General Authorisation of October 1999, farmers in 
areas without water stress are authorised to irrigate up to 25 hectares, at 6000 
cubic meters per hectare per annum. This situation is applicable to a wide range 
of formerly disadvantaged farmers. The general authorisation of October 1999 also 
indicates the water-stressed areas for which  the  general authorisation does not 
apply. Evidently, allocation is most critical in these water-stressed areas. 
For all  new water uses beyond general  authorisations,  licences are needed. 
Licences may be issued for a maximum of 40 years. The terms and conditions of 
a licence are  regularly  reviewed. Should  an  amendment of a licence condition 
severely prejudice the economic viability of an undertaking, the licensee may claim 
compensation. Licences may be  surrendered in order to facilitate the application 
for a  licence for that water allocation by  another  user and,  thus,  represent a 
monetary value. While the issuing of a licence authorises the person or institution 
to use water, it does not guarantee availability of water. 
In  the future,  the  government will  call for compulsory licensing of water users in 
water-stressed areas where  there are,  for  example,  problems experienced  or 
expected from over-utilisation and competing water uses. Such calls for compulsory 
licensing by  the  Minister will apply to  all  water users, including those authorised 
under the  continuation  of "existing  lawful  use" component of the Act  and those 
operating under a general authorisation. On the basis of all applications for licences, 
the responsible authority proposes an allocation schedule. In this,  among others, 
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the authority has to consider how to "allocate to each of the applicants to whom 
licences ought to be  issued in  order to  redress the  results  of past racial  and 
gender discrimination in  accordance with the constitutional  mandate for water 
reform" (National Water Act,  Part 8,  Section 45). After further rounds  of public 
comments,  a final  allocation schedule is compiled. Such compulsory licensing 
and reallocation, then, is the legal tool par excellence that can be used to allocate 
(but not guarantee) water to the poor that was claimed by the non-poor before. 
DWAF has started a massive campaign to register current water uses that either 
will have to be licensed or that are generally authorised but still substantial and/ 
or for which the payment of fees is required. An example of the latter is irrigation 
use above 50 cubic meters surface water or 10 cubic meters ground water per 
day.  DWAF  has invited such water users,  including farmers,  industry,  local 
authorities, a Water Board or any other recognised Water Services Provider or 
Water Users' Association, to fill  a registration  form  on  their current water use 
(Department of Water Affairs and Forestry,  12 November 1999). 
In the registration, the estimation of quantities of water used lies with the user 
but can be checked by the water authority. For the moment, the state has limited 
measuring capacity to prove deviations from the uses as estimated by the user. 
In  the case of  agriculture,  this  use  is  considered to  be a function of the  local 
crop water requirements as calculated in the SAPWAT model, and  efficiencies 
and land size; return flows are not taken into account. 
Registration will provide crucial information for future water management. It may 
reveal whether water that is claimed according to decades-old documents such 
as permits for mines, or water allocations for irrigation schemes, or even basin­
transfers is, in reality, used or not. 
Implementation In inequitable SOCiety 
When the National Water Act was  formulated and adopted in the mid-1990s, it 
critically challenged prevailing inequities in water use by introducing a powerful 
legal tool  with  a potential for change. The next hurdle is the implementation of 
the law,  challenging the continuation of these  inequities in  reality. As "existing 
lawful  use" has been  authorised under the new law,  the old  racist and 
discriminatory practices that the Act precisely aims to  overcome are still  legal 
practice. Examples of the continuation  of former discrimination,  like  using .the 
argument that "water has already been allocated" are reported as the Simple and 
effective negation by the powerful of black claimants of water (Woodhouse and 
Hassan  1999). The  new options under the  National Water Act  are still largely 
unknown. Emerging farmers who want to "Iegalise" their current or intended water 
use do not know where to go. Persistent accusations of "illegal use" may render 
black people even  hesitant to register current use. 
The current campaign for registration of water use would be a first step towards 
recognising  poor people's current water  use (and charging fees).  However, 
registration is easy for the organised users who were already registered in the past, 
like the former  Irrigation Boards,  industries and  mines.  But  as yet,  none  of the 
smallholder schemes has been organised into an association that fulfils the criteria 
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to be  registered  as  Water  Users' Association. Many small  schemes,  like  food 
gardens supported by  a wide  range of NGOs,  churches,  etc.,  or spontaneous 
initiatives to start irrigation, function  almost unnoticed. If the poor already drop 
out at  the  first  step to legalise water use,  even  the  limited quantities of water 
that they use today,  risk  being allocated to others. Therefore,  in  provinces like 
Mpumalanga and the Northern Province,  DWAF  undertakes specific efforts to 
compile exhaustive lists of the formerly state- or NGO-supported schemes. 
While poor people's basic drinking water rights are well protected in the Reserve, 
priority allocation of water for agricultural and other productive use by marginal 
and small farmers has not been stipulated in concrete and operational rules that 
can be  implemented as yet. Such  specification needs to go beyond household 
level, in order to ensure that both men's and women's entitlements to water are 
considered. The latter will  be  most relevant,  for example, when  membership of 
the future Water Users' Associations is established. 
One possible way  to translate the basic principle of redressing  inequities into 
concrete pro-poor legislation is to adapt general authorisations and to authorise 
categorically the use of relatively small quantities of irrigation water by farmers 
who have limited access to land. For example, Schedule 1 water use is authorised 
by  law  without any  registration  nation-wide. Schedule  1 refers  to  reasonable 
personal use and  also includes water use  for  home  garden  watering,  but  it 
explicitly mentions "not for commercial purposes." Even  though gardens of the 
rich  may  exceed  the  sizes  of vegetable  plots in community gardens, the 
specification "not for commercial  purposes" excludes poor and  emerging 
smallholders who are definitely market-oriented and price-oriented, and certainly 
want to become so if markets were better. That specification could be cancelled. 
A similar but more site-specific option would be to extend the existing General 
Authorisation  for  irrigation up to 25  hectares in  areas without water stress,  to 
those parts of water-stressed basins where water competition is still absent or 
low. As local variation is huge, many such sites could  be  identified. This would 
empower poor farmers especially for future competition. If competition over water 
is already strong, General Authorisations for specific sites may be most effective 
and enforceable where competing poor and  better-off farmers are  grouped 
together in  separate upstream  and  downstream  sites.  However,  if water 
competition  is between  neighbours at the  micro-level,  larger holders may  find 
ways  to  become  eligible as  well,  for example,  by  splitting up  their holding 
administratively and claiming water as many small users. Moreover, poor people's 
new rights are probably difficult to enforce. 
Whatever the most effective legal tool  would  be to endow the  poor with  water 
rights in  a general way,  this is only one side of the coin. Under competition for 
water, authorising some is only effective if others are "de-authorised." Voluntary 
water demand management measures among the beUer-off are important non­
legal tools currently being designed by DWAF. However, in the end, the legal tool 
of compulsory licensing would  be  needed as it is  binding. Under compulsory 
licensing, smallholders could get licences for optimal water use while allocations 
for the non-poor could be  reduced. 
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Measurement and  enforcement of water use  according to  the  licences would  be  a 
prerequisite.  However,  the  risk  exists that the  complex procedures for compulsory 
licensing could be recaptured by the literate, well-informed and organised water users. 
Therefore,  simultaneous efforts are  needed to  devise enforcement mechanisms. A 
crucial component of enforcement is the empowerment of poor people themselves: 
informing them of their rights,  building ,their negotiation capacity,  and  ensuring their 
effective inclusion in  forums for negotiation over the formal allocation schedule and 
its later implementation. For the implementing water authority this requires not only a 
thorough  understanding of  and  building  upon current local  realities and  legal 
arrangements,  but  also strong facilitation  skills and  commitments to  the  ultimate 
purpose of the Act. Support from  NGOs will be indispensable as well. 
Legal and  non-legal measures to take  water away  from  current users will  critically 
depend upon the amounts of water at stake. If larger farmers have to cede only some 
10  percent of their former use,  the job is  obviously much  easier; compensation 
procedures, as the National Water Act foresees if the profitability of an  enterprise is 
seriously affected, can be  avoided. Reportedly,  a number of large farmers in South 
Africa may well  see  saving  10 percent of water use as  a reasonable  measure,  if it 
were needed. A better understanding of the quantities at stake, and national and local 
sensitisation  campaigns  for  voluntary water use  restrictions  by  large users,  are to 
accompany pro-poor legislation. 
Another important direction in which  pro-poor legislation will be further specified is 
through the  National Water Resources  Strategy and  especially the Catchment 
Management Strategies,  which  provide a  legally binding framework for  water 
management. Catchment Management Strategies, which ultimately will be developed 
for each of  South' Africa's 19 Water Management Areas are specific and adapted to 
the widely varying local conditions and scarcity situation,  and  should specify water 
use and needs by poor women and men. They are formulated in close collaboration 
with water users in the basin through Catchment Management Agencies. 
Conclusion 
To  conclude, if the  aim of water management is to eradicate water deprivation, 
legal tools for priority water allocation to poor people are indispensable. The National 
Water Act of 1998 provides such tools in its over-arching principle that inequities 
from the past need to be redressed. However, this has to be translated into more 
concrete rules for non-domestic water uses as well,  and,  if there is competition, 
accompanied by concrete legal tools to take water smoothly away from  current 
large users. 
The main challenge for South Africa is the implementation of the new set of pro­
poor legal tools and policies. At this stage,  inequities could further widen due to 
the appropriation of the  implementation process by the better-off,  literate  an~ 
powerful water users,  who find their way  to the government anyhow. So 
implementation of the law needs to be accompanied by massive information, organisation, 
and empowerment of the masses of poor,  illiterate water users, still  excluded  from 
communication channels with the government even for simple registration, and 
hardly aware of their formal rights. Co-operation between the entire government, 
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DWAF,  Catchment Management Agencies,  NGOs, poor communities and other 
water users is clearly needed. Structurally new forms of water governance are 
warranted. 
5. Water allocation to poor women and men: governance 
Catchment Management Agencies in South Africa 
Today,  new forms of governance of water are high on the policy agenda. Key 
ingredients such as more users' participation, self-financing of water management 
and better consideration of the hydrological boundaries of basins in management, 
are all  supposed to improve governance of water,  besides  reducing state 
expenditures. Such new governance rarely aims at poverty eradication. As the first 
experiences with public participation and river basin management in South Africa 
show, the initiative and authority of the government remain pivotal to include poor 
people structurally in new governance forms and facilitate the implementation of 
pro-poor economic and legal tools. 
South Africa is a  pioneer in  creating new governance structures for water 
management by establishing Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) for gradual 
delegation of water resource management from the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry to these new agencies. CMAs will function directly under the Minister 
and will  be steered by a Governing Board and Committees that represent public 
interests. CMAs will be supported by a chief executive officer and technical staff. 
Initial tasks of the CMA include the development of the above-mentioned Catchment 
Management Strategy and advisory, monitoring and co-ordinating tasks. Collection 
of water charges is one of the early tasks to be taken over from DWAF. Once CMAs 
have proven to be mature and self-financing.  responsibilities such as water 
allocation and licensing will also be handed over. The first two pilot projects to 
establish CMAs are in the water-stressed and polluted Nkomati and Olifants basins. 
Already. since 1994, the South African government has actively promoted users' 
participation, for example during the formulation of the National Water Act. Regional 
offices of the DWAF also increasingly involved users. In the Nkomati and Olifants 
basin, for example, DWAF actively collaborated in public initiatives on issues like 
pollution by mines and water scarcity for downstream environmental needs. At that 
time and for those issues, the main actors were white, middle-class industrialists, 
environmentalists and consultants. In both basins, the establishment of the CMA 
and formulation of the formal  proposal built upon these already ongoing public 
initiatives. The major challenge was to bring the hitherto excluded black communities 
on board, both in the composition of the relevant forums and the contents of the 
proposal. 
In the Olifants basin, which covers 50,000 km2  and has 3.4 million inhabitants, a 
two-pronged strategy was followed to consult the public and create inclusive forums 
for the formulation of the proposal. One process focussed on the final output of a 
written proposal for the CMA and was implemented by a predominantly white 
consultancy firm; this had to be finalised within a tight time frame of one year and 
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a  half. The second process specifically targeted poor smallholders and was 
basically implemented by two black consultants. The two very different meanings 
of "public consultation" that emerged are illustrative for the governance issues 
at stake in the new water management paradigm. 
Negotiating formal stakeholders' agreement 
In  the first,  general  process that took place from  mid-1999 till end-2000, two 
rounds of five  public meetings were  held  covering all five  proposed  sub­
catchments throughout the  basin. In  each  of the  rounds,  about 700 people 
participated. These meetings were basically one-way information sessions on the 
general aims and structure of a CMA and proposed sub-catchments. The main 
language was English, with limited translation into the languages that the majority 
of participants mastered. Participants' main input was voting on the name of the 
CMA. 
Parallel to these public meetings, a Stakeholder Reference Group was created. 
Initially, this group was mainly composed of the white, mainly male participants 
in the earlier public consultation on pollution and environmental water needs. From 
the first  round  of public  meetings volunteers were  invited to participate in  the 
Stakeholder Reference  Group as  well. This  rendered  the  composition of the 
Stakeholder Reference Group more race-balanced (but still very male-dominated). 
In this Stakeholder Reference Group, the discussions on the CMA proposal were 
slightly more detailed, but still based on the ideas of the consultants, who also 
wrote  all  parts.  From  the  consultants' perspective, the  process of public 
participation seemed  mainly a  matter of negotiating the  formally  required 
agreement and  endorsement for the  proposal  by "the" stakeholders. The 
Stakeholder Reference Group was  increasingly shaped  and  seen  as  "the 
stakeholders." The draft proposal  of August 2000 admits that during the 
establishment of this CMA, no attention was paid to gender and poverty issues. 
Bottom-up empowerment for improved irrigated agriculture 
The  second process,  which  was targeted at poor small-holders,  started on the 
initiative of DWAF half-way through the first process, when it became clear that the 
public consultations were  not sufficiently addressing the problems of previously 
disadvantaged emerging farmers. The aim was to explore the establishment of a 
Smallholder Forum in  the  Olifants basin as a channel to speak out in  the CMA 
(Khumbane et al. 2000). Three hundred and sixty five black people participated in 
nine workshops. They came from NGOs, women's organisations, farmers' initiatives, 
including those engaged in land reform, local government and tribal authorities. The 
discussion, in the  local languages, focussed on people's own assessments of key 
problems in water management for agricuHure and livelihoods. It highlighted problems 
such as the need for land and land reform, markets, training, and better organisation 
in order to make productive use of water. Cases of competition over water that still 
reflected the  old  water laws  were  brought up as well. The  participants designed 
structures for a Smallholder Forum that is now proposed to become part of the new 
CMA and will have representation in the CMA Governing Board. In the future, this 
forum may also serve the wider purpose of better organising emerging farmers 
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for profitable agriculture, for example by forging better links between traders and 
producers. In this second process public participation was clearly interpreted as 
poor farmers' empowerment and structural integration in the CMA forums. 
Conclusion 
These very first experiences with new forms of basin-based governance in South 
Africa highlight significant differences in "public participation" and its effectiveness 
to address water-related poverty issues. Information is an  important first step, 
for which DWAF is now developing multi-media information strategies to reach 
people effectively nation-wide. But information alone is not enough if poor people's 
voices in  actual  water management are  to  be  heard. DWAF  keeps the 
responsibility that the  new  governance  structures encompass forums of poor 
water users that are  based on  felt  priority problems regarding water and land 
use and on self-organisation for change. Their concerns should be reflected and 
integrated in  the  CMA proposal  and  later policy documents such  as the 
Catchment Management Strategies. As long as such forums do not exist, which 
tends to be typically the case for poor people, governments have a role in creating 
them. Such forums need integrated support not only from the water sector but 
also from other government agencies and NGOs. 
6. Conclusions 
There is ample evidence that mainstream economic, legal and governance tools 
to manage water aggravate poverty by further reducing poor people's beneficial 
use of water, especially in water scarce areas. Imposing equal treatment for all 
in  unequal society aggravates poverty.  Inequities can  only be  redressed  if the 
new paradigm of water management is adopted that starts with recognising that 
water is most scarce for  poor men  and especially poor women. As a corollary, 
the primary aim is to develop water for both domestic and productive uses as 
the potentially powerful lever for poverty eradication and gender equity, even more 
so if effective collaboration is established within and outside the water sector. In 
order to realise  that potential,  new policies are  needed.  New  policies and 
intervention tools are proposed. 
1. Economic tools 
• 	 Water valuation attaches the highest value to a society that provides 
for all  water-related  basic needs of its people. The  full  range  of 
productive and domestic benefits of water and the distribution of 
benefits within SOCiety are taken into consideration. Benefits accruing 
to poor men and women are specifically and primarily targeted. This 
requires the  development of economic valuation tools that enable 
water managers to  weigh  up  the  real  value  of water to  poor 
communities,  against the  "market value" accorded to water in  the 
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• 	 Infrastructure costs to  fulfil  basic consumptive  needs are  fully 
subsidised up to minimum levels of service. Subsidised programmes 
to promote the development of appropriate low-cost technologies for 
poor women  and  men are  reinforced,  not swept  from  the agenda 
under the pretext of "equal treatment," ignoring the disproportionate 
benefits the non-poor received from  huge subsidies in  the  recent 
past. Lessons learned on the smart use of subsidies for sustainable 
benefit are taken into consideration. Integrated support is provided 
to poor water users to  increase the incomes from  water-related 
production, in order to have sufficient profits from which capital and 
operational costs can  be paid. 
2.  Legal tools 
• 	 In the nation's water law, water is set aside to fulfil basic consumptive 
and productive needs of poor people first. General principles in the 
law to redress  inequities are  translated  into operational,  effective 
rules  for  water allocation to poor users first and foremost. 
Implementation and enforcement of pro-poor legislation is pursued. 
3. Governance tools 
• 	 New systems of water governance at basin-level, like the Catchment 
Management Agencies in  South  Africa,  play an  important role  in 
implementing the new water management paradigm. As CMAs and 
user participation are not intrinsically pro-poor,  public conSUltation 
processes are explicitly and pro-actively shaped to organise the poor 
to ensure equal voices to all. 
4. Integration 
• 	 Water professionals actively co-ordinate and  integrate their 
actions with other government and non-government agencies to 
create  the  synergy needed to  alleviate water-related  poverty. 
Water ceases to be the exclusive mandate of water professionals. 
Instead, the overall mandate becomes poverty eradication to 
which each profession has a contribution to make. 
• 	 These changes require inter-departmental liaison-structures from 
national to local  levels,  as DWAF  now  implements.  Innovative 
ways are developed in which a range of professionals use their 
expertise and  develop new  knowledge for  the  benefit of poor 
people. 
CMAs, water managers, development activists and government officials all need to 
be equipped with the knowledge, tools and methodologies for using water to improve 
the lives of poor people and of poor women in particular. The continual achievement 
of these aims also requires  the  on-going  monitoring of the impact of  water 
management decisions on the poorest of the poor. This forms the key performance 
indicator of any department or body involved in the management of water. 
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Abstract 
A key determinant of high performing water resource systems is an effective 
institutional arrangement. An essentfal research question is what is an effective 
institutional arrangement? We  argue  that there is  no single best institutional 
model, as institutional requirements vary depending on the phase of  development 
of the  basin.  Based on  water accounting studies  we  observe that water use 
patterns can be used to identify stages of  river basin development. The hypothesis 
presented in this paper is  that depending on the phase of development, 
institutions wlff be concerned with different tasks. Thus an important feature of  a 
well-functioning set of water management institutions is the ability to  adapt to 
changes.  We  use a water accounting methodology to illustrate the concept of 
phases of development in  river basins.  We  argue that to  meet increases in 
demand over time,  institutions must change their focus  from  development of 
infrastructure, to better utilising and conserving water resources,  then to improving 
allocation and regulation of water resources. Institutions must be dynamic entities 
that change with changing phases of development of the basin. At their inception, 
serve a  single purpose. Then  as the  basin develops,  they either expand their 
number of functions,  or other institutions evolve  to  fulfil management 
requirements.  These concepts are illustrated in  two cases derived from  Nepal 
and China. 
1. Preface 
Imagine a river basin a long time ago ... Before the arrival of humans, the basin's 
renewable resources could be  measured at a point in the river nearby the sea. 
Now imagine a progression of events  in  the history of the development of the 
river basin. At first human demands on the water resource were modest. Water 
was used for crops, fishing, washing and navigation. With increasing population, 
there was  more demand for food,  and  river diversion  structures were built on 
tributary streams. Communities built up an agricultural basis for their livelihoods. 
Then,  as years  passed by,  many  more  people  settled  in  the area placing 
significantty greater demands on water resources, and communities constructed 
diversion structures along the main river. The area was used to produce food for 
the entire country,  so  it was  thought wise to construct a dam  and  reservoir to 
store and regulate 
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flows.  Initially,  some farmers benefited, while water scarcity remained a reality 
for other less fortunate people in spite of plentiful reservoir supplies. Significant 
water re-entered the  river as  drainage  return flows,  and navigation  remained 
possible. Yet  prosperous farmers needed  more water to produce more food for 
the nation, so serious efforts were placed in improving management and serving 
all users. Return flows dwindled, and navigation was no longer possible. 
To  further expand irrigated agriculture and to meet urban demands, individuals 
installed pumps to extract water from  aquifers and  drains. Conflicts developed 
as upstream  uSl;lrs  infringed on  the  traditional  rights of downstream  users. 
Pollution became a concern as urban and industrial effluents increased, and little 
water remained to dilute flows. Wetlands near the coast dried up. Poor people 
were left struggling to get sufficient drinking water. Alarmed, communities decided 
to take action ... 
2. Introduction 
Over the  last 50 years,  changes in  the  way humans use water have  been 
enormous. Major driving factors have  been  a growing popUlation,  economic 
development,  improved  living standards,  and  increasing demands. Irrigated 
agriculture has played a significant role in changing the face of water resource 
utilisation as dam,  diversion, delivery and drainage structures have  been 
developed to  store and distribute water for irrigation and  to drain out surplus 
supplies, With more development, we find ourselves in a situation where we have 
widely different and competing interests in our water resources. 
Our working hypothesis is that changing patterns of water use require adaptive 
institutions for sustainable, equitable, and productive management of basin wide 
resource. There is no one  set of institutional arrangements that is capable to 
adequately manage the present situation, then meet future needs. An important 
feature of institutions is the mechanisms they employ to adapt to change. 
In order to understand present uses of water, past trends, and future projections, 
it is essential to understand the physical resource base. Here we  present basic 
concepts of water accounting as  a means of providing this understanding. We 
use water accounting to develop and present various phases of water resource 
development, and problems that are faced during the various phases. We illustrate 
these concepts by examples from Nepal and China. 
3. Accounting for Water Use 
How much water is available for use within basins or sub-basins? Who are the 
major users of the water resource?  How much do they use?  Is there scope for 
water savings,  or scope for more development of water resources? These are 
the types of questions that can be addressed through the IWMI water accounting 
framework (Molden and Sakthivadivel, 1998). 
Water balance and water accounting. Water accounting  relies on  water balance 
studies. We define a domain bounded in space and by time. For example, we may 
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include a portion of a basin over a year's time, bounded spatially so that runoff 
is captured by the sub-basin, and vertically to include the bottom of the aquifer 
up to the top of the vegetation canopy. We  perform a water balance to quantify 
water flows  across the  boundaries including  rain,  evaporation,  surface and 
subsurface inflows and outflows. Changes in storage internal to the water balance 
domain,  such  as  changes in  reservoir levels or groundwater levels  must be 
considered.  Essentially,  water accounting divides  hydrological variables of 
discharge, rain and evaporation into water accounting categories (Box 1). 
Diversions, depletions, and recycling: Water is diverted to various uses. Water is 
depleted when  it  is  rendered  unavailable for  further downstream use-either 
through evaporation or by directing the water to sinks. Since not all water diverted 
to a use is depleted, some remains within the basin and is available for further 
use. Water recycling or reuse is prevalent in water resource systems. City effluents 
discharged  back into river systems are  often  used again  downstream. It  is 
common to underestimate how much reuse exists in river systems, especially in 
those that are highly stressed. 
Accounting for Precipitation:  In  many analyses of water resources,  only the 
"developed" water supply is considered-supply we tap from rivers by diversion 
structures. In IWMl's water accounting framework, rain is considered as a supply. 
Water commitments.  All  uses of water in  a  basin  could  be  captured  if  the 
boundaries of a basin were defined to extend to an ideal salt-freshwater interface. 
Most often it  is practical and useful to consider only part of a basin,  but when 
we do this we have to make sure and define commitments of water to downstream 
uses to meet ecological or other human requirements downstream. 
Open and Closed Basins. When all available water has been allocated to various 
uses we  consider the basin to be closed. When there is  water remaining in  the 
basin to develop and allocate, we  say the basin is open. In  many basins, there 
is ample water during part of a year, and at other parts it is dry. We consider the 
basin to be seasonally closed. 
4. Phases of water resources development 
Phases of river basin development are defined and illustrated (Figure  1)  using 
the water accounting methodology,  building on  work presented by  Keller et ai, 
1998. The  rainfall  onto a  basin  or sub-basin  plus  any trans-basin  diversions 
represents the  gross inflow into the basin.  Even  if all  feasible structures were 
built, in  many cases it is not possible to tap the entire amount of gross inflow. In 
addition, some water may be committed to downstream environmental uses. The 
amount of water potentially available for depletive use within the domain is the 
gross inflow less non-utilisable flows,  less any water commitments. 
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Box 1: Water Accounting Categories 









Gross Inflow is the total amount of 
water flowing into the water 
balance domain from precipitation. 
surface and subsurfece sources. 
Net inflow is the gross inflow plus 
any changes in storage. 
Water depletion is a use or 
removal of water from a water 
basin that renders it unavailable for 
further use. Water depletion is a 
key concept for water accounting. 
as interest focused mosfly on the 
productivity and the derived 
benefits per unit of water deplated. 
II is extremely important to 
distinguish water depletion from 
water diverted to a service or use 
as not all water diverted to a use is 
depleted. Water is depleted by four 
generic processes: 
Evaporation: waler is vaporised from 
surfaces or transpired by plants. 
Flows to sinks: water flows into a sea. 
saline groundwater, or other location 
where it is not readily or economically 
recovered for reuse. 
Pollution: water quality gets degraded to 
an extent that it is unlit for certain uses. 
Incorporation into a product: through an 
industrial. or agricultural process such 
as bottling water, or incorporation of 
inigation water into plant tissues. 
Process consumption is that 
amount of water diverted and 
depleted to produce a human 
intended product. 
· 
Non-process depletion occurs when water is 
depleted, but not by the process for which it 
was Intended. Non-process depletion can be 
either beneficial, or non-beneficial. 
· 
Committed water is that part of outflow from 
the water balance domain that is committed to 
other uses such as downstream 
environmental requirements or downstream 
water rights. 
· 
Uncommitted outflow is water that is not 
depleted. nor rommitted and is therefore. 
available for a use within the domain. but 
flows out of the basin due 10 lack of storage or 
sufficient operational measures. Uncommitted 
outflow can be classified as utllisable or non­
utilisable. Outflow is Ulilisable if by improved 
management of axisting facilities it could be 
consumptively used. Non-ulilisable 
uncommitted outflow exists whan the facilities 
are not sufficient to caplure the otherwise 
utilisable outflow. 
· 
Available water is the net inflow minus both 
lhe amount t)f water set aside for committed 
uses and the non-ulilisable uncommitted 
outflow. II represents the amount of water 
available for use at the basin. service. or use 
levels. Available water includes process and 
non-process depletion. plus Ulilisable 
outflows.  · 
A ciosed basin is one where all available 
water is deplated. An open basin is one where 
there is still some uncommitted UliRsabie 
outflow. 
· 
In a fully committed basin, there are no 
uncommitted outflows. All inflowing water is 
committed to various uses. 
The actual available water at any time in the course of river basin development 
is a function of the existing infrastructure. With all feasible structures built, the 
available water is  equal to the potentially available water. As time passes, and 
more infrastructure is built, more water is made available. When a new struCture 
comes  on line, there is an increase in the quantum of available water indicated 
by the stair-step pattern  in  Figure 1. 
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Development  Utilisation  Allocation 
As demand increases and more water is made available, more water is depleted. 
Eventually, the depleted water approaches the available water, and a new structure 
may be required. In a highly developed basin, depletion approaches the potentially 
available supplies. In  some cases,  water depletion  even  exceeds the potentially 
available  resource-in the  long-run,  a non-sustainable  situation. The  potentially 
available  water represents the  maximum  water that can  sustainably be  made 
available, unless more water is brought in through a trans-basin diversion. This is 
equivalent to a "frontier production function" in the field of economics. 
Three important stages can be  identified (Figure 1): 
1. 	 Development. In this phase the amount of naturally occurring water is not 
a  constraint. .Rather,  expansion  in  demands drives the  need for 
construction of new infrastructure. Institutions are heavily concerned with 
building infrastructure for providing supplies. Institutions typically emerge 
to  serve a single function, like construction organisations. 
2. 	 Utilisation. Significant construction has taken place, and goals are to make 
the most out of these facilities. Water savings and improved management 
of water deliveries are important objectives: Managing the supply of water 
to various uses is a primary concern. Early in this stage, scarcity is not a 
major problem, and inter-sectoral competition is minimal. Institutions are 
primarily concerned with  sectoral  issues such  as  managing  irrigation 
water,  or managing drinking water supplies. 
3. 	 Allocation. As closure is approached, and depletion approaches the potential 
available water,  there  is  limited  scope for further development. Efforts are 
placed  on  increasing the  productivity or value  of every drop of water.  An 
important means of accomplishing this is to  reallocate water from  lower to 
higher valued uses. Managing demand becomes increasingly critical. 
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Infrastructure construction is  limited to those  that aid  in  regulation  and 
control.  Little  scope  remains  for "real  water savings."  Institutions are 
primarily involved in allocation, conflict resolution, and regulation. Several 
important management and  regulatory functions  gain prominence, 
including inter-sectoral allocation. To effectively carry out these functions, 
either a single entity emerges (like the Brantas River Basin Organisation 
in Indonesia), or several inter-linked organisations manage these functions 
(as in the South Platte River Basin in Colorado). Co-ordination becomes 
important, involving significant transaction costs. 
5. Different Phases - Different Needs 
Institutional concerns differ depending on  the stage of development. These 
concerns may exist at all times,  but their importance or emphasis may change 
over time as illustrated in Table  1. 
Table 1: Various concerns at different phases of river basin 
development 
Development  Utilisation  Allocation 




Investing in O&M  .'  Managing demand 
Low value of water  Increasing value of water  High value of water 
Large structures  Modemisation/rehabilitation  Measurement, regulating 
Utilising groundwater  Conjunctive management  Regulating groundwater 
Diluting pollution  Emerging pollution/salinity  Cleaning up pollution 
Fewer water conflicts  Within-system conflicts  Between-system conflicts 
Economic water scercity  Localised water scarcity  Physical water scarcity 
Water data ­ not so 
important 
System water delivery data 
important 
Basin water accounting 
data important 
g/excluding poor in 
pment of facilities 
Including poor in O&M 
decision making 
Cutting off water to poor 
In  the  development phase,  infrastructure construction  plays a dominant role. 
Institutions in  the last 50 years have  been set up to build  major dams, canals, 
drinking water treatment and wastewater plants. Some agencies are dominated 
by civil engineers who have the important job of getting high quality work done 
quickly. Examples include the Mahaveli Development AuthOrity or Pakistan's Water 
and  Power  Development Administration.  In  Nepal's East Rapti  Basin,  building 
infrastructure is a major concern of residents, government agencies, and donors. 
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Constructing canals and managing canal water are two different types of tasks. 
Infrastructure projects, especially these serving large areas and numerous people 
are difficult to manage. The task is to provide water service to people with varying 
levels of expectations and demands subject to variations in climate. Even in ideal 
situations, this can take a long time to learn how to do. In the early stage, water 
utilisation may not be so effective. Reliable and equitable service deliveries can 
be difficult standards to reach. As a consequence, water scarcity for individuals 
may be a  reality because water is poorly managed, or construction quality or 
design  is poor.  Responses vary.  Some institutions quickly adapt,  and improve 
water delivery service. In other cases, problems persist. In response, people under 
their own initiative, develop alternative decentralised sources like groundwater, 
small ponds. or drains. 
Eventually through better service, reuse, local initiatives; and with growing demands, 
the physical supply of water becomes limiting. Water depletion approaches available 
supplies. There  are two typical responses.  If  there  is  more water remaining  for 
development (available water < potentially available water),  exploitation through 
more infrastructure development is possible. In the development and early utilisation 
stages,  developing more  supplies  may be  an  economically attractive  solution 
compared to more careful management. Later, as the easier locations are exploited, 
or as concerns about environment increase, infrastructure development gets more 
costly. Finally, during the allocation phase, the water resource limits. Different kinds 
of infrastructure development prevail:  measurement and  regulation  structures to 
control water become more important; rehabilitation and modernisation efforts are 
common; there may be scope for transbasin diversions. 
Over time, the value of water increases. Early, when water is plentiful, water has 
low value,  but when the  basin  is  closed,  and  demands for  a scarce  resource 
intensify the value of water can shoot up dramatically. This leads to a situation where 
early in the phases of development we are more concerned with developing supply 
of low valued water; while later in the development process,  managing demand 
prevails. When low valued water is plentiful. conflicts can be mitigated with more 
supplies. As supplies become limiting, the potential for conflict increases. 
Scarcity takes on different characteristics during various phases of development. 
Initially, scarcity is  felt  because there is no way  to tap water. "Water,  water 
everywhere but not a drop to drink  ...  " is a reality for many people who do not 
have the technology to access water. In the utilisation phase, the technology may 
be present,  but when  it is poorly managed,  people feel  water scarcity. This is 
common where head-tail  problems exist. Water accounting examples from  Sri 
Lanka show that there is sufficient water, but due to poor management, people 
still feel scarcity (Molden and Sakthivadivel, 1998). During the allocation phase. 
the absolute supply of the physical resource limits. 
Water scarcity in  its various forms during the advancing phases of development 
has implications for poverty.  During the  development phase,  an  important 
consideration is the identification of beneficiaries. Will infrastructure benefit poor 
people? Will more powerful people capture benefits? The problems change during 
the utilisation phase. Even though conveyance structures exist, management may 
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not fit the demands of the poor. Are the voices of disadvantaged people heard when 
making management decisions? During the allocation phase, water is  reallocated 
amongst sectors and people. When water moves away from agriculture to cities and 
industries, will the poor and less powerful be able to maintain their right to water; or 
capture the economic gains when water moves to higher valued uses? 
Environmental concerns also change over time. During development stages, huge 
changes in  nature can take place. During the utilisation phase, water use and 
depletion intensifies, further removing water that has environmental functions. A 
solution to scarCity is to tap into natural heritage sites for more water, resulting 
in  damaged wetlands.  During early phases of development, dilution can  be 
sufficient to' solve pollution problems. During allocation phases, dilution is not an 
option,  because there simply is not enough water.  Clean-up at the  source 
becomes increasingly critical. 
In  the allocation phase,  a  host of potential problems exist: pollution, conflict 
management,  resource overdraft. Managing more and different types  of 
information  becomes increasingly important.  Information  needs at the 
development phase are different. For design, information on river flows to assess 
supply,  and climate and population to assess demands are necessary. During 
the utilisation phase, more information is needed on the delivery of water services. 
6. Adaptive Institutions 
If early in the development phase,  we  try to design an  institutional framework 
that deals with  all these issues-pollution, poverty,  allocation,  regulation, 
construction-it is likely that we would fail.  At certain phases of development, 
some of these are not major concerns.  It is probably  right that there are 
construction agencies to make sure that there is safe and sound construction. It 
is probably not right that the same institutional set-up is used to manage service 
delivery. A different set of rules is required, different skills are required. And those 
who manage service delivery are probably not appropriate to regulate allocation 
and pollution of resources when these problems emerge. 
The implication is that water resource management institutions must adapt to 
meet different challenges as patterns of water use change. Common water 
problems are seen because agencies, at one time competent to carry out tasks, 
do not change. When evaluating an institution, we may find that they do 7 out of 
10 tasks fairly well. The seven may not be so important, while the three missing 
ones, may be critical. When analysing institutions then, we need to understand 
the mechanisms that exist to adapt to change. Are there rules to change rules? 
7. Examples 
Let  us explore two examples-one taken from  Nepal, and one from China to 
illustrate these concepts. The water accounting finger diagrams are given in Figure 
2, The Nepalese example illustrates a case of a basin in the development phase, 
while the Chinese basin is  closed, and is clearly in an allocation phase. Basic 
information on the two basins is presented in Table 2. 
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Figure 2: Water accounting finger diagrams 
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Table 2: Basin characteristics 
East Rapti 
China 
Fuyang River Basin  Particulars 
Nepal 

Type of basin 
 Of  Narayani 
Southern Basin 
Sub-basin of Huihe 
Basin 
i  Basin area  312.0 sQ. km. 

Land use cover 

22814 SQ. km. 
More than 60% forest 
1866 mm 
! precipitation 
Average annual potential 
569.2mm I Mean annual 
1460 mm 
evapotranspiration 















Wheat, (Ice and maize 
oil bearing crops 
Average yieldslha 
Wheat and corn, cotton,  Major crops grown 
4.26 tlha - wheat  1.85 to 2.5 tlha 
4.90 tlha - corn 

Major issues 
 1. 	 Physical water  1.  Concern about 
scarcity  impacts of increased 
2. 	 Inter-sectoral  diversion on natural 
competition for water  habitat. 
3.  Water pollution  2.  Population 
problem due to rural  resettlement and its' 
industrialisation  impact on present 
4.  Over-exploitation of  water use patterns. 
groundwater  3. 	 Soil degradation in 
catchment and 
sedimentation 
4. 	 Seasonal scarcity 
7.1  East Rapti, Nepal 
East Rapti River BaSin (ERB) is a part of the Chitwan valley within the inner tarai of 
Nepal. draining an area of 3,120 sq,  km. The East Rapti river originates from the 
Mahabarat range of mountains (MSL 1,500 m), traverses 122 km and  meets the 
Narayani River, one of the four major rivers in Nepal, at MSL 140 m. The Narayani, 
called the Gandak in  India, eventually discharges into the Ganges River.  Forests 
cover 60% of the area. The average annual rainfall is 1,937 mm, while the average 
annual potential evapotranspiration for the basin is 1,460 mm. Rainfall is concentrated 
during six months of monsoon period from middle of May to end of October. July 
and August are the rainiest months receiving nearly half the annual rainfall. Rainfall 
during the dry period of six months is only 7  percent of annual rainfall. The river 
hydrograph at the confluence of the Narayani River is presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The long-term average monthly discharges at the 
confluence point 
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The area has a growing population,  urban  and  industrial  base.  Most people 
remain engaged in agriculture. The Nepal Water Supply Corporation is engaged 
in constructing water supply and sanitation facilities to serve the needs of growing 
cities and villages. Irrigation projects are aimed at rehabilitating farmer managed 
irrigation systems,  or recently in  rehabilitating then  turning-over agency  run 
systems to farmers. 
There is no major dam or storage facility along the  East Rapti.  Farmers have 
constructed several  small diversion  structures along the  main  river and  its 
tributaries. Government agencies have built a few diversion structures, and have 
recently been involved in the modernisation of farmer constructed works. 
There is  one major transbasin diversion project where  water from  the  Kulekhani 
reservoirs flows through a hydroelectric station into the East Rapti. The purpose of 
this project is power generation rather than storage augmentation for the East Rapti. 
7.2  Fuyang, Hebel, China 
Fuyang  River  Basin  (FRB),  a  sub-basin  of  Haihe Southern Basin  in  Hebei 
province of North Chl,na,  drains an  area of 22,814 sq. km. The basin is divided 
into three broad regions: Fuyang river mountainous area', Fuxi plain and the Hufu 
inter-zone plain. The annual mean precipitation for the basin is 569 mm, 
In contrast to the East Rapti, the Fuyang River Basin is heavily equipped with a 

large number of storage structures. In  FRB,  there are 3  large reservoirs,  11 

medium reservoirs and 212 small reservoirs. These protect from floods,  supply 

. water for irrigation, industry, domestic and power production. Three-quarters of 

water is allocated to agricultural use, 15 percent for industry, and 10 percent for 

domestic use. 
Differences in water accounting indicators are striking (Table 3). At Fuyang, 109 
percent of available water is depleted showing that there is now over exploitation. 
At East Rapti,this indicator is only 39 percent, meaning that the amount of water 
in the basin is not constraining future water resource development. This is further 
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illustrated by considering the  ratio of uncommitted outflow to available water­
nearly 0 at Fuyang, and 61  percent at  ~ast Rapti. At Fuyang, process depletion 
(by industries, cities, and agriculture) is 83 percent of the available water, while 
at  East Rapti this is only 5 percent. At  Fuyang,  water resources are  heavily 
developed and effectively placed in  process use,  while the process fraction for 
East  Rapti  indicates that humans have  harnessed very  little of the water. 
Productivity of water in  agriculture has reached high levels in  Fuyang, while at 
East Rapti it remains quite low. One possible explanation is that'with increasing 
competition for water,  the value of water increases,  which  exerts pressure to 
increase productivity of water in agriculture. 
According to historical records, during 1950s and 1960s, Fuyang River was an 
important shipping channel for Hebei province. In contrast, from 1990s onwards, 
the river had over 300 dry days annually. The outflows from the basin dramatically 
decreased from  the late 1970s to less than  100 mm3  with  no outflow  in  1997 
(Figure 4). The basin has become a closed basin for all practical purposes. 
Table 3: Water accounting indicators 





Depletion/available water - DF  %  109  39 
Process/consumption/ Avail water - PF  %  83  5 
Non-process beneficial use - SF  %  12  31 
Non-process non-beneficial use - NSF  ,  %  14  4 
Uncommitted outflow/avail water  0/0­ 0.5  61 
Committed outflow/avail water  %  01.0*  9 
Productivity of water depleted by agriculture  US$/m'  0.29  0.09 
'not supplied. 
Figure 4: Variations of discharge measured at Aixinzhuang Hydrology 
Station from 1957 to 1998 
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In  Fuyang, groundwater accounts for 80 percent of supply,  while at  East Rapti. 
groundwater remains a relatively minor source although considerable groundwater 
potential exists. As  a conscious allocation decision, water managers of Fuyang 
have  allowed cities and  industries first  priority on  reservoir  water,  and  have 
supported farmers in their efforts to tap groundwater. Groundwater overdraft led 
to a dramatic drop of groundwater level.  especially in  the  recent two  decades 
(Figure 5). The groundwater table dropped at a rate of 0.68 m/year for the county 
located at  the  upstream and  at  a rate  exceeding  1 m/year for the  middle and 
downstream counties. There is apparently no institutional mechanism for dealing 
with this groundwater overdraft problem. 
Figure 5: Variations of groundwater depth from the surface, 1980 to 
1998, Jiuzhou Station, Renxian County, Hebei Province 
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For Nepal.  groundwater has been recognised as an important resource. But in 
spite of an  ample groundwater resource,  and  funding  for  development efforts. 
groundwater development  has  remained  limited. Institutional mechanisms to 
support groundwater development have not yet been effective. 
Environmental considerations differ in  the  two areas.  In  the  East  Rapli  Basin, 
non-process depletion by natural vegetation accounts for depletion of 35 percent 
of the water, a large portion in comparison to Fuyang (26%). An important feature 
of the East Rapti basin is the Chitwan National Park, an important nature reserve 
and popular tourist destination, situated near the tail end of the basin. Maintaining 
flows in the East Rapli is essential in maintaining the river ecosystem of the park. 
Efforts to build  more diversion structures along the  East Rapti  have  been 
hampered  in  part because of concerns about the  river habitat of the Chitwan 
National  Park. There have been  no  estimates of the flows  required  for 
environmental maintenance. 
In the Fuyang Basin, people are alarmed at the levels of pollution in the water system. 
Dilution  no .longer works,  as  flows are too small  to carry out excess pollutants. 
Industries continue to discharge polluted effluents. Salinity levels are also rising from 
agricultural practices. Institutions are at least showing some concern, but it is clear 
that they do not have the necessary clout to adequately deal with the problem. 
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In  Fuyang,  productivity levels  are  quite  high giving evidence  that water 

management in agriculture is effective at least promoting productive agriculture. 

In  East Rapti, cropping intensity is quite high, but crop yields remain low. Farmer 

constructed and managed systems in this area have often been cited as model 

examples for irrigation management, while agency constructed systems struggle. 

Management transfer efforts are  aimed  at  improving the  quality of delivery 

. services. Rehabilitation  and  modernisation of farmer managed systems is  an 

important concern in  the area to promote higher productivity. 
In  spite of ample water in  East Rapti,  many farmers do not have water during 
the dry months for crop-water scarcity is a reality for them. Within the Fuyang 
Basin, the amount of water limits the amount of productivity in  the basin. They 
have met a stage of absolute, physical water scarcity. 
Within the Fuyang River,  institutions for providing water delivery services seem 
well-developed.  Institutions for  regulation  of pollution  and  groundwater seem 
inadequate. At  East  Rapti,  institutions for construction  are  active.  It was 
recognised that this setup is not the best for managing water delivery services. 
Government agencies are still  struggling to find  the right formula for improved 
water management within government built irrigation systems. Mechanisms for 
allocation and regulation seem of little concern now,  except for the major issue 
of  allocation  between water for food  and water for nature.  It  is  questionable 
whether existing institutions are equipped to handle this problem. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
The growing  recognition  of a  river basin  as  the  most appropriate  unit for the 
development and management of water resources has prompted the search for 
appropriate institutional  arrangements for river basin  management. This paper 
has argued that there is no single "best" institutional model. Rather, institutional 
requirements differ with the different phases of development of the river basin. 
Thus, a clear specification of the stage of development of the river basin is crucial 
in  understanding or formulating  institutional arrangements for river basin 
management. This  paper outlines  a  framework to  define the  phases of 
development of a  river basin  on  the basis of water accounting. The  ideas 
presented in the paper are preliminary and research is underway to develop the 
methodology and test it empirically under various conditions. 
We demonstrated that as the river basin progresses from an "open" to a "closed" 
basin, three phases can be identified: development, utilisation and allocation. These 
are not mutually exclusive and some overlap of functions may occur. At the early 
stages of development, institutional arrangements focus on a single or very limited 
set of objectives. Very often they are involved in developing infrastructure to supply 
water.  Later,  more concern is  placed on  managing water within various sectors. 
With increasing scarcity brought on by more development, competition increases, 
the value of water increases, and a host of other issues including environmental 
concerns, pollution, and groundwater overdraft may arise. Over time they need to 
deal with  multiple functions that require  complex institutional arrangements that 
involve several organisations, and function in the realm of a broader and often 
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conflicting set of national objectives. Thus,  institutions are dynamic entities that 
need to cater to different management demands as water use changes with the 
progression of time.  Finally,  a key  feature  of an effective institutional design is 
the ability to adapt to changing needs. 
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Abstract 
Many developed countries such as the  USA,  France,  and Australia have evolved 
highly advanced and resilient institutional regimes for Integrated River Basin 
Management (IRBM); but this has taken decades or  even centuries of  gradual change 
to evolve. An issue which has held great appeal to policymakers, donors and social 
researchers is: might it be possible for the developing countries of today to  do an 
'institutional leap-frog', as it were,  to quickly approach a stage at which developed­
country basin institutions find themselves today.  This paper reviews the difficulties 
that developing countries might face in making such a leap-frog because of  the vast 
and fundamental differences in four realities that matter in their institutional evolution: 
hydrological and climatic, demographic, socio-economic, and the reality of the way 
their water sectors are organised. The paper suggests that problems that evolved 
basin institutions in the developed world have successfully resolved-pollution, 
sectoral allocation, etc-are not the uppermost in the priorities of many developing 
country policymakers and people; and the problems that are uppermost to them­
such as groundwater over-exploitation, using irrigation to promote the livelihoods and 
food security of the poor-have either remained unresolved in the developed world, 
or are rendered irrelevant by their evolutionary process. There is  thus the problem 
of  'contextual fit.' This does not mean that the experience of  river basin management 
in the developed world is irrelevant; but it does mean that uncritical imposition of 
developed-country institutional models in developing-country river basin contexts may 
prove dysfunctional or even counter-productive. 
1. Backdrop 
Management becomes important as a productive resource becomes scarce; and 
there is hardly a  situation  in  which this is truer than in  the case of the  water 
resource. For a long time now, water policies of many emerging nations have been 
focussed on developing the resource; and optimising was directed at the efficiency 
of water infrastructure rather than water itself. As water has became increasingly 
scarce, optimising is now being increasingly directed to improving the productivity 
of water itself. Increasingly, the river basin is emerging as the unit of management 
of land, water and other natural resources in an integrated fashion. Many developed 
89 Shah,  Makin and Sakthivadivel: Transposing River-Basin Management Institutions 
countries such as the USA, France, and Australia have evolved highly advanced 
and resilient institutional regimes for Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM); 
but this has taken decades-in Europe and centuries in the USA-of gradual 
change to  evolve. An issue which  has held great appeal to  policymakers and 
social researchers is this: 
Is  it necessary that developing countries in  Asia and Africa should take all that 
long in crafting such institutional regimes? Or might it be possible for them to do 
an "institutional leap-frog," as it were, to a stage at which developed country basin 
institutions are today? 
A textbook case of institutional reform for I  RBM in recent times has been the Murray­
Darling basin in Australia, where sweeping changes have been made and enforced 
since 1990. And transferring the lessons of success in IRBM-from Murray-Darling 
to Mahaveli, and Mississippi to Mekong-has emerged as a growth industry. 
This paper attempts a broad-brush approach to understanding the material 
differences in  the contexts of the developed-country river basins,  from where 
institutional models emerge, and the developing-country river basin context in which 
these are applied. The idea is not to undermine the significance of the lessons from 
success but to emphasise the need for sagacity and critical analysis in  assessing 
what  will  work and what will  not, given the differences in  the context. The phrase 
"Institutional change" is used to describe how communities, government and society 
change recurrent patterns of behaviour and interactions in coping with water scarcity 
and its socio-ecological ill-effects. It involves understanding laws and rule-making, 
roles,  policies and  institutional arrangements at different levels. The over-arching 
premise is that the effectiveness of a pattern of institutional  development is 
determined by at  least four realities of a  river  basin: hydro-geological reality, 
demographic reality. socia-economic reality. and the organisation of the water sector. 
By implication, institutional arrangements that have proved effective with one set of 
these realities may require major adaptation before they become appropriate to the 
needs of a river basin context defined by an alternative set of these realities. 
Integrated River  Basin  Management is a powerful  idiom,  and  will  increasingly 
dominate natural resource management discussion in the developed as well as 
developing world. In its broadest sense, a basin or catchment is visualised as 
"an  inter-connected machine or system  which  transforms natural 
inputs of solar energy, atmospheric preCipitation, nutrients and other 
environmental factors, along with man-made inputs of  labour, capital, 
materials and energy,  into output products such as food,  fibre,  timber, 
building materials,  fuels,  minerals,  natural vegetation and wildlife, 
recreational and aesthetic amenities,  buildings and development 
sites,  as  well as water in  desirable quality and quantity." (Burton 
1986, cited in  Hu  1999:324). 
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River"basin management as a notion goes far beyond traditional land and water 
management and 
"includes significant parts of  land-use planning, agricultural policy 
and erosion control,  environment management and other policy 
areas. It covers all human activities that use or affect fresh water 
systems.  To  put it briefly,  RBM is the management of water 
systems as part of the broader natural environment and in relation 
to their socio-economic environment." (Mostert et al  1999:3). 
Institutional discussions on  IRBM  have  tended  invariably"":'and  probably 
erroneously-to gravitate around three  models of strategic organisations for 
managing river basins: 
the hydrological model, in which a river basin organisation/authority, 
cutting  across administrative  boundaries,  takes over all  charge  of 
water resource management; 
the  administrative model,  prevailing  in  many developing countries, 
in  which  water  management  is  the  responsibility of territorial 
organisations unrelated to hydrological boundaries; and 
co-ordinating mechanisms superimposed on  the  administrative 
organisations to achieve basin management goals. 
Each has advantages and disadvantages: the hydrological model effectively deals 
with upstream-downstream issues that the administrative organisation is generally 
unable to deal with; however,  hydrological organisations tend typically to focus 
on water and overlook land management issues. River Basin Commissions, as 
a hybrid, might combine the advantages of both, but at least in the developing 
country context, they often command little authority, and are therefore confined 
to lowest-common-denominator solutions (Mostert et aI1999). In many developing 
countries today,  institutional  reform  for  RBM  is confined  almost wholly to the 
creation of the basin-level organisation-the implicit assumption being that mere 
formation  of the  appropriate  organisation  will  result  in  IRBM,  an  assumption 
whose validity has been  repeatedly refuted. 
In the developed world, the discussion has been much broader and has veered 
around initiatives in four aspects of natural resource governance: 
[a] 	 some mechanism for basin  level  negotiation  and  co-ordination 
fortified with adequate authority and resources, and a broad mandate 
considered appropriate to the basin's context; 
[b] 	 legal and regulatory reform; 
[c] 	 redeSigning economic instruments of policy (transfer prices, taxes, 
subsidies) in harmony with national policy goals; 
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[d] 	 redesign  of  economic  institutions  (including  utilities,  service 
providers,  property rights;  water markets,  Irrigation  Management 
Transfer to user organisations). 
Countries like the USA have achieved, over long periods, high levels of integration 
even without a central basin organisation (see, for example, Svendsen 2000). 
2. Applying the lessons of the Murray-Darling to the developing world 
The Murray-Darling River system,  as a recent case of accelerated institutional 
reform, has appropriately emerged as a model of institutional structure for IRBM. 
The basin encompasses over 75 percent of the State of New South Wales, 56 
percent of the State of Victoria, all of the Australian Capital Territory,  and small 
parts of Queensland and South Australia, a vast region of the south-eastern parts 
of the continent. Already, several case studies of the Murray-Darling are available; 
and it is not our intention to review these. In brief, the institutional innovations of 
the Murray-Darling basin management regime include: 
[a] 	 the Murray-Darling Ministerial Council as the top-level policymaking 
and co-ordinating mechanism; the Murray-Darling Basin Commissiol'1 
as the operating organisation; and several Catchment Management 
Agencies that are responsible for day-to-day management of water; 
[b] 	 a system of permits for diversions that encompasses all uses except 
the water needed for domestic use, livestock production, and irrigation 
of up to 2 ha which are recognised as a prior right (Hatton MacDonald 
and Young 2000 :  10), and exempted from legal as well as permit system; 
[c] 	 an  effective cap  on  water diversions at 1993-94 levels of 
development to  ensure  adequate  environmental  supplies, 
accompanied by a system of volumetric licensing to users that raises 
the scope for large-scale water trade across states and sectors; 
[d] 	 consumption based, full-cost-recovery  pricing  (Hatton  MacDonald 
and Young 2000: 14); 
tel 	 a system of "salinity credits" that permits trade in salinity; 
[f] 	 explicit mechanisms for water allocation for environmental needs; 
[g] 	 a legal regime that separates water rights from land rights; 
[h} 	 privatisation of service providers such as Murray Irrigation Ltd  and 
Victoria's Rural Water Corporation (Malano et al 1999). 
The Murray-Darling  RBM  regime  clearly  represents a  highly evolved form  of 
institutional arrangement and effectively addresses all major problems that a mature 
river basin would face. As alluded to earlier, exploring whether developed-country 
basin institutions- particularly, Murray-Darling  experienc~an be replicated in 
a developing-country context has fascinated many researchers in recent years. An 
entire issue of Water International (vol. 24, no 4, 1999) was devoted to it in  1999. 
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The results of these investigations have not been very encouraging. For example, 
Hu explored the applicability of Murray-Darling experience in the Chinese context 
and concluded negatively because of: (1) difficulty of co-ordinating authorities at 
different levels; (2) unclear ownership of resources; (3) small farming scales; and 
(4) poor education of resource users. (Hu 1999 : 323). 
In  a  similar vein,  Malano,  Bryant and Turral  (1999)  ask:  "Can Australian 
experiences be transferred to Vietnam?" Their conclusion is less emphatic than 
Hu's, but all their evidence suggests that it will be long before Vietnam becomes 
really ready for the Murray-Darling prescription; and that "context,  hydrological 
and socio-economic, defines the detail and balance that is  required .." (p:  313). 
The new water law of Vietnam contains provisions to adopt an  integrated river 
basin approach. The World Bank as well as ADB have apparently held up funding 
to Vietnam until it forms the National Water Council to implement it. The Ministry 
of Agriculture and  Rural  Development, which is  at present in  charge of water, 
does not  relish the responsibility of IRB!\II.  The progress in  stakeholder 
participation, another Murray-Darling prescription, has been slow to say the least. 
Farmers view irrigation provision as a government responsibility;  even  so, 
irrigation charges in Vietnam are high by Asian standards. Yet, presumably under 
donor pressure, the government tried to  eliminate  irrigation subsidies, but this 
was followed by massive popular unrest in  1998, whereupon, the Government 
had to  restore the subsidies. 
Can the Australian success in enforcing the "user pays" principle be transferred 
to the Solomon Islands? Hunt explored this issue in a recent study and concluded 
that such transfer "is not sustainably viable" on account of huge differences in 
pOlitical structures, national priorities, living standards, cultural traits, technological 
development,  literacy levels,  financial  and  infrastructure growth,  and change­
management competency. All these differences result in the absence of what Hunt 
calls a "contextual fit" between the policy development and the respective policy 
application  environme~t. ~Hunt.1999 : 302) 
"If there is any conclusion that springs from a comparative study of river systems, 
it is that no two are the same" (Gilbert White cited in Jacobs 1999). Each  river 
basin must differ from any other in a thousand respects; but that does not mean 
that lessons of success in one are of no value to another; it does mean though 
that uncritical "copycat" replication of successful institutional models-either by 
enthusiastic national governments or at the behest of enthusiastic donors-is a 
sure formula for failure. The history of institutional reform in developing-country 
water sectors is dotted with failures of such copycat reform. 
Integrated  river basin  management  is  not  a  new  idea,  even  in  developing 
countries.  India tried to transpose the TVA (Tennessee  Valley Authority)  model 
tried in  the  USA by constituting the  Damodar Valley Authority,  which was a 
resounding failure.  Catchment  management committees were established in 
China way back in  the 1950s in  some of the  major river basins such as the 
Yangtse and Yellow River to plan and exploit water resources, generate electricity, 
mitigate flood damage, and provide facilities for navigation (Hu  1999: 327). But 
all these institutions shed their broad agenda and ended up focusing on irrigation, 
the purpose that was most central to their domains at those times. 
93 Shah,  Makin and Sakthivadivel: Transposing River-Basin Management Institutions 
In  Sri  Lanka,  a Water  Resources  Board was established  as  early as  1964 to 
promote  integrated water resources  planning,  river basin  and  trans-basin 
development and to tackle water pollution; however, the Board never worked on 
its broad  mandate and  instead,  took to  hydrological  investigations and-drilling 
tubewells.1  Such examples can be multiplied easily; the point is: in learning useful 
lessons from  success cases for  making  meaningful  reform  in  developing 
countries, it is important to understand critical differences between the two worlds 
that have material significance for what will work and what will not. We pose that, 
in understanding the applicability of institutional innovations, it is critical to take 
into account four types of material differences between the developed- and 
developing-country realities: 
[aJ  hydrology and climate; 
[b]  demographics; 
[c]  socio-economics; and 
[d]  organisation of the water sector. 
We  briefly outline these material differences in  the following sections. 
3. Hydrology of the developing world 
Historically, agriculture advanced early in  arid climates such as those of Egypt 
and  Iraq;  but industrial development began  early in  the  temperate and  humid 
climates of Europe, North America and Japan. Some arid areas where significant 
wealth creation and accumulation has occurred-as in West Asia-are typically 
rich in mineral and oil resources. Today, however, the bulk of the developing world, 
where rainfall tends to be low and water scarcity is a major emerging constraint 
to progress is in the arid or semi-arid2  parts of the world. Figures 1 and 2, showing 
the global distributions of mean annual rainfall and potential evapotranspiration, 
help to illustrate some major climatic differences between developed countries 
(mostly in the temperate latitudes) and developing countries (mostly in the tropical 
and  sub-tropical regions). 
Sutcliffe (1995)  pOinted  out  that  developing countries also  happen  to  be 
concentrated in  parts of the world with more extreme climates when  compared 
to the regions occupied by today's developed countries. Figure 1 illustrates the 
'Another round of reform has just begun in Sri Lanka. In 1990, a draft law made provision 
for bulk water allocation and  included the  establishment of a National Water Resources 
Council to do what the Water Resources Board could not; but the law could be submitted 
to the Parliament only in 1995 for the lack of consensus in the cabinet as well as amongst 
the myriad agencies dealing with water ( Birch and Taylor 1999:331). 
'Referring to regions like  India and  West Africa,  which are  humid for a small part of the 
year but arid during the rest of the year, 
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enough  of  it from  evapotranspiration to  last from  October until April-May, the 
months that mark the period of highest water stress.  Botswana receives  all  of 
its 350-500 mm rainfall during November-March, the period which also coincides 
with the highest evaporation, resulting  in  little or no runoff (Sutcliffe 1995: 69). 
Humid  areas typically have higher stream densities than  are  found  in  the arid 
and semi-arid areas,  which  means that, ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of 
precipitation in the arid and semi-arid areas runs off in sheet flow before forming 
into streams,  and  is  thereby subject to  higher ET (evapotranspiration)  losses 
(Figure 2).  Other things also are  not quite the same;  the developing world­
especially, South Asia and much of Africa-around the tropics has higher mean 
temperatures for more of the year than the developed world. And, for equivalent 
levels of precipitation,  runoff and the need for irrigation tends to be greater in 
arid and semi-arid areas than  in  humid areas (Sutcliffe 1995:64). 
The climate and hydrological conditions, combined with demography (discussed 
in  the following section),  explain  why  decentralised institutions for  water 
management have  historically evolved  in  many parts of the  developing world. 
The profusion of small tanks in  India's southern peninsula and Sri Lanka can be 
viewed  as the response  of communities in  the  catchment areas to stake their 
claim on  their rainfall.  Even today,  one collective maintenance task carried out 
by  many south  Indian tank communities before the  start of the  monsoon  is 
cleaning and deepening of the channels that feed rainwater runoff to their tanks. 
Village people here recognise that if they do not capture runoff in artificial streams, 
most of it will be lost before it reaches their tanks. 
4.  Demographics 
Many parts of the developed world have extreme climates too; however, over 
time, population and urbanisation in these parts have tended to concentrate 
in wet areas or on downstream reaches of rivers near coastal areas, where 
water can be supplied through large-scale diversion structures. As  Figure 3 
shows, except in Europe, most of the developed countries have low population 
densities throughout,  with  urban  agglomerations near the coasts and  rural 
population along rivers or irrigation systems. Here, the competition is for large 
accumulated bodies of "diverted water." Since catchment areas have relatively 
sparse populations, the downstream water-harvesting structures have large 
catchment areas that are virtually free from competition. 
But this is not the case in some of the most densely populated regions of the 
world.  In  India,  for instance,  population density is  high-approaching 600 
persons per km2  in  the water-rich Ganga basin; and seldom less than 350­
400 even in semi-arid western India and hard-rock peninsular India. Population 
density is  high both  upstream and downstream of dams. The same is true 
for much of China; the North China plains have much less Water than South 
China; but their population density is around the same. One might argue that 
the cause of intensive groundwater development in  South Asia and China is 
that most people in these regions cannot be downstream of large dams; and 
by sinking tubewells people upstream are,  in a sense, challenging the basic 
inequity inherent in the pattern of large irrigation projects that usurp the 
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rainfall precipitation of populous upstream catchment areas to bequeath it to  a 
small number of canal irrigators. 
All these factors have had implications for the kind of water institutions that have 
evolved historically in the developed and developing world. For example, the system 
of rights based on  riparian  doctrine and on the  doctrine of prior appropriation is 
alien to the cultures of  many developing countries because the  largest majority, 
by  far,  depend upon  rainfall  and  local  water-harvesting and  storage structures. 
Riparian rights or prior allocation become operative only along the streams and 
rivers, where the bulk of the irrigators and water users tend to be concentrated in 
countries like the  USA or Australia.  But these  make  no sense,  for example, for 
some 20 million persons pumping groundwater in South Asia; or the communities 
that use over 300,000 tanks in South India or 7 million ponds in China. 
Because large proportions of the population in the developing world depend upon 
rain and on local storage, the people's notions of ownership and rights relate more 
easily to precipitation than large-scale public diversions.  Egypt gets less than 10 
percent of its water from  rainfall; yet Egyptians consider the  rainwater to be truly 
their own.  In  Asia,  where  population  densities are commonly as high  in  the 
catchment areas of the basin, as along the stream and river channels, the impliCit 
primacy of the right of communities over precipitation rather than over diversions 
is for example widely accepted. Indeed, in recent years, a popular slogan in western 
India is "rain  on  your roof,  stays  in  your house;  rain  on  your field stays in  your 
field;  and  rain  in  your village  stays in  your village."  In  the Western  countries, 
upstream-downstream conflicts are important because most water users think of 
users upstream as their rivals.  In the World Water Forum that met at The Hague 
in March 2000, the slogan that the Delhi-based Centre for Science and Environment 
popularised was "Everyone Lives Downstream," which is eminently sensible if all 
or a majority of people in a basin depend for their water needs directly upon rainfall. 
The  IRBM discussion talks very  little  of  the  enormous amount of work on 
farming  in  the semi-arid tropics,  done by  national and  international centres 
such  as  ICRISAP. As the Global Water Partnership (2000: 25)  notes: "Most 
water management, including the literature on  IWRM, tends to focus on  the 
'blue water'4, thus neglecting rain  and soil-water management. Management 
of 'green water' flows holds significant potential for water savings." This is 
because there is little real  "dryland farming" of the  Indian and West African 
variety in  the developed world; but making the best use of soil moisture is a 
critical issue in  many African and Asian  countries.  Europe,  Canada,  New 
Zealand, and USA do have rain-fed  farming;  but this is  not quite the same 
as dry farming in  western Rajasthan or sub-Saharan Africa; in  many of these 
31nternational  Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
'''Blue water"  is water existing in bodies such as rivers or lakes, or pumped from aquifers. 
"Green water" is soil water extracted and transpired by plants. 
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countries,  favourable  rainfall  and  climate conditions result  in  favourable  soil­
moisture regimes that make irrigation unnecessary for growing good crops. 
The conventional notion of irrigation is one of controlled supply of water to meet 
the full scientific requirements of plants precisely when needed. But the irrigation 
that is most widely practised in  South Asia and amongst smallholder farmers in 
Africa is supplemental irrigation designed to increase the productivity of "green 
water". Green water is the precipitation used directly for crop production and thus 
"lost" in evaporation; "blue water" pumped out from wells is as important in South 
Asia and North China as the part that flows into rivers and canal systems.5  This 
is quite unlike the situation in many developed country river basins. In these the 
bulk of economic water demands have been  met  from  development of  "blue" 
surface water and where.  with the closure of these  basins. the focus of basin 
management is on  raising the productivity of blue surface water,  largely without 
regard to green water. 
Uniformly high population density, combined with unhelpful climate and hydrology, 
has a profound impact on the objectives of water management in  developing­
country river basins. In recent years, IWMI's water accounting work (Molden and 
Sakthivadivel 1999: 58-60) has made much contribution to understanding water 
productivity in the basin context.5  Although IWMI's focus has been on productivity 
of water in  agriculture,  the  framework can  be  easily generalised to  develop a 
notion of basin-level water productivity in  terms of a social welfare function for 
all stakeholders in a river basin constituting a basin community. Under this broad 
conception. 
Basin welfare productivity of water = Basin welfare/Available water 
Water productivity understood thus could be enhanced by 
[aJ  enhancing productivity in each use; and 
[b]  constantly reallocating water amongst alternative uses-irrigation, 
domestic, industrial, and environmental-so that the marginal 
5This  distinction  between  'green' and  'blue' water is  extremely important for developing 
countries  in  the  semi-arid tropiCS.  Terrestrial  ecosystems are  'green water' dependent; 
aquatic ecosystems are blue water dependent (GWP 2000:24). 
"Standard definitions used in IWMI water accounting work (Molden and Sakthivadivel1999) 
are: Gross inflow: total amount of water flowing into a domain from precipitation, surface 
and sub-surface sources;  Net inflow: gross inflow +change in  storage; Depletion: use  or 
removal of water from a domain that renders it unavailable for or unsuitable for further use; 
Beneficial depletion: depletion that generates welfare; Process depletion: depletion in pri­
vate economic uses; Non-process depletion: depletion in non-private, socially valued uses; 
Non-beneficial depletion: depletion that generates no economic or non-economic, private 
or social benefit; Committed water: outflow committed to other or downstream  uses;  Un­
committed outflow: outflows by default which are not used to create any value, private or 
social; Available water:  net inflow -committed outflow-non-utilisable uncommitted outflow. 
Non-depletive uses: uses that create value without resulting in depletion. 
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contribution to overall welfare by water 'allocated to all uses remains 
equal. 
Using the  IWMI water accounting framework, this welfare productivity measure 
can be written in several alternative ways to highlight the importance of different 
water use strategies7 .  But for highlighting the difference between developed and 
developing world, a useful way to write the welfare productivity ratio is: 
Basin welfare/Available water =[Basin welfare/Diversions] * [Diversions/Available 
water] 
In  relatively water-abundant humid  regions,  with  low population density in  the 
catchment areas and dense human settlements near the coasts and along rivers, 
river-basin  management seeks to maximise basin  welfare  productivity by 
increasing  [Basin  welfare/Diversions]. Allocation  of diverted water amongst 
alternative uses is  a crucial function  in  basin-level water management in  such 
conditions.  Here,  reservoirs  have large free  catchments;  and  ET  in  catchment 
areas  is  often  not high;  therefore,  the  need for active  human  intervention to 
maximise [Diversions/available water] is  not great. 
In  water-scarce tropical  countries with  high  population density everywhere,  as  in 
South Asia and  China,  maximising basin  welfare  involves working  on  both the 
components. Increasing the productivity of diverted water is certainly important; but 
equally important is the need to maximise the proportion of precipitation and inflows 
into a basin that can be diverted before they are lost to non-beneficial depletion. 
It  is against this backdrop that we  need to consider the growing mass movement 
for rainwater harvesting and groundwater recharge  in  western  India (Shah 2000). 
The region has amongst the highest windspeeds encountered anywhere in the world; 
it  has high  mean  temperatures for nine  months;  rainfall  varies between 300-800 
mm/year; and population density is 300-500 per km2 in the catchment areas as well 
as in the downstream areas. The greatest challenge for rural communities is surviving 
the  annual  pre-monsoon drought in  April  and  May,  which  is  made infinitely more 
. daunting by regular failure of monsoon rains.  During the pre-monsoon months, leave 
alone growing crops; ensuring adequate drinking water for humans and cattle is the 
great challenge, especially in the catchment areas of river basins. While government 
investment programmes concentrated on  building  large  reservoirs  downstream to 
support irrigation and municipal water supplies to towns, the problems of the people 
living in the catchment areas remained  unaddressed. 
Disenchanted with government and public systems, NGOs and communities began 
to find  their own  solutions.  The  past decade  has witnessed  a massive popular 
awakening as the result of the efforts of NGOs like Tarun  Bharat Sangh,  Pradan, 
and of religious organisations such as the Swadhyaya Pariwar. This has taken the 
form  of rainwater conservation  and  groundwater recharge  work on  a scale that 
governments or public agencies would not be able to manage. The basic motivation 
7For example, by writing Basin welfare/available water = (Basin welfare/total depletion) *(total 
depletion/ total diversion) *( total diversion/water available), we can signify alternative routes 
to water productivity. 
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that has been driving the movement is to ensure availability of domestic water supply 
for two months before the monsoon and for one or two crop-saving waterings from 
wells; and there are indications that the movement may well  meet this challenge. 
Government agencies and scientists (hydrologists in particular) have been dubious 
about this mass movement,  their argument being that rainwater harvesting 
structures upstream merely transfer water; these reduce the input into the reservoirs 
downstream, thereby reducing their productivity.  But this  argument does not 
resonate with the communities, especially in the upstream areas, which fail to see 
why they cannot meet their basic water domestic needs  instead of feeding 
reservoirs to irrigate relatively small areas of paddy or cotton.  In  defence of this 
popular movement, the  Delhi-based Centre for Science and  Environment has 
asked: what does India need more-Irrigation or Drought-proofing? In reply, it has 
suggested that by a total rethink on  "appropriate" river-basin management, India 
can trade drought-proofing over vast areas by sacrificing irrigation of small areas. 
It has also adduced evidence to show that diverting rainwater in a large number 
of small water-harvesting structures in a catchment captures and stores more of 
the scarce precipitation, closer to the communities in  these parts of the world, 
than having a large reservoir downstream (Agarwal 2000).8  This is because water 
collected over larger watersheds will have to flow over a larger area before it is 
collected and a large part will be lost in small puddles and depressions, as soil 
moisture and evaporation. Much before irrigated crop production, semi-arid India 
needs dril1king  water for its dispersed rural  population during the nine months 
without rainfall.  Many Indian observers think that the answer is  not piped water 
supply schemes  but decentralised rainwater harvesting. Agarwal's Centre for 
Science and Environment has estimated the average area needed per village to 
capture sufficient water to meet every household's drinking and cooking water 
requirement in  the various regions with  varying  climate,  precipitation  and 
demographic conditions. The average for India as a whole was  all  of  1.14 hal 
village in  a normal year and 2.28 halvillage in a drought year! 
5. Organisation of the water sector 
Developed-country water sectors which  have  evolved over decades of public 
intervention tend to be highly organised and formalised with the bulk of the water 
delivered-and most of the users served - by "service providers" in the organised 
aFor instance, Agarwal cites evidence from the Negev desert in Israel to show that 3000 
micro-catchments of 0.1  ha capture 5 times more water than a single catchment of 300 
ha,  and this multiple increases in a drought period (p: 9). He also cites results by Michael 
Evanari, an Israeli scientist that show that 'While a 1 ha watershed in the Negev yielded 
as much as 95 m
3  of water per ha per year, a 345 ha watershed yielded only 24 m3/hal 
year.  In  other words. as much as 75  percent of the water that could be coliected was 
lost. This loss was even higher in  a drought year.' Agarwal cites Evenari: " ... during 
drought years with less than 50 mm of rainfall. watersheds larger than 50 ha will not 
produce any appreciable water yield while small natural watersheds will yield 20-40 
m3/ha.  and micro-catchments (smaller than 0.1  hal as much as 80-100 m3/ha." 
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sector.  In  low-income countries,  a vast majority of water users-the poorest 
ones-get their water directly from  rain  and from  local  private or community 
storage without any  significant mediation from  public agencies or organised 
service providers. The notion of water service providers is alien to a majority of 
rural South Asians and Africans. As  a society evolves and its economy as well 
as  water sector mature,  the  bulk of  the  water delivered to  ultimate users is 
produced,  developed,  planned,  allocated-in general,  managed-by formal 
organisations,  businesses or utilities.  In  Israel, for example,  70  percent of the 
water supply in  the country is  managed  by Mekorot,  a  state-owned water 
company that operates the  National Water Carrier-the pipeline system  that 
moves water from Lake Galilee to the Negev desert, and is in urban water retail, 
desalination and sewerage treatment businesses (Saleth and Dinar 2000:185). 
When  the  bulk of the  users  and  uses are  served  through  the  formal  sector, 
resource governance becomes feasible,  even  Simple.  If  a basin  management 
regime wants to increase the water price to domestic users by 5 percent, or make 
a  law intended to change the  way  business  is  done,  it can  do so  with  the 
confidence that it will stick. But this is not true when the bulk of the water users 
and uses are served by an informal sector where "service providers" are not even 
registered. 
In comparing the Australian success with containing agricultural pollution of water 
with the Chinese situation, Hu (1999:327) laments that the small number of large 
Australian farmers are served by a range of local organisations-such as sugar, 
rice,  cattle associations-which serve as  vehicles not only for new  knowledge 
and technical advice but also for implementing new rules and laws; but in China, 
"given the small scale  of farming  units  and  the  large number of farmers,  it is 
difficult to  control chemical  and  pesticide  application,  removal  of  vegetation, 
erosion and water resource exploitation." In South Africa, over 90 percent of water 
is managed by formal organisations, including the Water Boards, but 90 percent 
of rural people, the black irrigators in former homelands are almost wholly in the 
informal sector, far out of the reach of the public systems. 
Ignoring the scale and complexity of dealing with the  informal water sectors in 
the developing world can lead to misleading analysis. In the perspective of Saleth 
and  Dinar (2000:  186), for example, the  institutional reform challenge in  South 
Africa "lies in translating the provision of its water law and water policy without 
creating much uncertainty among private investors." In our view, these are easily 
done; the  real challenge the government of South Africa is struggling with is of 
reaching the  reform  to the black  communities  in  the  former homelands,  who 
operate in the informal water sector. And hard as the government is trying, this 
is not proving to be easy. About the process of Catchment Management Agency 
(CMA) formation  in  Olifants, South Africa, Merrey (2000:9) writes: 
n••• rural communities were unaware of  the provisions of the new water 
law and the CMA process, despite the efforts to inform people and  offer 
them opportunities to express their views.  Small-scale farmers had not 
heard about the CMA. ... [But] the Irrigation Boards providing water to 
large commercial farmers were participating actively in the process  ... " 
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Small number of large stakeholders are easy to work with; the ball game changes 
fundamentally once we  have to  deal with a huge number of tiny stakeholders. 
One  way  the  informal sector can  be  "formalised"  is through  grassroots user 
organisations; and the global Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) initiatives to 
organise irrigators into water user associations is partly motivated by the need 
to bring them into the formal sector. But in this too, small number of large users 
in the developed world have an advantage over large numbers of small users in 
the developing world.  All  manner of user associations form  spontaneously in 
countries like the USA and Australia. These institutional models are constantly 
being tried  out  in  developing countries but,  here,  these  generally break down 
when  faced  with  large  numbers of small stakeholders who  face  such  diverse 
constraints in their livelihood systems that they are at best apathetic towards each 
of them. 
Thus, for example, irrigation management transfer to Water User Organisations 
has unambiguously succeeded in the USA, New Zealand, Colombia, Turkey, and 
Mexico, all situations of medium to large commercial or export farmers who run 
their farms as wealth-creating enterprises.  In  contrast,  nowhere in  low-income 
Asia,  barring a few  "islands of excellence," including the  much-researched 
Philippines,  has  IMT held  out the  promise of long-term sustainability.  White 
commercial farmers in South Africa took to Irrigation Boards like ducks to water; 
in African smallholder black irrigation schemes,  there seems little chance that 
IMT will  take  off at all  unless it  is  preceded  by a wide-ranging intervention to 
make smallholder farming itself viable (see e.g.  Shah,  van  Koppen,  Merrey, de 
Lange, and Samad 2000). 
One standard refrain of institutional discussions in the water sector is get water 
law and get it "right." It is often the case, however, that the problem is not passing 
a law  but in  enforcing it  in  a society with  a large  number of tiny stakeholders 
operating in the informal sector with little or no  linkage with meso- and macro­
level  resource  governance structures.  This is why  many governments in  Asia 
readily pass Acts but spend years before converting these into laws. 
There are also cases of countries which have passed laws, and these have come 
totally unstuck.  Sri  Lanka has been  debating a water law-which has  "all  the 
right ingredients" (Saleth and Dinar 2000)-since the early 1980s but is yet to 
enact it. This is presumably because it is difficult to figure how to make all the 
"right ingredients"-water permit systems, full-cost pricing, water courts, explici,t 
water policy statement-actually work in  ways that make Significant difference 
to the management of water resource in  a country where 50-70 percent of the 
rural  people  acquire their water not through  water supply service  utilities! 
companies  but straight from  nature  or from  local  storage  in  small community 
tanks. 
India adopted a water pOlicy in 1987; but nothing changed as a consequence; and 
it is now working on a new one.  Many Indian states have likewise been debating 
groundwater laws for 30 years; a dozen or so drafts are in circulation; the legislative 
assembly of Gujarat, the state with  most severe groundwater overdraft problems, 
passed a bill as far back as in 1974; but the Chief Minister refused to make it into a 
law. And  his  reasons were convincing:  firstly,  he  was  unable to see how the  law 
could be effectively enforced on a million small private pumpers scattered throughout 
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a huge countryside;  secondly,  he  was certain that it  would  become one  more 
instrument of rent-seeking for the local bureaucracy (Shah 1993). 
"Get the price right"·is another old prescription to make water an economic good. 
Now that water scarcity in  many parts of the world is  real,  it would be  naIve to 
question the  value of pricing,  not so much  for revenue collection but to signal 
the scarcity value of water to users. There can be no serious debate on whether 
the view of water as  a "scarce but free"  resource is tenable in  today's context. 
The real  issue is  making the price of water stick in a situation where a majority 
of users are in the informal sector and do not go to anyone except the rain-gods 
for getting their water. 
Even in canal irrigation systems in South Asia, which are in the formal sector, many 
political leaders and senior administrators would become open to volumetric pricing 
of water to promote efficient use, if only the logistics of doing so were simple and 
cost-effective, what with the large number of small  irrigators in the commands of 
Asian  systems. After all,  paying  high  prices for high  quality irrigation  service  is 
common for millions of resource-poor buyers of pump irrigation in India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Nepal; but most people would avoid paying the full-cost price if 
not paying were an option, as is the case in many developing country water sectors. 
That high transaction cost of monitoring water use and collecting water charge 
is the central issue in water pricing, rather than the politicians' propensity towards 
giving away largesse, will soon be evident in South Africa, where the new pricing 
policy will  be  easy to enforce  on  large commercial farmers,  for whom  the 
transaction cost of monitoring and collection will be low,  rather than areas of black 
irrigation, which represent the developing-country picture in general, dominated 
as these are by large numbers of small users. 
Developed-country institutions have not solved the problem of serving or regulating 
large  numbers  of small  users  particularly well;  indeed,  they  have  not yet found 
satisfactory ways of dealing with moderate numbers of large users. In New South 
Wales, Queensland and Victoria, the existing law confers on every occupier of land 
the right to take and use water for domestic consumptive purposes, watering stock, 
irrigating home gardens and non-commercial crops on a maximum of 2 ha (Hatton 
MacDonald and Young 2000: 24).  If this exemption were applied to India, it would 
cover over 80 percent of all  land and over 90 percent of all  people; and in South 
Africa,  it would cover 90 percent of all  users though only 10 percent of land and 
water.  In  South Asia,  South-East Asia and North China, groundwater is the most 
valuable and threatened resource; protecting ground-water from over-development 
is probably among the top three priorities in this region; yet doing so is proving to 
be a challenge precisely because groundwater is in the informal sector. 
In the question of how best to deal with South Asia's 20 million tubewell owners in 
the informal sector, the experiences of Murray-Darling or Mississippi do not have 
many practical lessons to offer.  Even in "highly evolved" river basins, sustainable 
management of groundwater is at best problematic, and at worst, as hopeless as 
in India and Pakistan. Murray-Darling has tried groundwater regulation but it is not 
certain if it has worked. Access to groundwater in  New South Wales is  regulated 
by licences under the Water Administration Act of 1986; however, 
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"over much of New South Wales,  undeveloped licences were not 
cancel/ed. In retrospect,  this has proved an administrative disaster 
as,  in a number of areas,  the total volume of licences issued is well 
in  excess of estimated sustained yield." (Hatton  MacDonald  and 
Young  2000:23). 
In California's Central Valley, groundwater over-exploitation is a 60-year-old problem; 
yet in his case study of basin management, Svendsen (2000) concludes that 
"Groundwater is the  most lightly planned and  regulated segment of the state's 
water resources. There is  little control  over abstractions and,  on  average, the 
state is in a serious overdraft situation." 
Even  in  middle-income countries,  where major institutional reforms have  been 
initiated in recent years, groundwater over-exploitation has defied solution. Spain, 
one  of the  European countries that suffer agricultural  over-exploitation of 
groundwater, has instituted sweeping  reforms that will affect surface water but 
have little to do with groundwater (Saleth and Dinar 2000). Mexico's aquifers too 
are amongst the most over-developed; IWMI researchers based in Guanajuato 
state,  one  of Mexico's agriculturally dynamic regions, found  water tables in  10 
aquifers they studied declining at average annual rates of 1.79-3.3 m/year during 
recent years (Wester,  Pimentel and  Scott,  1999:9). An  institutional  solution  is 
being  tried  here;  the establishment of Aquifer Management Councils called 
COTAS  (Consejos Tecnicos de Aguas)  in  Mexico as  part of its water reforms 
and under the  new Mexican  water law  are  a  notable development.  IWMI 
researchers in Guanajuato are, however, sceptical: "  ...several factors bod~ ill for 
their (COTAS') future effectiveness in arresting groundwater depletion .. ." 
Finally, for top echelons of national decision-makers, it is always easy to take hard 
decisions,  which  do  not affect a large proportion  of  a nation's population  in  a 
seriously adverse manner. Political leaders and water-sector leaders in emerging 
economies constantly face pressures to be myopic and adopt postures that are at 
odds with the ideal of integrated RBM. The most powerful and compelling pressures 
emerge from  their own  intemal social  realities.  In  low-income agrarian  societies 
like in  South Asia and  much  of Africa,  food  security and  poverty alleviation will 
continue to remain prime concems for decades to come. 
When  several poor states  are  involved in  a basin-such as  India,  Nepal,  and 
Bangladesh  in  the  Ganga-Meghana-Brahmaputra basin,  or the Central Asian 
states in the Aral Sea-co-ordinating mechanisms tend to operate at sub-optimal 
levels because  national leaders are under pressure to maximise their national 
interests.  It  has been  argued that  the Aral  Sea  crisis  is the outcome  of the 
compelling need of the political leaders in the Central Asian states to ensure food 
security as well as water-intensive cotton cultivation for export, both at once; and 
a major move to reverse the desiccation  of  the Aral  Sea,  the Amu  Darya and 
the Syr Darya, will have to wait until something changes the dominant perception 
of the political leadership in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that cessation of cotton 
monoculture will have politically and socially destabilising consequences. 
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6.  Stage of socio-economic development 
What factors might influence the pace of institutional change in developing-country 
water sectors?  Saleth and Dinar (2000) suggest that as water scarcity intensifies, 
opportunity costs imposed by missing or malfunctioning institutions will increase and 
transaction costs of institutional change will decline, which together will determine 
the pace of institutional change in developing countries. A competing hypothesis is 
offered  by  the  application of Kuznets' curve to  natural  resource  management by 
societies. Recently, there have been attempts to fit an environmental Kuznets curve 
to deforestation using cross-country data (Bhattarai and Hammig 2000). 
The environmental Kuznets curve (EGG) poses an inverted U relationship between 
economic growth and environmental degradation (Figure 4). The core hypothesis 
is that,  as economies grow,  they use  natural  resources as  a factor of  wealth 
creation; but as per capita real income grows, demand for environmental amenity 
grows and there is greater demand and support for environmental protection. 
Although the  empirical  results of some of this econometric work are far from 
conclusive, intuitively, it seems compelling to suppose that the income elasticity 
of demand for environmental amenity is lower at low per capita incomes (as in 
Bangladesh and Burkina Faso) than at high per capita incomes; and therefore, 
that highly evolved economies of the Western world would have greater demand, 
capacity and  collective will  to  fix the  environmental problems from  natural 
resource  mismanagement than low-income emerging  economies.  In  many 
Western countries,  where per capita income growth to present levels took 200 
years or more, the EGG-effect too took centuries to work out. Historical evidence 
suggests deforestation in  Europe was at its peak  at the time of  the  Industrial 
Revolution; and the area under forests began to increase long after economic 
prosperity ensued (Bhattarai and Hammig 2000). 
Figure 4:  Relationship between level of economic growth and natural 
resource degradation 
llmeframe 
Per caput Income (PPP adjusted) 
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Much  the  same  relationship  seems to  hold  in  the  case of  water  resource 
management,  too.  Countries  with  highly developed water institutions are  also 
those which have evolved industrially. In contrast, it is difficult to find a low-income 
agrarian society, which has highly developed water institutions. Interestingly, some 
sketchy evidence suggests that the period of decline followed by upswing gets 
telescoped in economies like Japan and Taiwan that have grown their industrial 
output and employment rapidly over a relatively short period. 
In Table  1, we present the data set for 57 countries organised around their per 
capita water and arable land availability. The figures alongside the country names 
are their respective per capita CO2 emissions, which is one of the best co-relates 
of GDP per capita as well  as  Human  Development Index.  Mean  per capita 
availability of water and arable land along with CO
2  emission is used to divide 
the countries into eight categories. 
Countries  in  categories  81,  C1  and  D1  are  poor in  water and/or arable land 
resources; but these are rapidly becoming post-agrarian societies where pressure 
on  water and  land from  irrigated farming will  rapidly  ease.  The  social  and 
economic costs of fixing water mismanagement in  these countries already are 
or will soon be  within acceptable limits. 
It is notable that A  1 represents the category of countries from which most models 
of effective water institutions emerge, and these are offered to countries in  D2 
category which have the least water,  land and CO2  emissions. A1  are amongst 
the best endowed countries with both water and land; as a result, despite being 
highly industrialised (as indicated by their high CO2  emissions), these still have 
large, wealth-creating agriculture and agro-industries sectors that absorb a very 
small proportion of their populations. 
In  D2  category,  poor land and  water resource  endowments combine with  high 
population  pressure;  but  ironically,  their most critical  problem  is  their low  CO2 
emiSSion.  Industrial growth,  urbanisation and transfer of people from agricultural 
to off-farm livelihoods seems the only way pressure on land and water will ease. 
Many of these  countries will,  over the coming decades,  more  likely take the 
Kuznets-curve route that Japan and Taiwan  took than the one that the Australia 
and USA took. 
In Taiwan,  where rapid industrial growth and urbanisation have resulted in 40 
percent decline in  irrigated areas  over recent decades, the  popular outlook 
towards water management issues has undergone fundamental transformation. 
Over 90 percent of Taiwan's  irrigators  have become part-time farmers,  and 
income from  industrial  employment far outweighs agricultural incomes; there 
have  been  major increases in  demand for environmental amenity and  in  the 
touristic value  of former irrigation  structures;  all  these have  resulted  in 
substantial private initiatives and  investments in  improving water quality and 
aquatic ecology. Taiwan has amongst the highest population densities we find 
anywhere  in  the  world;  yet  its  water institutions will  soon  approach  those in 
high-income western countries rather than low-income Asian countries, which 
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The  Kuznets curve  hypothesis looks at the  relationship only from  the  angle of 
demand for environmental amenity.  But there is also the supply side to it; much 
larger volume and quality of resources are applied to natural resource management 
in high-income countries than in low-income countries. Consider the budget of the 
water departments: California State  Department of Water  Resources  has  2000 
employees,  mostly professionals, who operate an  annual budget of US$1  billion 
(Svendsen 2000); Gujarat Department of Water Resources probably employs as 
many engineers but operates a budget of less than US$ 10 million. The upshot of 
this discussion is that, over a decadal timeframe, economic growth is probably both 
the cause as well as response to the problem of natural resource mismanagement; 
and,  if the experience of Japan and Taiwan  is any guide, the period over which 
the interaction between the two plays out need not run into centuries as it did in 
the case of Europe, but it can be telescoped from centuries to decades. 
7. Conclusion 
In  this paper,  we  have  made an attempt to explore why  efforts to transfer the 
institutional  models of river-basin  management from  developed countries to 
developing ones have not met with  desired success. The contexts  in  which 
reforms are tried in developing countries are vastly different-in their hydrologic 
and climatic conditions, in their demographics, in their socio-economic conditions 
as well as in the way their water sectors are currently organised-from the context 
of the countries in  which  the  models first  succeeded. Successful institutional 
reforms in the water sector world-wide have tended to have common over-arching 
patterns. They have focussed largely on  management of surface water bodies; 
they  have  aimed  at  improving the  productivity of  publicly  diverted  large water 
bodies; they have largely ignored groundwater and have not had to contend with 
dominant informal water sectors;  they  have  centrally  been  about "blue water" 
productivity and  have largely ignored "green water;' 
The problems that successful institutional models have resolved-water quality, 
wet lands, sediment build up in the upper parts of the river, maintaining navigation 
use, dealing with occasional floods-are often not of paramount interest in the 
developing  country contexts. And  the problems that developing countries find 
critical and insurmountable have either remained unresolved in developed-country 
river basins,  such as groundwater over-exploitation, or are rendered  irrelevant 
by their evolutionary process, as in using irrigation as a means to provide poor 
people with livelihoods and food security. This does not by any means imply that 
developed-country experience has no lessons to offer to the developing world; 
drawing such a conclusion would be na'ive in the extreme. What it does mean, 
however, is that imposing institutional models uncritically in vastly different socio­
ecological contexts can be dysfunctional and even counter-productive. 
What it also means is that we need to take a broader view of institutional change. 
An extraordinary aspect of the institutional discussion in the global water sector is 
how very narrowly it has focussed on things that governments can do: make laws, 
set up regulatory organisations, turn over irrigation systems, and specify property 
rights,  A recent  review  of institutional changes in  the  global water sector in  11 
countries by Saleth and Dinar (2000), for example, treats water law,  water policy 
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and water administration, as the three pillars of institutional analysis. This makes 
water purely the government's business, quite contrary to the slogan popularised 
by the World Water Council to make "Water Everyone's Business!" If institutional 
change is about how societies adapt to new demands, its study has to deal with 
more than what just the governments do; people, businesses, exchange institutions, 
civil society institutions, religions and movements-all these must be  covered in 
the ambit of institutional analysis (see, e.g. Mestre 1997 cited in Merrey 2000:5). 
Which elements of the  Murray-Darling experience can be  sensibly applied in 
which developing-country context is certainly an  important and interesting 
analytical enterprise; but equally,  or even  more,  important is the need to listen 
to voices from  the grassroots. If people living,  for example in  the  Deduru Oya 
basin in  Sri Lanka, are facing water scarcity, they are sure going to begin to do 
something about it; likewise,  if  the government of South Africa withdraws from 
the  management of smallholder irrigation schemes in  the Olifants basin,  the 
sm<;l.llholders will soon respond in some way. What institutional reform makes best 
sense in  Deduru  Oya or Olifants should  best emerge from  understanding the 
respective realities of these basins; a broad understanding of what has worked 
elsewhere including in  the developed world might offer a good backdrop to the 
design of institutional interventions. But it  might be  unrealistic to expect much 
more; copycat institutional reform would be outright disastrous. 
In understanding how societies adapt their institutions to changing demands, Nobel 
Laureate Oliver Williamson  (1999) suggests the criticality of four levels of social 
analysis as outlined in Figure 5. The top level is referred to as the social embededness 
level  where customs, traditions,  mores and  religion  are located. Institutions at this 
level change very slowly because of the  spontaneous origin of these  practices in 
which "deliberative choice of a calculative kind is minimally implicated:' At the second 
level-where the institutional  environment of a society is involved-evolutionary 
processes playa big  role; but opportunities for design present themselves through 
formal  rules,  constitutions,  laws,  property rights; the challenge here  is getting the 
rules of the game right. The definition and enforcement of property rights and contract 
laws are critical features here. Also critical  is  understanding how things  actually 
work-'warts and all'-in some settings, but not in others. 
However, it is one thing to get the rules of the game (institutional environment) right; 
it is quite another to get the play of the game (enforcement of contracts/property 
rights) right. Which leads to the third level of institutional analysis: transaction costs 
of enforcement of contracts and property rights,  and the governance structures 
through which this is done. Governance-through markets, hybrids, firms, bureaus­
is an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realise mutual gains; and 
good governance structures craft order by reshaping incentives, which leads to the 
fourth level of social analysis-getting the incentives right. 
Discussion of water policy and institutions in  the developing-country context has 
focussed a g-reat deal on levels 2, 3 and 4 and little on level 1; more, it has tended 
to underplay the interactions between levels. Many populous developing countries 
will feel a lot wiser about IRBM if we learn more about how level 1 operates in their 
respective contexts and how the interaction between 2 and 3,  and 3 and 4 can Shah,  Makin and Sakthivadivel: Transposing River-Basin Management Institutions 
Figure 5: Four levels of institutional change that explain how 
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work better. How to  create  property rights that affect users' behaviour is  more 
important than exhortations that clear property rights be created; understanding 
how  to enforce a groundwater law meaningfully on  20  million private pumpers 
scattered throughout the South Asian countryside is more helpful than pushing 
a groundwater law; how to monitor water use and collect canal irrigation charges 
cost-effectively is more  in  order than  discussing whether irrigation subsidies 
should be eliminated. 
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Abstract 
The paper discusses reasons  why stakeholder identification and stakeholder 
participation have become important issues in water management in recent times. 
Three levels of  possible application of these concepts are described: in accounting 
for the uses of water; in analysing the legal and institutional frameworks  within 
which water is used and managed; and in addressing problems of exclusion (and 
inclusion) of  specific and especially of  disadvantaged social groups. In conclusion 
the general inadequacy and imprecision of the stakeholder concept are discussed, 
while noting its main value as a way of linking analyses based on the physical 
resources with those based on social goals, and of  resolving some of  the tensions 
between these approaches. 
1. Introduction 
Stakeholder identification and participation in  basin-level water management, if 
taken literally, encompasses nothing less than water, people, and society. "Being 
a stakeholder" expresses an interest of a person, a social entity, or even an entity 
like "environment," vis-a.-vis water. "Identification" relates to a systematic effort to 
spot the range  of entities with  stakes,  according to  a  specific definition. 
"Participation" is equally broad,  ranging from passively being  informed to core 
decision-making (Pretty 1995). So the concept of stakeholder identification and 
participation remains as nebulous as concepts like sustainability. 
Analytically,  there are two solutions for too  broadly defined concepts: either one 
defines the concept more precisely or one replaces it by better ones. This paper 
presents some arguments that would justify either choice. Firstly, a sketch is given 
of three more concrete definitions and applications of "stakeholder identification 
and participation," which are relevant in the context of this workshop on basin-level 
water management: identifying all water users in a basin; stakeholder identification 
and participation in basin-level water governance; and poverty and gender analysis. 
Secondly,  it is argued why "stakeholder identification and participation" could be 
replaced by other approaches to link the resource and the people that lead to more 
insightful analysis and more realistic policy recommendations. 
2. Identifying all water users in a basin: water accounting 
Water use is an obvious stake in water. Identification of people from that perspective 
is meaningful. Stakeholder identification along these lines builds upon and refines 
what is assessed in  water accounting: current water use,  water demand and 
(emerging) competition. Water accounting itself usually does not extend beyond 
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averages and  sector levels,  while  making crude  assumptions about future 
demand. Extended and deepened stakeholder analysis can further elaborate intra­
sector distribution of water and unmet water needs,  which would  be  important 
for poverty analysis. It can  better analyse the broader developments in society 
in  which  water is  used  and  future  demands can be  assessed, etc. Existing  or 
expected competing demands and conflicts that are brought to the surface  by 
water accounting are also important pointers for in-depth analysis of the  water 
users involved, the nature of the conflict, ways in which negotiations take place, 
or not, etc. 
More sophisticated stakeholder analysis of water use,  demand,  and  conflict is 
basically endless; it covers all historical, economic, social, technical, cultural and 
political dimensions of water use. This will  also highlight other boundaries than 
basin-boundaries (Schlager and. Blomquist 2000) and not only include the stakes 
of end-users of water,  but also those  with  stakes as water managers,  service 
providers, technology developers, regulators, policy makers etc. In fact, the very 
concept of stakeholder identification becomes rather redundant for such in-depth 
social analysis. 
Such  all-basin identification of "stakes" of water use is mainly analytical and 
informs policy or decision-making at best indirectly; the  "partiCipation" part is 
elaborated less, or not at all. This is the opposite of the next application. 
3. Stakehold!"r identification and participation in basin-level water 
governance: legal and institutional issues 
The emphasis on "stakeholder participation" is paramount in the context of water 
governance. Here stakeholder identification and  participation  are part of the 
institutional and legal analysis. Related to this are financing issues: stakes in water 
are  the basis for charges. "Stakeholder identification and participation" are the 
business of water policymakers,  managers,  and others; researchers  would 
address the  underlying issues of governance and  inclusion and exclusion 
processes. Possible topics are the following. 
"Stakeholder identification and participation" is a typical endeavour in situations 
in  which  new forms of governance are  explored which  often  entail new 
relationships between the state and other stakeholders. Today,  there are many 
such ventures in which the roles, networks, and powers of governmental and non­
governmental actors are newly negotiated and articulated, up to the basin level. 
They are induced by new water-related problems, such as pollution or upstream­
downstream competition. Or the devolution of state tasks to private entities and 
pricing policies, or general claims for more democratic decision-making require 
new forms of water governance. 
At  the  one end  of  the  continuum of new forms  of governance are people's 
initiatives outside the  government,  if  not against the state.  Examples where 
individuals take the initiative are the river parliaments in  India, or an initiative in 
a small watershed in the USA 10 ensure the breeding of a particular species of 
fish throughout Ihe basin (Heikkila 2000). Such spontaneous initiatives that tend 
to  be led  by  the  middle-classes are accompanied by  further organisation into 
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NGOs, forums, etc., and by the development of relationships with the various state 
agencies. The claim of being a "stakeholder" justifies the claim for more decision­
making power; this is negotiated. 
At the other end of new governance forms are the initiatives taken by international 
or national groupings within or near the state itself, to involve stakeholders in new 
ways, for example to address better the complexities of water problems and ensure 
better informed decisions. An  example of state-initiated stakeholder identification 
and participation is the establishment of the Catchment Management Agencies in 
South Africa,  for which public consultation  is  required  according to the  National 
Water Act 1998. New communication channels are to be structured between the 
government and the public in  which governmental decision-making authority is 
shared in new ways. Being recognised as "a stakeholder" is the first step of inclusion 
in  the new decision-making networks. Stakeholders are defined as "anyone 
interested in or affected by a proposed undertaking" (Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry, South Africa, 1999). 
Although representation along class, race, and gender lines in these new structures 
initiated by the state is often a pertinent goal, there are major bottlenecks to achieve 
this objective. New forms of governance build upon existing forms and networks, 
which often are already biased. Moreover, especially when time schedules are tight, 
there is the strong tendency,  also for legitimate reasons, to include de facto the 
more resourceful, and leaders among newly entering groups. A poor black woman 
is  still not reached. This practical issue is illustrated in  the Guide Four for Public 
Participation for Catchment Management Agencies and Water Users' Associations 
of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa (1999): 
"... every sector has what can be termed 'key' stakeholders. They are 
either influential people,  respected people,  spokespeople for their 
sectors,  people with authority to say 'yes' or 'no,' people whose local 
knowledge is  important,  people  who  want to  derail the  process  for 
personal gain, and all those who think that they are key stakeholders." 
Even if expansion of existing networks is actively promoted in an initial stage, there 
is the moment when the networks are consolidated and less open to new entrants. 
However, if representation is the aim, continuous efforts for further inclusion need to 
be deSigned  and  institutionalised. The following,  third  application of stakeholder 
identification and participation tries to fill this gap. 
4. Inclusion of specific water user groups: poverty and gender analysis 
Stakeholder identification and participation can  also focus on  specific water user 
groups that tend to be  marginalised. Such analysis would ultimately contribute to 
their more effective inclusion. This is a route to go if goals like poverty alleviation or 
gender eqUity through water management are to be reached. Water is perhaps the 
most critical resource, besides land, for the agriculture-dependent poor-the world's 
majority of poor people. Improved water management probably represents the 
most ignored and untapped potential for agriculture-based poverty alleviation, in 
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combination with  improved seeds  (as  Upton (1999)  argues for tropical food 
staples) and marketing (Shah et al. 2000). 
In this application of stakeholder identification and participation, the links between 
the resource water, people, and the ultimate beneficial goals for society (a world 
with  less poverty) are most explicit. While the current and  potential stakes are 
convincing for this group of stakeholders, concrete stakeholder identification has 
only just started in global debates, whereas participation is still at the initial stage 
of establishing communication, especially in the productive water use sector. It is 
clear that simply reducing poor people to "water users" will not do the analytical 
job needed. Poverty and water deprivation are issues of taller order both in analysis 
and policy and intervention. Some of the topics of poverty and gender analysis are: 
identifying poor people and  assessing the  nature of poverty 
processes and gender inequities; 
assessing poor women's and  men's potentials and  constraints  in 
accessing appropriate technologies for managing water and making 
more productive use of water for higher incomes, in the wider socio­
economic, cultural, and political context; 
analysing class- and gender-based conflicts and competition in water 
use and possible axes of action for more effective inclusion in existing 
or new forms of decision-making networks regarding water; 
designing integrated  support systems to  alleviate  water-related 
poverty. 
5. A people focus, or a resource focus? 
The three above mentioned applications illustrate the variation of interpretations 
of stakeholder identification and  participation. For  any  other application,  the 
concept of stakeholder identification and participation would become much more 
useful  if 'stakes', 'participation' and the  purpose and  context within which 
stakeholders are identified for participation are made explicit. 
The question  remains where further specifications of stakeholder identification 
and participation finally would lead. Even with the best specifications, the concept 
of stakeholder remains a-historic and individualistic and easily assumes equality 
among all stakeholders and their participation. Vague concepts may give good 
space for creative use, but as a tool for social analysis stakeholder identification 
and participation is weak. In all above mentioned applications, the whole concept 
of "stakeholder' quickly evaporates, except as an object of study in governance 
and  inclusion and exclusion processes. 
The main  merit of the  concept of "stakeholder" may be that it links resources 
with people. Having a stake in  resource use and management says something 
about the two completely different "animals": natural resources and people. This 
link between the resource focus and the people or livelihood focus is a variation 
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age-old theme of the tension between technical and social perspectives. But even 
in this respect, the concept is not very helpful, as already become clear for poverty 
analysis. Reducing people to individual users or managers of a natural resource, 
however important that  use is,  is  inadequate to capture the  many other 
dimensions of society in which water use and management are embedded. The 
concept of "stakeholder" is also unlikely to trigger the search for more creative 
ways to deal with this tension. Non-trivial issue-based analysis and dialogue from 
various perspectives and disciplinary angles do better. 
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Abstract 
The paper considers how reliable sources of funding can be found,  for new river­
basin management organisations,  if these are established in  the  economic 
conditions of developing countries. These questions are considered against the 
general context of  the gradual global movement towards the "users pay" concept, 
which is already familiar in the irrigation sub-sector in many countries. Aspects 
discussed include the types of costs that will have to be met, possible sources 
of  funds and the difficulties or  constraints associated with them, methods by which 
the liability for payments can be assessed, methods available for compliance on 
the income side and for control and accountability on the expenditure side, and 
the impacts that charging systems may be expected to cause. 
1. Introduction: uses and demands for water 
It has become quite widely accepted that countries should be  aiming towards 
comprehensive management of water resources through organisations based on 
river basins or aquifers. (There  may be other ways of managing the resources 
of a basin, but this paper addresses the specific situation where a country has 
decided that it wants to assign an  organisation for this management purpose.) 
Such organisations will not develop effectively unless they can be provided with 
adequate financial resources. 
In this respect, the experiences of the richer countries may not offer much useful 
guidance to the developing countries, especially the poorest ones. Their patterns 
of water use are radically different. Table 1 shows the breakdown at the broadest 
level, among the three biggest user sectors. In the rich countries, industrial users 
predominate. In  the  poorest countries, the  industrial category is  not  yet  very 
significant, whereas as much as 89  percent of all the water abstracted is  used 
for agriculture. 
Table 1: Sectoral consumption of water 
Units: % of  annual freshwater abstractions 
Sector ~  Agriculture  Domestic  Industry 
Wealth category ,.. 
Low income  89  4  7 
Lower middle income  74  8  18 
Upper middle Income  73  12  15 
High income  40  15  45 
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These patterns of use illustrate two obvious factors that have great influence on 
the financing situation. Firstly,  in  a basin where the majority of users are small 
agriculturists, they are usually extremely numerous, forming a large majority of 
the people in  the poorest countries. Secondly, the productivity of water used in 
agriculture is usually very much lower than that of water used in industry. So when 
we deal with industry we  are usually dealing with a relatively smaller number of 
people who are engaged in  relatively profitable activities, while,  when we  deal 
with  agricultural  users  (in  developing countries),  we  are probably dealing with 
large numbers of people whose financial  resources are very meagre. 
We can note also (although it is far beyond the scope of this paper) that the low 
productivity of irrigated agriculture  has well-known  links with  the  agricultural 
production  policies of  rich  countries,  with  market access problems for poor 
countries,  and  other issues of  global  scale which  no  developing country can 
modify much by  its own choice of policies. 
Domestic water supply is different again. We cannot compare it with other types 
of use on  the basis of productivity. Domestic use is essential for human health 
and indeed for survival. So we  supply water for social objectives as well  as for 
productive objectives, and these are not really comparable in a financial sense. 
Even that distinction is not as clear as we might like. The four basic human needs 
for water-drinking, washing, cooking, and sanitation-are certainly essential, but 
domestic uses of water can include many non-essential uses. When we compare 
the consumption patterns of the rich and poor countries, this becomes very evident. 
As Table 2 shows,  in  the  rich  countries the amount of domestic water consumed 
per person  is very much  higher than  in  the poorest countries. Also,  within each 
country there are similar variations of consumption, related to poverty or affluence. 
Table 2:  Abstractions per person 
Units: m3/person/year abstracted from  the natural systems 
Sector  ~  Agriculture  Domestic  Industry 
Wealth category  .... 
Low income  332  16.4  26.7 
Lower middle income  339  36.3  81.7 
Upper middle income  332  55.9  68.9 
High income  386  146.5  442.2 
In Table 2, we see that in the poorest countries the abstractions for personal use 
are minimal. We  may estimate the basic needs at about 30 m3/person/y, so the 
figure of 16.4 indicates that many people are obliged to satisfy those needs in 
ways that do not reach the formal statistical system. These are people who have 
to bathe in open bodies of water, carry household water from local streams, and 
in  other such ways that are omitted from the data. 
Table 2 also shows that, around the world, the gross amounts of water extracted for 
agriculture are quite similar. Here again we see that (although irrigated agriculture 
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is often blamed for water scarcity) the uses in poor countries are lower than  in 
rich ones. We can also relate these figures to basic human needs. At the minimal 
nutritional  levels  required  for sustaining human  health,  in  a sOciety  where  the 
basic food is a cereal crop such as rice or wheat or maize, it takes in the order 
of 300 m3/person/y to grow that food if the water is applied very efficiently. 
Of course that figure does not reflect directly the abstractions from the natural 
river systems. since much is supplied by rain, and also most of the irrigation water 
is  not applied at highest efficiency; nevertheless,  the need to satisfy a certain 
basic food requirement applies to us all, and it is good to note that this need is 
in the order of ten times bigger than our basic need for domestic water. 
These widely differing patterns of water abstraction  and  use have  various 
implications for the effectiveness of financial  policies as charging tools.  In  the 
affluent countries, where personal domestic consumption is very much more than 
the amount required for satisfying the four basic needs, a charging policy may 
have significant impacts on consumption. A high charge may make people reduce 
frivolous or non-essential uses of water, or may just make them more conscious 
about water costs, and therefore induce them to change their bE;lhaviour, in ways 
such as becoming quicker to attend to leakages. 
But  in  countries,  or families,  where  domestic consumption consists simply of 
satisfying basic needs,  a charging policy is  not so likely to have those impacts. 
Supplying a basic need such as drinking is not something about which the "user" 
can exercise much choice. If the cost increases. the basic consumption will have 
to stay roughly the same. Any financial effect on that user will appear in some other 
direction, by not spending on some other item that must appear as less vital. 
When we look at the productive applications of water, we can find many illustrations 
of the relatively low financial productivity of agricultural water. For example, Schiffler 
and others (1994) analysed the economics of water uses in Jordan, a country with 
one of the world's lowest levels of water resources per person. They reported that 
the average productivity of water in industry was 11.2 dinars I m3  (about 16.8 US 
dollars I m3  at the bank exchange rate then) whereas the average productivity of 
water in agriculture was 0.28 dinars I m3,  or 2.5 percent of the industrial level. 
Within the agricultural sector,  there are further huge variations of  productivity. 
The productivity of basic cereal crops in the developing countries is usually around 
the !'lquivalent of a few .uS cents per cubic metre, while fruit and vegetable crops, 
especially those for export, may show productivity as much as 100 times greater 
than the cereals.  In  the Jordan case.  Schiffler and others found  that that the 
productivity of grapes was 130 times more than that of wheat. 
So here again we  have the problem of basic needs. In the poorer countries, or 
poorer environments within  any country,  these  low-productivity cereal crops­
rice,  wheat,  maize especially-dominate the  agricultural  scene,  and  are  not 
necessarily grown for the market. In the studies of five small irrigation systems 
reported by PMI-Burkina Faso (1997). it was found that the proportion of products 
marketed was 25.6 percent.  In  the  system with  least road  access,  this fell  as 
low as 5.3 percent. The rest was household consumption. 
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To  the users in  those villages, the financial productivity of water must seem an 
utterly irrelevant concept. The idea makes sense (to the user of water) only in 
the context of marketable alternatives. Of course there is a governmental or "public 
interest" viewpoint that may suggest something else, concerning optimal uses 
of a scarce national resource. But if we feel that we may be moving towards any 
kind of user-based financing system, it seems that we have to try to understand 
how these things seem from the users' perspective. 
Briscoe (1997) has emphasised particularly the idea that there can be a high 
opportunity cost associated with  agricultural uses of water. The nub of this 
argument is that, where water is not abundant, low-productivity applications of 
it,  for example to grow cereal crops,  deny that water to higher-value potential 
users. He points out that prices charged to agricultural users are, typically, around 
10 percent of those charged to urban and industrial users for comparable volumes 
delivered. 
This is an argument that is easier to act upon in a mixed agricultural/industrial 
economy (or "middle-income" economy), such as some of those in South America; 
but it seems to carry less weight in countries where 89 percent of the utilisation 
is agricultural and the opportunities for transfers of use are correspondingly few. 
The concept of opportunity cost depends on the existence of such opportunities. 
On the other hand, it is not safe for poor countries to treat the opportunity cost 
argument as irrelevant to their situation. In recent times, several countries in east 
and south-east Asia (Thailand is an example) experienced rapid economic growth 
continuously for more than a decade. A consequence of this was the arrival of 
many new investment opportunities, some of which would depend on transferring 
of water from a traditional low-productivity use into one of the new uses where 
its value (in  economic productivity terms) would be  some orders of magnitude 
more. In the absence of sound institutional mechanisms for responding to these 
opportunities through orderly, voluntary transfers and compensation of the prior 
users, these changes have occurred but sometimes at high social cost. 
In the agricultural sector of developing countries, the problems of how to finance 
irrigation  services,  and how to  collect irrigation service fees from  users of 
agricultural water, have been prominent issues throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
It cannot yet be said that the issues are satisfactorily solved. This experience 
should make us aware that the establishment of new basin organisations  in 
developing countries is going to face similar difficulties. 
Financing urban domestic water supplies is not any easier than financing irrigated 
agriculture. The World Bank (1993) reported its experience in lending for water 
projects in these terms (referring mainly to non-agricultural uses): 
"The  Bank has maintained the policy that cost recovery should be 
sufficient to pay both for operations and maintenance and for a fair return 
on capital investment. ..  cost recovery was rated as unsatisfactory in 80 
of 114 projects. And, in  78 percent of countries receiving water supply 
and sanitation loans,  financial covenants were not fulfilled. In 49 of the 
120 water supply and sanitation projects, fees were not raised enough 
to meet financial requirements due to government constraints." 
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We can perhaps make a guess, that these problems of investment projects whose 
cost-recovery conditions are not implemented in  reality,  happen because such 
projects are prepared in the bureaucratic domain, and subsequently meet strong 
resistances in the political domain, due to neglect (in project preparation) of the 
weight of the  people's views. This can  only  increase,  as  more countries are 
inclining towards democratic modes of government. 
2. Components of costs 
The financing question, for river-basin organisations, depends of course on the 
tasks that each country may decide its river basin organisations should perform. 
The scope of basin organisations faits into three broad categories, which  may 
overlap in some countries: 
regulatory organisations, which oversee the management of water, 
and make rules which service-providing organisations have to follow, 
but have no other role in service provision; 
organisations which own the principal structures and facilities for water 
supply, but do not provide water supply services directly; 
organisations that provide water supply services directly to the users. 
It may  appear that the first of these,  regulation only,  is a  relatively cheap 
alternative. If we adopt that kind of organisation, perhaps if the budgetary issue 
will be small and easily manageable. But that is not the case. If regulation is to 
be done well, it needs a significant amount of finance. A short list of the primary 
regulatory functions would include: 
monitoring of the quantity and quality of water in  all  rivers and other 
natural water bodies in the basin; 
conserving and protecting the watershed; 
making rules about abstraction, uses, disposal and pollution; 
supervising the  application of a system of water abstraction rights or 
licences; 
ensuring compliance with rules through monitoring of activities, public 
information programmes, court processes, etc. 
These tasks amount to a quite formidable financial commitment. They are most 
urgent in basins where water resources per person are already low. On the other 
hand,  an  organisation which has no service delivery function does not have a 
direct customer base from  which a proportion of funds can be  sought. These 
considerations show that the design of basin organisations cannot be separated 
from the question of how they will be financed,  at a level sufficient for them to 
discharge the tasks that are assigned to them. 
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The movement towards establishing river-basin management organisations is coming 
at a time when governments, in both rich and poor countries, have been trying to 
reduce the amounts they budget for providing water services; so the idea that these 
organisations might be funded from the budget of a central government ministry 
may not be received well in many countries. In the developing countries, the main 
feature of this trend has been the numerous programmes of irrigation management 
transfer, which began in a few countries such as the Philippines and Colombia 
in the middle 1970s and have since become very general, indicating a widespread 
perception that central subsidising of water services is difficult to sustain. 
The experience of irrigation  management transfers in  the  past 20 years  has 
however shown some of the difficulties that can occur when governments try to 
transfer the responsibility for certain tasks and their related expenditures from a 
service-providing organisation (such as a government irrigation department) to an 
organisation of service-receivers. 
We can distinguish four kinds of costs that are faced by water organisations which 
are service providers: 
capital investment (constructing facilities for capture, conveyance and 
distribution of water; purchasing equipment; providing the buildings 
and other hardware of the management systems); 
major repairs and renewals of equipment and infrastructure; 
direct recurring costs (operation and maintenance); 
overhead costs  (sustaining an administrative structure,  including 
probably higher and remoter organisational levels, national, regional, 
etc). 
An economist might say that the first two of these belong together as one "capital" 
category. But it seems better to make them distinct, as they usually happen far 
apart in  time, and by the time when the need for renewals becomes urgent, the 
fact  of  the  initial capital  investment has usually caused  great changes in  the 
economic condition of the users. 
In  irrigation  management transfer,  governments typically aim  to transfer to 
organisations of the service-receivers the responsibility for some or all of the third 
cost category, operation and maintenance, but usually the first and fourth categories 
are not transferred. The responsibility for the second category is often left unclear, 
and has been a source of problems in  a number of such transfer programmes, 
because it creates doubt about the borderlines between the two parties. 
The overhead costs of governmental irrigation organisations are not often discussed 
in the relevant literature. This could be because they are very large. Especially in 
Asia, government irrigation organisations are among the strongest and most long­
lived organisations, and have developed large superstructures, often based in capital 
cities far away from their client populations. This seems to make the overhead cost 
a special one, which is not likely to be transferable to the individual end-users. 
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3. Regulation and service-delivery functions 
Let us look now at the three different modes of basin organisation which were 
identified at the beginning of the preceding section. In the developing countries, 
we can usually find existing organisations that exercise the functions of service­
delivery for each specific use category. These are often quite old organisations, 
which have developed a variety of specialist skills and have large professional work­
forces.  It  seems unlikely that governments will  abolish them.  It  seems unlikely, 
therefore, that basin management organisations will evolve towards direct service­
provision to the ordinary citizens. A more probable path of evolution will be towards 
basin organisations taking up the regulatory functions, while direct service-delivery 
will  remain  the  task of other organisations which  manage urban  water supply, 
agricultural water supply,  hydropower, and  other specific services to people, to 
companies and to other user organisations. 
In theory, then, the service-providing organisations should become more clearly 
service-oriented, should behave more commercially, should become more subject 
. to compliance with laws about pollution and other adverse social consequences 
of their activities, and (depending on the politics of the country) may be considered 
for privatisation; while the regulatory organisation exists in  the public domain to 
ensure good laws, allocation of resources by administering a water-rights or licence 
system, conservation and protection of water sources, and compliance with all this. 
That still leaves open the very difficult question of who should undertake new capital 
investments. Will it be the service-providers, or the basin organisations? There are 
strong arguments both ways. But it seems clear that this issue will be a vital one 
in  determining the character of a basin organisation,  and its relationships with 
service-providing organisations. If basin organisations are going to be constructors 
of major new facilities,  their financial  requirements will be  much heavier than if 
they are purely regulators. 
It  seems that the primary reason  why we  need  basin  organisations,  as the 
prospects of water deficits appear in  an  increasing number of countries,  is  for 
establishing compliance with a body of rules that will enable the people at large, 
through institutions, to regain some kind of control over the diminishing quality and 
quantity of water in  their rivers.  If we  take that view,  then perhaps we  will think 
that this is a sufficiently huge and important task, and that we should not give the 
same organisation more conventional tasks, such as construction of major facilities, 
or even ownership of facilities that exist already. 
One of the problems of establishing basin-management organisations is that there 
is clearly a potential conflict with existing organs of local government, which almost 
everywhere have boundaries that are different from the boundaries of river-basins. 
It  is  said sometimes that,  since provinces or other local  government units are 
responsible for achieving development within their specific boundaries, they must 
have control over such a major development factor as  water. There is certainly 
much force in that argument. However, the separation of regulatory and service­
delivery functions opens the way to escape from this problem. It is possible then 
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service-delivery functions can be organised on a different basis which may conform 
more nearly to the boundaries of local or provincial governments. 
4. Sources of funds 
The Dublin and Rio Conferences of 1992 enjoined us to regard water as an economic 
good. That seems to mean that users of it should pay for it according to the amount 
that they use. The way ahead, according to this view, seems to involve finance coming 
primarily from  users of water,  paying to service-providing organisations. In  that 
pattern, it would seem practicable to finance regulatory basin organisations through 
some system of levies on the income of the service-providers. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see that service-providing organisations, in the 
poorer countries, are going to be able to behave commercially, and at the same 
time invest substantially in new capital facilities. The low profitability of the prime 
user,  irrigated agriculture,  indicates that,  for  many countries, this  is  not an 
immediate prospect. 
Probably, too, the phrase "economic good" suggests that the prices we pay for water 
services should somehow reflect the sort of factors that usually influence prices 
of other economic goods. For example, if water is an economic good we  might 
expect its price to rise in times and places of scarcity, and to fall in circumstances 
of low quality. 
Concepts like this, however satisfactory they are economically, face many difficulties 
from the social and political angles. Water has been treated for long as an aspect 
of welfare provision, and in many places long periods of provision of water at zero 
price, or extremely low price, have promoted high effective demand, which is now 
very difficult to reduce. 
However, there seem to be few alternative routes available for financing the 
activities. Either they must be financed from user charges, or they must be financed 
from central government budgets, or they will probably not happen effectively at 
all. The problem of central government funding, for the poorer countries at least, 
is that there is very little of it available, and there is strong competition for that 
little amount. We can see from the fate of (for example) hydrological data-collecting 
organisations, which in many countries have become weak and inadequate for their 
tasks, that centrally-funded organisations which are doing things that do not have 
direct popular appeal are likely to be left on the sidelines in the budget contest. 
Funding of river basin organisations this way may well make them unstable, and 
unable to pursue consistent long-range planning. 
In Europe, there has been a trend in recent years towards the use of abstraction 
licences as a means of raising a significant proportion of the funds needed for 
sustaining regulatory organisations. This becomes possible when the regulatory 
function  is  clearly separated from the service-provision function.  Regulatory 
organisations assess the available  quantities of water,  and issue licences 
accordingly. In that system, the service-providing organisation can be just another 
holder of an abstraction licence. 
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Abstraction fees are not the same as user fees. A service-providing organisation 
may pay abstraction fees to the regulatory organisation, and then sell the water to 
ordinary people or businesses,  charging them a  user fee,  which  exceeds the 
abstraction fee in order to cover the costs and financial risks of delivering the water. 
In such systems, licence fees may be graded according to scarcity. 
Buckland and Zabel (1998) describe the workings of these systems, and report 
abstraction fees that are typically around the equivalent of 1-2 US centslm3,  but 
in some cases significantly more. In some countries the product of abstraction fees 
is sufficient to cover the cost of all regulatory functions. 
In a licence fee system, there are two ways of charging the user. The charge may 
be based on the measured actual consumption of water, or it may be based on the 
amount allowed by the licence. The system of measuring actual amounts involves a 
higher level of regular metering of the users, whereas the licence-amount method 
can be implemented with only occasional checks, to ensure that the conditions of 
the licence are not exceeded. If the cost of abstraction licences is set high enough, 
they can  have an  effect on the consumption of water.  In  the German  state of 
Hamburg, for example, a relatively high abstraction fee for groundwater licences 
caused about a third of the licences to  be renounced,  and  handed back to  the 
regulatory organisation, which could then re-issue them to others. 
There are other pOssible sources of revenue for a basin organisation. We may note 
three principal areas: 
waste-water disposal charges; 
pollution charges; 
charges for other permits for other water-based activities, such as 
fishing, navigation, recreation, etc. 
5. Methods of assessment 
Funding of regulatory organisations from abstraction charges, user charges, or from 
(for example) a small percentage levy on the user charges collected by the service­
providing organisations, does not necessarily mean that all categories of users 
pay at similar rates. When we examine current charging practices, world-wide, we 
find a tendency to charge agricultural users much less, and industrial users much 
more, than the average. 
This leads us to the question,  how should charges be assessed?  If basin 
organisations are to draw their funding ultimately from user charges, how will those 
charges be calculated? 
This is related to other issues, about the impacts that we may want a charging 
system to have upon patterns of water consumption. It also brings in some very 
complicated issues related to the quantity, quality and locations of disposal flows, 
returning to the natural system after use. 
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Industrial users are accustomed to pay for measured quantities of water delivered 
to their premises. Urban users in the better-off suburbs also probably pay on the 
basis of measured volumes, and poorer users, especially the very poor, also pay, 
though probably not for measured flows but for volumes brought by water-carriers. 
But the biggest users in the poor countries, the farmers, generally do not pay by 
volume at  all. In  the countries  where irrigation service fees are levied,  the 
overwhelming majority pay an amount that is based on land area. There are many 
variants of this, such as seasonal differences, crop differences, and so on; but the 
central point about the dominant current practice is that the marginal price, the 
cost to the farmer for taking more water, is normally zero. 
Countries vary in the way they account for water that flows back to the river systems 
after use. In virtually all the uses of water, there is some "return flow," but the amount 
of this varies, and in many ·uses it is difficult to measure it. Briscoe says that 
u••. taking the US  as  an example,  consumptive  use as a percentage of 
withdrawals was 56 percent for irrigation,  compared with  17 percent for 
urban  water supplies,  16 percent for industry and just 3 percent for 
thermoelectric power." 
The United Kingdom, following the logic of these different levels of consumption 
and return, adopted a classification of use types into four bands, according to their 
average proportions of return flow. In such a system, users who consume a large 
fraction of what they abstract (such as irrigation) are charged more heavily than 
users with a high  return percentage (such  as power generation). There are of 
course quality aspects in relation to these return flows as well, which can be dealt 
with by the different mechanism of pollution charges. 
In developing countries, water charges do not vary, generally, according to scarcity 
of the commodity. Water prices are usually calculated on some basis that is related 
to the cost of delivering it. That means that it stays the same, and does not respond 
to variations in available resources. In many countries, charging scales are centrally 
or provincially determined for large sets of irrigation systems, so that systems with 
water abundance and systems with local water scarcity are obliged to charge their 
users the same price. 
Indeed, when we look at inter-country comparisons, although the variations in 
charging practices are enormous, there are signs of a correlation between scarcity 
and price policy, but it is a correlation that is opposite to economic logic. Some of 
the lowest charges (even when comparisons are based on purchasing power parity) 
are found in dry countries such as Egypt or Iran, while high charges can be found 
in much wetter places. This presumably represents a socio-politicallogic instead, 
which may well be stronger than economics. 
There are even cases where the cost of taking water for irrigation becomes lower 
in the driest, hottest time of the year. The middle Niger river is such a case, simply 
because at that time the river level is comparatively high and the cost of pumping 
water to adjacent land is therefore less. This kind of anomaly results from basing 
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charges only on the cost 01 service delivery, which is effectively unrelated to scarcity, 
and often is only weakly related to quality, or to demand. 
A river-basin organisation could reduce some of these anomalies. In many countries, 
water has been made legally the property of the state. It is possible, therefore, for a 
river-basin organisation to charge the service-providing organisations on the basis 
of the measured amounts that they extract from  the  natural system (as in  the 
European examples of abstraction licences, noted earlier). Each basin organisation 
can devise its own level of charge,  related to the amounts 01  water which it has 
available for abstraction. It is possible for those charges to be varied along some 
seasonal or even monthly scale. In this way, a basin organisation could exert some 
pressure on the service delivery organisations to look for ways of moderating their 
rates 01 water use, while at the same time improving its own financial independence. 
6. Collection 
The compliance problem, in respect of irrigation service fees, became famous during 
the 1980s. The Philippines, especially, made the "viability index" a central feature of 
its institutional reforms: this index is the ratio between fees collected and the costs 
of operation and maintenance. Field officials of the government agency could receive 
bonuses depending on the percentage of fees actually collected. 
Studies of the costs of fee collection show that they can be a significant proportion 
01 the total amount collected. "Passive" collection, meaning the kind of system where 
each user is expected to bring the fee to the collection office, seems prone to abuses, 
or at least to long delays of payment, which present serious cash-flow difficulties to 
service-providing organisations. "Active" fee collection, using paid collectors who visit 
houses or farms, incurs a significant wage cost. Both methods need accounting staff 
and certain facilities. Some studies of irrigation service fee collection have found the 
cost to be occasionally as high as 15 percent of the collected amounts. 
How will river-basin organisations minimise these linked problems of compliance, 
delayed payment, and collection cost? The answer to this seems to be (as for some 
of the other issues raised above) that the separation of regulatory from service­
delivery functions should substantially reduce this problem. The service-deliverer 
must have a direct relationship with the water users, and indeed the trend towards 
user-controlled service organisations assists this. The regulatory organisation on 
the other hand has different duties, and should collect its fees from a few major 
sources, principally the service-delivery organisations, but also including any others 
to which it grants permission for abstractions, pollution permits, or other water­
related activities. On the whole, passive modes of collection may be sufficient lor 
this. 
7. Control ot expenditure 
As  river-basin organisations come into existence in an increasing number of 
countries, we will face another kind of issue: how will their expenditure levels be 
controlled? These organisations should become, as far as possible, responsive to 
the interests of their own stakeholders. But the stakeholders are very diverse. 
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Everybody is a water user; and most of us are water users in several different 
modes. Some may want new storage facilities to be built; others would prefer that 
costs be kept down as far as possible. The interests of birds, fishes and other wildlife 
have to be accommodated somehow, along with other non-economic aspects of 
water, such as landscape beauty, waterfalls, and the like. All of these things tend 
to have cost connotations in some way. 
These matters cannot be satisfactorily resolved by creating river-basin organisations 
that are firmly embedded in the governmental bureaucracy. A different and more 
responsive kind of organisation is  needed, which will be  accountable to some 
council in which all principal stakeholders have a voice. 
In these conditions, control of expenditure can be done transparently, with budgets 
approved in advance not by finance ministries, but by the people of the basin who 
will have to bear most of the costs and receive the consequent benefits. 
8. Impacts of charging 
The Economist, reporting after the World Water Forum, said, 
"whether it is Australia or Rajasthan, once people understand the true 
cost of water services, they will conserve water,  and even help to dig 
ditches if necessary. In  return,  they will want transparent prices and 
better service from both governments and private firms." 
That is a clear statement.of the standard economic view of the impacts of water 
charges: consumption will reduce, capital costs will be partially taken up by users, 
and customer pressures will cause organisational behaviour to improve. Is it true? 
It is quite difficult to reconcile this optimistic view of the power of economics, with 
the findings from the detailed work of PMI-Niger (Abernethy and others, 2000). 
There, in  a country that is at or near the bottom of the per capita wealth scale 
and other human development scales, the irrigation service fees are among the 
highest in the world. On the whole, fee collection rates are high. Farmers pay 20 
percent of their gross crop value in fees. If the foregoing quotation is true, water 
should I?e used very efficiently in these circumstances. But the water productivity 
was found to be equivalent only to 20 US cents I m3,  in terms of gross product 
value, at Purchasing Power Parity (less than 5 US cents I m3,  at nominal bank 
exchange rate). No signs of reduction in water consumption could be detected over 
ten seasons of monitoring. 
There seem to be three sources of the difference between these observations and 
the view quoted earlier. Firstly, The Economist was drawing lessons primarily from 
urban cases. Secondly, water is only one input to a production process, whether 
in agriculture or industry, and it is generally not a replaceable input; so if the user 
thinks that more water is necessary in order to realise the benefits of other inputs, 
that user will probably apply the extra water. But it seems likely that the third reason 
is the most influential. This is, that farmers in Niger, as in most other developing 
countries, do not pay for the quantity of water they use. They pay heavily, but the 
charge is area-based, so the marginal cost of taking more water is zero. Urban 
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users, whose quantitative needs are smaller and more measurable, normally are 
not in that situation. For them, the marginal cost of increasing their usage of water 
may be quite high. 
This problem, that the major users of water (farmers) have no direct incentive to 
reduce their consumption, is not likely to change in the near future. Although we 
can measure pipe flow volumes acceptably, and the equipment cost for doing so is 
quite tolerable, devices for measuring flow volumes (as distinct from flow rates) in 
open channels are not available at the scales and costs required for the small land 
units typical of developing countries, especially in Asia. So the impacts of charging 
in metered urban systems can be quite different from those in smallholder irrigation. 
One proposed approach to this problem is by charging, not to individuals, but to 
groups, for example to all the farmers along a single common channel. There is 
as yet little evidence that this is effective. At the level of the individual, it does not 
alter the incentive much. If there are fifty farmers sharing a metered source, each 
may calculate that, by taking an extra cubic metre of water he or she will obtain 
all the benefit of using it, but will pay only one-fiftieth of its cost. 
For a financial system to have a strong impact on water abstractions, it must also 
be designed to give incentive to the service-delivery organisations to reduce the 
conveyance losses in their systems. Both urban water-supply organisations, and 
irrigation departments have until recently shown poor records and lack of concern 
about reducing  losses. This is another area where separation of river-basin 
management from service-delivery is helpful. 
If the service-delivery organisation has to buy the right to abstract water, it will be 
more strongly motivated to ensure that as much of that water as possible reaches 
a customer. Water leaking from a canal or a pipe, in that system, means a direct 
financial loss to the service-delivery organisation. The separation also makes it 
easier to include in the financing arrangements some reflection of the value of 
leakage water that can be recovered by pumping from aquifers, which varies greatly 
according to factors like location, quality and aquifer depth. 
There is also the problem of eqUity.  As we  move more towards the principle of 
payment for water services, can we feel sure that the poorer sections of society 
will have adequate access to water? Briscoe (1997) put this problem clearly: 
"The inequities of existing command-and-control mechanisms for water 
allocation  in  irrigated  agriculture  have  been  widely 
documented  ... Because water has rarely been formally managed as an 
economic good in developing countries, however,  there is little information 
on the equity effects of a market-oriented management system." 
We can, however, feel relatively confident that there are belter chances for restoring 
equity, under river-basin management organisations, than under the present systems 
of management. Traditional water rights have been rapidly eroded by the political 
and economic changes of the past two or three decades, and relatively few 
countries have succeeded in supporting the traditional systems, or in replacing 
them by modern systems based on water rights that are legally enforceable by 
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their users. Basin management offers a way of redressing this situation, either 
through rights or licences. It would seem reasonable to accept the need for some 
payment, or increase of existing payments, in return for a better guarantee of supply 
or abstraction rights. 
However, we should also note the need for good, transparent public information 
programmes when such a policy change is under consideration. If public opinion 
is not prepared for such changes of traditional patterns, and informed about the 
benefits that they are intended to bring, they are likely to be rejected. 
Charges, or increases of charges, are never going to be popular. It is futile to hope 
for thaI. However sound our economic logic is, however much we may feel that a 
charge system can  reduce  distributional inequities,. or improve water-use 
efficiencies,  there will  not be demonstrators  in  the  streets demanding the 
introduction of such charges. It is good to keep this point in mind, as we think about 
possible beneficial impacts of charging policies. 
The equity question can be  regarded  as yet another argument for keeping  a 
separation between the regulatory and service-delivery functions. Research on 
equity effects will probably continue to be necessary for quite a long time. River­
basin organisations should take some responsibility for monitoring these effects, 
and for encouraging the necessary research. They should be in the position to 
adjust their regulations, and the constraints on the service-delivery organisations, 
so as to take account of the need to limit the degree of inequity that may exist, 
and particularly to ensure access for all up to a certain basic level. 
9. Conclusions 
River-basin organisations offer a promising way towards better and more equitable 
management of water resources. They need to be adequately financed, and it is 
better that their finance should be generated locally from among the users of their 
services, who should also have an effective voice in influencing their policies, than 
that their finance and policy should be determined centrally. 
The ways of generating sufficient finance, in the case of poorer countries, are not 
yet sure, because of the weak financial situation of agricultural users, who account 
for the overwhelming majority of water consumption in most countries. The lessons 
that can be learned from the financing systems of richer countries are of limited 
relevance, because of the different balance of user types. 
Current systems of charging for water services have  many  defects.  Irrigation 
charges are usually.area-based, not volume-based, so they give no incentive for 
water-saving, neither for the service-delivery organisation to reduce leakages nor 
for the end-user to improve application efficiency. Charging rates are usually 
calculated on  the basis of the cost of providing  water delivery service, and 
sustaining a supply organisation, but do not often reflect the scarcity or abundance 
of the water resource, or the quality of the water. Often economic logic is reversed, 
as poor city-dwellers pay more for low-quality domestic water. 
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Systems of abstraction licences may be the most easily implemented,method of 
addressing simultaneously these various problems, especially: 
to sustain the kind of organisation that is needed; 
to give firm legality to long-standing traditional users; 
to protect principles of equity during rapid socio-economic changes; 
and 
to make possible more flexible systems of charging that will reflect 
scarcity and quality, and will follow some progressive scale so that 
basic needs (both personal water use and food production) can be 
satisfied at rates that are less than those charged for levels of use 
which exceed the fundamental human requirements. 
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Abstract 
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) is the management of surface 
and subsurface water in qualitative, quantitative and ecological senses from a multi­
disciplinary perspective, and focussed on the needs and requirements of society 
at large regarding water.  IWRM requires a platform for weighing of all relevant 
interests and decision-making on use of water and water systems in the river basin. 
Ideally, all interests are represented in this platform and it requires decision, control 
and sanctioning powers under governance ofgovernment to protect the interest 
ofsociety at large. A minimum set of  institutional conditions should be met to allow 
such IWRM platforms to operate successfully. A framework with guidelines for 
application has been developed to  assess the required capacity-building 
interventions to arrive at these conditions and to establish such platforms. This 
framework is based on a development process with and by the stakeholders to 
come from an identified present water resources management situation to some 
desired integrated water resources management situation. It is a compromise 
between the present and an "idear IWRM situation, as a result of  a negotiation 
process in which policymakers, water resources and water utility managers and 
stakeholders are involved. 
During development, the guidelines for assessment of the institutional framework 
were tested in three pilot cases: in Guatemala, Jamaica, and Colombia. After their 
acceptance the Inter-American Development Bank (lOB) applied these guidelines 
in,  among others,  Honduras,  Dominican Republic and Costa  Rica.  This  paper 
describes briefly the methodology and its theoretical framework underlying these 
guidelines and elaborates on the experience with and outcome of  their application. 
1. Introduction 
International awareness about the importance of water resources management is 
growing. Originally the approach was very sub-sectoral, mostly in relation to water 
supply,  sanitation and  irrigation. There is however,  a growing consensus that 
Integrated Water  Resources Management (IWRM)  is  necessary for sustainable 
resource use for all the sub-sectors and to protect the environment. 
The aim of IWRM is to discard the one-sided management perspective of single 
interests of one sub-sector by one government agency and to strive for a participatory 
multi-sided management perspective of all  interests in management of water 
resources.  IWRM therefore takes account of all  natural aspects of the water 
resources. all sectoral interests and stakeholders, the spatial and temporal variation 
of resources and demands, relevant policy frameworks and all institutional levels. 
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The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) developed a strategy for IWRM which 
aims to help borrowing member countries to shift from a sectoral, development­
based focus to an integrated. management-based approach. One key principle of 
this strategy is an increased emphasis on institutional issues and capacity building. 
This requires an analytical framework for the assessment of the institutional setting 
for integrated water resources management that the bank could use for the 
incorporation of capacity-building considerations in future IDB water-related projects. 
This paper describes an overview of the framework and the guidelines as developed 
for project teams. bank officers and government agencies to facilitate the process 
of project formulation and monitoring (van Hofwegen and Jaspers. 1999, 2000). 
2. Framework for assessment of institutional frameworks 
2.1  Need for integrated water resources management 
Actions to use or control water for specific purposes are aimed at security. social 
well-being. economic gain and the preservation of ecosystems. These activities of 
use and control can create problems that may  be classified as externality. open 
access, public interest and scarcity problems (Lord and Israel, 1996). 
Externality problems exist when actions of one party affect the well-being of a second 
party. and the first party cannot itself gain by considering this effect and modifying 
its behaviour accordingly. Open access problems exist when the use of the resource 
is open to all. and when the rate of use of that resource affects the amount that can 
be used. Public interest problems relate to the necessity to provide a particular good 
to all in equal amounts. No one can be excluded from consuming it. and the cost of 
providing it to one is as great as the cost of providing it to all. The problem is that 
these goods are likely to be under-provided because no one will undertake to produce 
them, since they cannot be withheld from others, thus cannot be sold to make profit. 
Government thus must provide these goods. Scarcity problems exist when the users 
want more of a good than the quantity available at a given price. Economic markets 
handle scarcity by allowing competition. in which those with the most purchasing 
power. and to whom the resource is most valuable, will bid it away from others. To 
safeguard the low-income strata of society and the environmental needs. the negative 
effect of scarcity is commonly dealt with by non-market institutions such as river basin 
councils or the government. 
Solving these problems requires establishment or changes of water use rules that must 
occur at water resource level. Creating an effective set of water resource management 
rules requires action at the water policy and law level. These higher level actions are 
important because ineffective rules and ineffective accountability and policing 
mechanisms assure that water use and control problems cannot be solved. 
2.2 Interests 
There are many interests in water. Interests in water means the benefit obtained or 
preserved by individuals, groups or nations with the presence. use and control of 
water. 
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Interests can be classified as those of the first and second order. Interests of the 
first order are essential conditions for life (human, animal and plant) in that water 
system. Interests of the second order are those that can be prioritised after being 
weighed on their economic, ecological and social values. 
Government has the "care function" as for management of water resources. First­
order interests are interests of society and therefore require to be represented by 
government. Second-order interests are interests of individuals, groups, or parts 
of society, and can best be represented by their stakeholders. 
First and second order interests are different in place because of different physical, 
hydrological, cultural and socio-economic conditions. As development goes on, 
especially second-order interests will change. This means that interests are site­
specific and time-specific, and site-specific approaches are therefore warranted. 
In water resources allocation there is general agreement that the supply of water 
for basic human needs has priority. In this respect the equity principle plays a major 
role. Another priority is the  requirement to maintain essential  life  support 
ecosystems. These can be considered first- order priorities. All  other needs for 
industry, agriculture or other societal needs should be prioritised according to socio­
economic criteria, by which water is considered an economic good. Although cost­
recovery and economic pricing are overriding principles,  pricing and tariff 
regulations within sub-sectors are considered necessary where equity or social 
well-being are at risk and environment is endangered. 
2.3 Generally accepted principles 
Another clear consensus is the need for adequate participatory approaches to 
planning and management, and mechanisms for accountability and democratic 
control. This is closely related to the principle of decision-making at the lowest 
appropriate level (subsidiarity), which also implies that some decisions (for instance, 
on the sharing of international waters) should be taken at the highest level. In that 
case,  mechanisms of democratic control and stakeholder participation clearly 
operate at the highest level of government. 
The river basin is the logical unit for water resources management. In many cases 
this has led to the decentralisation of management to  river basin level. But one 
should not forget the role of central government. River basin management is largely 
an operational matter, whereby water allocation, water quality management, cost 
recovery and stakeholder involvement are essential components. However, the river 
·basin authority is hot a legislator and not responsible for policymaking and the 
setting of objectives and constraints to operational management. 
Central government has an important role  in  IWRM in  policymaking, legislation, 
strategic planning, establishment of the appropriate legal and institutional framework, 
capacity building, and supervision of decentralised and privatised institutions in water 
resources management. In addition, government should provide the protocols for 
information exchange (on water resources, water use and infrastructure), should 
provide adequate databases required for  strategic planning and should prepare 
integrated river basins plans in response to its policy guidelines and constraints. 
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2.4 Functions and functional levels in IWRM 
IWRM means decision-making concerning development and management of water 
resources for various uses. In this decision making process it takes into account the 
needs and desires of all the different uses, users and stakeholders. To pursue IWRM 
three functions are considered (figure 1): the operational or water use function, the 
organisational or water resource management function,  and the constitutional or 
water policy and law function (Lord and Israel, 1996). The operational function is 
focussed at use or control of water for specific purposes to fulfil specific needs and 
demands. These include water supply and sanitation, irrigation and drainage, flood 
protection, hydropower,  industrial supplies,  tourism and recreation, fisheries, 
navigation and the preservation or rehabilitation of ecosystems. 
Figure 1: Functions In integrated water resources management 
CONSTITUTIONAL  Establishing laws and 
policjes-a national strategy 
FUNCTION  for integrated water 
resources management 
River Basin Management 
ORGANISATIONAL  allocahng waler flows, 
assimilative capacity, 
FUNCTION  ecosystem maintenance, 
potential energy 
OPERATIONAL  Water uses and users 
using water resources 
FUNCTION  subject to operational rules, 
to meet demands and needs 
To  minimise the problems and conflicts of these different uses and  users, co­
ordination of water use and water allocation is required. Solving these problems 
also requires establishment or changes of water use rules. This is the organisational 
function. It involves co-ordination, planning, decision-making and pOlicing of water 
use and users in water systems (river basins, aquifers). 
To make the organisational function possible an enabling environment has to be 
created. This requires water policies, institutional development policies, including 
human resources development and normative and executive legislation. This is the 
constitutional function. These higher level actions are important because ineffective 
rules, accountability and policing mechanisms assure that water use and control 
problems cannot be solved (lOB 1997). 
IWRM requires a good performance at al these functional levels. Development 
towards IWRM, therefore, needs to address these levels in a holistic way. These 
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development efforts are called capacity building. To  make a proper assessment 
of required capacity building interventions the following framework is proposed. 
2.5 The framework 
The analytical framework is based on  a cyclic development process to come from 
an  identified present water resources management situation to  some desired 
integrated water resources management situation. The desired IWRM situation is a 
compromise between the present and the ideal IWRM situation as an instantaneous 
complete introduction of IWRM is unrealistic and maybe undesirable to expect. This 
compromise will be the result of a negotiation process in which policymakers, water 
resources and water utility managers and stakeholders are involved. The outcome 
will  be determined by technical, financial and political attainability under prevailing 
socio-economic conditions. With changing conditions the desired IWRM situation will 
change. This process contains the following major steps (figure 2): 
Assessment of the present situation and trends, 
Formulation  of a desired IWRM situation based on  an  "ideal" or 
eventual IWRM situation, 
Formulation of interventions to arrive at the desired IWRM situation, 
Establishment of a  monitoring system  to  see whether the 
interventions are being carried out properly and whether they really 
contribute to the achievement of the IWRM goals. 
The framework and the guidelines are developed for the three functional levels: 
constitutional, organisational and operational. 
2.6 The "Ideal" IWRM situation 
In the framework an "ideal" IWRM situation is formulated that should give direction 
to the process of integration of the management of water resources. In an ideal 
IWRM  situation the water resource  is managed on  (sub-) basin  level  in  a 
sustainable way. The water related interests of all  stakeholders are considered 
in decision making on  water use. All  stakeholders are aware of the potential of 
the water source and the impact of their use on the other stakeholders. Decisions 
on water use and associated cost of service provision are made in a participatory 
manner according  criteria agreed  and  accepted  by  all  stakeholders. 
Implementation of  IWRM  is  done  at the least cost in  a transparent way  with 
effective accountability mechanisms in place. 
The "ideal" IWRM situation is derived from the theory on IWRM and the internationally 
accepted and applied principles on water policies. Use has been made of regional 
and local water policy documents aiming at IWRM. (lOB 1997, Worldbank 1993, ADB 
1996, South Africa 1997, the  Netherlands 1997). The "ideal" IWRM  situation does 
not exist.  Local and regional conditions will determine what the most appropriate 
situation will or should be.  The ideal situation is  only presented to provide 
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an orientation in formulation of the desired IWRM situation.  Conscious choices 
must be made to deviate from the ideal situation.  This not only helps to  increase 
understanding of  the  implications of  IWRM,  but  it  also  generates  (in  the end 
product)  a  better sense  of participation  and  belonging.  It  allows  for  active 
contributions to the formulation process, as the desirable IWRM situation will be 
used to  define gaps in  different arrangements, which  in  turn could be  used for 
formulation of interventions. 
Before  IWRM  can  be  successfully carried  out,  a set of institutional  conditions 
must be  met. These requirements are at the three functional  levels and will be 
discussed in  the following chapter. 
Figure 2:  Analytical framework for the assessment of the institutional 
setting and capacity building requirements for integrated water 
resources management 
-PRESENT SITUATION AND TRENDS 
- Stakeholders 
- Physical Conditions 
Socia-Economic Conditions 
- Legal FrameworJoi 
- Institutional Framework 
- Policies and Trends 
- Financial Situation 
DESIRED IWRM SITUATION 
- Stakeholders 
- Socia-Economic Conditions 
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3. IWRM requirements for the functional levels 
IWRM  is a process of assignment of functions to water systems,  the  setting of 
norms, enforcement (policing) and management. It includes gathering information, 
analysis of physical and  socio-economic processes,  weighing  of interests and 
decision making related to availability, development and use of water resources. 
This means that IWRM requires: 
a platform for weighing of all relevant interests and decision making 
on use of water and water systems in the river basin; 
this platform should represent all interests and be under governance 
of government to protect the interest of society at large; 
this platform should have decision, control and sanctioning powers; 
A minimum  set of conditions should  be  met  to  allow such  IWRM  platforms to 
operate successfully. These conditions are related to constitutional, organisational 
and operational functions: For all these functions it is required that the respective 
authorities have the mandate and the' resources (financial and human) to carry 
out their tasks in development and implementing IWRM. 
3.1 The Constitutional Function: Water Policy And  Law 
The  main  purpose of the  constitutional  function  is  to  create an  enabling 
environment for the IWRM platform with appropriate policy and legal frameworks, 
which  gives the  boundary conditions for effective implementation  of the 
organisational and operational functions. Constitutional functions include policy 
development based on clear principles, development of normative and executive 
legislation and development of human  resources  development strategies. An 
important aspect to be  arranged  at this functional  level  is the  degree level  of 
participation of the private sector in all three functional levels. 
IWRM requires from the constitutional function a system that: 
enables  effective  development and  implementation  of laws and 
regulations, 
enables effective constitution and dev!3lopment of relevant institutions, 
regulates decision making based on interests of all stakeholders, 
enables all stakeholders to participate in decision making, 
provides quantitative and qualitative standards for use, 
provides quantitative and qualitative standards for effluents, 
enables and regulates effective control and sanctioning of violations, 
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enables  implementing  agencies to take the  necessary steps to 
secure and conserve the  resource, 
provides effective and transparent accountability mechanisms, 
provides sufficient capable people to meet the  IWRM demands of 
policymaking, adapting legislation and all other activities. 
enables and regulates private sector participation. 
3.2 The Organisational Function: Integrated Water Resources 
Management 
The organisational function  is  integrated water resources  management. The 
ultimate goal  of the management process  is  to allocate water in  quantity and 
quality terms for different purposes. The process involves resource assessments, 
planning, decision making,  implementation and policing on  allocations and use 
of water  resources  with  and  based  on  the  interest of stakeholders. These 
processes are time and location specific. The activities are highly multidisciplinary, 
involving engineers in hydrology, hydraulics. construction. water supply, sanitation, 
hydropower, irrigation, and non-engineers such as: environmentalists, ecologists, 
lawyers, economists, sociologists, agriculturists, politicians and representatives 
of interested parties, pressure groups, and water users. 
The  development of  an  integrated water resources management capacity  and 
capability is both a top-down and bottom-up process. The top-down process is a 
result  of the  execution of the care function of government. Government has to 
impose measures and  regulations to protect the  interest of  society  through 
protection of resources, ecosystems and socio-economic well-being of the people. 
Government executes this task through policy development and creation of legal 
and institutional frameworks for use and management of water resources. 
The bottom up approach originates from the operational level where different and 
sometimes conflicting use and control interests need to be protected. This bottom 
up  process  is  to  be  carried  out  in  the  enabling  environment  as  created  by 
government. As  this  is  a  process  of  learning,  correcting  and  adjusting,  the 
frameworks as imposed by the constitutional level should leave enough room for 
refining and adjusting. This means that only main policies and major concepts 
are regulated in law and the interest groups are given the opportunity to formulate 
their own  way  of co-ordination and operation. This, of course,  should  be  done 
under tutelage of government. 
3.3 Platform for co-ordination and decision making 
The development efforts  should  be  focussed  at  the creation  of a platform  for 
weighing  interests and  decision making on  water use  and  control. To  be 
successful this platform  should have the support of the stakeholders. A 
consultation process before establishment of such platform is warranted. 
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The platform should  have  a decision-making capacity on  river basin  level  that 
reflects the  interests  of  different uses  and  users. The great lines for decision­
making  procedures should  be  part of  the  regulatory framework prepared by 
government. This should include a clear regulatory framework with  norms and 
standards for decision making. 
An  effective and  transparent accountability mechanism is essential for effective 
management. This includes accountability to the operational level to see whether 
the service agreements are being carried out,  and to the constitutional level  to 
ensure that societies' interests (wise  use of resources)  are not violated.  Such 
accountability mechanisms  require  the  platform to  have  power to  control  and 
sanction violations. These accountability mechanisms and policing powers have 
to be  regulated in legislation from  government. 
3.4 Data availability 
An  effective IWRM system  requires  reliable information on  the  availability,  use 
and quality of  surface and  groundwater in  the basin.  Databases,  observation 
networks and  inspection  systems are  to be  made accessible,  improved or 
developed. Good access to  these data allows analysis  of  various  options or 
scenarios for interventions in development and use of water.  Sufficient capable 
and motivated people with the appropriate tools are required to meet these IWRM 
demands for planning, management, control and development. Identification and 
development of people and tools for management are part of the development 
process of the platform that also requires consent and support from the different 
stakeholders as important cost can be involved. 
The legal and  institutional framework in  which the platform  is to be developed 
and will operate is to be created at constitutional level. At constitutional level also 
the policies are set for development of capable and motivated staff. 
3.5 IWRM requirements at organisational functional level 
The basic function at organisational level is to co-ordinate between the different 
interests and to decide on the different uses of water. An effective organisational 
function requires: 
a decision making capacity on (sub-) river basin level which reflects 
the interests of different uses and  users, 
a clear regulatory framework with norms and standards for decision 
making, 
a system that provides reliable  information  on  the  availability,  use 
and quality of surface water and groundwater in the (sub-) basin, 
a system that allows analysis of several scenarios for interventions 
in  use of water at basin level, 
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an effective and transparent accountability mechanism, 
power to control and sanction violations, 
sufficient capable people to  meet the  IWRM demands on  planning 
and management, control and development. 
4. The operational function: water services 
In  IWRM  a distinction is to  be made between the management of the water 
resource and the delivery of water services, both of which are necessary in each 
country.  Usually the planning,  development and management of the water 
resource must be a government responsibility to ensure that public interests are 
served.  In  contrast,  specific water services are  generally best delivered by 
autonomous and accountable public, private or co-operative agencies with scope 
for increased private sector participation. 
Manipulation of flows  and (ground) water levels,  to provide these services, 
requires an hydraulic infrastructure, whose development and management costs 
need to be recovered from the beneficiaries or from the community at large,  if 
the system is  to be sustainable. 
Sustainability requires among others, adequate funding for operation, maintenance 
and  management of  the system. The costs for services are  in  principle to be 
recovered from those who benefit from the provision of those services. This requires 
an  identification of beneficiaries and clients for the services provided. Clients are 
only willing to pay for services if these are reliable and considered not too expensive. 
Often government subsidies are provided to reduce the cost for the clients or to 
stimulate certain developments. However, this usually reduces the incentive for the 
managing agency for optimal performance of service delivery and effective and 
efficient use of resources. Financial autonomy of the managing agency that is fully 
accountable to the clients is a prerequisite for system sustainability. 
4.1  Service orientation 
The provision of the services requires an  infrastructure that needs to be  planned, 
designed,  constructed, operated,  maintained and after some time  replaced  or 
modernised. At the onset of development, the infrastructure is deSigned to provide 
a certain level of service. The cost of service provision is directly related to the level 
of service provided. The higher the level of service, the more management efforts 
and Infrastructural reqUirements are needed, the higher the cost. In a situation where 
clients fully pay for the cost, the level of service must then be balanced against the 
associated cost in a consultative process with  the clients and other stakeholders. 
They will agree on the level of service and its associated cost. The results are included 
in a  service agreement between the  service provider and  the client. These 
agreements can  only be  successfully carried out if transparent and  effective 
accountability mechanisms and accountancy systems are in place (van Hofwegen 
and Schultz, 1997). These also constitute part of the service agreement. 
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4.2 Water management services 
Water management is the manipulation of surface or subsurface flows, levels and 
quality of water to serve either one or a combination of the following purposes: 
water supply for agriculture, domestic, municipal and industrial use, 
recreation and environmental protection; 
drainage of urban and rural areas; 
flood protection for urban and rural areas; 
control or maintenance of water quality. 
These manipulations are carried out by individuals or organisations in a provision 
of public or private services on  a local, regional and international scale and are 
mutually interactive. 
The  nature of  water as  a  resource  and  its  multiple  use  requires  co-ordinated 
efforts to manage the different and often conflicting manipulations needed to fulfil 
the demands for the different purposes. These management efforts are offered 
as services and can be carried out by one or more institutions that can be either 
government, semi-government, private or users' organisations. 
It happens that different organisations are involved in the provision of one service. 
Typical for such situations is  the provision of irrigation water for agriculture not 
directly to the individual clients but through a water user's association. 
4.3 The clients 
In  water management different services are provided for different client groups. 
The nature of the service determines whether the clients are clearly identifiable 
individuals who can voluntarily use or reject the services without doing harm to 
others.  In  water supply the  transaction  of a certain  volume  of water can  be 
demanded or rejected without harming another water user (provided water is not 
a constraining factor). 
However, flood protection, drainage and water treatment are water management 
activities that are of public nature and cannot be accepted or rejected by individuals. 
It  is  clear that water services are not always  provided to identifiable individuals. 
Clear definition of the  clients  is  necessary to decide with  whom  to  enter into a 
service agreement, who is to be charged, and where to send the bill. 
4.4 Development of the service relationships 
As described above, the service relations and the services provided need to be 
clearly defined and  transparent administration  and  effective accountability 
mechanisms need to be introduced. These are the main ingredients of the service 
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4.5 IWRM requirements at operational functional level 
Effective operational functioning within an IWRM context requires a management 
system that responds to societal needs. This means that for water services the 
system should enable, provide or regulate: 
effective control of the service providers by users/clients and the 
IWRM Platform 
representation of clients' interests at and by the managing agency 
cost recovery by the service provider 
negotiations between the managing agency/service provider and its 
clients on the  level  of service  it provides  and  recovery of its 
associated cost 
assessment of the demands, actual use and availability of water 
(quantitative and qualitative) 
power at the service provider to control and sanction violations 
sufficient capable people to meet the IWRM demands. planning. 
development and management of services provided 
a system that allows market incentives to make most economic use 
of water through participation of the private sector 
5. Assessment of the institutional framework-process and tools 
Assessment of the institutional framework requires a  process, to come from an 
identified present water resources management situation to a desired integrated 
water resources management situation. The steps in this process are: identification 
of the present situation, formulation of a desired IWRM situation,  formulation of 
interventions to arrive at the desired  IWRM  situation  and establishment of a 
monitoring system to see whether the interventions are being carried out properly 
and whether they really contribute to the achievement of the IWRM goals. 
The assessment process  is  using  10 steps that  have been based on  the 
experience gained from the test cases in  Guatemala, Colombia, and Jamaica. 
In  this chapter these steps are  elaborated and tools which  have been used 
successfully in these case studies are presented. 
5.1  Step 1: existing water management situation 
The present situation on water resources use and management should be well 
known before any intervention directing to IWRM can be made. Understanding the 
.  water situation is a prerequisite for assessment and analysis of the institutional 
framework and the (potential) water use conflicts between stakeholders. It appeared 
essential to have a basic document on the present water management situation to 
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start the  institutional assessment process. Such a document will  represent an 
experts opinion and will n.ot necessarily be complete, accurate and representing 
the opinions, desires and aspirations of all stakeholders. 
Important aspects to be  dealt with  are: water availability and  water use, 
stakeholders, physical conditions,  socio-economic conditions,  legal framework, 
institutional framework,  policies and trends and the financial  situation. Experts 
are assigned to prepare such a (desk study) report describing the existing water 
management situation combined with registered problems (quantity, quality and 
environment). The  report serves as  a general  background  document for the 
following steps and has to be disseminated accordingly. 
Physical conditions 
The assessment of the physical conditions concentrates on the temporal and spatial 
availability and  use of water (quantitative and qualitative). It requires information 
on the climate and meteorology, hydrology and hydro-geology, aquatic ecosystems, 
abstractions and influents and the availability and capacity of storage facilities. 
As  in  IWRM  water is  managed on  basin  or sub-basin  level,  use  of  water 
resources, water distribution per sector and the resulting water balance have to 
be  identified per basin or sub-basin. This is essential information for IWRM so 
the existence of observation networks and data bases, the levels of processing 
and the accessibility to these datasets and should be included in the inventory. 
For the  inventory a clear distinction has to be  made between the different levels: 
national, basin and sub-basin level. At national level the inventory should limit itself 
to the water balance in the different basins. Such  water balance provides insight 
into whether and when the basin is in a surplus or deficit condition. Temporal surplus 
conditions provide the opportunity to  overcome temporal  deficit conditions  by 
creation of storage  facilities.  During deficit conditions the occurrence  of major 
conflicts in interest will be most prominent both in quantitative and qualitative sense. 
At basin or sub-basin levels a more detailed inventory can be required.  For such 
an  inventory a water use flow diagram can  be  most helpful.  Such  a diagram 
provides not only the uses and users but also their inter-dependencies with regard 
to water quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
Stakeholders and interest groups 
Stakeholders are people or groups of people with a legitimate interest. Legitimate 
interests are formulated in the by-laws of the interest group where the stakeholder 
is regarded as a private entity/body. Stakeholders are not the same as interest 
groups. Interest groups  represent  all  kind  of  interests: public,  private, 
environmental, social etc. If they are organised and have statutes or by-laws they 
represent legitimate interests (GO's,  NGO's,  professional  organisations, 
commercial organisations, users associations) and as such become stakeholders. 
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In  IWRM the stakeholders can be classified as fOllows: 
water users - consumptive and non-consumptive uses 
water polluters  agriculture, industry, domestic etc. 
water managers  organisational and operational level 
water policy and law makers - constitutional level 
society - general interests represented by government and 
specific interests represented by NGOs 
It depends on the socio-economic and the political situation whether all the interests 
are  represented. So  it is  important to  assess which  stakeholders' interests are 
considered and which are not considered, but are important for sustainability. 
A water use (flow) diagram can  be  most helpful in identifying the stakeholders. 
Water use  will  be  different for each  basin. Therefore,  stakeholders have  to  be 
identified on  basin level. 
Inventory of water problems 
In this stage the inventory of water problems limits itself to those generally known 
and registered at the main stakeholders. The basin water balances and the water 
use flow diagram can again be  most useful to  put the  registered problems into 
the basin perspective. The type of problems that not only concern water quantity, 
quality and environmental issues (erosion,  siltation salinity etc.) but also relate 
to navigation, recreation and other uses. This inventory will be used in the second 
step as a starting point for an analysis of the problems and identification of other 
interest groups and stakeholders. 
Water rights and water allocation 
In  most of the countries water is considered a public good, but individuals can 
obtain private rights over water by tradition. Existing water rights are often a main 
constraint and a source of many problems in  the optimisation and introduction 
of  IWRM. The system of water rights  (surface water and  groundwater) their 
acquisition and conditionalities, their transferability and the system of water right 
administration should be clearly presented. Especially in water market systems 
a sound administration and a system of approval of transfers is required. If not 
available, planning of water will become very difficult. 
Water allocation between different uses and users is an organisational function. 
The introduction and development of IWRM could learn much from the present 
water allocation system, the conditions and procedures and actors in the decision­
making process. A good description will,  therefore, be very valuable especially 
for the analysis of water quantity related  conflicts or problems. These aspects 
can be verified in the stakeholder interviews in the next step. 
150 Intersectoral Management o( River Basins 
Description of socio-economic and financial environment: 
Many of the problems identified above will be said to be due to the actual financial 
and social  situation. Lack  of  infrastructure and  maintenance,  lack  of  good 
management,  and  the difficulty of  having effective cost  recovery  are  usually 
blamed  on  lack of financial  resources. Therefore, it is important to have insight 
into the  budget  allocation mechanisms, budget constraints,  cost recovery 
mechanisms,  subsidies,  price and  tariff structures,  collection  mechanisms, 
collection efficiencies, capability and willingness to pay for the various uses. These 
mechanisms should be  identified in general terms per sub-sector or use. 
Existing water policies and strategies 
In many countries the water sector is under debate due to problems experienced 
and  the commitment of  governments to the outcome of  the  international 
conferences. Though often not yet formulated, many countries are in the process 
of policy development. These policies deal with  principles like: equitable and 
socially acceptable water distribution (priorities, redistribution to marginal groups: 
poor, women etc.), water as a scarce, finite and economic good (efficient water 
use,  cost  recovery,  pricing  mechanisms and  tariff structures, transferability of 
water  rights,  rate  of commercialisation), water management at  the lowest 
appropriate level and on hydrological boundaries (delegation and decentralisation, 
water users participation,  involvement,  water management by  and  for water 
users), integrated planning arrangements and other co-ordination efforts, private 
sector participation, and environmental protection. An inventory of these policies 
indicates the level of awareness and commitment at constitutional functional level. 
Lack of these means either that there are no problems,  lack of awareness or 
lack of political will. 
Legal framework 
An inventory with  an explanation of principles is required of existing water laws 
(and  other  relevant  environmental  legislation),  water regulations and  relevant 
environmental regulations and decrees and by-laws of water authorities and river 
catchment agencies. II  is  important to  indicate,  whether and  how  the above 
mentioned focal  policy aspects are  incorporated  in  the  legislation such  as 
equitable water distribution, pricing, delegation and decentralisation, participation, 
integrated planning, and environmental protection. 
Especially in countries where water policies are changing, legislation will be under 
reconsideration or in the process of change. Therefore, it is necessary not only 
to present the existing  legislation but also the adjustments envisaged. When 
legislation is in a process of change this indicates that on constitutional level they 
are aware that present legislation does not satisfy the needs. It is of great value 
to describe the background of these changes and the direction of the change. 
SpeCial attention is to be paid to "trial" legislation where government has given 
mandate to certain management entities to work with legislation under design in 
pilot areas, for example, IWRM or basin level management. 
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Relevant water institutions 
Relevant water institutions are those institutions that with  regard  to water and 
water management either formulate policies and laws, do or are involved in water 
planning, co-ordinate water uses and users, provide water services or make use 
of water services, These can  be  government,  semi-government or private 
institutions on national, basin or use level. A water use flow diagram can give an 
indication of water users, service providers and co-ordinators. 
Past and present experience in IWRM 
It  is  important to know  what has  been  tried  in  the  past to  overcome certain 
problems  encountered and  to  what  extent these  interventions have  been 
successful  or not.  A  description is  desired  of  lessons learned from  local 
experiences of earlier and/or present interventions in the field of integrated water 
resources management and reasons for success or failure. 
5.2 Step 2:  stakeholder selection 
A first inventory of stakeholders will  be  made in  step one. These stakeholders 
will be the obvious operators of water services, co-ordination bodies and policy 
and  lawmakers. For the further process a selection  of stakeholders has to  be 
made to avoid duplication. Also some stakeholders might have been overlooked 
in the first study. Therefore, an independent team is formed to identify and select 
relevant stakeholders from the categories: water policymakers, water managers, 
water service providers, water using agencies, water using groups, water users 
and  other potential  interest holders  at constitutional,  organisational  and 
operational levels. These stakeholders will be approached for in depth interviews. 
5.3 Step 3:  stakeholder interviews 
Experts  carry out an  elaborate procedure of interviewing the  selected 
stakeholders applying the guidelines for interviews. These guidelines are in the 
format of  a questionnaire which  contain questions relating to the stakeholders 
interviewed and their perception of the existing situation and what they consider 
to be the  desired  IWRM  situation.  During this interview previously  overlooked 
stakeholders can be identified through the identification of parties that negatively 
influence the implementation of the stakeholder's duties. 
A different set of questions under the  issues in the  matrix is used for all  three 
functional  levels. They  are  organised under the  headings:  stakeholders, 
awareness,  policy,  legal framework,  institutional framework,  financial 
arrangements, human resources development, management information systems 
and decision support systems. 
The selected stakeholders will be invited to answer the questions during the interview. 
Guidelines for  interviews have been prepared (Van  Hofwegen and Jaspers 1999). 
The interviews should provide information on the situation of water management 
and  indicate the conflicts and the level of agreement and disagreement between 
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the stakeholders.  It  is,  therefore,  important that the  interviews are  made  by 
specialists who understand the meaning, purpose and operationalisation of IWRM 
and the potential problems and conflicts that might be encountered. 
A second part of the interview aims to obtain a description of the stakeholder's 
concept for improvement of the eXisting water resources situation, towards more 
integrated  water resources  management. The following  aspects and  principles 
should be included: 
Equitable and socially acceptable water distribution 
Efficient and economically sustainable water use 
Delegation, decentralisation and other devolution of authority 
Participation of stakeholders 
Integrated planning 
Private sector participation 
Environmental protection 
It is obvious that no guidelines can be prepared on how the IWRM situation should 
be as this is location and time specific. However, to give direction to the process 
on  formulation  of a desired  IWRM  situation, an  "ideal" IWRM  situation  is 
formulated where  in  relation to all  the points  raised  during the  interview,  a 
clarification is given on  how the situation would look like under ideal conditions. 
The formulation of the desired situation by the  individual stakeholders provides 
information  on  what  they consider the  main  constraints and  what should be 
changed  and  what they see as being  realistic  and  attainable in  their present 
situation. 
The "ideal" IWRM  situation  is derived from  the theory on  IWRM  and  the 
internationally accepted and applied principles on water policies. It does not exist 
but is only presented to provide an orientation in formulation of the desired IWRM 
situation. Conscious choices must be  made to deviate from  the ideal situation. 
This  allows for  active contribution to the  formulation  process,  as  the desirable 
IWRM situation will  be  used to define gaps in  existing  arrangements, which in 
turn could be used for formulation of interventions (steps 4-6). 
5.4 Step 4:  analysis of stakeholder opinions 
The guidelines are  presented  in  the  format of a matrix where  through sets of 
questions for different stakeholders the present and desired situation for each of 
these stakeholders on  the various levels are  identified. The outcome of all  the 
interviews will be  collected  and  an  inventory will  be  made of agreements and 
disagreements between the different stakeholders on the present situation, the 
problems and constraints and the steps to be taken to come to a better water 
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disseminated with  the background document to  the  interviewed stakeholders. 
These stakeholders should  also be  invited to the  workshops that follow  in  the 
process. 
5.5 Step 5: workshop 1-problem identification 
The first workshop to which all the relevant stakeholders are invited deals with 
the assessment of the  existing water resources management situation and 
problem identification according to the perception of the stakeholders. The steps 
1-4 were  focussing  on  individual stakeholders and  their interests. Their 
agreements and disagreements as formulated  in  the analysis report in  step 4 
are an interpretation of the "expert". Therefore, it is important that all the relevant 
stakeholders recognise their problems and those of others. 
The purpose of the first workshop is to confront the different stakeholders with 
the perception of other stakeholders and to obtain consensus between all different 
stakeholders of what the real problems are and which should be addressed. The 
analysis report will  be used as a reference and will be'improved in accordance 
with the outcome of the workshop. The agreed set of problems will then be used 
as an  input for the further stages on  formulation  of  a desired IWRM  situation 
and necessary interventions. During the test cases it proved to be a very fruitful 
method to arrive at a set of most important problems. 
Important is that the  workshop will  be organised  under the auspices of 
acknowledged and accepted  authorities as  participants will only take  such  an 
activity serious if the result will contribute to the process of change. This means 
that the outcome should  be  included  in  the  policy development process, 
implementation process or operationalisation of water resource management. 
5.6 Step 6: workshop 2-formulation of desired IWRM situation and 
interventions 
The second workshop (one to three months after the first workshop) will elaborate 
extensively on the principles of integrated water resources management and will 
further result  in  the  formulation  of  a  desired  water resources  management 
situation in that specific country or river (sub-) basin and the set of interventions 
that will be  needed to achieve that. 
This workshop is indicative and the outcome provides directions for constitutional, 
organisational and operational interventions. The outcome should be seen as an 
input for  national policy and  deciSion  makers  on  the one hand,  and  as  a 
framework for defining interventions at the three levels. It is, therefore, important 
that the status of the outcome is valued in this light. 
In case these guidelines are applied for specific project work, an additional step 
in  this workshop is  required to analyse which,  if any,  of the above  formulated 
interventions should be promoted in the context of this specific project and which 
interventions better to leave for other projects or sets of activities. 
154 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
5.7 Step 7: preliminary country/basin/sub-basin report 
Based  on  the  foregoing  steps the experts will  draft a  preliminary country 
document comprising: 
assessment of existing water management situation 
complete problem inventory 
desired water resources management situation 
proposed set of general and specific interventions needed to reach 
the desired situation 
5.8 Step 8: dissemination and comments 
The draft country/basin/sub-basin  report is  disseminated and  a  thorough 
procedure for collecting comments from the different stakeholders at the different 
levels is followed. 
5.9 Step 9: final countrylbasin/sub-basin report 
Experts  draft a final  country/basin/sub-basin  report which  is  offered to the 
government and financing  agencies for endorsement and inclusion into the 
strategy and/or into specific water related projects for the specific country. 
5.10 Step 10: Monitoring procedure 
A monitoring procedure is developed to see whether the interventions are taking 
place and whether the envisaged results are achieved. 
6. Application of guidelines and lessons learned 
These guidelines have been developed in an interactive process, which included 
field  tests  in  three countries (Colombia,  Guatemala and  Jamaica). The use of 
the guidelines initiates a process towards  balancing  the  interests of different 
stakeholders in  water. The guidelines can  be  applied  in  different stages of the 
project cycle:  sector policymaking,  sector planning,  institutional  design  and 
management arrangements for the sector and for specific projects. Its use should 
result  in  an  agreement on  what the problems and  conflicts are and  how these 
can be resolved. The process in itself is cyclic and by monitoring the effectiveness 
of the interventions new problems and constraints can be identified and corrective 
actions or new solutions have to be sought. The following points require attention 
in the application of the guidelines: 
1  . 	 The  use of the  guidelines has  to  be  regarded  as  the initiation of the 
process towards IWRM attached to projects envisaged. The first cycle 
of the  process  results  in  a set of interventions necessary to  achieve 
the desired IWRM situation. These interventions can be included in the 
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project design. These projects can be sectoral on  regional or (sub-) 
basin scale or sub-sectoral and on local scale. 
2. 	 The application of the framework is  most effective  in  programmes 
aiming at sector wide institutional change and development because 
the  aim of the programme coincides with  the purpose of the 
guidelines. Moreover, the programme is most likely to be supported 
by the main stakeholders, making the possibilities for interventions 
wider and  necessary adjustments in  legal  and  institutional 
frameworks less complicated. 
The guidelines can also be applied in relation to local projects in physical 
infrastructure. The  project should  be  of such  scale'that different 
stakeholders can and will be influenced and conflicts of interest on local 
and (sub-) basin scale are foreseen. However, in this case the focus of 
the  project  is  on  the physical  works and institutional change  is  a 
derivative of such a project. The possibilities for interventions will also 
be  limited by  the  room  provided in  legislation as  it can hardly  be 
expected that for only one such project legislation will be amended. 
3. 	 It is important to notice that, on the local scale, the situation is not 
always perceived as problematic.  However,  it  is the duty of 
government to foresee  possible negative  effects for,  and conflicts 
with, the interest of society.  In such cases government should take 
appropriate action through awareness creation and, in a later stage, 
should participate as a stakeholder in the formulation of interventions 
using the proposed framework. 
4. 	 The guidelines can be applied at different levels of scale: sub-basin, 
basin and national level. For whatever level of scale these guidelines 
are  applied,  it  is  crucial to identify  and  engage all  relevant 
stakeholders at  the three functional  levels.  Leaving  out some 
stakeholders might lead to  non-acceptance of the  outcome of the 
process and obstruction  of the further development of IWRM. 
Therefore, these exercises cannot be done through desk studies. 
5. 	 It is advisable to engage independent local experts and preferably not 
from  within the  government. Independence should take  away bias 
towards selection of stakeholders in the process. Government officials 
are likely to focus on  official  government policies and government 
agencies limiting the marsgins of problem identification and solving. 
6. 	 During the tests it became clear that the interview procedure required 
more emphasis. The purpose of the interviews is to obtain the opinion 
of the individual stakeholders or their representatives. The guidelines 
for the  interviews are  meant to be a  tool  for the  interviewer to 
structure the interview and  to  interact with  the stakeholder on  the 
different issues  raised. The guidelines should  not be  handled as 
questionnaires to be handed over to the stakeholder to be filled as 
then the sensitive issues 
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will  not surface. This means that besides a good understanding of 
IWRM,  good communication skills are  required for the interviewer. 
It  also  emphasises the  necessity for  good,  clear and  field  tested 
guidelines. 
7. 	 The workshops proved to  be  an  effective tool to  obtain consensus 
on  what the  problems and conflicts are and  what steps should be 
taken  to  resolve  them. On  several  occasions  it  seemed  to  be  the 
first time that different stakeholders were  sitting  in  one  room 
discussing their  problems!  However,  to  deal  with  problem 
identification and  resolution  in  one workshop was too much asked 
for.  Several  workshops  with  different focus  are  needed  e.g.  one 
workshop on  problem  identification and  one  on  solutions and 
interventions. 
8. 	 Clear prospects for the stakeholders are a necessary condition for 
the stakeholders to participate actively.  The idea that problems are 
being  inventoried and  ways  are  sought to solve them  leads to 
expectations that follow up will  be  given.  Therefore the framework 
of this  process  must  be  made clear from  the  onset.  Active 
participation also depends on  the  authority of the  initiator of  the 
process.  For example, the role of the Inter-American Development 
Bank as  initiator and  organiser of the  workshops appeared to  be 
crucial in  all the test cases. 
9. 	 Some understanding of IWRM and private sector participation (PSP) 
among the participants in  the  process  is  a condition  for a good 
outcome. The first inventory should identify the  level  of awareness 
and  knowledge on  IWRM  and  PSP.  If  necessary awareness and 
knowledge can  be  raised  through  information  and  education  and 
training programmes. 
10. 	 A  basic  requirement for  IWRM 'is  the  preparedness to  reflect  on 
principles of  active  democracy,  because  IWRM  is  about weighing 
private and public interests and therefore a matter of compromises. 
Outcomes of democratic processes should  be  respected  and 
solutions should not be forced. 
11. 	 In most cases the scale of the process will not be sufficiently known. 
In such case step one of the process (inventory) can  be  separated 
from the remainder. The outcome of step one should then include a 
cost estimate for one cycle of the process. 
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Abstract 
The Lerma-Chapala basin in central Mexico,  with a catchment area of  some 54,300 
krrf and serving a population of over 15 million, is one of the most over-committed 
basins in  the  world.  Its total water depletion exceeds annual renewable water by 
10%  on average.  To  counter this over-exploitation several institutional innovations 
have occurred in  the basin,  while  water reforms at the national level have also 
significantly altered the arrangements for water management in the basin.  These 
changes reflect the adaptive capacity ofMexico to manage the transition from supply 
to demand management.  This paper analyses this transition through assessing the 
effectiveness of  the institutional arrangements for water management in the Lerma­
Chapala basin in addressing the negative impacts ofbasin closure.  Special attention 
is paid to stakeholder participation in the Lerma-Chapala River Basin Council and 
basin-wide water allocation mechanisms.  The analysis shows that,  while basin level 
co-ordination mechanisms are clearly necessary, and  promising progress has been 
made, more drastic changes are needed to ensure sustainable water management. 
In particular, access to water bypoor farmers needs to be safeguarded, the overdraft 
of  the basin's aquifers remedied, user representation in basin-level decision-making 
improved and mechanisms for compensating farmers for the transfer of water out of 
the agricultural sector drawn up.  Lastly,  decision-making power and control over 
financial resources need to be further decentraJised to the basin and state levels to 
enable sustainable water management. 
1. Introduction 
The recognition that effective water management requires a basin perspective is long­
standing and widespread.  Especially in closing'  river basins, where increasing water 
over-exploitation results in a complex interplay among declines in  water quality, 
'Seckler (1996)  coined  this  term  to  characterise  river  basins  with  no utilisable outflows, 
i.e.  where the  use  of water that  renders  it  unavailable  for  further use is  approaching or 
equal  to  the  level  of  annual  renewable  water.  This definition differs from  the  hydrologiC 
definition of a closed basin, where there are outflows but these go  only to  internal seas, 
lakes or other sinks. 
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increasing water over-exploitation results in a complex interplay among declines 
in water quality, intersectoral water transfers, threats to human health, inequitable 
water allocation and  reduced  access  to  water by  poor people,  the  need for 
effective institutional arrangements is  urgent (Vermillion and Merrey 1998).  In 
this regard, Turton and Ohlsson (2000) posit that water scarcity per se is not the 
key  issue,  but rather whether a society has the adaptive capacity to cope with 
the challenges water scarcity poses.  They argue that two institutional transitions 
(need to) occur in the water sector as water becomes more scarce: the first when 
water abundance turns to water shortage and the second when water shortage 
turns to water over-exploitation. 
The first transition,  which occurs when  water demand  due  to  population growth 
overtakes the readily available supply of water, triggers the construction of significant 
hydraulic infrastructure, usually by the government, to mobilise more water.  Reisner 
(1993)  terms this transition to water supply development the birth of the  hydraulic 
mission, embodied in a central government agency consisting of engineers.  Whereas 
before water was  controlled  locally,  after the  first transition its development and 
management becomes highly centralised.  During this phase river-baSin development 
is important and one would typically expect to find river-basin authorities. 
The supply-oriented phase  runs up against a barrier when  river basins close, 
i.e. when  water demand continues to outstrip supply even though  all  available 
water sources have been developed or are  prohibitively expensive to develop. 
This induces increased competition between water use sectors and calls for a 
different approach  to  managing water.  However,  making the  second water 
transition, from  supply-oriented development to water demand management, 
requires substantial changes in institutional arrangements for water management, 
possibly including the creation of river basin councils.  Under favourable socio­
economic and  political conditions this transition can  be made,  resulting  in  a 
stabilisation of water demand and the birth of sustainable water management. 
However, this transition is not automatic and whether and how well it occurs is a 
function of the adaptive capacity of a society. 
The need to make the water transition in the Lerma-Chapala basin is urgent.  This 
basin in central Mexico has reached a crisis point, with total water depletion exceeding 
supply by 10 percent on average.  Unchecked groundwater pumping has produced 
declines in aquifer levels of 2.1  m/year  (Scott and  Garces-Restrepo 2000),  while 
surface water depletion exceeds supply in  all  but the wettest years,  as a result of 
which Lake Chapala, the receiving water body of the basin, is drying up.  In addition, 
water is being transferred from the agricultural to the  urban and industrial sectors, 
without due compensation to farmers.  Lastly, water pollution is serious with significant 
wastewater reuse for irrigation within the basin (Scott et al. 2000). 
In  response to the  deterioration  in  the  basin's water resource  base,  several 
institutional innovations have occurred in the basin since 1989, including the Signing 
of a river basin co-ordination agreement (1989), the creation of a river basin council 
(1993) and  the  establishment of aquifer management councils (1995-onwards). 
Water reforms at the national level, such as the creation of a national water agency 
in 1989, the transfer of government irrigation districts to users (1991-present) and 
the promulgation of a new water law in  1992, have also significantly altered 
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institutional arrangements for  water management in the basin.  These reforms 
are strongly interrelated and constitute Mexico's attempt to manage the  water 
transition. 
This paper partially assesses the effectiveness of these changes in  dealing with 
basin closure in the Lerma-Chapala basin.  The rationale of this assessment is to 
explore the types of institutional arrangements needed to manage the  water 
transition at the basin level.  The next section presents a basin water balance and 
introduces the water management stakeholders in the basin.  This brief basin profile 
provides the backdrop for the description of the institutional arrangements in the 
basin in  the third section, which also assesses stakeholder participation and the 
representation of interests in the river basin council.  The  key  challenges facing 
the  basin,  namely surface and  groundwater allocation  mechanisms and the 
representation of interests are reviewed in the final section, followed by conclusions. 
2. The Lerma-Chapala basin: water balance and stakeholders 
2.1  Water balance 
The Lerma-Chapala basin  covers  some 54,300  km2  and  crosses five  states: 
Queretaro (5%),  Guanajuato (44%),  Michoacan (28%),  Mexico (10%)  and  Jalisco 
(13%).  The basin is home to a dynamic agricultural  sector and a rapidly growing 
industrial sector,  and accounts for 9 percent of Mexico's GNP.  It  is  the source of 
water for around  15 million  people  (11  million  in  the basin  and 2 million  each  in 
Guadalajara and  Mexico City) and contains 13 percent of the irrigated area in the 
country.  The average annual runoff in the basin from 1940 to 1995 was 5,757 million 
cubic meters (MCM), a little over one percent of Mexico's total runoff (CNA 1999a). 
The headwaters of the  Rio Lerma rise  in  the east of the basin  near the city of 
Toluca at an elevation of 2600 m above sea level to discharge into Lake Chapala 
in the west at an  elevation of 1,500 m.a.s.1.  The total length of the Rio Lerma is 
750 km and eight major tributaries discharge into it.  Lake Chapala, with a length 
of 77 km and a width of 23 km, is Mexico's largest natural lake and at full capacity 
stores 8,125 MCM and covers 111,000 ha.  The shallow depth of the lake (7.2 m) 
results in the loss of a large percentage of its storage to evaporation each year2 
At times of high water levels Lake Chapala discharges into the  Santiago River, 
which flows in a north-westerly direction and then drops to the Pacific Ocean after 
524 km.  The topography and stream network of the basin are shown in Figure 1, 
which was derived from the DEM at 30-sec resolution issued by the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS). 
The climate in the basin is  semi~arid to sub-humid, with 90 percent of the rains falling 
between May and OctOber.  Rainfall is highly variable, with an average annual rainfall 
over the 1945-1997 period of 712 mm, and a minimum of 494 mm in  1999 and a 
maximum of 1,022 mm in 1958 (CNA 199ge).  Average monthly temperatures vary 
'On a scale of 1:10,000 the  dimensions of the  lake  are  7.7  m by 2.3 m and  less than 
1 mm  deep. 
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Figure 1: Topography and stream network of the Lerma-Chapala basin 
from  14.6°C in January to 21.3°C in  May,  thus a range of crops can  be  grown 
throughout the year.  The potential evapotranspiration mirrors the temperature 
variation,  with  a peak in  April/May,  and an  annual total of some 1,900 mm.  In 
every month except July and August there is  a net deficit between rainfall  and 
evapotranspiration,  indicating the  importance of  irrigation for  agricultural 
production in the basin. 
A total of 40 aquifers,  largely interconnected, have been identified in  the  basin 
(CNAlMW 1999).  Up to depths of over a hundred meters from the surface, the 
aquifers are composed of alluvial and lacustrine materials while the lower layers, 
several hundred meters in depth, are composed primarily of basaltic rocks and 
rhyolite tuff (Chavez 1998).  The aquifers are recharged through rainfall infiltration, 
surface run-off, and importantly deep percolation from surface irrigation.  Various 
sources  report  wildly different data on  annual extraction and  recharge  rates, 
making it hard to portray with any precision the groundwater situation in the basin. 
What is clear is that 30 of the 40 aquifers are in deficit and falling fast, at 2.1  m/ 
year on average (Scott and Garces-Restrepo 2000).  The most recent data from 
CAN (National Water Commission) indicate that average annual recharge is 3,980 
MCM, while average annual extrac1ions are placed at 4,621  MCM giving a deficit 
of 641  MCM per year (CNA 1999a). 
Table  1 presents current average consumptive water use for different sectors in 
the basin compared to average annual renewable water, showing a deficit of 900 
MCM.  The percentage of available water that is developed and put to use in the 
164 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
Table 1: Water balance of the Lerma-Chapala basin 
Surface Water 
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Source: CNA 1999a 
basin is  110 percenP, showing its degree of over-commitment. The out-of-basin 
transfers are to Guadalajara (surface water) and Mexico City (groundwater) for 
urban water supply. 
To portray basin closure in the Lerma-Chapala basin it is instructive to analyse 
fluctuations in the water levels of Lake Chapala.  Figure 2 shows these fluctuations 
from 1934 to 1999 and relates them to developments in the basin.  Starting in 
1945, water levels in the lake declined sharply, from around 97 m4  on average 
to 90.8 m in  1954, due to a drought combined with significant abstractions from 
the lake.  At this time around 250,000 ha were irrigated, mainly with surface water, 
and the constructed storage capacity in  the basin was 1,817 MCM.  This period 
was the first time the basin headed towards closure as far as surface water is 
concerned.  However, thanks to good rains towards the end of the  1950s, the 
lake recuperated, and levels fluctuated between 95.5 m and 98.5 m from 1960 
to 1979. 
In  1979 a second period of decline set in  leading to basin closure in  the mid­
1980s.  Constructed storage capacity in the basin had increased to 4,499 MCM 
and the average irrigated area had grown to around 650,000 ha, with a Significant 
increase in groundwater irrigation.  Even though abstractions from the lake for 
hydroelectricity had ceased, the combination of these factors resulted in declines 
of the lake level, from around 95 m at the start of 1980 to 92 m in 1990.  After a 
modest recuperation in the early 1990s, lake levels in October 2000 are at their 
lowest since 1954, due to continued over-exploitation of surface and groundwater. 
It  is unlikely that the lake will  recover without exceptional runoff as generated 
through a major hurricane. 
"This basin water exploitation Indicator is arrived at by dividing total depletion (process and 
non-process) by annual renewable water (see Seckler et al.  1998 and Molden 1997). 
4A locally defined benchmark where  100 m is defined as the  high shoreline. (de Anda 
et al.  1998) 
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Figure 2:  Lake Chapala water levels and basin developments 
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1934  1939 1944  1949  1954  1959 1964 1969 1974  1979 1984  1989 1984  1999 
Rainfall (mm)l1)  670  648  685  757  740  668  720 
Population (miliions)IZ)  2.5  3,0  3,6  4,5  5,9  8,7  11,0 
Storage Capacity Dams (MCMt"  747  1,628  1,817  3,269  3,840  4,499  4,499 
Irrigation (ha)I')  n.a.  175,843  250,500  408,746  681,668  657,734  689,743 
Lake Inflow from Lerma (MCMf')  2,864  1,652  1,692  1,773  1,931  590  n.a. 
Lake Extractions (MCM)15)  2,638  1,049  674  1,350  1,817  309  293 
Sources for lake  levels: de  P,  Sandoval (1994) and CNA (1991-1999b) 
(1) 	 Decade average from de P. Sandoval (1994) for 1934-1949 and CNAlMW (1999) 
for  1950-1999. 
(2) 	 Population data for the end of the decade. Sources: de  P.  Sandoval (1994)  for 
estimates for 1939, 1949, 1959, 1969 and 1979 and CNAlMW (1999) for actual 
figures for 1989 and 1999. 
(3) 	 Constructed storage capacity at end of decade. Source: de P.  Sandoval (1994) 
and CNA (199ge). 
(4) 	 Average actual irrigated area over the decade. Source: CNA (199ge). 
(5) 	 Decade average,  excluding  evaporation  from  de  P.  Sandoval  (1994) and CNA 
(1991,1992, 1993a, 1994, 1995,  1996, 1997, 1998,  1999b). 
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2.2 Major users of water 
2.2. 1 Irrigated agriculture 
The main water user in  the basin is irrigated agriculture, causing 57 percent of 
the  total  depletion of surface  water and 68 percent of  the  total  depletion  of 
groundwater (see Table 1).  Eleven large-scale canal irrigation systems (termed 
irrigation districts in  Mexico) command around 285,000 ha and  some  16,000 
farmer-managed and  private irrigation systems (termed  unidades de riego in 
Mexico) cover 510,000 ha.  Twenty-seven reservoirs with a storage capacity of 
2,500 MCM provide 235,000 ha in the irrigation districts with surface water while 
around 1,500 smaller reservoirs serve 180,000 ha in the unidades.  An estimated 
17,500 deep tubewells provide around 380,000 ha in the basin with groundwater, 
of which 47,000 ha is located in irrigation districts (CNA 1993b; CNNMW 1999). 
There  are an  estimated 88,000 water users (70,000 ejidatarios5  and  18,000 
pequenos propietario:l') in the irrigation districts, and 100,000 water users (84,000 
ejidatarios and 16,000 pequenos propietarios) in the unidades (CNNMW 1999). 
Data on cropping patterns and productivity for the whole basin are not available, 
although  studies on parts of the basin or selected irrigation systems are available 
(e.g.  Flores-L6pez and  Scott 2000; Kloezen and Garces Restrepo 1998; Silva­
Ochao 2000). 
In the early 1990s the Mexican government transferred the government-managed 
irrigation  districts to Water Users' Associations (WUAs)  to reduce  public 
expenditure on irrigation (Espinosa-de Le6n and Trava 1992; Trava 1994; Gorriz 
et al.  1995; Johnson 1997a).  In the Lerma-Chapala basin 10 irrigation districts 
were transferred, after a comprehensive social mobilisation campaign, to WUAs, 
who now manage secondary canal  units varying in  size from  1,500 to 30,000 
ha.  The WUAs were formed as legally recognised non-profit associations to whom 
CNA granted concessions for the use of water and the irrigation infrastructure, 
for periods ranging from 5 to 50 years. 
In  all the districts CNA continues to manage the dams,  headworks and main 
canals and  delivers water in  bulk to the  WUAs,  except in  the Alto Rro  Lerma 
irrigation district where a federation of WUAs  has been formed to manage the 
main  system  (Kloezen  2000).  Although  user involvement in  irrigation 
management has increased, at the same time the state's control over water was 
reasserted through IMT.  This is apparent from the new water law, which reaffirms 
federal control over the nation's waters as well as the irrigation infrastructure and 
makes CNA ultimately responsible for the management of the irrigation districts. 
5Ejidatarios are  members of  ejidos,  land reform  communities created  after the  Mexican 
Revolution of  1910.  Land holdings per ejidatario are typically less than 5 ha. 
6Pequeiios propietarios are private farmers with a limit on land ownership of 100 ha; how­
ever, holdings may be managed in much larger blocks, with nominal ownership in the hands 
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The  management structures in  the  unidades are  much more diverse, and  may 
consist of  informal WUAs,  government recognised WUAs,  water judges, pump 
groups or commercial management.  As  state intervention in  the unidades has 
been piecemeal in comparison to the districts and  has usually only consisted of 
assistance in  construction and the granting of water rights, their representation 
in formal decision-making forums is weak.  In the case of groundwater unidades 
this is changing, with the recent creation of Consejos Teenicos de Aguas (COTAS; 
aquifer management councils)  in  17 aquifers.  These COTAS  are to serve as 
forums for reaching agreement on aquifer management, taking into consideration 
the needs of the different sectors using groundwater. 
2.2.2 Urban water supply 
Domestic water supply in the basin depends mainly on groundwater (95%), with 
total consumptive use standing at 791  MCM.  In  addition,  water is transferred 
out of the basin to provide Guadalajara (237 MCM surface water)  and Mexico 
City (323 MCM groundwater) with urban water.  The population in the basin has 
increased significantly, doubling from 2.1  million inhabitants in 1930 to 4.5 million 
in  1970 and then  more then doubling in the next 30 years to 11  million in 2000 
(CNAlMW 1999).  During this period Mexico's population grew from 16.6 million 
to 100.6 million.  The population's annual growth rate in the basin between 1990 
and  1995 was 2.16 percent,  implying that the  basin's population  will  double in 
around 30 years if this rate remains the same (CNAlMW 1999).  Besides a five­
fold increase in the population in  the past 70 years, the basin's population has 
become strongly urbanised.  Population in the seven largest cities in  the basin 
increased from  267,197 in  1930 to 4,500,643 in  2000 (CNA/MW 1999). 
Understandably, population growth has led to increasing pressures on the basin's 
water resources.  Scott et al.  (forthcoming) project that urban water demand in 
the medium term will  increase by some 4.1  percent per year. 
Starting in 1983 domestic water supply, wastewater collection and more recently 
wastewater treatment were decentralised to the municipalities.  The creation of 
water utilities has been promoted, to separate these activities from other municipal 
responsibilities.  However, according to CNA (1999d: 8) "most of the water utilities 
have a poor performance and need to be greatly improved to achieve technical 
and economical sufficiency:' 
2.2.3 Industry 
Although industry only uses a small amount of the basin's water (278 MCM or 3 
percent of consumptive use)  it generates 35 percent of Mexico's industrial GNP 
and pays around $42 million in water taxes to the federal government (CNAlMW 
1999).  The 6,400 registered industrial firms in the basin are still a major source 
of water pollution (figures are not available), although officially they must have a 
permit from CNA indicating effluent standards to discharge wastewater. 
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3. Institutional arrangements for water management in the Lerma­
Chapala basin 
A watershed  year for water management in  Mexico was  1989.  Whereas  the 
previous 100 years were characterised by increasing federal control over water, 
since 1989 decentralisation has been the norm.  Currently states, municipalities 
and water users have a much larger say in water management decision-making. 
These changes are all part of the transition from supply to demand management 
in the Mexican water sector and the reconfiguration of the relationships between 
water users and  the  three levels of government (federal,  state and  municipal). 
In this regard, two aspects of how Mexico is structured as a country are important, 
namely that it is a highly centralised federation?  and that surface water is defined 
in  the Constitution  as  national property,  placed  in  the  trust of the  federal 
government. 
3.1  Water rights 
In  Mexico the  federal  government, as  the holder of  water property  rights,  has 
the right to grant surface water-use rights as concessions to users (Kloezen 1998). 
The concession titles set out the quantity of surface water a user is entitled to, 
although in practice the actual quantity a user receives may be adjusted annually 
to reflect water availability,  with priority accorded to domestic water use (CNA, 
1999c).  Thus,  for allocating surface  water Mexico follows the  proportional 
appropriation doctrine and in theory all concession holders share proportionally 
in any shortages or surpluses of water.s 
The situation surrounding groundwater is more complex, as the Constitution does 
not define it as national property, but rather states that overlying landowners may 
bring groundwater to the surface as long as this does not affect other users.  In 
1946 the Constitution  was  amended to the effect that the federal  government 
can intervene in aquifers in overdraft, by issuing pump permits or declaring that 
new pumps may not be  installed.  Based on  a ruling of the Supreme Court in 
1983 groundwater is  now considered national  property,  although  this  is  not 
reflected in the Constitution or the 1992 water law (Palacios-Velez and Martinez 
1999).  Groundwater concessions in  Mexico are granted on  a volumetric basis 
with a maximum extraction or pumping rate specified (and limited by electrical 
power transformer capacity). 
7Mexico is a federation composed of 31  states and a Federal District. Each state is subdi· 
vided into municipalities, has its own constitution and laws as well as a governor who serves 
as the highest executive authority. The co-ordination of federal and state affairs is achieved 
through federal legislation and by compacts. Concerning water, the federal government may 
enter into co-ordination agreements with  the  states in  order for them to  take  on  specific 
responsibilities. 
8This contrasts with the prior appropriation system, where first rights have seniority imply­
ing that water rights issued later are the first to  be curtailed in times of shortage. 
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Once issued, water concessions need to be registered in the Registro Publico de 
Derechos de Agua (REPDA; Public Registry of Water Rights), maintained by CNA. 
After registration the concessions become fully tradable within river basins, although 
the CNA needs to be notified of the trade and needs to approve it (Kloezen, 1998). 
3.2 Water management organisations and stakeholders 
In the Lerma-Chapala basin a wide array of organisations and stakeholders are 
involved  in  water management,  of  which the  major ones  are described below. 
The government agency responsible for water management in the basin  is the 
CNA.  Created in January 1989 the CNA is a semi-autonomous federal agency 
charged with defining water policy, granting water concessions and wastewater 
discharge permits,  establishing norms for water use and  water quality and 
integrating regional and national water management plans. 
The role of states in the water sector has been limited to regulating the municipal 
water utilities and supporting those utilities which  show poor technical  and 
economic performance.  State legislation regulates the domestic water industry, 
establishes the  basis for the creation of water utilities and  sets  the  rules for 
determining water tariffs.  As part of the "new federalism" policy during the Zedillo 
administration (1995-2000), the federal government promoted the delegation of 
water sector responsibilities  and  programmes to  the  states,  but  notably  not 
financial  resources.  Although  the  federal  government has  encouraged the 
modification of state laws to  promote the participation of state governments in 
all water sector activities through the creation of State Water Commissions, the 
response has been  lukewarm.  This is  not the case in  the state of Guanajuato, 
where CEAG (Comisi6n Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato; Guanajuato State Water 
Commission) has taken on  its new role with vigour. 
The official aim of unifying all government responsibilities related to water in the CNA 
was to create the  necessary conditions for moving towards sustainable water 
management (CNA, 1999d). To complement this move a modem and comprehensive 
water law was  promulgated  in  1992.  This  law defines  an  integral approach  for 
managing surface and groundwater in the context of river basins, which it considers 
as the ideal geographical  unit for the planning,  development and management of 
water.  It also promotes decentralisation, stakeholder participation, better control over 
water withdrawals and wastewater discharges, and full-cost pricing. 
A key provision of the 1992 water law is the stipulation that stakeholder participation 
is mandatory in water management at the river basin level.  To this end river basin 
councils, which are forums where federal, state and municipal governments as well 
as water user representatives share the responsibility for allocating water resources 
and fostering integral water management at the basin level, have been established 
in 26  river basins.  The government's philosophy behind the river basin councils, 
detailed in the 1992 water law, is that they are to be co-ordination and consensus­
building bodies, as shown in Figure 3.  In addition, the CNA has divided the country 
into 13 hydrologic regions and established an office in each region to improve river 
basin planning and the interaction with stakeholders. 
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Mexico's first river basin council was established in  the Lerma-Chapala basin,  in 
response to the drying up of Lake Chapala in the 1980s, combined with the severe 
contamination of the Lerma River.  It was clear that something had to be done to 
preserve Lake Chapala, which generates significant tourism revenues and supplies 
two million inhabitants of Guadalajara with domestic water.  In addition, its symbolic 
value as Mexico's largest natural lake is high. According to Mestre (1997:144): 
'~ wide-ranging water diagnosis existing by mid 1989 clearly presented 
four capital problems in  the  Lerma River basin: scarcity,  as well as 
unsuitable  water allocation,  pollution,  inefficiency of water use,  and 
environmental depredation.  To turn the tide,  it became clear that it would 
be insufficient and imprudent to  maintain that the  federal government 
was solely responsible for this chaos and for its solution or mitigation." 
Hence, the federal government and the governments of the five states falling in 
the river basin signed an  agreement in Chapala on 13 April 1989, adopting four 
main objectives to improve water management in  the basin: 
Allocate surface and groundwater fairly among users and regulate 
its use; 
Improve water quality by treating municipal and industrial effluents; 
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Increase water-use efficiency; and 
Conserve the river basin ecosystem and protect wat'ersheds. 
On  1 September 1989 a formal Consultative Council was formed to follow up on 
these objectives.  Based on the 1992 water law the Consultative Council became 
the Lerma-Chapala River Basin Council on 28 January 1993.  A challenge for the 
River Basin Council has been ensuring effective user representation-critical in 
the consensus building and co-ordination role envisioned in the law.  Until the end 
of 1998, the Council was very top heavy: its president was the federal minister of 
agriculture until 1995 and the federal minister of the environment from 1995 to 1998, 
while its members were the governors of the five states making up the basin, the 
federal ministers of five key ministries and the Directors General of CFE, PEMEX  . 
and CNA.  It  is evident from  this choice of institutional design that control  over 
water and financial resources was a driving force in  the inter-agency alignments 
within the basin.  In 1998 this changed, with user representatives from six different 
sectors (agriculture,  fisheries,  services,  industry,  livestock and  urban)  being 
appointed to the Council.  Also,  the Director General of the CNA became the 
president of the Council. while the remaining members are the five state governors. 
This  change was  based  on  a  modification  in  1997 of the water law  and  its 
regulations, to allow for larger representation of users.  However. the users on the 
Council have been nominated by CNA, and do not necessarily reflect the interests 
of the water use sector they represent.  To rectify this. CNA is currently working to 
establish a stepped form  of user representation  consisting of user committees in 
each state of the basin for each of the  six water use sectors represented on  the 
Council, giving a total of 36 user committees.  These committees will each vote for 
a representative to sit in the user assembly at the basin level, which in turn will elect 
the six user representatives on the Council.  In  addition. forums at the sub-basin 
level, such as Commissions and COTAS complement the Council (see Figure 4). 
As part of the process of strengthening stakeholder participation in the River Basin 
Council a participatory planning process was started in the Lerma-Chapala basin in 
1998, based on the hypothesis that local stakeholders have a better understanding 
of the problems within the region and will playa decisive role in plan implementation. 
To mobilise stakeholders and build consensus, the CNA organised 15 workshops in 
the Lerma-Chapala basin,  attended by  160 user representatives and 33 
representatives of civil society (NGOs, research institutes, etc). 
4.  Over-arching issues 
Through the Lerma-Chapala River Basin CounCil,  promising progress has been 
made towards improved water management in  the basin.  This progress  is 
remarkable,  in  light of the complicated transition from  highly centralised water 
management to one in which states, municipalities and water users have a larger 
say.  Nonetheless, from a water perspective the Lerma-Chapala basin is still in 
crisis and time  is  running out.  The efforts of the council in  the  past 10 years 
need to be redoubled to tackle the significant challenges lying ahead of it.  Three 
challenges  stand  out,  namely surface and groundwater allocation and the 
representation of interests in the council. 
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4.1  Surface water allocation 
To  allocate surface water fairly among users in the basin,  the governors of the 
five  states in  the  basin and the  federal  government signed  a treaty in  August 
1991  (CCCLC, 1991).  An important objective of the treaty is to maintain adequate 
water levels in Lake Chapala and to ensure Guadalajara's domestic water supply. 
To  preserve Lake Chapala the treaty sets out three allocation policies, namely 
critical, average and  abundant,  based on the volume of water in the lake (less 
than  3,300  MCM.  from  3,300 to  6,000  MCM  and  more than 6,000 MCM, 
respectively).  Each year the council verifies the volume stored in  Lake Chapala 
to determine the allocation  policy to be followed  for the next year.  For  each 
allocation  policy,  formulas  have been drawn  up  to  calculate allocations to  the 
irrigation systems in the basin, based on the surface runoff generated in each of 
the five states in the previous year.  Table 2 indicates how this works for the Alto 
Rio Lerma irrigation district.  Based on extensive modelling of these formulas it 
was concluded that the resulting water allocation would not impinge on the 1  ,440 
MCM needed by Lake Chapala for evaporation. 
173 Wester,  Burton and Mestre: Lerma-Chapaia Basin, Mexico 




Surface Runoff Generated (SRG) 
in the Stale of GuanaJuato (MCM) 
Volume Allocated (VA) to 
Irrigation District (MCM) 
Cntical  if SRG between 280 and 1,260  then VA = 94.2"10 of SRG -262.8 
if SRG > 1.260  then VA = 924 
Average  if SRG between 144 and 1,125 
if SRG between 1,125 and 1,400 
thenVA=94 
then VA = 924 
II SRG > 1,400  then VA =955 
Abundant  If SRG between 19 and 1,000  then VA = 94.2% of SRG -17.9 
II SRG between 1,000 and 1,200  then VA = 924 
if SRG > 1,200  then VA =955 
Source: CCCLC (1991) 
Since 1991, the Monitoring and Evaluation Group of the Council has met each 
year and has applied the water allocation rules set out in the treaty.  Figure 5 
sets out the volumes of water allocated and t1sed from 1992 to 2000 as well as 
the volume of water stored in  Lake Chapala.  This shows that the  1991  treaty 
has been enforced, as actual use has never been higher than the allocated values. 
A caveat here is that only the  extractions by  irrigation  districts are accurately 
measured, thus actual withdrawals may have been higher as the amount of water 
going to the  unidades de riego is unknown. 
Sources: CNA (1991,1992, 1993a, 1994, 1995.1996,1997,1998, 1999b) 
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Despite the apparently good performance of the surface water allocation 
mechanisms at the basin level through the application of the 1991  treaty,  Lake 
Chapala's volume  has halved in  the past eight years.  This is so because the 
surface water treaty takes the  surface runoff generated in the previous year to 
determine water allocations.  In 1997 rainfall was 645 mm and dam storage (used 
here as a proxy of surface runoff) was consequently low.  Combined with a lake 
volume below 3,300 MCM the  critical  allocation policy was followed  for  1998, 
leading to the lowest allocations since the treaty was signed.  However, rainfall 
in 1998 was exceptionally good, at 810 mm some 100 mm above average, leading 
to a recuperation of the volume of water stored behind dams and a slight increase 
in the volume of Lake Chapala to 3,361  MCM.  As a result, the average allocation' 
policy was followed for 1999 and 3,664 MCM were allocated to water users, the 
highest level since the signing of the treaty.  Unfortunately, rainfall in 1999 was a 
historic low of 494 mm.  These two factors resulted in Lake Chapala dropping to 
its lowest level since the signing of the treaty. 
Although the signing of the surface water treaty in 1991  was historic, the members 
of the council have recognised and discussed its shortcomings candidly.  In 1999 
the council decided to revise the treaty as it was clear that it was not rescuing 
Lake Chapala.  In  1999 and 2000 detailed hydrological studies were carried out 
using data from the 1945 to 1997 period (an improvement over the 1950 to 1979 
data used for the previous treaty) to develop a new model for calculating surface 
runoff (CNA, 199ge). The council signed the amendment of the 1991 surface treaty 
on 24 August 2000 (Consejo de Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, 2000).  However, various 
states feel that they did not have sufficient input in the design of the surface runoff 
model and that the federal government forced the treaty on them, thereby negating 
the  co-ordinating  role  of the  council.  In  addition,  consultation  with water users 
concerning the new treaty has been  minimal, although the user representatives 
voted in favour of it.  Although the Signing of the new treaty shows the adaptability 
of the council and the commitment of its members to construct a water allocation 
policy that meets urban and agricultural needs while safeguarding the environment, 
the process by which it was arrived at needs improvement. 
An issue that the council has not yet started to consider is how to compensate farmers 
for water transferred out of agriculture for urban and environmental demands.  In 
closed basins inter-sectoral transfers are  inevitable and  it  will  invariably be  the 
irrigation sector that will need to cede water.  A key institutional challenge in closed 
river basins is how to deal with these transfers in a just and equitable manner.  Scott 
et al.  (forthcoming) calculate that the benefits forgone  for farmers in  the Alto Rio 
Lerma irrigation district as a result of the reduced allocation to the district for 2000 
amounted to US$14 million.  Although sufficient water was available in its main dam 
to cover its full all~tion (955 MCM) the district was allocated only 648.2 MCM under 
the treaty, due to the critically low volume of water in Lake Chapala and the minimal 
surface runoff generated in Guanajuato in  1999.  To shore up water levels in  Lake 
Chapala the council decided to release the additional storage in the Solis Dam, the 
first time that surface water was physically transferred from the agricultural sector to 
the urban and environmental sector under the 1991 treaty.  The Lerma-Chapala River 
Basin CounCil  provides a good forum for drawing up and enforcing compensation 
mechanisms and for safeguarding the water rights of farmers. 
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4.2 The allocation of grou!l.dwater 
Another serious challenge  that the  council  and  other water management 
stakeholders in  the basin need to deal  ~ith urgently is the serious overdraft of 
the basin's aquifers.  Although the council signed a co-ordination agreement to 
regulate the groundwater extraction in the basin in 1993, progress on the ground 
has been much slower (CCCLC, 1993).  A key problem is that the council, through 
the CNA, does not physically control the water extraction infrastructure (the wells), 
as it does in  the case of surface water (the  dams).  Although the constitution 
mandates the federal government to intervene in aquifers in overdraft by placing 
them  under veda,  entailing  that it  is  prohibited to  sink new  wells without 
permission from  the federal  government, the experience with  vedas has been 
mixed  (Arreguin,  1998).  The  reality of groundwater extraction  in  Guanajuato 
clearly shows  how  groundwater regulation  by the  federal  government has run 
aground.  According to Vazquez (1999) ten  vedas were  issued in  Guanajuato 
between  1948 and  1964, prohibiting the drilling of new wells  in  large parts of 
the state while  in  1983 the  remainder of the  state was  placed  under  veda. 
NotWithstanding these  legal  restrictions,  the number of wells increased from 
approximately 2,000 in  1958 to 16,500 in  1997 (Guerrero, 1998). 
Based  on  the  recognition  that  vedas have  not worked,  and to  counter the 
continued depletion of groundwater in the Lerma-Chapala basin, the CNA started 
promoting the formation of COTAS in selected aquifers in 1995, as an outflow of 
the 1993 agreement.  Through the estaQiishment of COTAS, which fall under the 
River Basin Council, the CNA is seeking to stimulate the organised participation 
of aquifer users  with  the aim of establishing  mutual  agreements for  reversing 
groundwater depletion, in  keeping with  Article 76 of the  water law  regulations 
(CNA, 1999d).  Based on recent developments in the State of Guanajuato, where 
CEAG enthusiastically promoted the creation of COTAS (Wester et al. 1999), the 
structure of the COTAS  has been defined at the national level in  the rules and 
regulations for river basin councils (CNA, 2000).  In these rules the COTAS are 
defined as full-fledged user organisations. whose membership consists of all the 
water users of an  aquifer.  They are  to  serve  as  mechanisms for  reaching 
agreement on  aquifer management taking  into consideration  the  needs of  the 
various sectors using groundwater (CNA. 2000). 
To date, 17 COTAS have been formed in the basin.  However, none of them has 
yet started to devise ways to reduce groundwater extraction.  Considering that 
some 350,000 ha in the basin are irrigated with groundwater and that industrial 
and domestic uses depend nearly entirely on  groundwater.  it  is fair to say that 
groundwater is the strategic resource in the basin.  The long-term consequences 
of its continued depletion easily overshadow those of Lake Chapala drying up. 
Although the COTAS are a timely institutional response to the pressing need for 
innovative approaches to  managing aquifers in  the  basin,  it  is  unclear whether 
they will succeed in  reducing aquifer over-exploitation. 
4.3 Representation of interests 
The institutional arrangements for water management in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
revolve around who controls water.  With basin closure, the competition for access 
176 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
to water is  becoming more severe and  poor people are  losing their access to 
water, due to reductions in surface irrigation and increased costs for groundwater 
irrigation.  Unfortunately, meeting the water needs of poor people and including 
poor women and men at all levels of water management decision-making is not 
a priority of the council,  nor of the  larger set  of  institutional arrangements for 
water management in  Mexico. The council needs to start considering seriously 
how to safeguard and improve the access of the poor to water, and how to combat 
the current de facto concentration of water rights in the hands of the few. 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has presented a classic scenario of change management, with crises 
occurring over time, each being met with a different response.  The drought and 
water shortages between 1945 to 1954 resulted in  a doubling of the  reservoir 
capacity within the basin.  However pressure on  available resources continued 
to increase, with the irrigated area increasing almost four-fold up to 1989, and 
population increasing almost three-fold.  With no opportunity available for further 
increases in  stored water,  dramatic institutional reforms have been introduced 
from  1989, devolving responsibility for water management in  irrigation systems 
to water users, and initiating participatory water management bopies at the basin 
level for high-level decision-making on water allocation. 
A central component in this reform has been the 1992 water law, though of equal 
importance has been the institutional capability to put the law into practice, and 
to adapt to a dynamic situation with further measures for controlling and managing 
available surface and ground water resources.  An essential component of this 
decision-making process,  both  in  relation  to overall strategy and to day-to-day 
management, has been professional data collection, processing and analysis. 
Though the institutional measures have had a significant impact in restructuring 
the way  in  which water resources are managed, the basin is still in  crisis, with 
the  level of Lake Chapala still  in  decline.  It  is anticipated that further radical 
measures will  need  to  be taken  in  the  near future,  especially  in  the irrigated 
agriculture sector,  as  this  is the major consumptive user of available water 
resources.  At the heart of this change will be the need to protect the livelihoods 
of those most at risk, farmers with small landholdings who are already close to 
the poverty line. 
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Abstract 
The Gediz is a closing basin with little new water available for allocation. It is not, 
however, a mature basin, in  the sense that the institutional set-up is not yet fully 
developed.  Both surface and groundwater use are largely unregulated,  and 
groundwater extraction is growing rapidly in  response  to  urban and,  particularly, 
industrial demand. There is no functional system of  allocating rights to either surface 
or ground water. The most serious current problem, however, is deteriorating water 
quality in the Gediz and its tributaries resulting from urban and industrial wastewater 
discharges and,  to a lesser extent, agricultural return flows. 
Two  public agencies are responsible  for in-stream and wastewater quality 
monitoring,  but neither has enforcement powers.  These are concentrated in  a 
third party in each province-the provincial governor. Governors are subject to 
competing pressures and are generally unable to  mount effective enforcement 
programmes.  Responsibilities  for basin planning and monitoring are 
compartmentalised, broken out into dimensions of ground and surface water on 
one hand,  and quantity and quality on  the  other.  Co-ordination among the 
responsible units is limited. 
Ultimately the roots of the water quality problem are political in nature, as there 
is presently a severe imbalance in power among the various inVOlved parties­
industry,  municipalities,  agriculture,  and the  environment. The  environment,  in 
particular, is underrepresented and an internationally-recognised bird sanctuary 
at the mouth of the Gediz currently receives only extremely limited quantities of 
poor quality water during the summer months. 
Solutions to  these problems involve systematising water rights,  developing co­
ordinating mechanisms among managers,  involving the private sector in 
wastewater treatment, and the emergence of an effective NGO-based advocacy 
for environmental concerns in  the basin. 
1. Introduction 
The Gediz basin in  western Turkey (Figure 1)  has changed considerably in the 
past decade, moving from being a comparatively water-rich basin to one that is 
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Figure 1:  Location of Gediz basin 
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now closing', This change has been  in  part a result of a severe drought that 
affected the basin from  1989 to  1994, in part due to an above average increase 
in urban and industrial demand, and in part due to a rapidly growing concern for 
issues of water quality and environmental protection, Paralleling these hydrologic 
changes has been a much slower institutional response that has not kept up with 
the requirements for changes in the way water is allocated and managed, 
The basin is currently caught up in a very dynamic period of reassessment and 
change which began with the onset of drought in 1989. Before the drought, there 
was  little competition  for water,  and the established mechanism for allocating 
water to  different users through a set of bilateral agreements worked well. The 
only serious conflicts  were  internal to  irrigation systems where there were 
disagreements between the state Hydraulics Works Organisation (DSI) and water 
users. 
When the drought struck, water issues for irrigation in the peak summer season 
were reduced  sharply,  return flows diminished, and,  as a consequence, water 
quality in  the  lower third of the basin deteriorated. Rural  residents began  to 
complain  that water was unsuitable for irrigation. At  the same time there was 
widespread desiccation of the important wetland areas in the Gediz delta, leading 
to large reductions in bird populations and. possibly. loss of species diversity. 
Although the drought has now passed, the legacy is seen  in  a number of 
important issues that continue to lie at the core of the debates surrounding the 
management of water in the Gediz basin. Several of these are highlighted below 
and discussed in  more detail in  the remainder of the paper. 
'A closed basin is one  in which there is no unused water left to be allocated. 
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The  increasingly apparent need for a  unified co-ordinating 
mechanism for allocating water among  irrigation,  urban  demand, 
industrial  requirements and environmental  protection  to  replace 
existing bilateral processes. 
The continuing struggle between older long-established institutions 
dealing with water resource development and water allocation, and 
emerging institutions concerned  primarily with  water quality and 
environmental issues. 
The need to represent  and  protect the  interests of certain  water 
users,  such  as  the  Gediz delta ecology  and the  Irrigation 
. Associations established during the past five  years to  assume 
responsibility of operation and maintenance for 110,000 hectares of 
large-scale irrigation systems,  within the wider debate on  water 
resources allocation and management. 
The need for clear rules  assigning  responsibility for setting  water 
quality and quantity standards and monitoring actual conditions, and 
for sufficient political  power and  will  to sanction  violators of the 
standards. 
In  the remainder of the paper we  deal first with  the  hydrology and  water use 
patterns within  the  basin  and  then  turn to  the  legal,  policy,  and  institutional 
conditions which influence how the basin is governed and managed. Finally, we 
combine the two assessments to summarise the problems facing the basin and 
the challenges it must meet to overcome them. The economic and social context 
of Turkey is described briefly in  Annex 1. 
2. Basin water use 
The Gediz basin contains a typical  range of water users, although the balance 
among them has been changing during the  past couple of decades. Each user 
category is described briefly hereunder. 
2.1  Irrigated agriculture 
Traditionally the largest user of water has been  irrigated agriculture,  originally 
deriving from small run-of-the-river diversions from the Gediz and its tributaries 
dating back some three thousand years. Since 1945 the development of large­
scale systems and groundwater exploitation  have transformed irrigated 
agriculture. 
2. 1. 1 Large scale surface irrigation 
The first investments in modern irrigated agricuHure began in 1945 with the construction 
of two large regulators to tap the flow of the Gediz River. Adala regulator serves some 
20,000 hectares of land in the middle portion of the basin while Emiralem  regulator 
commands 22,000 hectares in the Gediz delta (Figure 2). In the 1960s, a second set 
of investments were made that included the construction of Demirkopru 
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Reservoir a few kilometres upstream of Adala, a third regulator at Ahmetli, and 
the regulation and raising of the natural lake of Gol Marmara. Ahmetli Regulator 
commands some 45,000 hectares of land. The final surface water developments 
took place in the Alasehir valley with the construction of two small reservoirs. 
Figure 2: Irrigation and drainage flow patterns, Gediz basin 
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The total command area of the  large-scale surface systems is approximately 
110,000 ha.  The predominant crops are cotton (50%), grapes (35%), maize, fruit 
orchards, and vegetables.  At  present surface water issues from Demirkopru are 
limited to the interval between mid-June and mid-September which is focused on 
the cotton growing season.  Natural stream flows from tributaries can be used for 
land preparation for cotton or for early irrigation of grapes and fruit trees, but there 
are no releases made into the Gediz River from Demirkopru outside this period. 
Water use in  the 90,000 hectares of the central and delta zones is limited to 75 
m3/sec from Demirkopru and 15 m3/sec from Gol Marmara for a release perioO  of. 
approximately 60 days, or a total of some 550 million cubic metres during the year. 
This is equivalent to some 450 mm of irrigation water for the growing season. 
In the Alasehir Valley in the east of the basin, irrigation is almost exclusively for grapes. 
Application rates are approximately 350 mm/season and during the summer there 
is no significant net outflow into the main part of the basin.  It is estimated that, through 
a combination of surface application and some pumping of the shallow aquifer, 
approximately 60 million m3  are consumed during the summer season. 
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2. 1.2 Small-scale surface irrigation 
In  many tributary valleys  into the  Gediz there are small-scale surface water 
diversions that take advantage of winter run-off and  spring snowmelt.  Typical 
crops are fruit trees, winter wheat, and vegetables because these require water 
only in spring and early summer before the streams dry up. 
There are no accurate records of the total area involved, but it almost certainly 
is  more than 25,000 hectares since almost every village situated on the valley 
fringe has some irrigated area (Kayam and Svendsen,  1999).  Because the 
number of irrigations is low,  normally 2-4 irrigations of about 50 mm each for 
the entire season, total water use is also low and is estimated at 50 million m3• 
2.1.3 Groundwater irrigation 
There are two different categories of groundwater users: those who are members 
of village or pump co-operatives and those who make private investments. 
Groundwater user groups 
Starting in the 1960s, but increasingly in the 1970s, the government has fostered 
community-based irrigation based around deep tubewells.  Most deep tubewells 
have discharges in the range of 50-150 I/sec and are often tapping groundwater 
at least 100m below the surface.  The majority of wells are outside the boundaries 
of the surface irrigation systems and are concentrated in the Akhisar and Nit valleys. 
Typically crops are high value and include tobacco, vegetables, and fruit trees.  Total 
water extractions are  estimated at 30  million  m3/year on  the  basis of 100 wells 
having a typical discharge of 75 I/sec and operated for 40-50 days per year. 
Private groundwater users 
Private groundwater exploitation started during the drought of 1989-1994.  Many 
individuals purchased centrifugal pumps to exploit shallow groundwater within 
the boundaries of surface irrigation systems,  and  in  some cases  neighbours 
formed informal pump groups to purchase a pump and well, and share operating 
costs at the end of the season.  Farmers have kept using these pumps and there 
has been a recent small increase as some farmers adopt trickle irrigation systems 
for high-value fruits and vegetables. 
The vast majority of private pump owners are within the boundaries of the surface 
irrigation systems.  As such they rely on  the  seepage and  management losses 
from the surface irrigation system.  While there is some evidence that the shallow 
groundwater table  dropped during the  drought,  it  has  since  recovered  and  it  is 
assumed that they do not mine groundwater but merely re-use surface water.  Their 
net water use is therefore included in the total surface irrigation volumes.  However, 
official records of surface irrigation shows that only about 70 percent of farmers 
use surface water and some of those also pump.  It is estimated that some 40,000 
hectares of land in the command areas of the surface irrigation systems are actually 
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A few private pump owners are situated on the fringes of the surface irrigation 
system or in  the  area between  the  Alasehir valley and the main  Gediz valley, 
These are estimated to use some 5 million  m3Jyear that is  not direct recharge 
from surface irrigation systems. 
2.2 Municipal water supply 
The Gediz basin has two separate classes of urban and municipal water users: 
the  towns and villages within the basin  itself,  and a substantial trans-basin 
diversion of drinking water to Izmir. 
2.2.1  Within-basin use 
There are no accurate records of total water extractions for urban and municipal 
water consumption in the Gediz basin.  All  municipal extractions are from 
groundwater.  Based  on  estimates provided  by  the different municipalities,  it 
appears that extractions are in the order of 130 million m3 Jyear.  However, much 
of this returns in the form of wastewater, either percolation into the groundwater 
or discharge in  surface water.  Allowing for 20 percent actual consumption, the 
net municipal extraction within the basin is estimated to be 26 million m3 Jyear. 
Some municipalities also have shown interest in using good-quality spring water 
for their water supply.  In a few cases municipalities have arranged with villages 
to use a portion of their spring water and agree to compensate them by improving 
village irrigation systems. 
2.2.2 Izmir use of Gediz water 
The city of Izmir has had a long-standing claim on groundwater within the Gediz 
basin.  There are two  main well fields,  at Sarikiz in  the  north of the basin and 
Goksu near Manisa.  Actual consumption data are not available,  but Izmir has 
extracted as much as 108 million m3Jyear from these well fields.  Because the 
water is  transferred out of the basin, there  is  no  return flow2 .  An  important 
potential source of additional water for in-basin use is the estimated 50 percent 
of the water entering the Izmir municipal system which is  lost to  underground 
leakage.  Since Izmir is on the sea, no reuse of these losses is possible.  If the 
conveyance efficiency of the Izmir piped system were improved, up to 50 million 
m3 0f high-quality groundwater could be left in the Gediz basin annually and used 
for other purposes. 
"There is a proposal for Izmir to supply irrigators in lower portions of the Gediz basin with 
treated wastewater.  Irrigators are enthusiastic about this because of the very poor quality 
of the surface water they currently receive.  There are concerns,  however, about possible 
high salinity in the treated effluent.  At design output, the treatment plant would produce 
about 880 million ma/year,  roughly equivalent to the entire current use in the basin. 
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2.3 Industry 
There are two  important industrial areas in the basin.  The largest is  in the  Nif 
Valley  immediately east of  Izmir in  Kemalpasa  municipality.  There is also a 
growing  industrial  estate in  the  western  edge  of  Manisa.  Industries included 
ceramics, leather, food processing, metal works and assembly plants. 
In  both  areas groundwater is  used for the  industries, and  each  industry must 
obtain a permit from DS!.  However, there are no  records of how much water is 
consumed and it is difficult to  make an  estimate of total water use. 
2.4 Hydropower 
Between  1970 and  1988,  Demirkopru  Reservoir was  used for  hydropower 
generation throughout the year.  Since the drought, however, power generation 
has been restricted to periods when water is  released for irrigation or for flood 
control and no special releases for hydropower are made. 
2.5 Environmental consumption 
The  seaward fringe of the  Gediz delta is an  important nature reserve and has 
recently been designated as a Ramsar site to protect rare bird species.  Originally 
the area received excess water from the Gediz River for much of the year,  but 
since 1990, with restrictions on irrigation releases, the reserve suffers from water 
shortages.  The  summer months are  the critical time for providing water 
specifically for the nature reserve, since during the winter water is available from 
the Gediz River before flowing to the  sea. 
In  response to demands to  preserve  bird  habitat,  one  small  channel with a 
capacity of 0.7 m3/sec does now extend from the irrigation system into the nature 
reserve.  However, the channel does not always flow at the maximum rate during 
the 60 day irrigation season, and so the potential volume of about 4 million m3 
per day  is  not  normally provided.  One  preliminary estimate suggests that to 
maintain appropriate conditions for freshwater bird  habitat, as much as  1.5 m31 
sec is required during the 120 days of the summer season, or a total of about 
15 million cubic meters.  Enlargement of an  existing irrigation channel to carry 
an  additional 1 m3/sec flow is proposed. 
A second component of environmental demand is the water needed for waste 
conveyance  from  points of origin  within  the  basin  to  the  sea.  In  transporting 
wastes, the flow must provide sufficient velocity to prevent organic compounds 
and heavy metals, adsorbed on to soil particles, from settling out before reaching 
the sea, and sufficient dilution to avoid in-stream environmental harm.  Obviously, 
reducing the pollutant loads which  must  be  carried will  reduce the  quantity of 
water needed for this purpose. 
2.6 Use patterns 
The total estimated water extraction by the different users is shown in Table  1. 
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3. Water resources of the Gediz basin 
3.1  Hydrology 
3. 1. 1 Surface water 
The hydrology of the Gediz basin is typically Mediterranean.  PreCipitation falls 
between November and April, and peak river flows occur in February or March. 
Annual precipitation varies from 800 mm in higher inland areas to about 450 mm 
near the cost, with about 80 percent falling in the winter months.  Under natural 
conditions there is a steady decline in stream discharge until May when many of 
the smaller streams dry up.  Summer flows are only present in the Gediz River 
and its largest tributaries, and even they may be negligible in the peak summer 
months.  Following the irrigation season, the only flows  in  the Gediz River are 
from the few larger tributaries plus residual return flows from irrigated areas and 
industrial and municipal wastewater discharges to the  river. 
Following the construction of Demirkopru Dam and before the drought, net annual 
surface water availability in the main basin and the delta is  estimated to have 
been approximately 1,900 million m3/year.  Since 1990, however, there has been 
a perSistent decline in surface water flows into Demirkopru and water availability 
has averaged only some 940 million m3 during this period.  As some of this flow 
occurs in winter and is derived from tributaries where there is no storage, there 
is little difference between annual surface water availability and current demand 
of about 660 million m3. 
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3. 1.2 Groundwater 
Groundwater resources are able to make  up  some  of the  potential shortfall  in 
overall water availability.  The central part of the basin is an alluvial plain whose 
groundwater reserve is  replenished in  most years.  Only during the peak of the 
drought, from  1991  to 1993, were there reports of declining year-to-year water 
tables, and they have since recovered. 
In the alluvial fan areas on either side of the main valley and in the Nif Valley the 
situation is more critical.  Tubewell-based farmers in  the Akhisar area complain 
of a steady and long-term decline in water tables, and in the Nif Valley the water 
table is reported to have dropped by 5-8 meters in the past 10 years as industrial 
extractions have  burgeoned.  Springs in  the limestone areas are also reported 
to have declined in  the past decade. 
The estimated safe annual yield for groundwater in the main part of the valley is 
estimated to be  160 million m3/year  which  is about one-third considerably less 
than the 219 million cubic  meters estimated as  being  extracted from the  main 
and  Nif valleys.  Despite the  absence of  definitive figures,  it appears that 
groundwater use presently exceeds, by a sizeable margin, the sustainable limit. 
In  the Gediz delta there is little groundwater utilisation, and extraction near the 
coast is prohibited to prevent salt water intrusion.  The groundwater is deep and 
therefore there are no shallow tubewells. 
3.2 Changing patterns of demand 
The drought had an  impact not only on the releases made from Demirkopru but 
also on changing demand.  Rice used to be grown in poorly drained central parts 
of the basin  but  has  been  replaced  by  cotton,  while there  has  been  a steady 
increase in  grape and fruit tree areas as agro-industrial enterprises have grown 
up to support cash crop agriculture.  The trend toward grape cultivation, although 
partly a response to the growing market for raisins, resulted in decreased demand 
for irrigation water, and total irrigation deliveries are now only about 70 percent 
of the pre-drought situation.  With a recent surge in  interest in  drip irrigation by 
fruit,  vegetable and seed corn growers, demand is likely to continue to decline. 
In  contrast, non-agricultural demand is growing rapidly.  The area has a higher 
than average growth  rate  because of in-migration from  poorer parts of Turkey, 
and  Izmir has  promoted  industrial  development to complement agricultural 
production.  Domestic demand for water has been growing by approximately 2-3 
percent a year,  industrial demand by  as  much  as  10 percent per year.  Given 
that most non-agricultural consumption of water is from groundwater rather than 
surface water, aquifer management requires closer attention than surface water 
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Figure 3:  Estimated population and organic waste load generation. 
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However,  an additional demand  is  arising  which  is  associated  with  growing 
concern over water quality,  particularly during the peak of the summer season 
when surface water supplies are limited (see Annex 1).  Figure 3 shows actual 
and estimated growth of basin population between  1970 and 2010,  along with 
estimated organiC  load  from  both  domestic and  industrial  sources.  As  seen, 
although  domestic load  increases  modestly along  with  population growth, 
industrial load grows exponentially.  Note that the chart shows only pot'3ntial loads 
and  does not take  into  account the effect  of  treatment facilities which  mayor 
may not exist as of a particular date. 
3.3 Summary 
3.3.1 Surface water 
Irrigation currently uses a large share of the surface water resources of the basin. 
Withdrawals total about 660  million m3,  with  83  percent of that going to large­
scale irrigation systems.  Current surface water allocation practices are primarily 
aimed at providing reliable water deliveries to the Irrigation Associations in the 
large irrigation systems, and this has been achieved with considerable success. 
Hydropower generation has no priority of its own  and uses only water which is 
to be released for irrigation.  A small and probably inadequate allocation of poor 
quality surface water is currently made for the wetlands in the Gediz delta. 
2010 
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Heavily-polluted wastewater discharged from  urban areas and  industries within 
the  basin  seriously degrades the quality of surface water in  natural channels, 
particularly in the low-flow summer months.  Since water use for these purposes 
is growing at an estimated rate of six to eight percent per year, this degradation 
can be expected to worsen unless major efforts at control are made successfully. 
3.3.2 Groundwater 
Groundwater supplies roughly a quarter of basin water use, of which about 16 
percent is for irrigation,  and the  remainder for  urban and  industrial use. 
Groundwater supplies nearly all of the water used for these two latter purposes. 
Irrigation use of groundwater is largely static or declining as less-water intensive 
crops replace cotton and improved water application technology gains a foothold. 
Municipal and,  particularly,  industrial uses are  expanding  rapidly,  however.  At 
present as much as one-quarter of groundwater withdrawal in the basin may be 
unsustainable overdrafting,  and  pressure on  these aquifers is expected  to 
increase as industrial demand continues to grow. 
Much of the water withdrawn for municipal and  industrial use within the basin is 
returned to surface waterways, but in seriously degraded condition.  This,  in turn, 
gives  rise  to  a need for additional  allocations of surface water for waste  load 
transport and dilution, water which is simply not available at present.  The alternative 
is to improve quality of wastewater discharges significantly at their sources. 
4. Legal, policy, and institutional environment 
4.1  Water rights 
All  natural water resources,  except some  small  privately-owned  springs,  are 
vested  in  the  state by  the Turkish  constitution  (Yavuz  and  Cakmak,  1996).  The 
basic principle governing surface water use rights in Turkey provides that water is 
a public good which everyone is entitled to use, subject to the rights of prior users. 
Surface water use is  normally free of any obligation to obtain prior authorisation. 
Conflicts are resolved by first referring to local customary rules and regulations.  If 
the dispute cannot be  resolved  in  this way,  rights  are  settled by court decision. 
There is no registration system for surface water rights or water use.  In large basins 
where impacts of  new diversions are diffuse, this system  is  generally unable to 
prevent or  resolve conflicts between new and existing claims, and this is leading 
to serious problems of over-allocation in some basins (Svendsen and Nott, 1997). 
Groundwater also is state property.  Its management is governed by a 1960 law 
giving sole authority over the use and protection of groundwater to the General 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI).  Drilling a well deeper than 10 meters 
requires prior approval from DSI, while constructing shallower wells requires only 
that DSI be notiiied.  Shallow groundwater is thus an open access resource, while 
deeper aquifers are subject to some controls. 
According to the  groundwater law,  when abstractions "approach the safe output 
level" of the aquifer, a committee of representatives of "relevant ministries" is to be 
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formed to decide on pending and future applications for groundwater utilisation. 
Frederiksen and Vissia (1998) conclude that enforcement of the groundwater law 
is weak, which by extension implies that, in practice, the system of groundwater 
rights created by the current groundwater law is  not as effective as it could be. 
Rights to both ground and surface water use are thus not formalised.  Although 
they follow  roughly the  appropriative doctrine of allocation, there are  no 
guarantees of continued access.  The principles of  the system of water  rights 
outlined above apply in the Gediz basin. 
4.2 Actors 
In  an  earlier section,  five  categories of water users in the  Gediz basin were 
identified and their respective water uses outlined.  Some of these water users 
are able  to  represent their own  interests (industries and  municipalities),  while 
others may be either many and unorganised (small-system irrigators) or unable 
for other reasons to represent themselves (ecosystems).  In  addition there are 
other State actors such as OSI involved in Gediz basin water management which, 
while not water users, are important players.  The range of basin stakeholders is 
thus different, and broader, than the group of actual water users.  The major ones 
of these are described below. 
4.2. 1Public agencies 
OSI 
The General Directorate of State HydrauliC Works (OSI)  is the main executive 
agency of the Government of Turkey for the  country's overall  water resources 
planning, execution and operation.  It was established in 1954 and is currently a 
part of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.  The mandate of the OSI 
is "to develop water and land resources in Turkey" (OSI,  1995).  It is responsible 
for  major irrigation,  flood  control,  drainage,  hydropower development,  and 
supplying water to cities with populations over 100,000.  OSI centralises most of 
the state functions involved  in  planning and developing large-scale water 
resources. 
Until recently, OSI's policy has been to manage the irrigation schemes it designs 
and constructs.  Current policy and  practice  is  to  transfer schemes to  locally­
based Irrigation Associations (lAs) to manage.  OSI  also transfers hydropower 
and  municipal water  supply schemes that it designs and constructs to  other 
agencies to operate. 
OSI  is also responsible for managing and allocating groundwater to prospective 
users,  It does this 'through  the  permitting system described in  the previous 
section.  Its responsibilities for groundwater quality are limited to monitoring. 
OSI maintains 26 regional offices across the country, organised along watershed 
lines.  The Gediz basin lies entirely within one of these regions and is serviced 
by  the regional office in  Izmir. 
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Ministry of Environment 
The Ministry of Environment (MoE) is the public agency with overall responsible 
for surface water quality.  In  spite of this general status.  however,  its mandate 
and capacities extend to cover only some of the functions that implementing this 
responsibility entail.  Its major responsibilities include co-ordinating plans among 
the various public and private agencies involved with protecting the environment, 
commissioning environmental impact assessments of major water resources 
projects, and setting standards for and monitoring surface water quality.  Actual 
monitoring and reporting of water quality and wastewater discharges are carried 
out by provincial offices of MoE.  The explicit mandate of the MoE does not extend 
to groundwater quality.  Neither the  national nor the  provincial  offices of MoE 
possess direct enforcement powers. 
Municipalities and villages 
Towns and villages play three important roles in the water resource arena.  First 
they are water users and dischargers of wastewater.  There are 19 settlements 
in the basin with a combined population of 1.35 million.  All draw their domestic 
water supplies from groundwater.  Of the 19. only 3 have completed wastewater 
sewage  systems and  treatment plants.  The remainder discharge untreated 
wastewater into the Gediz and tributaries. 
The second important role played by towns and  villages is that of representing 
irrigation water users in  their areas.  They do this (a)  through  their statutory 
dominance of the  boards of  large-scale  Irrigation Associations.  (b)  as owners 
and operators of municipal irrigation wellfields, and (c) as representatives of the 
interests of otherwise unorganised farmers irrigating from private wells or small 
surface water sources who make up parts of their constituencies. 
The third  role  is that of environmental  regulation.  Municipal  and  village 
administrations are  responsible  for operating water and  wastewater treatment 
plants within  their jurisdictions and  monitoring the quality of domestic water 
supplies3 •  They also have some authority to monitor industrial wastewater 
discharges, although most are not active in this area. 
Provinces and districts 
Provincial  and  district governors.  appointed by the  Ministry of the  Interior in 
Ankara.  are  the  only authorities with  the  power to assess fines or issue and 
enforce prohibitions against violators of water quality regulations.  All other actors, 
including  MoE.  MoH.  DSI,  and  municipalities,  may only report cases that 
contradict laws for which they are responsible to the provincial or district governor. 
District governors must secure approval from the provincial governor before taking 
action.  Provincial  governors are thus singularly responsible for water quality 
enforcement proceeding. 
3The Ministry of Health (MoH) may monitor the quality of drinking water in piped distribution 
systems at the request of a municipality or village. 
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State Planning Organisation 
The state Planning Organisation is an arm of the Prime Ministry which prepares a 
rolling five-year investment plan  for  the nation.  It  is  responsible for  planning all 
public capital investment in  the country,  including investments for water resource 
development, wastewater treatment, and environmental problem mitigation. 
General Directorate of Rural Services 
The General Directorate of Rural Services (GDRS), a part of the Prime Ministry, 
is  responsible for developing small-scale groundwater resources for irrigation, 
developing surface water sources with flows of less than 500 lit  res per second 
for irrigation, on-farm irrigation development, and the construction of rural roads 
and village water supply systems.  GDRS's minor irrigation schemes are 
transferred to farmers' co-operatives  or local  governments upon completion. 
GDRS does not have an operation and maintenance capacity. 
4,2,2 Semi-public or private groups 
Irrigation Associations 
Thirteen Irrigation Associations (lAs) were established in the seven large canal irrigation 
commands in the basin in 1995 under the accelerated irrigation management transfer 
programme of DSI and have assumed operational control of canal irrigation in those 
areas.  DSI continues to operate the main reservoir and river diversion structures, but 
operational management below that level is now in the hands of the lAs. 
The legal basis for forming lAs is a law allowing the establishment of associations 
of local governments, and the present governance structure of the lAs is dominated 
by  elected village heads,  town  mayors, and elected members of local  municipal 
councils.  Irrigation Associations are public bodies that enjoy tax exemptions and 
are non-profit, but are not bound by standard government civil service regulations 
and financial  procedures.  Although this system has drawbacks,  it does provide 
valuable links with  local government structures.  lAs operate the canal systems 
within their areas, employing hired staff and financing operations and maintenance 
through fees  collected from water users.  The 13 lAs collaborate extensively on 
an informal basis and have discussed the possibility of forming a more permanent 
association to represent their common interests.  They are the most important water 
users in the basin and retain a strong functional tie to DSI, which provides their 
bulk water supply and serves as the basin water allocation authority in the absence 
of a more explicit system of water right allocation. 
Other irrigators 
Other irrigation water suppliers and users not encompassed by lAs include towns 
and villages which  have  developed well-fieldS for irrigation supply in  their areas, 
individual farmers and groups of farmers who have invested in irrigation wells, and 
farmers who employ small surface water diversions in  upper parts of the Gediz 
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catchment to  irrigate crops.  There  is no formal  organisation tying these water 
users together, though their number is significant.  To some extent, local village 
heads and town mayors are able and generally willing to represent the interests 
of these irrigators when a need arises.  Such representation is not co-ordinated 
among villages, however, and in general would not be expected to be particularly 
potent in competition with larger better-organised interests.  . 
Environmental NGOs 
There are many NGOs active in the field environmental conservation in Turkey. 
A 1995 directory lists 98 of them, and there are others which are not included in 
the directory.  With  respect to water-related issues in general, and the Gediz in 
particular, the following are among the most important. 
Turkish Erosion Control, Reforestation, and Environment Foundation 
(TEMA).  TEMA was established  in  1992 with  strong  business 
community support.  It currently has about 50,000 members and in 
1997 operated  on  a budget of  US$ 2 million.  TEMA  publishes a 
monthly bulletin  on  environmental  issues  and every  two-years 
publishes an  Environmental  Profile of Turkey,  which  is  now  also 
available in  English.  It  enjoys  good  contacts with  the  Ministry of 
Environment and has been instrumental in shaping the new national 
environmental laws and regulations4•  It is the most influential of the 
national environmental NGOs. 
Gediz basin  Erosion  Control  Reforestation  and  Environment 
Foundation  (GEMA).  This  NGO  has interests similar to  those  of 
TEMA but is concerned specifically with the Gediz basin 
Society for the Protection of Wildlife.  This society was established 
in  1975 and  works to raise awareness of shrinking populations of 
various wildlife species, with a special focus on birds.  The society 
works extensively with  elementary school  children,  publishing a 
newsletter and guidebooks for schools and others.  It collaborates 
with the World Wildlife Fund and other international organisations. 
Although concerned with water, none of these organisations place a priority focus 
on  it.  Most of  NGO  activities to date  have  been  concerned with  education, 
awareness raising, and lobbying, with little independent scientific or information 
collection effort evidenced so far. 
Industries 
Although industrial plants are scattered throughout the Gediz baSin, the largest 
concentration is in two Organised Industrial Districts, one in Kemalpasa in Izmir 
4DSI has an agreement with TEMA for reforestation of certain catchment areas above DSI 
reservoirs. 
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Province with abut 180 enterprises, and the second near Manisa in Manisa Province 
with about 50 enterprises,  The owners of these industries are organised into several 
associations which  wield  considerable political  power.  These  include the Aegean 
Chamber of Industry, the Businessmen's Association, and the Young Businessmen's 
Association. 
Environmental assemblies 
Local environmental assemblies (MahaUi Cevre Kurulu)  have recently been formed in 
several basin areas.  Authorised under the Environmental Law, assemblies are broadly 
constituted, comprising mayors, DSI, the Chamber of Industry, and so on, and are typically 
chaired by the provincial governor. They meet rnonthly and are authorised to make fairty 
influential decisions on issues relating to urban environmental quality.  Such an authority, 
chaired by the district governor, exists also for the Kemalpasa Organised Industrial District. 
Water and the Poor 
As always, the poor, particularly those living in makeshift and illegal housing on the urban 
fringe, have the worst access to safe drinking water and sanitation services.  Because 
of more limited mobility, they are also the ones most affected by pollution of the Gediz 
which they are more likely to use for recreational purposes.  Access to irrigation water is 
determined by access to land, which in tum is also related to wealth, both as a cause 
and as an effect.  Many smallholders do practise very productive agriculture, however, 
often growing high-value horticultural crops. 
4.3 Essential functions: gaps and overlap 
Burton (1999)  has identified  11  essential functions of basin management.  A 
somewhat modified listing of these functions,  as they apply in  the Gediz basin, 
crossed with the key actors identified in the previous section is shown in Table 2. 
These  functions are  replicated,  as  appropriate,  across four broad categories­
surface water,  ground  water,  wastewater disposal,  and  agricultural  return flows. 
Cells are marked to indicate an actor which is active in a particular functional area. 
Information is drawn largely from  richly-detailed reports prepared by HarmanclOg/u 
et al.  (1999, 2000a, 2000b)5. 
Several terms require definition.  Allocation refers to basin or sub-basin-Ievel division 
of water among users, including practices relating to the granting of rights to use 
water.  It also includes the supply of bulk quantities of water to major distribution 
5Note that the activity indications contained in the table refer to actual activity in practice, 
and not nominal responsibility as assigned in statutes.  Open circles indicate limited activity, 
while filled  circles  indicate more  extensive activity.  Situations where there is only minor 
activity might not be indicated in the table.  The  indications are the collective judgements 
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points.  Water distribution  refers  to the  more  routine  practices associated with 
the  regular delivery of water to multiple users.  It might also be thought of  as 
provision of a water-related service to users.  Monitoring water quality refers to 
taking  measurements, taking and  analysing  samples, and  storing the resulting 
data.  Ensuring water quality is a more active process of investigating deviations 
from quality standards based on monitoring information, identifying causes, and 
taking remedial action.  Enforcing water quality refers to the process of securing 
compliance  with  wastewater quality standards on  the  part of  the  discharging 
municipalities, industries, or agriculturalists. 
A  number of interesting  points emerge from  an  examination  of  Table  2, 
supplemented with  background observations. 
There has been very limited planning at the basin level with respect 
to surface  water and  virtually  none  for groundwater and  waste 
disposals.  There is  no  integrated plan  which  considers both 
groundwater and surface water availability, nor does existing planning 
consider water quality,  wastewater disposal, current and  projected 
land use,  anticipated future demand and return flows,  or projected 
future quantity and quality of water resources. 
Water  is  allocated, in  practice,  by a variety of  agencies and  users 
operating independently of each other.  These include OSI,  private 
surface and  groundwater irrigators, and  industries.  There  is  no 
national  legal  framework for surface water  rights  and  only a 
rudimentary system of allocating access to groundwater, and  both 
are largely open  access resources  at  present.  Although  nominal 
control  is  stronger for groundwater than  for  surface water, 
groundwater is  presently the  most stressed of the two  resources 
resource.  It  is  also the  more desirable of the two,  in  part because 
of the poor quality of Gediz surface water,  but also because of the 
relative ease of access provided by groundwater.  The current system 
of  registering groundwater withdrawals  does not appear to  be 
effective at  present at limiting  overdrafting which  is  occurring in 
certain sub·basins. 
Water quality  monitoring takes  place,  but  information  is  often  not 
available in useful forms to interested parties.  OSI operates 14 water 
quality sampling locations within the Gediz basin, sampling about 35 
parameters on  a monthly or bi-monthly  basis.  The  information 
collected remains as pure data in  OSI files and is not generally used 
as a basis for policymaking or decision-making for basin management. 
6DSI  is currently anticipating a new Gediz basin planning exercise.  The previous plan was 
prepared  35  years  ago and  updated  in  1982,  but covered  only surface  water.  The 
groundwater section of the DSI  regional office is also planning a new groundwater survey 
in the near future. 
200 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
A single  actor,  the  provincial  governor's office,  is  empowered  to 
authorise  enforcement of  breaches  of  wastewater discharge 
regulations  by  banning  offending practices or  imposing  fines.  In 
practice,  attempts to process fines  or prohibit industrial activities 
often  leads to confrontation  between  industrialists and  public 
administrators, with the administrators generally lacking the political 
will and power to  make penalties stick:  It is very common for files 
of violation  reports to  remain  unprocessed in the offices of district 
and provincial governors. 
Ensuring surface  water and  groundwater quality is  not actively 
practised  in  the  Gediz  basin.  Ensuring water quality involves 
conducting follow-up investigations of observed sub-standard water 
quality to identify its sources and proposing remedies. 
No attention is currently paid to the quality of agricultural return flows. 
It  is  sometimes presumed that  these  flows  contribute  nitrates to 
groundwater and  nitrates, phosphorus,  and  organic chemical 
residues, e.g. from pesticides, to surface water, but there is little hard 
information on this, nor is any responsible party actively monitoring 
or assessing the quality and impact of agricultural return flows. 
Agricultural drainage infrastructure is  inadequately maintained  at 
present.  Drain  maintenance receives  a  lower priority from  lAs 
compared  with  delivery channel  maintenance and  DSI  has 
inadequate budget and equipment to fully maintain larger drains.  In 
addition, responsibility for maintaining main drains which serve more 
than one IA is under dispute by DSI  and  lAs. 
NGOs have no role in performing essential management functions, 
but clearly have an important role to play in overall basin governance. 
This suggests that cataloguing essential functions, while useful, does 
not constitute,  by  itself,  a  sufficient analytic  methodology for 
understanding  and  diagnosing  problems  affecting  basin 
governance? . 
4.4 Enabling conditions: where problems lie 
The essential functions and actors' roles depicted in Table 2 provide a static view 

. of  responsibilities.  Additional attributes of well-functioning  basin  governance 

systems relate to its dynamics.  We term these attributes enabling conditions. 

'The term governance is used in a somewhat different sense here than in Burton's list of 
essential attributes, of which it is one.  Here the term refers to the rules providing the context 
for multi-actor basin management and the processes and  activities engaged in  by  those 
actors operating within this set of rules. 
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Enabling conditions are features of the institutional environment at the basin level 
that must be present,  in  some measure, to achieve good governance and 
management of the basin.  These attributes are not specific to anyone actor, but 
apply to all actors and their interactions and comprise necessary (but not sufficient) 
normative conditions for success.  Basic enabling conditions are shown in the box 
below.  A full analysis of these factors is well beyond the scope of this paper.  A 
brief sketch of each in the context of the Gediz basin will be attempted to illustrate 
the concepts and indicate broad strengths and weaknesses. 
4.4. 1 Political attributes 
This is perhaps the most important gap in the current set of enabling conditions. 
Although some water users are well represented, others are not, and in the arena 
of political give and take those without representation become losers.  Industrialists, 
for example, have ample financial resources, are well organised, and have ready 
access to political decision makers.  Other irrigators,  on the other hand,  are 
unorganised and enjoy representation only through their local village heads.  Their 
interests are rather fragile.  Irrigation  A~sociations are intermediate.  They enjoy 
multiple connections to the local political establishment by virtue of having a number 
of village heads and town mayors on their managing committees.  In addition they 
collaborate informally, sharing information and co-ordinating activities.  Irrigation 
Associations would benefit by establishing more formal linkages among themselves 
to allow a  single spokesperson to  represent them collectively in  discussions 
over basin water allocation, water quality standards, potential irrigation return flow 
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restrictions, and so on.  Other irrigators could affiliate with such an association 
and, contributing financially to it, participate in its representalional benefits. 
The most serious failure of representation at the  moment relates to the 
environment.  Although it is nominally represented by the Ministry of Environment, 
the Ministry is still relatively young and has yet to establish presence and capacity 
in many areas.  For example, it currently has provincial offices in only two of the 
four provinces covered  by  the  Gediz basin.  It  also lacks sufficient budget to 
perform its many duties fully.  Moreover, as a government agency,  it will always 
be subject to  political  pressures and  pulls that encourage or inhibit vigorous 
pursuit of particular water quality issues.  Experience from other countries has 
shown that strong non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rooted in civil society 
are  essential components of the  political system surrounding environmental 
issues.  These  NGOs serve as  advocates for environmental values  and  for 
unrepresented future generations.  There are several groups with potential to fulfil 
this role, but at present they provide an ineffective counterweight to other interests. 
Just as important as the existence of representational bodies is the  need for a 
rough balance of political power and influence among various interests.  When 
power is one-sided, issues are not aired adequately, and decisions are also one­
sided.  A key to the evolution of a suitable and balanced governance regime for 
the Gediz basin is further maturation  of non-government organisations and 
associations based in civil SOCiety which can advocate for environmental interests. 
4.4.2 Informational attributes 
Another essential enabling condition  is the presence  in  the public domain of 
accurate and  up-tO-date descriptive information on  water-related issues in  the 
basin, along with open public transaction of decision making processes related 
to plans,  regulations,  violations,  and  sanctions.  The first of these stipulations 
require that information on  basin  water allocations,  reservoir pOSitions, 
groundwater elevations, water quality conditions, available resources, and so on 
be a part of the public record.  Information collected with public funds should be 
available to the general public at little or no charge in the interest of sound and 
democratic public decision  making.  This disclosure condition  applies to  intra­
and  inter-departmental information  relationships as· well  as  to those with  the 
general public.  The second stipulation, transparency of public proceedings, is 
likewise essential to fair democratic processes.  Rent-seeking behaviour requires 
darkness and privacy to thrive, and conducting regulatory processes in full view 
of the public is an effective antidote to  such practices. 
4.4.3 Legal authority 
Establishing appropriate institutions requires suitable legal authority.  This does not 
appear to the most serious current problem  constraining the  emergence of an 
effective governance regime in the Gediz basin.  Although improvements can be 
made, and a number of legislative changes are proposed in the Eighth Five Year 
Plan, the most important short-term constraints appear to lie in other areas, such 
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as balanced political power and providing adequate resources.  Over the longer 
run, however, the legislation of a new legal basis for an effective system of water 
rights allocation, protection, and transfer will be essential. 
4.4.4 Resources 
Clearly,  all  four types of resources  listed in the  box are  needed for  effective 
implementation of basin management activities.  In a number of the responsible public 
organisations they are  inadequate.  In  some this constraint may  be  relaxed  by 
reassigning staff positions from functions which have lost importance to those which 
are increasingly so.  Another potential problem is scattering of resources among a 
variety of institutions, where each lacks a critical mass to be effective.  In a context 
of co-operation,  it is not necessary that resources  be consolidated under a single 
administrative structure for effective implementation.  However co-operation and co­
ordination must be effective if a decentralised strategy is to be effective. 
5. Toward solutions 
5.1  Problem summary 
In this section the hydrologic, policy, and institutional problems identified in earlier 
sections are  brought together and summarised. 
5.1. 1 Poor surface water quality 
The most pressing water-related problem facing the Gediz basin presently is the 
poor and deteriorating quality of its surface water.  The deterioration results primarily 
from the basin's recent rapid growth in population and the even more rapid growth 
in  local industry, coupled with the  widespread  use of agricultural chemicals in  a 
highly productive agriculture.  Failure to control this growing problem at its several 
sources leads to large requirements for in-stream flows for dilution-flows which are 
then unavailable for other uses.  The problem stems from several sources. 
Weak enforcement.  First and foremost, it is the inability of the 
provincial  and  district governors,  appointed  by  the  Ministry of 
Interior,  to  apply  and  enforce sanctions  and  penalties  on 
violators of wastewater discharge standards that is responsible 
for the growing pollution problem.  Although monitoring could be 
improved and standards tightened, the failure to enforce existing 
standards effectively, on the basis of existing information, sends 
a powerful signal to polluters that compliance is unnecessary. 
Weak  co-ordination.  A  second  cause  of  deteriorating 
surfaced water quality is poor co-ordination and co-operation 
among  the  three  separate  agencies  responsible  for  (a) 
surface water quality monitoring, (b) wastewater discharge 
monitoring,  and  (c)  enforcement  of  standards.  To  some 
extent this is driven by  bureaucratic tussling over turf.  In 
204 Inlersecloral Management of River Basins 
addition, the failure of any of the three parties to come forward 
with effective, inclusive, and forward-looking leadership is a cause. 
Limited availability of data.  Because of restricted access, the 
debate on water quality is poorly informed and emotional rather than 
scientific,  making development of acceptable  remedial  measures 
difficult and contentious. 
Haphazard  monitoring of wastewater  discharges.  The  most 
readily identifiable and  correctable causes of  Gediz  pollution  are 
untreated or inadequately treated  wastewater discharges from 
industries, cities, and towns.  It is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Environment to  monitor these discharges and  report  breaches of 
standards to the provincial governor.  Limited staff, laboratory facilities, 
and funds currently forestall an adequate monitoring programme. 
Inadequate funding for wastewater treatment plants.  Inadequate 
funding  has two components - capital  and operating expenses. 
Several funding windows are available to industries and municipalities 
for investment capital but a shortage remains.  For municipalities, there 
is  little private sector involvement in  constructing and  operating 
treatment facilities, in contrast to the case in many other countries.  A 
considerable amount of the funds  made  available by the state for 
municipal treatment plant construction have come through the bank 
of the provinces, but with little expectation of repayment.  This makes 
the discipline of mobilising private capital for such investment difficult 
or impossible.  Inadequate investment in wastewater treatment by the 
industrial sector relates,  in  part,  to the weak enforcement record of 
provincial governors.  As long as the costs of compliance exceed the 
costs of non-compliance, this situation is likely to continue. 
Limited  public awareness  of the  problem.  Negative effects of 
surface water pollution include harm to public health, increased costs 
to other water users, and negative environmental effects, particularly 
in the Gediz delta.  Limited public awareness of the problem and its 
impacts results in  limited public pressure and support for reforms, 
which in turn affects every single one of the factors outlined above. 
Causes of limited public awareness include restricted public access 
to water quality data collected by government agencies, inadequate 
MoE efforts to  publicise water quality problems,  and the  long 
gestation period for non-governmental environmental organisations 
to become effective advocates and spokespersons. 
5.1.2 Unknown groundwater quality 
The extent of possible groundwater contamination,  particularly in  the  Nef Creek 
watershed, is unknown.  Due to coarse alluvial soils and the extensive use of in­
ground holding pits, some wastewater from both urban and industrial sources may 
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go into groundwater rather than being disposed of as surface water effluent.  The 
primary cause of this uncertainty is the following. 
Groundwater quality monitoring is not  widespread  and  the  results 
not publicly available,  making  it difficult to know  if significant 
degradation of groundwater quality is occurring. 
This  is  a significant gap because aquifer pollution  is often more difficult and 
expensive to  mitigate than  pollution of surface waters.  The  possibility of 
contamination gains added significance as a result of the almost total dependence 
of the basin's population on groundwater for domestic supplies. 
5.1.3 LooselY7controlled allocation among users 
Shallow groundwater is an open-access resource in  the Gediz basin, meaning 
that  anyone with  physical  access to  such  water can withdraw and use it. 
Unregulated use of shallow groundwater creates difficulties where there are clear 
hydrologic linkages between surface water flows, shallow groundwater availability, 
and deep aquifer .conditions.  Deep groundwater and surface waler, once released 
from the  Demirkopru Reservoir,  share this open  access characteristic,  in  part, 
as well.  The result is that some legitimate needs, especially environmenial needs, 
are  inadequately met,  access of existing users is  insecure, and  it  is difficult to 
transfer water allocations among users in a rational way.  Among the causes are 
the following.  . 
Inadequate representation.  Interests of some users are not well 
represented in allocational planning and decision-making.  The most 
salient example is the environment, and, in particular, the needs of 
the Gediz delta and its rich complement of wildlife. 
Inadequate specification.  While water needs in the basin for large­
scale  irrigation and  urban use are generally known  at  present, 
present use and  future requirements for small scale irrigation, the 
burgeoning  industrial sector,  and  the environment are  not  well 
specified in terms of quantity, timing, and quality requirements.  This 
makes allocation decision making difficult. 
Ineffective reporting  and  record-keeping.  While  municipal 
extractions are reasonably well-documented,  industrial extractions 
from groundwater remain largely a matter of conjecture.  This makes 
evaluation of new requests for withdrawal permits difficult.  There is 
likewise no cumulative inventory of the total  number of permits 
issued, the agreed extraction rates, and the depth from which water 
is extracted, rendering this process even less rigorous and reliable. 
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5.1.4 Over-arching future problems 
In addition to the current problems affecting water allocation and basin governance, 
there are longer-term problems which will require more fundamental changes in laws, 
pOlicies, institutions, and practices.  Two of the most significant are the following: 
Rudimentary water rights system.  The current national system of 
recording and harmonising rights to use water dates from an earlier 
simpler day and is not well adapted to a water short environment.  It 
does not provide security for  present users,  does not  allow for or 
adequately protect environmental uses of water, and does not provide 
incentives for economy of use or for orderly transfers among sectors. 
Lack of integrated planning.  Assessment of basin water resources 
is currently. separated irito ground and surface water components: 
Because these interact in  practice, there is a need to understand 
the basin as an  integrated water resource system.  Also,  because 
water quality influences the  uses to which  water can  be  put,  and 
gives rise to its own quantitative demands for dilution flows, quantity 
and quality must also receive joint consideration. 
5.2 Recent strides 
The current situation in  the Gediz basin,  and at the  national level,  is dynamic 
and somewhat fluid.  Locally a number of steps have been or are being taken to 
improve the enforcement of water quality standards and  protect the  natural 
environment.  Many of these steps began with a Franco-Turkish basin study of 
the Gediz in the mid-1990s.  Although this study was intended to lead to various 
action programmes, the latter failed to materialise because of lack of co-operation 
among the different institutions involved8.  The  study did raise awareness of 
problems and stimulate other initiatives, however. 
In  1996. the  provincial  MoE  office conducted a study of polluting industries in 
Izmir province which resulted in sanctions on 14 firms.  In that same year, MoE 
offices  in  Izmir and  Manisa began a two-year surface water quality sampling 
exercise in the lower Gediz. 
In early 1998, three provincial governors from the Gediz basin, together with  MoE 
and  other parties, convened  a "co-ordination  meeting" for  the  basin, which  led  to 
the establishment of a co-ordinating committee consisting of the directors of the three 
provincial MoE offices.  More recently, this co-ordinating committee was transformed 
into a permanent body named the  Environmental Protection Service Association 
of  Gediz Basin Provinces.  This Association was officially authorised by the cabinet 
of the  national  government in  December 1999 giving it a legal persona.  This 
association has a broader base than earlier initiatives, and. in principle, has 
SThe  study was neller formally "accepted" by DSI or MoE. 
207 Svendsen,  Murray-Rust, Harmancloglu and A/pas/an: Gediz River,  Turkey 
considerable power.  Since its creation, however, it has lain largely dormant due 
to lack of resources and the ongoing bottleneck in the  enforcement of existing 
standards and regulations. 
At the national level,  sentiment for change is  reflected in the recently published 
Eighth Five Year Plan covering the period 2001-2005.  The Plan  recognises the 
need for change in the way water is allocated and managed.  There is a commitment 
to  introduce new  water legislation that will cover such issues as water rights, 
responsibilities for water allocation, setting and enforcing environmental standards, 
and consolidating the position of the  Irrigation ASSOciations.  However,  the  Plan 
does not specifically mention  basin  level water management nor is there any 
provision for establishing basin level entities that could implement or co-ordination 
various basin-level activities.  Reduction in  support for utilisation of fertilisers and 
agricultural chemicals is a preliminary step toward addressing non-point source 
pollution problems.  Revising water and wastewater standards to comply with EU 
standards will raise the bar for existing polluters and those in compliance alike. 
The  Plan  does indicate that the private sector will become more involved in 
various aspects of water,  adding an additional set of regulatory challenges to 
the existing situation and raising the question of the security of rights to water 
use by less well-represented groups.  Until these new initiatives are defined and 
brought into place, however, current institutional arrangements will continue within 
the context of rapid growth in demand for water and increasing pressure on water 
resources from wastewater disposal from urban, industrial and agricultural users. 
5.3 Strengths to build on 
Although the problems faced are formidable, Turkey and the Gediz basin have a 
number of  strengths on  which  to build an effective basin governance regime. 
These include the following. 
The  premier water resource  agency  in the country,  DSI,  is 
responsible for both ground and surface water,  providing a strong 
base for integrated treatment in the future.  This is not the case in 
many other countries where separate organisations are responsible. 
Moreover, handing over irrigation management responsibilities to lAs 
positions it well to take on the role of basin planner and water quality 
monitor for both ground and surface waters. 
Water quality is squarely identified as an important problem in the Gediz 
basin.  Moreover,  while serious,  it has not yet  reached catastrophic 
proportions, offering a grace period in which action Can be taken.  Actors 
in the basin appear to be responding to the warning signals. 
There is recognition  that  a  number of different actors must  be 
involved in solving water quality problems in the Gediz.  It is important 
to transform this recognition into effective ways of working together, 
rather than squandering energy and resources in intra-governmental 
squabbles over bureaucratic turf. 
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Likewise, there is  recognition that there are multiple dimensions to 
water resource management problems-different disciplines, different 
interests,  different uses,  ground  and  surface  water,  quantity and 
quality, and so on.  Recognising this provides opportunity to develop 
an  integrated approach  to  basin  water resource planning and 
management. 
A new water law is  under consideration, offering an  opportunity to 
lay legal groundwork for effective basin management and protection 
for the Gediz and other water-short basins in the country. 
There  is  a  strong university-based scientific community,  e.g. 
CEVMER and others, providing capability for applied problem-solving 
research and,  where needed, independent scientific assessment. 
There are linkages with international institutions such as IWMI which 
provide access to international experience  of  basin  governance 
problems.  Moreover, there is a healthy willingness to look outside 
the country  to  the experiences of others and  a strong  interest in 
harmonising standards, practices, and procedures with those of the 
European Union. 
5.4 Challenges 
A  number of immediate solutions to  problems affecting  governance and 
management of water  resources  in  the  Gediz basin  are  self-evident from  the 
listing of problems  in  section  5.1.  In  this concluding  section,  we  indicate four 
important longer-range challenges facing the basin.  Addressing these challenges 
effectively would go a long way toward putting into place a strong, dynamic, and 
flexible system of basin governance. 
5.4. 1 Systematise water rights 
The current rudimentary rights system cannot continue to provide security and 
flexibility in an era of growing water scarcity.  A new system which is fair, flexible, 
and  effective needs to  be  designed,  based on both Turkish  and  international 
experience. 
5.4.2 Build representational presence and political muscle 
Some basin water users,  such as the natural environment, are not well 
represented in water-related discussions at present, and there are severe 
imbalances of political power among the various water users.  Fair and 
equitable governance of basin water resources  requires  that users and 
interests  be  represented  in  discussion and decision-making  fora  in  a 
balanced way.  NGOs rooted  in  civil society provide an  important voice 
and advocacy presence for the environment, supplementing the efforts 
of the MoE, and their emergence as a political force will add balance to 
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decision-making 'and pressure for effective enforcement of sanctions for water 
quality violations. 
5A.3 Develop Co-ordinating Mechanisms 
Alternative models for water basin  governance exist.  At  one  pole is  a 
comprehensive basin  authority,  which  concentrates power,  responsibility,  and 
capacity to implement directly many basin management tasks.  At the other pole 
is  a co-ordinating committee which simply provides a forum  for discussion and 
voluntary co-ordination.  Between these poles many variations are possible.  One 
thing that is clear is that the present system of compartmentalising water quantity 
and quality, ground and surface water, and fresh water and wastewater is not an 
effective base for the future.  Mechanisms have to be developed for bringing these 
components together in a functional integrated system for planning, governance, 
and management9 . 
A useful first step would be the completion of an integrated assessment of basin 
water resources of all types and of the present and predicted demands on those 
resources.  High-level political commitment to such an  undertaking and strong 
leadership would be essential.  It  is equally important that this exercise not be 
carried  out by  a single organisation,  but that it  involves the various agencies, 
and the different departments within agencies, which have mandates to address 
water-related issues in the basin.  The report produced is only half of the desired 
output of such a process.  The other half is the experience of joint action among 
agencies and groups to implement the study and the creation of "ownership" of 
the result by the various stakeholders. 
5AA Involve the private sector 
In  many countries,  the private sector plays  important roles  in  water resource 
management.  Turkey  is well embarked on  the  devolution of  responsibility for 
managing previously state-operated irrigation systems to locally-based associations. 
The private sector can also playa major role in providing safe drinking water and 
effective sanitation  services to urban  areas,  Private sector involvement has a 
number of advantages, including operational efficiency, ability to mObilise private 
capital, and access to new technology.  To attract such involvement without state 
guarantees of repayment, firms must have confidence that the principle of payment­
for-service will be honoured and supported by'the involved governmental entities. 
Bringing in such private participation would provide needed capital for wastewater 
collection and treatment systems and  provide wider access to these essential 
services. 
"Turkey  is not pursuing the concept of  basin-wide authorities at present because of  the 
difficult issues posed by important trans-national river basins shared by Turkey and several 
of its neighbours.  The next five-year plan  may address this option. 
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Annex 1.  Economic and social context of Turkey 
Turkey is a parliamentary democracy of approximately 65 million people.  As of 1997, 
its population  was  growing  at  a rate  of  1.5 percent.  There  is extensive  internal 
migration and rapid  urbanisation.  At present, 65 percent of the population lives in 
urban areas,  and,  while the rural  population  is  shrinking at an  annual  rate  of 0.7 
percent, urban population is growing at 2.8 percent per year.  At the sub-national 
level, the country is governed by a mixed system employing both local elections and 
central government appointments.  Population centres (cities, towns,  and villages) 
are governed by locally-elected assemblies or councils with administrations headed 
by  locally-elected mayors.  Provinces and districts,  while  having  locally-elected 
assemblies,  are  headed  by  senior civil  servants appointed  by the  Ministry of the 
Interior.  National level policy guidance and instruction is important at all levels and 
centralised revenue collection makes revenue transfers from national to local levels 
important and enhances the power of the centre. 
Turkey has a strong mixed economy, larger than that of Russia.  The present one­
year-old government is taking strong steps to privatise publicly-owned enterprises 
and introduce other economic reforms under an IMF-backed programme (WSJ, 2000). 
Economic growth averaged 6.1  percent per year in 1997-98, but shrank at a rate of 
6.4 percent for 1999 as a result of the earthquake and the economic restructuring 
programme.  Inflation, however, which has been chronically high for more than two 
decades, has declined sharply.  Turkey hopes to join the European Union, providing 
a powerful motive across all sectors for harmonising Turkish policies, practices, and 
standards with those of the EU, 
In  1999, agriculture provided just 15 percent of GOP and provided 45 percent of 
national employment as a result.  Agricultural incomes are just one-fifth to one-quarter 
of those in other sectors.  Industry makes up 23 percent of the economy and services 
62 percent. 
Annex 2.  Estimation of future organic loads in Gediz River water 
Based on the data in Table 3 and assuming that in a typical year since the end of 
the drought, the only surface flows are 75 m3/sec released from Demirkopru, 15 m3 / 
sec released from Gol Marmara, 5 m3lsec as urban wastewater return flows, and a 
further 5 m3/sec from  industrial return flows,  then the estimated biological oxygen 
demand (BOD) concentration on a basin-wide basis can be estimated. 
Table 3.2 shows these estimates (which are not spatially distributed within different 
parts of the basin).  Irrigation water extractions at different regulators will show different 
concentrations because of the  concentration  of  BOD  generation  in  urban  and 
industrial areas. 
The drought year of  1990 shows a marked  increase in  potential  BOD concentration 
because irrigation water was only released for 32 days out of a possible 60 days in July 
and August.  In 1992 it would have been higher, on the order of 40-45 gI m3released, 
because irrigation water was only released for 27 days during July and August.  By 1997 
the potential concentration has dropped despite urban and industrial growth because 
water is issued for the full  60 days.  However, if there are no releases from 
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Table 3 : Population, domestic and industrial BOD loads (kg/day), 
Gediz basin, 1970-2010 




















































Industrial BOD (3)  8,000  SO.OOO  100,000 
Total Estimated BOD  75,000  100,000  lSO,OOO  206,000 
Notes:  1.  Population data based on  State Statistical Office data 
2.  Domestic BOD at 60 g/person/day 
3.  Industrial BOD  in  1997 is estimated to equal urban BOD  generation. 
Past and future industrial BOD  values are calculated on  a basis on 
+10 percent industrial growth rate per annum. 
Table 4: Estimated dry season potential BOD loads, Gediz basin, 
1970-2010 
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!tlUU IKg/oay  {O,ooo  100,000  150,000  206,000  1 435,000 
iconcentration per Unit 01 
water released (g/m')  10.8  14.5  32.6  23.8  50.3 
Demirkopru to  dilute wastewater return flows, the situation in  2010 will be at least 
20 percent higher than in the peak of the drought of 1992. 
These data only refer to BOD,  With  no reliable estimates of chemical oxygen 
demand (COD)  releases from  industry,  it  is not possible to generate similar 
estimates, but they will surely show the same growth trends, 
In  the Menemen portion of the delta,  where there is extensive cultivation of soft 
fruits and  vegetables,  most farmers rely on groundwater pumping,  because the 
surtace water is considered too polluted to use on  edible crops,  Even the cotton 
farmers complain of "water that burns",  In the tail-end areas downstream of a large 
tannery complex, water quality is appalling and directly affects the nature reserve, 
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Although winter floods, and particularly the near record flood of February 1999, 
flush out some of the waste that accumulates in periods of low flows, the lack of 
any regulated minimum flow in the river for non-agricultural purposes means that 
water quality returns to sub-standard conditions very rapidly. 
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Abstract 
Integrated water resources management (lWRM) is an important development 
agenda for addressing institutional problems and capacity building for the  41se, 
control, preservation and sustainability of water systems. Pursuing this requires 
understanding of related issues and their implications for dev~/opment  of effective 
water management institutions. 
Indonesia is in the process of reforming its water resources management policy, 
which  will give emphasis to  putting IWRM principles into action.  One of the 
elements of the  new policy is  related to  the  improvement of river-basin 
management. Although experience on  river-basin management has been 
developed in one basin (Brantas river basin in East Java),  this was not the case 
for other regions of the country until lately. 
This paper discusses the dynamics of water use and management in the upper 
sub-basin of the Inderagiri river basin,  in West Sumatra,  Indonesia. Issues and 
implications related to IWRM are identified. The  topics covered are: 
the policy and institutional context of river-basin management,  with 
an overview of the water management policy reforms and related 
aspects of  policy relevant to improvement of river-basin management 
in West Sumatra Province; 
a more specific discussion on the setting and hydrology of the upper 
sub-basin; 
a special case illustrating water use competition and water allocation 
in a river (Ombilin River) within the  upper sub-basin. This  includes 
stakeholder identification; river water accounting; the  changing 
pattern of water use; impacts on  the poor and other downstream 
users; and the lack of a framework for river-basin management. 
The conclusion is that this problem of water-use competition and the impacts it 
causes have  raised the need for improved water management in  the Ombilin 
River.  Frameworks  for this are not yet developed.  The  on-going water 
management policy reform provides a basis for management improvement. It is 
suggested that measures be taken  to  review existing provincial water 
management regulations and to develop a framework for river-basin management. 
Capacity building for river-basin 
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management can be initiated from  efforts to solve the Ombilin River problems, 
and lessons  from  the  experience can be used for other river basins in  West 
Sumatra. 
1. Introduction 
West Sumatra  Province  is one  of  the  priority areas  for improvement of  water 
resources management, as part of the on-going implementation of policy reform. 
One item of the reform  agenda is the improvement of river-basin management. 
River-basin management and water allocation from the source have increasingly 
become issues in West Sumatra in the last decade. The development of electric 
power plants and the growth of  urban  settlement areas in West Sumatra have 
increased demand for water, which  in turn increased competition for water use 
between irrigated agriculture and other sectors of the economy. 
Despite the increasing demand for better and more organised water management 
in West Sumatra, the framework and experience for river-basin management and 
water allocation from the source  is  not yet developed. This paper attempts to 
present issues related to river-basin management and to identify implications for 
efforts to adopt integrated water resource management principles as the basis 
for future development of effective institutions. 
The paper first discusses the direction of water resource management reform in 
Indonesia. This is followed by a discussion of the upper Inderagiri sub-basin and 
its changing  pattern  of  water uses. Two  prominent issues related  to water 
allocation  and  basin management are discussed,  illustrating the  nature and 
dynamics of water uses and management in the basin. In the last part implications 
related to integrated water resource management are identified. 
2. The policy and institutional context of river-basin management in 
Indonesia 
2.1  Water resources management policy reform 
The Indonesian government is reforming  its water resources  and  irrigation 
management policy. This section presents the reform principles, which are closely 
related to the improvement of  river basin management, especially for the West 
Sumatra context. The reforms have four objectives (BAPPENAS, 2000): 
1. 	 Improving national  institutional frameworks for water resources 
development and management. 
2. 	 Improving  organisational  and  financial frameworks for river-basin 
management. 
3. 	 Improving regional water quality management, regulatory institutions 
and implementation. 
4.  Improving irrigation management policy, institutions and regulations. 
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Among  those objectives,  the  first  and  the  second  are  closely related  to  the 
improvement of water allocation from the source and river basin management. 
One of five  sub-objectives1  of the first objective mentions the involvement of 
stakeholders (including private sector) in river-basin management and decision­
making. The proposed reforms in this sub-objective cover three areas: 
issuing government regulations  emphasising the participation of 
stakeholders (public agency institutions, community, and private) in 
water resources development and management. 
amending ministerial  regulations to:  (1)  include stakeholders' 
representatives in  provincial and basin  water management co­
ordination committees (in  Indonesian  language called:  PTPA  and 
PPTPA); and (2) merging provincial water management committees 
(PTPA) with provincial irrigation committees. 
establishing  functional  PTPA  and  basin  water management 
committees (PPTPA)  with stakeholders' representation in  key  river 
basins in  12 provinces. 
The  second  objective contains three  sub-objectives,  one of which  is  the 
improvement of the provincial regulatory framework for river basin and aquifers 
management. This will  be the  basis for development of effective  water 
management institutions at province and basin levels. 
2.2 River-basin management in  Indonesia 
River basins and their management authority. The Government of Indonesia 
(GOI) started to recognise the river basin as the unit of water management in 1982, 
through the enactment of Government  Regulation  (GR)  No.  22/19822 • In  1989 
Public Works Ministerial Regulation  No. 39/PRT/1989 was issued to specify the 
90 river basins in Indonesia3 • The objective of this ministerial regulation is to ensure 
that conservation and use of water in the basins are conducted in a holistic and 
integrated manner. In  1990, the Public Works Ministerial Regulation (No. 48/PRT/ 
'(1) Establishment a national  water  resources management co-ordination  framework; 
(2) adoption  of a national  policy for water resources  management;  (3)  involvement of 
stakeholders (including private sector) in river-basin management and decision-making; (4) 
improvement of national  water resources  information and  decision  support systems; (5) 
improvement of national hydrological and  water-quality data collection and  management 
systems. 
2Article  4,  Chapter III  stressed  the  use  of  river basins as  the  basis  for  water  resources 
management. 
3The PubliC WorkS Ministry has been abolished this year and its function has been merged 
into the  Ministry of  Settlements and  Regional  Development (MSRD). This involved 
reorganisation of MSRD, whose name is changed to Ministry of Settlements and Regional 
Infrastructure Development. Adjustment of laws and  regulations  related  to  water 
management is underway within the framework of policy reform. 
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1990) was enacted, specifying the authority for the management of water and 
river basins. Out of the 90  river  basins,  73  are managed  by provincial 
governments, 15 fall under the management of Ministry of Public Works, and 2 
basins4  are under the management of public corporations. Incorporation of the 
idea of river-basin management into policy and action are thus relatively new to 
Indonesia and the management framework-other than in those two basins under 
publiC corporations-is not yet developed. 
River basins of West Sumatra and the Inderagiri sub-basin. The area of West 
Sumatra province is divided into six river basins. These are named: Inderagiri; 
Silaut; Anai-Sialang;  Rokan; Kampar; and  Satang Hari. Two  (Silaut and Anai­
Sialang) are entirely in  West Sumatra province, the rivers flowing down to the 
West Coast of West Sumatra. The other four are upstream parts of river basins, 
which flow to the East Coast of Sumatra in the provinces of Riau and Jambi. 
According to the Public Works Ministerial deciSion on the diviSion of river basins, 
the Inderagiri river basin falls under the authority of the Ministry of Public Works 
because it is located in two provinces. The upper part is in West Sumatra and 
the lower part in Riau. 
3. The upper sub-basin Of Inderagirl river basin and its hydrology 
3.1  Demographic and employment features 
The population of the sub-basin in 1997 was 662,425, and the average population 
density was 408 persons per km2• The urban-rural population ratio was 0.28. This 
implies that water supply for urban needs will be an important issue in the near 
future. In terms of households, the population data show that in 1997 there were 
150,466 households in the basin. The average household size was 4.59 persons. 
It is estimated that only about 12.56 percent (or some 18,898) households were 
served by pipe-borne water. These data reflect there are still a large number of 
households that need piped water in the future. There were also some industries, 
offices, and other SOCial  facilities that were served by piped water. 
About 67.6 percent were categorised as farm households5 ,  indicating that the 
majority of households in the basin engaged in the agricultural sector as their 
main occupation. It is reasonable to expect water demand for agricultural-related 
activities to be a major issue in the basin. 
4Brantas River in  East Java under the Jasa Tirta Public Corporation, and Citarum River in 
West Java under Otorita Jatiluhur Public Corporation. 
'Data taken from agricultural census conducted in  1993. No recent data available on 
the  number of  households by type  of  livelihood or occupation.  Data from  1993 
agricultural census were used to estimate the number of  households in agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors. Assuming that the percentages of people in both sectors 
are as before, the number of farm households in the basin in  1997 would be 97,742. 
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3.2 The sub-basin 
The sub-basin consists of three major rivers,  Lembang/Sumani,  Sumpur,  and 
Ombilin, and two lakes, Danau Dibawah and Singkarak. Water from the Lembang/ 
Sumani and Sumpur rivers flows into Singkarak Lake,  while the Ombilin  River 
originates from Singkarak Lake and flows eastward to the Inderagiri. The altitude 
varies from 164 m above sea level at the lowest point (near confluence of Ombilin 
River and Sinamar River) to 1,200 m at the highest point where the Lembang 
River originates from the Dibawah Lake. Thus, water supply in the Ombilin River 
depends largely on the 9utflow from Singkarak Lake, while Singkarak water supply 
is influenced by inflow from Lembang/Sumani and Sumpur rivers. Moreover, water 
supply in Lembang/Sumani River is largely determined by the outflow from Danau 
Dibawah  Lake. These three main rivers (and their tributaries)  and  two  lakes 
constitute a sub-basin. 
The total area of the upper Inderagiri sub-basin is estimated at 3,059.7 km2• The 
Lembang/Sumani  watershed constitutes 48  percent of this,  the Ombilin  30 
percent, and the Sumpur 13 percent. The sub-basin includes 400 villages, within 
three districts and three municipalities. Around 87 percent of the villages are rural. 
3.3 Climate and rainfall 
The sub-basin generally has the typical humid tropic climate that covers almost 
all of Sumatra. However, differences exist among regions of the basin. An agro­
climatic map of West Sumatra (Oldemann6  et a11978) shows five climatic zones­
on the basis of consecutive wet and dry months7 -in  the basin. Based on these 
zones, a large part of area of the sub-basin under Lembang/Sumani and Sumpur 
Rivers belongs to the wettest zone,  while most of the Ombilin watershed  is in 
the driest zone,  constituting around  one-third of the sub-basin. Consequently, 
changes in the outflows from Singkarak Lake would affect water availability for 
the part of the sub-basin in the Ombilin watershed. 
Rainfall in the basin tends to follow the agro-cllmatic zones. Average annual rainfall 
in the sub-basin is 2,025.9 mm. There are differences in rainfall pattern between 
the watersheds. The data show that the watershed of the Sumpur River is wettest, 
with  average  rainfall of 2,484 mm  per year. This is slightly higher than the 
Lembang/Sumani watershed (2,200.6 mm). The Ombilin watershed is driest 
(1,789.3 mm). 
"Climatic zone Type  A has 9 consecutive  wet  months and  less  than  2 consecutive dry 
months; Type  B1  7-9 consecutive wet months and less than  2 consecutive dry months; 
Type C1  5 -6 consecutive wet months and less than 2 consecutive dry months; Type 02 3 
-4 consecutive wet months and 2-3 consecutive  dry months; Type  E2  less than  3 
consecutive wet months and 2-3 consecutive dry months. 
70ldemann et.al. (1978)  defined a wet month as  having monthly average  rainfall  of  200 
mm or more, and a dry month as having 100 mm  and less. 
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4. The sub-basin under stress: construction of hydroelectric power 
plant at Singkarak Lake and impacts on the poor and other water 
users on Ombilin River 
4.1  Stakeholder identification and water accounting
8  along Ombilin 
River 
Stakeholder identification. Four major groups9  from various sectors have direct 
interests in the water of the Ombilin River. These are farmers/irrigators who use 
waterwheels to lift water from the river; a coal-mining company which uses water 
for washing coal; domestic water suppliers who provide water for Sawah Lunto 
town  and  their consumers; and  an  electricity company which  uses water from 
Singkarak Lake for hydro-power generation (for which the outflows from the lake 
to Ombilin River need to be  reduced) and for two thermal power plants located 
along the river'°. 
The hydrological setting. (See  Figure  1 for  schematic presentation). Seven 
major rivers flow into the Ombilin River and influence its discharge. They are (from 
upstream to  downstream): Bengkawas,  Katialo,  Silaki,  Selo,  Malakutan,  Lunto, 
and Lasi. Among these, the Selo has the biggest inflow to the Ombilin, and Silaki 
the lowest (see Figure 2). 
Zoning of the sub-basin and water uses. Based on  types of water uses,  the 
Ombilin River can be divided into three zones: A (upstream), B (midstream), and 
C (downstream). 
Zone A is  from  the  Singkarak outlet to  the  confluence with  Selo  River.  In  this 
zone the use of water is mainly for irrigation. Water is lifted by waterwheels. Three 
rivers,  Bengkawas,  Katialo,  and  Silaki,  flow  into the  Ombilin  in  this zone.  58 
waterwheels were found, of which only 30 were functioning. 
"Water accounting is an art and procedure "to classify water-balance components into water 
use categories that reflect the consequences of human intervention in the hydrologic cycle" 
(Molden, 1997). This classification enables analysis of water uses, depletion, and productivity 
in a water basin context. There are three main components: inflow (consisting of gross inflow 
and net inflow), available water ( the difference between net inflow and committed water), 
and committed water (the part of outflow reserved for other uses). The depletive use consists 
of two components: process and non-process depletion. 
Increasing  competition  for  water from  the  river  source  creates 
conflicts among users. Efforts to improve water management at a particular river require 
understanding of how much water is available, being used, and depleted for various uses, 
and  for  this water accounting  is  a tool  to  generate  understanding,  which  will  help in 
formulating policy and developing effective institutions. 
gOther groups do not consume water but  use the  river for various activities. They include 
fisherfolk; users of river for bathing, washing, and other personal needs; people-collecting 
building materials such as sand, gravel, and stone. 
1°For more details of impacts on the poor and other users see section 4.3. 
220 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
Figure 1  : Inflows, water uses, and zoning of part of the Ombilin River 
(under study) 
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Zone B is  between the confluences with the Selo and  Malakutan rivers. There 
are three types of water use in this zone: irrigation, domestic, and industrial. From 
the inventory, 77 waterwheels for irrigation are found only 38 of them functional. 
In addition to the waterwheels. five pumping stations for irrigation are also in this 
zone. There are two pumping stations for drinking water and one for washing coal. 
Zone C is between the confluences with the  Lunto and Sinamar rivers.  In  this 
zone water use is mainly for irrigation. using waterwheels to lift water from the 
river. In this zone there are 231  waterwheels for irrigation. of which only 116 are 
functioning. In addition. there are nine pumping stations for irrigation. 
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Figure 2:  Dependable flows of seven tributaries flowing into the 
Ombilin River 
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4.2 Water Balance 
Water balance computations for each  zone showed that discharges are higher 
than the outflows for water uses for different purposes (Table  1). In Zones A,  B 
and C,  respectively only about 5.4 percent, 30.6 percent and 12.7 percent of the 
water is being used. The data suggest that pressure on water resources is highest 
in Zone B,  followed by Zone C, and Zone A. 
Water Accounting. Further classification of the water balance components into 
use categories (river water accounting)  indicated that the depleted fraction of 
gross and net inflow for the part of the Ombilin River under study is 0.34 (in this 
case gross inflow is equal to net inflow). The process fraction of depleted water 
is 1 (because total depletion is assumed to be equal to process depletion), and 
the process fraction of available water is 0.43. (Table 2). 
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Table 1: Water balance computation for the Ombilin River 
Zone A  Zone B  ZoneC 
Items  Inflow  Outflow  Inllow  Outflow  Inllow~ mJ./s  m'/s  m'/s  m'/s  m~/s 
::;'ngkarak LaKe  3.;;;J3 
Bengkawas River  1.19 
Katialo River  2.97 
Silak, River  0.07 
Irrigation (Agric.)  - 0.41 
Water Balance  7.563  0.41  7.153 
'Selo River  3.96 
water 
:Irrigation (Agric.)  0.92  flowing 
!Talawi Domestic WS  - 0.04  down­
,Company  stream 
PLN Thermal Power Plant  - 0.005 
TBO Thermal Power Plant  1.9 
- 0.14 
Rantih Pump Stalion  - 0.4 
(Domestic WS) 
Water Balance  11.113  3.405  7.706 
Malakutan River  1.32  -
Lunlo River  0.64 
Lasi River  2.02 
Irrigation (Agric.)  1.489 
Water Balance  11.688  1.489 10,199 
4.3 Issue 1: Impacts of construction of a hydro-electric power plant 
at Singkarak Lake on the poor and other water users. 
The development of Singkarak Hydro-electric Power Plant has caused a drastic 
reduction in the discharge of the Ombilin River because a large amount of water 
from Singkarak Lake is now drained out to another river, flowing to the west coast, 
whereas the Ombilin River flows to the east coast. A permanent weir has been 
built at the outlet from  Singkarak Lake to the Ombilin River,  and the outflow to 
the river has been reduced and kept in the range of 2-6 m3/s instead of the former 
average  of about 40  m3/s.  The development of  Singkarak HEPP  has thus 
increased the scarcity of water,  and competition over water use in the  river. 
Changing the amount of water supply has brought about a number of changes 
in  the water use  pattern of the basin.  It has also brought several  problems to 
water users along the river. 
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Table 2: Water accounting for part of the Ombilin River under study 
(normal year) 
I No  Items  Nota  Amount  Total 
Inflow 
1  Gross inflow  2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9  15.503 
2  Singkarak Outlet  m
3/s  3.33 
,zona A  Inflow from rivers 
'~  'a.l3engkawas River  m'ls  1.19 
~  !~.  Katialo River  m"/s  2.97 
'5  i Sileki River  m'ls  0.07 
~ 
:Zone B  rivers 
mls  3.96 
~ 
IZone C  I  Inflow from rivers 
~ 
la.  Malakutan River  m
3/s
:,.­ fb.LWi!O River  m'ls 8 
i9  c.  Lasi River  m
1/s  2.02 
10  Storage Change  11  + 12  0 
11  Surface  0 
12  Subsurface  0 
13  Nat inflow  1  10  15.503 
14  Depletive use 
15  Process depletion  117+18+19+21+22+23+24+25  5.304 
16  Evapotranspiration 
117  ZansA  Irrigation (Agric.)  m 
3!s  0.410 
l!!.­
Zone B  Irrigation (Agric.)  m 
1/s  0.920 ::- .. 
m~/s 19  ZonaC  Irrigation (Agric.)  1.489 
120  Municipal, Industry. and Energy.  21+22+23+24+25  2.485 
121  T  alawi Domestic WS Company  m~!s  0.040 
22  Coal Washing  m~/s  0.140 
~
~ntih  Pump Station (Domestic WS)  m'ls  0.400 
'24  PLN Thermal Power Plant  mJ/s  0.005 
25  TBO Thermal Power Plant  m
3 /s  1.9 
~ Non-Process depletion  0 
27  Flows to sinks  m3/s  na 
28  Other evaporation  m:ljs  na 
29  Total Depletion  15  5.304 
Outflow 
30  T  alai Outflow  13-29  10.199 
'31 Surface outflow from rivers  30  10.199  . 
32  Surface outflow from drains  na 
~
~urface outflow  na 
34  Committed Water  35+36  3.1 
,35  Navigation (assumed)  mJ/s  o.ns 
,36  'Environment maLntenance (assumed)  m
3/s  2.325 
37  Uncommitted water  30-34  7.099 
f38 Available water  13-34  12.403 
!39  Available for irrigation 
Ilnrlic.tn« 
38-20  9.918 
,40  Depleted fraction (9ross and net)  37113xl00%  34% 
41  Process fractiofl.(depleted)  15129  1  I 42  Process fraction (available)  29/38xl00%  43 Q/o 
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(1) Reduction in the number of waterwheels and  irrigated area 
Irrigation systems along the Ombilin River are supplied by traditional waterwheels 
and pumps. No surface system was found. This method of irrigation is felt by the 
farmers to be the most suitable system under the physical conditions. The limited 
rice fields available; their locations scattered over a narrow flat area along the 
river;  and  the  average  river width  of  around  50  meters would  make  the 
construction of weirs for surface irrigation very costly. In addition, the porosity of 
the soil requires continuous flows of irrigation. 
A field inventory found some  184 waterwheels serving a command area of 333 
hectares and 463 farmers. This indicates that, on average, a waterwheel serves 
1.8 hectare with 2.5 farmers involved. However, the exact capacity of waterwheels 
as well as serviced area and  number of farmers involved vary depending on the 
size of waterwheel which is determined by the length, number, and diameter of 
its water tUbes. 11  In general, the capacity of a waterwheel increases as the length, 
number, and diameter of water tubes increase. In reality, there are waterwheels 
that could irrigate up to 15 hectares, involving some 30 farmers. 
Pump irrigation technology has begun to be used in the last few years, especially 
by those whose land can  no  longer be  served  by  waterwheels. When  the  field 
inventory was conducted 14 pump irrigation units were found along the Ombilin 
River,  with a command area of 138.5 ha,  involving some 200 farmers. Most of 
these were provided by either government or non-government agencies. Pumps 
are usually given to farmers who group themselves into an organisation. In that 
case, pump irrigation is owned by a group and not by a farmer personally. There 
has thus been a change in the institutional form of irrigation ownership, following 
change in the irrigation technology from traditional waterwheel to pump irrigation 
system. 
Some farmers whose land was served by pump irrigation complained about the 
cost of operation and maintenance of a pump compared to a waterwheel. Another 
problem is the soil type, which is  mostly porous and  needs continuous inflow of 
water to maintain soil  moisture and  fulfil the crop water requirement. This  is  a 
weakness  of pump  irrigation whose technology often  is  not  mastered  by  the 
farmers and  whose operating time  is  limited. A waterwheel on  the other hand 
has  a comparative advantage,  as  it can  be  operated continuously without 
significant additional cost. 
Irrigation has been  severely affected  by  reduction  in  the  river discharge. The 
numbers of waterwheels, command  area,  and  farm  families  serviced  have 
declined  markedly after the  Singkarak HEPP  development. The  number of 
currently existing waterwheels is only around 50 percent of that in 1996 (before 
the operation  of the  Singkarak HEPP  started),  and  current irrigated area  is 
approximately 61  percent of that in  1996. Table  3 shows  changes  in  these 
numbers during the last five years. 
"A water tube is part of the waterwheel, extracting water from the river. Normally, the larger 
the waterwheel the higher the number of tubes it has. However, under some conditions­
for example,  when river discharge is low- the operator may reduce the number of tubes 
to allow it to continue operating. 
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Table 3: Number of waterwheels, service area, and farmers In the 
Ombilin River from 1996-2000 
Year  Number of waterwheels  Irrigation service area (ha)  Number of farmers 
1996  366  549  729 
1997  296  470  621 
1998  237  405  556 
1999  195  343  478 
2000  184  333  463 
(2) Increased operation and maintenance costs of waterwheel 
irrigation systems 
For owners and operators of waterwheels,  reduction in the river discharge has 
caused several problems in  system operation and  maintenance (O&M). Firstly, 
the  current discharge,  especially in the dry season,  often  cannot rotate  the 
waterwheels or if it can the rotation rate is very low. Consequently, operators have 
to lengthen the traditional weir to increase water depth and direct water towards 
the wheel so as to increase  its  rotation  speed. Another way of making a 
waterwheel continue operating under such conditions is by reducing the number 
of water tubes, making it lighter and easier to move. The consequence of both 
choices is increase in  the  workload and cost of operating and maintaining the 
system, and reduction in the capacity of the wheel to supply water which means 
decrease in the area of land irrigated and reliability of irrigation water. 
Secondly,  increased intensity of damage on traditional  weirs and waterwheels 
results from  drastic increases of river discharge due to sudden opening of the 
gate at the Singkarak outlet. According to farmers, the gatekeeper usually opens 
it during the rainy season to avoid flooding on the settlement and irrigated area, 
which are located in low land surrounding Singkarak Lake. Consequently, Ombilin 
River discharge increased during the rainy season because of additional inflow 
coming from  Singkarak Lake. 
To the  owners and operators of waterwheel  irrigation systems,  increased  damage 
intenSity means more labour,  capital and costs if the system is to be  repaired. The 
socio-economic survey shows that on average  the intenSity of waterwheel damage 
increased from 1 to 2.5 per season since the operation of Singkarak HEPP (Table 4)  . 
(3) Unreliability of irrigation water and decline of rice yield. 
The higher intensity of damage to waterwheels has resulted in  some problems 
in  irrigation water supply. Most farmers reported that irrigation water supply has 
been  unreliable  since  development of Singkarak HEPP,  due to the above­
mentioned problems of operation and maintenance. As a result, the growth and 
yield of rice on  land irrigated by waterwheels declined markedly. Some farmers 
reported a lighter effect while others noted a considera,ble decline. The socio­
economic survey showed that the average yield of rice dropped from 4.2 ton per 
hectare before the development of Singkarak HEPP to 3.1  tlha in  1999. 
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Table 4: Damage intensity. and average rehabilitation costs of 
waterwhseels and weirs, before and after development of Singkarak 
HEPP 








waterwneel damage  1  ",0  150 
Weir damage  1  4.5  350 
Rehabilitation costs of waterwheel  150,000  1,100,000  633 
Rehabilitation costs of weir  50,000  425,000  750 
(4) Impact on domestic water supply and industry 
The  reduction of discharge in Ombilin River has also affected the water supply 
of the  pump station  for  coal  washing  and  the  water quality of domestic water 
supply. However, the coal washing company experienced it only initially. The PLN 
(the company operating the Singkarak HEPP) has built a weir to improve water 
level so that problem is solved. 
Reduced water quality has brought some problems to domestic water suppliers and 
consumers. The main problems facing the domestic water suppliers (in this case was 
PDAM) is increased operation and maintenance costs. The domestic water company 
manager estimated that water treatment cost  increased by  almost 100 percent. 
However, at times when raw water quality was very low, the domestic water suppliers 
did not perform wa.ter treatment since it would not bear any improvement in the quality 
of water. At such  times,  the domestic water company  would  distribute  raw  water 
direcliy to the customers without treating it. So far, no health-related problems caused 
by low water quality have been reported by the domestic water consumers. 
The latest data show that in  1999 the company served approximately around 
27 percent (or 15,042) people of Sawahlunto municipality. This indicates that 
a low percentage of people have access to pipe-borne' water in the  town. 
Therefore,  it is reasonable  enough to expect a  growing demand for piped 
water in the near future, and a greater amount of water from Ombilin river 
to be taken by PDAM since there are  no other water sources in the area. 
4.4 Issue 2: Non-existence of organisation for river-basin 
management and framework for water rights licensing. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the incorporation of the idea of river­
basin  management  into  policy  and  action  are  relatively  new  to 
Indonesia. The management framework is not yet developed except 
in  two  basins  in  Java,  which  are  managed  by  publicly  owned 
corporations. In other provinces, the idea of river-basin management 
is newly introduced. As the responsibility for water management is 
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fragmented  among a  number of  government agencies a  provincial water 
management committee (PTPA) is supposed to be set up in each provinoe'2 . In 
West Sumatra the PTPA was set up in 1994. The characteristics of this committee 
are: 
Its  main  function  is  to  assist the governor in  co-ordinating water 
management at the provincial level. 
The specific tasks are: (1) data collection, processing, and preparing 
materials to  be  used  to  formulate  provincial  policy on  water 
management co-ordination; and  (2)  providing consideration and/or 
advice to  the governor on  matters related  to  water supply,  waste 
water drainage, and flood control. 
The members of the committee are  staff from agencies related to 
water  management (other stakeholders are  not  considered as 
members of the committee). 
No specific budget was allocated for this committee, so its activity was on an ad 
hoc basis. When there were problems related to water supply, drainage or flood 
a meeting of provincial  staff would  be  held  but  it was not clear whether the 
meeting was a PTPA  meeting or just a meeting related  to the performance of 
general government tasks. 
The government regulation  related to the provincial  PTPA has an  article, which 
states that the governor can set up basin water management committees (PPTPA) 
to assist the PTPA in performing its tasks. Until now no such committee has been 
set  up in  any of the six river  basins  in  West  Sumatra. As conflicts over water 
allocation and use tended to increase in West Sumatra, as illustrated with the 
case of Ombilin River, there is clearly a need to develop a framework for river­
basin management in the province. The case of Ombilin River can be used as 
the pilot activity to develop the framework  and  capacity for integrated  water 
resource management at the basin level. 
In terms of priority of water use, GR No. 2211982 underlines that water for drinking 
is the highest priority because drinking water is  a very basic human  need for 
survival. This essential  need of water for  human  life  seems to be the basis for 
prioritisation so  that the order of priority can  be  seen,  as  one  source said,  as 
water for life, water for livelihood, and water for amenity. Environmental need for 
water is not included in the list. Since there are inter-regional differences in water 
use and in the capacity to provide water, the order of priority below drinking water 
may be  arranged differently in  different regions  of Indonesia. The PTPA  is  the 
co-ordinating body tasked with making such prioritisation. 
The prioritisation still leaves questions, such  as how it would  be  applied  in 
decision making in times of short- or long-term water shortage. What about the 
12Based on Public Works Ministerial DeciSion No. 67/PRT/1993 
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irrigation systems,  if higher priority  users  exert their right over water from  the 
same source? Clarification of such points remains desirable. 
Water rights are to be given in the form of use rights, allocated by the government 
through a licensing mechanism. Since water and source of water are considered 
to  embody social  functions,  there  are  uses of  water that  require  licence,  and 
others  do  not. Tapping  sources for  non-commercial drinking water and  other 
individual domestic uses is allowed without licence as long as these do not harm 
the water source or other water users' interests. According to  MR  No.  48/PRTI 
1990,  a government licence  is  required  for  uses  like  domestic water supply, 
municipality and  real  estate,  irrigation,  animal  husbandry,  plantation,  fishery, 
industry, mining, energy,  navigation, disposing of waste,  etc. 
The  Minister of Public Works or the  governor is  authorised to  issue licences 
for water use within their respective basins. Licences for groundwater use are 
issued by  the Minister of  Mining and  Energy.  Licences for water use may be 
given to  individuals, groups of individuals or any legal entity. A group having a 
licence is authorised to  arrange water distribution among its members based 
on  government regulations. Those granted  a  licence  must pay  a  fee  to  the 
ministry or to the governor, depending on who issues the licence. According to 
MR 48/PRT/1990, the fee is to be used for financing operation and maintenance 
of water structures and maintaining of the water source. Every licence on water 
use  has  a  time  frame  depending on  the  kind  of  use. There  is  no  general 
reference for this yet, but the fee is supposed to be  set every five years. 
Transfer of water licences is  prohibited. Article 18 of MR  48/PRT/1990 states 
that giving up  a water licence or selling it to other parties may  be  allowed  if 
the licensing agency gives its permission. The MR,  however,  is not explicit on 
this exception. 
This formal system for allocating water use rights is hardly implemented, except 
perhaps to some extent in the two basins managed by publicly owned company. 
The problems are not only the  existence of gaps and  inconsistencies in  the 
formal regulations, policies and organisations. The lack of consensus on  some 
key  concepts (Pusposutardjo 1996) and the lack of hydrological data in  most 
of the basins (Hehanusa et al. 1994) make it impossible for the government to 
make basin-level plans or even to make the  right decisions on  whether or not 
new uses of river water are justifiable. 
Regulations provide that licences for water uses that potentially affect water 
balance must be based on general basin-level plans for development, protection, 
and  utilisation of  the  basin  water.  In  cases where such  plans have  not been 
made, the issuing of licences must be based on consensus in the co-ordinating 
body,  PTPA. But what would be the basis for such a consensus? 
In  most basins,  water allocation  is  governed  by  whatever  local  communities 
accept as rules. In predominantly agricultural basins, traditional adat may govern 
water allocation. Where non-agricultural sectors have  exerted their interests, 
claims over water may  be  based  on  political or economic power leading  to 
transfer of water from the agricultural sector (Kurnia et al 1996). Nevertheless, 
government is capable of exercising the authority in water allocation, including 
inter-basin water transfers. 
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Transferring water from Ombilin River to Anai-Sialang basin is an example. The 
decisions about this transfer,  it seems, were made on the basis of studies done 
by the government. The original water users must adjust to the new situation. 
One  of the  impacts of the  government action,  for  farmers  in  Ombilin  River,  is 
that it has affected the operation  of their waterwheels supplying water to their 
paddy fields,  due to lower river  discharge. The  lower flow  has  also caused 
domestic pollution  more felt  in  the downstream  Ombilin  River. This  underlines 
the  importance of formalisation of irrigation water rights  in  order to protect the 
interests of the  poor and  small  farmers.  Also,  it  is  important to  assess the 
technologies used by  the existing water users in  order to predict the  impact of 
river water reallocation and consequent reduced water supply to them. 
5. Conclusions and  implications for Integrated Water Resources 
Management 
Preceding sections have indicated the need to develop effective water management 
institutions. Improving water management in Inderagiri sub-basin (especially in the 
under watershed) will take  more effort and  longer time because the organisation 
for river-basin management and frameworks for water rights are not yet developed. 
The construction of a hydroelectric power plant at Singkarak Lake has significantly 
reduced the outflow from this lake to the Ombilin River, which in turn has affected 
water users along the  river. Among the impacts were: 
the cost of operating waterwheels has increased and the number of 
waterwheels for irrigation has gone down by around 20  percent; 
reported productivity of irrigated rice  has decreased; and 
water quality for domestic water supply has declined and the  cost 
of water purification has increased. 
A number of  options  can  be  considered  in  order to  solve the  problems  in  the 
short term,  while  starting  longer-term efforts to develop effective  water 
management institutions. The proposed options are: 
In  the  short-term, problems faced  by  the  users need to be  solved 
by  reviewing  water  allocation  rules,  especially  by  releasing  more 
water from Singkarak Lake to Ombilin River. 
The handling of water allocation needs to be done systematically. A 
water board conSisting of all stakeholders should be set up and given 
authority to regulate water allocation, especially from Singkarak Lake. 
The technology for lifting water for irrigation both with waterwheels 
and  diesel pumps needs to be  adjusted to meet the  need of local 
environment. Soil porosity is high and there is need for 24 hours of 
water supply. The waterwheel is well suited for this environment but 
the water level  in the  river is not sufficient to continue operating it 
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efficiently with  the current technology.  Farmers indicated that they  have 
difficulties with the cost of pump operation and maintenance and are 
thinking about using electric pumps to lift water from the river. 
It is also proposed that the electricity company provide a special 
discount for the domestic water supply company and  farmers who 
will  use electric pumps for  irrigation, as a "good  neighbourhood 
policy." 
In the long-term, the government should take the initiative to set up 
a co-ordinating body  (water board)  which can  effectively enforce 
water allocation rules, for which the national water resources policy 
has provided a legal basis. 
Steps required to implement these options would include: 
Reviewing all  water-related laws and  provincial  regulations and 
adjusting these in accordance with the direction of the new national 
water policy. 
Drafting and issuing a Governor Decision for setting  up  a working 
group to  review  water-related  laws and  regulations,  and  a co­
ordinating andlor operating body for river (sub-)basin management, 
using the Ombilin sub-basin as the pilot site. 
Reviewing the  possibility of charging a surface water use tax,  and 
using this  income to finance  the co-ordinating body and  river and 
watershed maintenance. 
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Abstract 
In  France,  the water management issue is no longer a question of developing 
stakeholders' participation or transferring State competence to user associations. 
As for the other countries with a complete and complex institutional framework, 
the point is to define clearly the role of each water management stakeholder and 
to answer both remaining questions: 
1.  How to ensure sustainability of the investments by raising the price 
of water without discouraging economic development? 
2.  How to share water among users when resources are scarce? 
The general answer given to these questions relies on the two basic principles 
of a good water management leading to sustainable development: 
1. 	 as it consumes more than 70 percent of the available water of low 
flow periods,  irrigated agriculture must respect the  other uses by 
limiting its demand to the allocated volume; 
2. 	 as it involves large and long-term public investments,  irrigated 
agriculture must at least bear the "sustainability cost" of the upstream 
water resources. 
Such a general answer is of course largely case-specific and should be adjusted 
to  each institutional framework. 
France,  like other Euro-Mediterranean countries,  has a  long history of water 
development, bom from water scarcity and a constant search for the best agricultural 
use and the fairest sharing. A complex institutional structure has progressively been 
set up to develop private initiatives within a public service framework. 
During the last century, Authorised User Associations (ASA) were developed. They 
were public establishments constituted by landowners for sharing the construction 
and management of irrigation systems. 
In  the  1950s,  the State created,  within more ambitious land use planning,  the 
Regional Development Companies (SARs), public corporations with a "concession" 
from  the State,  to develop water resources and manage irrigation schemes in the 
southem regions of  France. Well subsidised by the State at the beginning, the SARs now 
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cover their costs with the contributions of their customers. This  management is 
now financially sustainable as it includes the provisions necessary to  maintain 
the investments under concession. It nevertheless keeps the basic characteristics 
of a French public service: continuity,  equity,  sustainability,  and transparency. 
Finally,  Basin Organisations were set up more recently,  with a widened approach 
to  include  management and protection of the  environment,  to  seek a global 
consensus  on  water management by using dialogue and financial incentives, 
while the State keeps the  role of regulation. 
After a short discussion about the  stakeholders in  French  irrigation  and water 
management, this paper addresses both socio-economic questions stated above, 
with a specific discussion of the case of the Neste system, a water-stressed basin 
in  the south-west of France. 
1. The key stakeholders in  irrigation and water management in 
France 
1.1  At the individual level: farmers 
Farmers aim to satisfy the objectives they select for their household (to ensure 
a minimum revenue), their enterprise (to maximise profits, to minimise risks, and 
to improve the quality of the products) and their land (to be sustainable). 
Each  one freely chooses the  crops to grow  on  the  basis of advice from  his 
profession with due consideration given to the market. He consequently optimises 
the management of the production factors, particularly the on-farm irrigation system. 
The valorisation of water through irrigated agriculture varies,  largely due to the 
heterogeneity of the production systems. The cost of irrigation water is generally 
relatively high in the Mediterranean regions, and implies high performances with 
high value-added crops. 
The constraints of agricultural competitiveness make the irrigator very sensitive 
to the reliability of water supply and of course to its cost. 
For each culture in  a given cropping pattern, water value can be  assessed; so 
the water demand is represented by the graph of water values per water volume. 
Such a graph shows how an irrigator reacts when the water price varies. 
1.2 At the level of small systems: Authorised User Associations 
(ASA) 
Gathering irrigators through an association which owns and/or manages common 
assets is the first and the oldest way to manage collective irrigation [Lesbats et 
al  1996]. These associations bring together the land-owners concerned with the 
irrigation system. They are self-managed structures, based on a legal framework 
developed since the 19th  century, and have all the authority needed to carry out 
and to manage their irrigation system. 
234 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
The statutes of Authorised User Associations (ASAs) are public; they confer on 
them the  capacity to  act for the  public  good,  particularly in  the matter of cost 
recovery,  where they follow the rules of public accounting. Costs are shared in 
proportion to the involvement of each owner in the project area, generally as a 
function of his irrigated area. 
These associations have a very long lifetime, since the properties are irrevocably 
engaged in the association. This long experience provides valuable references. 
Initially,  the collective  participation of members is exemplary. They  define their 
projects according to their needs and their means of fulfilling them. They personally 
ensure operation and minor maintenance. The apparent cost, corresponding only 
to monetary expenditure, is thus largely below the comprehensive cost of water. 
But it sometimes happens that the necessary solidarity decreases and the ASA 
goes wrong  by  lack of involvement and  lack of professionalism.  Members are 
then concerned about the immediate balance of the accounts, and cut down the 
maintenance expenditure. This entails serious consequences in terms of quality 
and continuity of service. 
To be assisted in all these approaches, and to preserve or re-establish the durability 
of their system, at the conception as well as at the management stage, ASAs have 
currently been calling for the help of the Administration. The ASA statutes indeed 
foresee  that in  case  of bankruptcy of the ASA,  the  State  representative  has to 
replace the ASA President. Considering the State's other involvements, ASAs are 
now looking for professional advice, particularly on the part of the SARs (see below). 
Such a complementary relationship between ASAs and a technically competent 
body can be organised at the start of the project so as to guarantee sustainable 
management. This is  the case  with  the design and/or maintenance contracts 
offered by CACG,  one of the  SARs. These contracts can  also  evolve towards 
Public Service Delegation. 
1.3 At the level of large systems: Regional Development Companies 
(SARs) 
Created about 40 years ago, in the southern regions of France where water was 
proved to be a limiting factor to development, the SARs are characterised by the 
originality of their mission and statutes (Plantey et aI.1996). 
Their mission, defined by the concession contract with the State, deals with the 
implementation and operation of hydraulic projects necessary for the development 
of their region.  Managing the  conceded water resources,  they  ensure their 
conveyance to the centres of urban and  industrial consumption,  and the 
distribution in rural irrigated areas. For this purpose, they have all the rights and 
obligations of the owner of the works,  but without the  right to sell them. 
Their statutes are those of private companies, implying rules of sound management 
and economic efficiency. The majority of the shareholders are public, and so is the 
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governance: the  local  authorities (Departements1  and Regions) have therefore 
control  of the  strategic resources  in  the  name of the  public good for all  water 
users. The agricultural  users  are  especially  represented  in  the  Board and 
participate therefore in  governance as the SARs' private shareholders. 
In  accordance with  the  specifications of their concession contract,  the  action of 
the SARs is guided by the principles of sustainable management of a public service: 
Quality, continuity of water service; 
Equity when water is to be shared between users; 
Sustainability with adequate provisions for long term maintenance; 
Transparency of the management and accountability to the Board. 
The SARs' continuous effort, with regard to innovation and professionalism, bears 
fruit: the system performances ensure, for a controlled cost, the best adequacy 
between  resources and  needs on  the  basis of integrated water management. 
Despite the relative scarcity of the resource in the French Mediterranean regions, 
water shortages or conflicts between users are no longer a major concern in the 
systems managed by the SARs (Tardieu and Plantey 1999). 
When an exceptional crisis situation arises,  high-tech equipment and well-tried 
methods in  water sharing allow equitable management of the  resource. This is 
typically the case of the Neste system managed by CACG. 
1.4 At the level of large catchment basins 
The Basin Committee, a sort of water parliament where users, local authorities 
and  government are  represented,  is  in  charge of conservation  of the water 
environment and  of water management policy  in  one  of the six  French  large 
catchment basins. It develops, in collaboration with the State Administration, the 
long-term water policy plan  (SDAGE). 
The Water Agencies are their executive body: taxes, collected in accordance with 
voted decisions of the Basin Committee, discourage polluters and consumers from 
polluting and consuming. This incentive to behave in  a more responsible manner 
is coupled  with  a financial  policy since the product of the  taxes is  allocated to 
financial aids for pollution abatement and for conservation/development of water 
resources. For irrigation particularly Water Agencies contribute to investments in 
modernisation and regulation, which are very important sources of water savings. 
After 30 years the system based on  the principles of solidarity and equity (the 
polluter pays and the consumer pays) is well accepted by public opinion. But the 
French  Water Agencies  are  not to  be  misunderstood: they do not  have  direct 
responsibilities in water system management unlike the bodies described above. 
'A Departement is  a local government unit. 
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1.5 At the State level 
According to the terms of the 1992 Water Law,  it is not the State's responsibility 
to  ensure  directly the  operational management of  water resources,  except for 
very large  rivers.  Its authority should  guarantee the respect of the  necessary 
regulations of.water uses, which are subject to previous authorisation. Elaboration 
and updating of the rules should be carried out in consensus with the members 
of the water community, so as to minimise the number of rule-breaker users. 
Finally the State is  the  owner of large hydraulic works for irrigation purposes, 
precisely those which are delegated to the SARs by a concession contract. As a 
consequence, it supervises both the maintenance and the best use of the assets 
in order to meet all water demands. 
Although  this  presentation of the  French  institutional framework  in  water 
management may be too simplified, we can nevertheless see an attempt to clarify 
the respective roles of different stakeholders: 
basin planning and financial policy: the  Basin Committee seeks a 
consensus to reconcile all users, both among themselves and with 
the environment, in a global approach to water management using 
financial incentives. 
operational  management: the  SARs manage  water resources by 
contracting with  users, and ensure the sustainability of the assets; 
the  ASAs have  almost the same  objectives but  only for  smaller 
irrigation systems. 
regulation  and  law enforcement: the  State sets up  regulation 
measures,  keeping  in  mind both the necessary consensus and  its 
own  possibilities for applying them to all users. 
It is worth noting that the  French  water organisation is also characterised by a 
"public/private" mix. The freedom of  the  private initiative is  balanced by  the 
research of the public good. The economic efficiency of private management is 
associated with the sustainability of the public service. 
2. The Neste system: an example of "controlled water management" 
In the south-west of France, water management concerns several uses, among 
which, particularly for surface water,  there are three important competing uses: 
irrigation, hydropower and minimum flow in the  rivers. 
As an example, water management in the Neste system is here described not only 
as a successful set of rules, consultation methods and high-tech controls, but also 
as a system facing  a regulation problem due to  a water supply below the water 
demand. The specific features of the water management agency-the Compagnie 
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d'Amenagement des Coteaux de Gascogne (CACG), one of the SARs-are 
described as preconditions of the success of "controlled water management": the 
institutional originality of the SARs with public missions and private management, 
their joint experience  in  regional development and water management, their 
capacity in  maintenance and asset conservation, and finally the good practices 
they follow in pricing water as an economic tool together with a quota system. 
Economic analysis of the water value in each use, particularly for irrigation in the specific 
context of irrigated agriculture and land development, may clarify the allocation of water 
and validate the regulation tools used in "controlled water management:' 
2.1  Presentation of the Neste system 
In  1990, after a deep crisis, with conflicts between users due to a water-scarce 
situation, a new management method was  set up (Tardieu  1991). In operation 
for 10 years, it can be described as follows with its successes and limitations: 
Location: 	 A 10,000 km2 basin located in the south-west of France with 650 mm 
of rainfall, where irrigation is necessary for most kinds of agricultural 
production, and surface water is  the only resource for  urban  and 
industrial uses because of lack of groundwater: recharged  rivers 
(1,300 km)  are the common resource for every user. 
Water users: 
fish, wildlife and tourism need 250 Mm3/yearto strengthen low flows2 ; 
200,000 inhabitants consume 13 Mm3/year; 
51,000 irrigated hectares (28,000 lIs subscribed by 3,000 irrigators) 
consume 70 (average) to 95 Mm3/year (dry years); 
a 10,000 hectares waiting list without irrigation contract (equivalent 
to 6,000 lIs). 
Water resources: 
the Neste Canal (a State concession to CACG) which diverts 250 
Mm3 of the natural flow of the river Neste; 
stored  resources:  100 Mm3,  of which  48  Mm3 are stored  in 
hydroelectric mountain reservoirs and 52 Mm3 in CACG lakes (also 
State concessions). 
2Mm3 = million (106)  cubic meters. 
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Types of withdrawal: 
individual withdrawals (14,500 lis subscribed through "conventions 
de restitution", or "pour-back contracts"; 
collective withdrawals by ASAs or CACG (State-conceded) irrigation 
networks (13,500 I/s). 
Monitoring and remote control: 
resources: 200 river flow meters, 40 dam and canal gates, and 150 
pumping stations under remote control; 
demand: 1,500 individual water meters (checked 3 to 4 times a year), 
6,000 meters on  collective networks,  150 pumping stations under 
continuous monitoring 
Resource-demand balancing: 
The balance is ensured with a failure  rate  ot'1  in  4  (years). For a 
more comfortable balance, the additional resource needed is 43 Mm3 
for the waiting list, and 7 Mm3  to reduce the failure rate. 
2.2 Management rules: the contract, individual and collective 
Each  user signs with  CACG  a water contract called "convention de restitution" 
guaranteeing that his/her withdrawal is balanced out by an equivalent upstream 
recharge. The contract states a maximum diversion flow and a subscribed volume 
(the "quota") with a  2-tier price  (2-step): the  first price is a function  of the 
subscribed flow (Francs 320 per I/S)3, the second price is a function of the volume 
consumed over and above the  quota.  (F  0.63 per m3  above the 4,000 in3/1/s 
quota). 
Thus there are two limits on  the abstraction of water by the user: a rate  limit, 
and a volume limit. If the authorised flow rate is Q litres per second, the volume 
quota for the year is 4,000 m3.  (This means in effect that the user may abstract 
water for 1,110 hours before the quota is exceeded.) The extra payment required 
by those who exceed their volume quota is F 0.63 per m3• The price step is thus 
large. By  paying F 320 the user becomes entitled to take. up to 4,000 m3,  so if 
the full quota is taken its average price per m3 is F 0.08. If the quota is exceeded 
by the user, the marginal price for taking more water rises immediately to F 0.63. 
In  reality,  the user will often take less than  the quota, particularly during  rainy 
years. In that case the payment of F 320 remains, so in effect the average price 
paid  per m3  is  more than  F 0.08, which  is  the  minimum  possible. Over a long 
period, the average price actually paid is close to F 0.12 per m3. 
'1  Franc  about 12.6 US cents (October 2000). 
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The contract also fixes penalties for the user (in  case of withdrawing above the 
subscribed flow, or lack of water meter) and for CACG (in case of quota reduction). 
As demand exceeds resources even when dams are full, the Neste Commission, 
which brings together all water stakeholders from the five Departements involved, 
decided to start a "waiting  list" of applicants. All  rejected  applications are 
registered in a withdrawal file freely accessible (6,000 lIs to date). Newly created 
resources and contract reSignations allow a few  new applications to be  met 
annually, according to priority rules (young farmers) or to seniority on the waiting 
list. All  the yearly contracts get a collective withdrawal authorisation in  each of 
the five Departements. 
When dams are not full  or when  it is  anticipated that the Neste river flow will 
decrease, the Neste Commission meets before the irrigation season to decide 
on a quota reduction. The choice of the meeting date is the result of a compromise 
between the possibility of making a sound hydrological forecast and the possibility 
for farmers to adjust cropping patterns or inputs. 
During the irrigation period, water meters are checked; if the quota seems likely 
to  be  entirely used,  a warning  letter is sent by  CACG  to the  irrigator. Quota 
overrides are billed at the end of the season. Besides, CACG which  is  also in 
charge of the resource management activates its computerised remote control 
(RIO software): tactical water management in order to save water transferred from 
the  remote-controlled dams (checked  every three hours); strategiC  water 
management in  order to optimise water allocation between  irrigation and  river 
wildlife with the objective of emptying the  reservoirs by the end of the low flow 
period with a failure rate of 1 in  10 (weekly check). 
After the irrigation season, water management performance is assessed in terms 
of respect or improvement of minimum wildlife flows,  respect of volumes 
subscribed by irrigators and water savings throughout the system: 
Since 1990, when the system was first put in operation, failures to 
maintain wildlife minimum flows have been  r\ire: One to two days 
per year over a  few  kilometres,  as compared to the drying up  of 
several dozens of kilometres over several weeks in  1989. 
However, irrigators' quotas have been reduced in 4 years out of to (although 
one of these reductions was later cancelled). The ultimate solution, when 
a crisis cannot be solved by quotas-imposition of the authority of the state, 
through  intervention by the  Prefect of the Department-has not been 
applied, except for substituting (in 3 years out of 10) a simple interdiction 
instead of the economic incentive for staying within the allocated quota. 
As to water savings throughout the system, it can be said, after using 
the RIO software for 10 years, that these amount to over 20 percent 
of the managed volume. 
241 Tardieu: Charging, as a Management Tool,  in South-West France 
2.3 Successes and problems of the system: can a limited supply be 
regulated? 
In the Neste system both principles of good water management are respected: 
Water is shared in such a way that fish and wildlife are preserved 
all  along the  1,300 km  of  recharged  rivers and  that irrigators are 
delivered their contracted volumes; 
CACG, on behalf of the "conceding" State which bills the cost of the 
service, gets the financial means to cover at least the "sustainability 
cost" and guarantee the maintenance of the invested assets (F 3,000 
million in current prices). 
This is an  obvious progress in comparison with the two "wrong practices" of the 
previous period: daily interdictions by the  Prefect,  which irrigators were 
circumventing by over-investing  in  pumping capacities,  thus worsening 
subsequent crises; and the inability to charge for the "resource" part of the water 
service, thus leading to asset jeopardy. 
One direct positive consequence is that irrigators are driven to saving water and 
optimising their cropping patterns, through a sound and sustainable incentive far 
more valuable than any media campaign. It also induces a renewed interest on 
the part of advice and  research networks towards quota optimisation, in  terms 
of cropping patterns or input selection (Balas 1993). 
But a fundamental question remains which concerns "spatial development"3: what 
about the waiting list's demand, if water resource creation is hampered by procedure 
problems as well  as limitations of public funds?  One solution  is sometimes 
envisaged: to reduce definitively all quotas of current irrigators, in  order to let in 
the new applicants. This bad solution, which addresses issues of equity, economic 
efficiency, social acceptance and technical and agricultural management, has been 
discussed in  a special paper (Tardieu  1999) and is summarised in section 4. 
3. How to charge for balancing the irrigation costs without 
threatening economic development? 
Whichever institutional framework one chooses, irrigation's main challenge is to 
cover the full cost of water used, by raising the water price. 
The point is, for most irrigation systems being managed by government agencies, 
that public subsidies are now limited by Budget constraints. Such subsidies may 
consist in financing the operating personnel, heavy maintenance or rehabilitation 
costs, or in under-pricing the energy, etc. For us Europeans, the commitment "user 
pays for water" will  be the basis of the new European Water Directive. Some 
targeted and transparent subsidies will still be acceptable, on the condition that 
they will be gradually phased out. This objective of an irrigation system breaking 
even  thanks to adapted water charges is not impossible to reach:  it  is already 
the case in several regions of France. 
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However,  the economic and  social consequences of  water price rises can  be 
serious, as shown by the following examples of likely risks: 
Overall  reduction  in  the  country's agricultural production,  making it 
impossible to  reach the goal frequently assigned to irrigation,  i.e. to 
secure food self-sufficiency. This consequence may be accepted if the 
country can maintain its ''food sovereignty" [FAO-NGO 1996]. A regular 
increase  in  the price of water  has  recently been  started in Tunisia, 
except for cereals, for which water charges have been kept constant. 
Higher food prices for urban consumers, which induces larger food 
imports and some  losses of internal  market shares for irrigating 
farmers. This has already been verified in various African countries. 
Lower agricultural  income,  hence  increased rural  poverty and 
population migration towards towns. Even if the irrigating farmers are 
not the  most vulnerable in  economic terms-since they can  use a 
wider  range  of crops-the economic development of  rural 
populations must remain  irrigation's fundamental objective. 
On the other hand, the "true prices" process can also entail some benefits: 
a new respect for water,  which improves management efficiency; 
an  incentive to choose the  most profitable crops and  to maximise 
comparative advantages; 
a means to know  which assets have to be maintained,  and  which 
investments have to be done. 
So,  this price adjustment process has  to be  conducted  with great care, taking 
into account the economic consequences on production: this is done by analysing 
the "water value" of irrigation for the farmer,  I.e. the additional added value per 
water unit (ma) offered by irrigated crops as compared with rain-fed. 
3.1  Full cost and "sustainability cost" 
Before  tackling this issue,  it is  worth  restating  the  definition of the  full  cost of 
water from  the  point of  view  of the  agency responsible for water resource 
acquisition and distribution. 
The full cost of water includes: 
operating costs: staff, energy, daily upkeep; 
investment-linked costs: depreciation and/or maintenance/renewal, 
financial costs of the initial investment. 
A water price set at this level secures a balanced budget for the managing agency 
without any subsidies. In France, this price is about 1 F/m3 for the large irrigation 
schemes, where water charges are based on the full cost of water with the first 
investment partially SUbsidised. 
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However,  the cost of major headworks (reservoirs, transfer canals) is  generally 
not included. The rationale for such under-charging is based on the consideration 
that these works are both strategic and mUlti-purpose and that they were created 
for the sake of regional development at a time when economies were more state­
backed and more protected. Today,  countries where such infrastructure is paid 
for by water users instead of taxpayers are rare. Nevertheless, it is the objective 
that has been set for irrigation, notably in France, with a transition period allowing 
a smooth evolution of production systems. 
During  that phase,  water charges are  meant to cover what  will  be  called  the 
sustainability cost  of  water,  something that,  in  the  case  of heavy,  long-life 
investments, is very different from the full cost: 
sustainability cost = operating cost + maintenance and sustainable 
renewal cost; or 
sustainabilify cost =full cost  financial cost of initial investment 
With  a water price set at the sustainability cost level,  no  new investment is 
possible; but  budget constraints are  met,  and  sustainable operation and 
maintenance ensured without having to resort to public funding. 
As  a very simplified  example,  here are  the different costs,  added  to the  water 
distribution cost, generated by the water resource infrastructure. This is the case 
of the  Neste  system:  actual annual  costs  of a reservoir dam  feeding  a river 
(investment cost 10 F/m 3  with a quasi-infinite life duration). 
Table 1: Calculation of sustainability cost and full cost, in the Neste 
system 
Units: F/m" 
Operation and daily upkeep  0.05 
Maintenance I Renewal 
(0.5% x investment cost) 
0.05 
Sustainability cost  0.10 
Financial cost (Long-term interest rate: 5%)  0.50 
t-utl cost  0.60 
A water price covering the sustainability cost of0.1 0 F/m3  is socially acceptable 
and, after the necessary public funding of the initial investment, prevents the need 
for further subsidies. 
This transition  phase,  in  the priCing  policy is  adopted in  France:  irrigation 
distribution costs are charged  usually around  1 FI  m3,  I.e.  at  full  cost pricing 
whereas the irrigator's share of the water resource costs is charged more around 
0.10 F/m3,  I.e. at sustainability cost pricing. 
244 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
3.2 Water Strategic Value 
On  the  basis of the  existing  farming  infrastructure,  the  strategic value  (Vs) 
corresponds to the  optimum  combination  between  irrigated  and  non-irrigated 
crops, with a given cropping pattern: 
VAl  - VANI 
Strategic Value:  Vs  = -------­
VI 
where 
VAl  = Value Added from Irrigated crops (before deducting the cost of water); 
VANI  = Value Added from  Non-Irrigated crops (rain-fed  crops)  which  could  be 
cultivated instead of Irrigated crops 
VI  = Volume of water allocated to Irrigation 
This value5  reflects strategic choices made by the farmer at a point in time when 
he  can  still  modify  his cropping  pattern,  and  adjust his  irrigation  practice to a 
variable allocated water volume.  It is the result of a decision taken once or twice 
a year and it should at least cover the cost of irrigation (not included in  VAl)  for 
it to be profitable. 
The strategic values of irrigated crops in  any region can then be  related to the 
areas of those crops and hence to their water consumption. By arranging these 
various crops in  decreasing  order of  their strategic values,  we  can  obtain  a 
graphical relationship between crop value and water demand, as shown in figure 
2. 
Figure 2: Effect of water quantity on water value 
The Strategic Value of  Water 
Gascony 1998 usual cropping pattern on 10,000 ha 
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The following remarks can be made on the Vs formula presented 
above: 
Variations  in  the  crop  price (domestic or world  price) can  lead to  a 
change in value that rules out irrigation, or on the contrary to a stronger 
water demand; this is  particularly the case for cereals, whose water 
valuation is relatively feeble but which call for large volumes of water. 
Changes  in  the  yield  or added  value  of  a given  rainfed  crop  can 
paradoxically entail changes in irrigation water demand. For instance, 
a  specific subsidy to  rainfed  durum  ("hard" wheat)  makes  it  an 
alternative to irrigated maize in the driest parts of southern France. 
On  the  other hand,  the  probable diminishing profitability of  cattle 
breeding (because of the coming reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy  of the  European  Union)  will  increase water demand for 
irrigated cereals; the improvement of rainfed crops in Sahel ian Africa 
may lead to reserving irrigation for high added-value crops, such as 
vegetables or fruits. 
Improving  irrigation effectiveness,  thus diminishing the formula's 
denominator,  increases water value  and  may  make  irrigation 
profitable; this is often the case with the flood irrigation of meadows, 
economically unthinkable in  water-scarce areas but quite sound,  if 
carefully conducted, in a mixed farming system. 
3.3 Water's Strategic Value, price and  budget constraints 
By comparing the strategic values of water for the farmer and its comprehensive 
cost, it is easy to know the average price that will balance the irrigation manager's 
budget. 
The problem for the irrigation agency, and for the State which is often backing it, 
is  the  following:  water price  rises,  which  help to  balance  its  budget,  have  a 
negative effect on water sales and, hence, a tendency to raise the costs of each 
m3 sold since irrigation costs are mostly fixed ones (depreciation, financial, and 
maintenance costs).  This is a vicious circle leading inevitably to the collapse of 
the  system.  That is  why,  in  a now-transparent  management environment,  the 
State may find it interesting to keep on financing intensification or modernisation 
investments, thus boosting irrigated agriculture and increasing its own chances 
of recouping heavy sunk costs. 
The concept of sustainability cost as described above is essential, for it constitutes 
the  lowest  price  the  State can  accept.  If  the  water price  does not  cover the 
sustainability cost and  exceeds the Strategic Value  of water for farmers (for at 
least one given existing crop), this means that a long-term public subsidy through 
water charges will be  necessary to maintain that irrigated crop in the country or 
region  considered.  The opening  up  of agricultural  markets and  the  new 
transparency in  world trade will  make this practice impossible in the future. 
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Figure 3: Sustainable allocation of water 
The Slrategic value of water 
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Note:  In this example. the price of 1.1 O/Fm3 based on sustainability cost includes the costs 
of the upstream dam and the distribution system, whereas on a full-cost basis this 
price would be about 2F/m3• 
On the other hand, it does not seem economically sound to dismantle entire sectors 
of irrigated agriculture on the principle that the full cost of water should be covered ... 
at all  costs!  This would  mean that today's  irrigators would  have  to pay  for 
investments which will also be used by future generations, thus justifying a certain 
amount of public subsidies to help start up the economic development process. 
So, when embarking on the true-price process in irrigation, it is essential to have 
a good understanding of strategic values of water to be able to derive demand 
curves by  farm types and by  region.  Economic data on  irrigated crops are not 
always  available.  This is one  negative consequence of the  disappearance of 
public irrigation agencies: the overall regulation of irrigation investments and of 
agricultural production requires States to allocate some funds to data collection 
and processing that "privatised" agencies can no longer afford.  It should not be 
forgotten that economic references to be looked at also concern rain-fed crops, 
so as to be in a position to correctly appraise water value by comparison between 
alternative agro-economic systems. 
4.  Is water pricing useful for controlling water allocations? 
The points made above assume that  an  essential pre-requisite has been met: 
the clear identification of the economic agents who buy and sell irrigation water, 
and  can  also measure the  traded economic good.  This is an  often heavy but 
always decisive task,  which precedes and  accompanies the true-price process 
in  irrigation: going  away from  the  idea that water is  a free  gift from  the  State, 
towards the concept of an irrigation water "service" to a "client" farmer.  The critical 
• point of how this transfer should be conducted is the subject of many workshops. 
Let it just be said that,  wherever water is scarce,  it is very tempting to use the 
newly established economic links between "supplier" and  "customer" to  try  to 
regulate water management through prices. 
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Indeed, after the beneficial disengagement of the State from direct management 
of irrigation schemes, some think that the regulation of water management can 
also be taken care of solely by price mechanisms.  To what extent is such price­
based regulation reliable? 
Water allocation regulation consists in inciting each economic agent to respect the 
volume of water allOcated by the public authority.  Is the pricing of water sufficient 
to avoid crises  in  scarce water systems?  Can it settle intersectoral disputes 
between competing uses?  Can it improve water distribution between farmers? 
4.1  Quotas and pricing: instruments for allocation regulation 
In  water-scarce  regions,  water quotas are-more or less clearly-allocated to 
farmers,  by  sub-basin or by  region.  For the public authority, the problem is to 
ensure that these allocations are  respected.  The answer is  usually of the law 
enforcement type,  forbidding  off-takes and  suing  trespassers.  This type of 
regulation  generates economic inefficiency and,  sometimes, corruption. 
Therefore, it is highly tempting to use the price of water to avoid disputes between 
users, provided that all participants have been identified and the service billed 
has been clearly defined. 
From analysis of the marginal value of water (marginal value is defined here as the value 
of the additional production that is brought about by one additional ffil of water applied 
during the irrigation period), a method of water pricing can be derived with  a view to 
attempting such regulation.  It will necessarily be step-pricing, i.e. a discontinuous series 
of price levels, increasing with waler demand. The higher price step, which will counteract 
the marginal value, must be higher than the lower price step, which itself is calculated to 
cover at least the sustainability cost and also to secure the farmers income. 
The fairly simple system set up  in  the Neste system consists of: 
an allocated Quota, priced at a fixed total which is the same whether 
the user takes it all or takes less; 
an over-consumption price, for using more water than the quota. 
The overall volume quota must be compatible with the limited resources allocated 
to irrigation as opposed to other competing uses.  For a given existing irrigated 
area there exists a corresponding volume quota per hectare,  which  has to be 
regulated with a price step high enough to deter over-consumption. 
But efficient regulation is based on understandable and practical water charges, 
within a freely negotiated contract: bills are useless if they cannot be recovered. 
Too high over-consumption prices can only lead to jeopardised contracts and then 
to legal prosecutions, which is precisely the regulation mode to be avoided. 
The Neste system example shows that a price step between average price and 
over-consumption price exceeding 0.60 or 0.80 F/m 3  would  not be  socially 
acceptable at present.  This approach provides useful strategic guidelines for fixing 
the volume quota per hectare.  In consideration of the marginal value graph, this 
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highest price step clarifies the concept of socially acceptable minimum quota.  If 
the quota is too far below the  optimum needs (less than  80%  of those  needs) 
the system does not work in a dry year: then, crisis can be frequent, with stalled 
contracts and prosecution by the public authorities. 
4.2 Best practices in  water pricing and water resources development 
Stemming from this discussion, three basic ideas can be emphasised: 
Water step-pricing can help to regulate the allocation system if the quota 
and the over-consumption price are set in consideration of the marginal 
value of water and the social acceptability of the water charge. 
Quotas that  are too  low compared  to  the  crop  need cannot be 
regulated  by  pricing,  and  lead to  economic inefficiency linked  to 
enforcing inapplicable rules.  The quest for  equity at all  costs  in  a 
system with  limited resources leads to the same result. 
In~reasing water resources in a tight system makes it possible, over 
and  above  the  direct economic  benefits,  to  rebuild  collective 
regulation based on a sound quota + price contract which will leave 
each farmer free to manage his irrigation efficiently according to his 
own water value function. 
Such an effort to adapt the strategy of water pricing, together with the investments 
needed to create new water resources',  is  necessary to help farmers face open 
market competition: guaranteed and  clearly contracted water supply,  full 
responsibility in  irrigation management without public intervention. 
But it is clear that such a system of price regulation can only work smoothly within 
a narrow  range  of economic variables,  water price and  water value.  And  it  is 
the State's responsibility not only to identify this range  but also to be  ready to 
lay down  rules  on  economically "offside" behaviours  (high  water value  crops, 
exceptional water shortages, and  irrational collective wastage).  Only this type 
of strong State makes it possible for the managing agency to make efficient and 
economic use of price regulation; 
The main advantage of such' regulation is to give back to farmers the freedom 
to optimise their choice of crops and their management of irrigated or non-irrigated 
agriculture,  this  optimisation  being  more  and  more  complex  in  the  context of 
competitive world markets. 
One prerequisite to the efficiency of this economic approach lies in the identification 
of the relevant agents (managing agency,  individual farm!3rs,  water user groups), 
the clear content of their contract relations (water price, allocated water volume), 
and the capacity to measure the traded economic good (water meters).  It is indeed 
a move towards water markets (Kosciusko-Morizet et "al.  1998).  But analysis of 
the value of, irrigation water-particularly its marginal value-shows that it would 
be unwise to go further along this line, especially when it comes to free bidding for 
water quotas, given, on the one hand, the disproportion between the marginal value 
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and the socially acceptable price of water and, on the other hand, the necessary 
equity in the sharing of a highly socially-valued good, this feeling of equity being 
necessary for water pricing to be efficient. 
5.  Conclusion and  lessons learned 
The role of service-oriented organisations in  irrigation and water management 
is now largely accepted as a prerequisite for implementing good control of water 
allocation and ensuring the sustainability of economic development (Malano et 
al. 1999).  The transfer of management to water users' associations under control 
of an integrated basin authority is one possible solution, frequently described but 
too recent to be completely convincing.  In fact this type of solution often leaves 
unanswered the two important questions raised at the beginning of this paper, 
I.e. how to balance the budget by raising the water price and how to reach a fair 
sharing of scarce water among users.  If water management is transferred to 
water users' associations, the process must be implemented carefully.  The main 
idea is to develop "self-management without abandonment" by  transferring to 
socially strong users' associations responsibilities adapted to their capacity, while 
keeping a tight partnership with a professional water manager. 
French history of irrigation management emphasises the efficiency of some other 
solutions,  such as  management by  the SARs,  mixed public-private companies 
linked to the Government by concession contracts.  With the experience of such 
management, we can propose two recommendations in the very difficult debate 
on  water pricing and allocation: 
Firstly,  it is  recommended  that a cautious but firm  move  towards 
Sustainability Cost Pricing; that is, charging the necessary amount to 
ensure the  sustainability of the assets-I.e. operation,  maintenance 
and renewal costs, or what has been called Sustainability Cost earlier 
in this paper-but not trying to recoup the full financial cost of initial 
investment or of the most recent rehabilitation.  To correspond exactly 
to sustainability, the price charged must cover all costs incurred  in 
delivering each drop of water from the dam to the crop.  At this level 
of cost recovery, there is no further need of current subsidies for staff, 
for repairs, for energy or for future rehabilitation: the subsidies' "vicious 
circle" is broken.  Such development is sustainable, even though it is 
not designed to recover the initial investment. 
Secondly,  it  is  recommended to us'e  step  pricing,  based  on  water 
metering,  in order to facilitate control of the allocations in  a fair and 
transparent water sharing  system.  In  case  of water scarcity the' 
implementation of a joint quota system is necessary due to the high 
marginal value  of  water during the  irrigation  period.  The collective 
regulation  has to  be  based  on  a sound  quota + price  contract with 
the service provider, which will leave each farmer free to manage his 
irrigation efficiently according to his own water value function.  But in 
a "closing" basin,  the  development of new  resources must also be 
implemented in order to ensure the governability of the system.  The 
success of controlled water management, as developed in the Neste 
system has been founded on joint-management of demand and 
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resources,  with  the implementation  of necessary new  reservoirs 
during the  last 10 years.  In  France it is  now very difficult to take 
such decisions.  The transfer of experience in  water management 
can be  based on  such methods,  if governance, after the period of 
"decision without consultation," avoids the current tendency towards 
"consultation without decision." 
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The  institutional arrangements in the  Murray-Darling basin are an evolving set 
of rules which manage the conflicting interests of the Commonwealth of  Australia, 
four States and a Territory.  Governments and water users share the common 
understanding that the basin is the heart of Australian agriculture and water is 
viewed as a precious resource.  The high-level vision is that water must be used 
according to its highest and best use while ensuring that water is provided for 
the  environment.  Australia has been undertaking significant water reforms  in 
areas such as full-cost pricing,  water trading and the  separation of policy and 
regulation from the day-to-day management of water related infrastructure.  There 
have been further movements towards involving the community at various points 
in the management of the resource.  Consultation with  the varied stakeholders 
is viewed as an important means of resolving conflict in  the basin. 
1. Overview of the basin 
Managing water resources in  the  Murray-Darling basin  is  a lesson in  resolving 
conflict across jurisdictional lines.  The layers consist of a council,  a commission 
and series of high level groups interspersed with community representatives.  These 
layers make up the forum where strategies and policies are set out for sharing the 
water and managing the serious problems of water quality in the basin.  Water is 
fundamental to the  region's  economy and a strong commitment to using water 
according to its highest and best use  has emerged in  Australia.  As part of a 
National Competition Policy, Australia has embarked 01) major reforms which include 
expanding water trading and moving to fUll-cost pricing of the resource. 
The  Murray-Darling  River basin  comprises  a  large  geographical  area, 
approximately one million square kilometres or one-seventh of the land mass of 
Australia.  With a total length of 3,780 km,  it is the fourth longest river system in 
the world. The total area is roughly equivalent to the area of France.  An overview 
of the Murray-Darling basin can be seen in  Figure 1. 
The Murray-Darling River basin contains half the Great Dividing Range and some 
of Australia's highest mountains.  The high catchments provide a significant amount 
of water to the system.  However, much of the basin is flat with extensive plains or 
low undulating areas less than 200 metres above sea level.  The basin covers 75 
percent of the State of New South Wales,  56 percent of the State of Victoria,  15 
percent of the State of Queensland, 8 percent of the State of South Australia and 
the entire Australian Capital Territory (Murray-Darling Ministerial CounCil, 1987). 
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The Murray-Darling basin is defined by the catchment areas of the Murray and Darling 
Rivers and their many tributaries.  The  source of the  Murray  is  in  south-eastern 
Australia in  the Australian Alps.  The Murray flows across the southern section of 
the continent to form the border of New South Wales and Victoria before flowing out 
through South Australia to the Southern Ocean.  The longer Darling  River drains 
the northern half of the basin from Queensland into New South Wales.  These two 
major rivers come together quite far downstream, just to the east of the border of 
South Australia, some 250 km from the sea.  A right-bank tributary of the Murray, 
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the Murrumbidgee, drains important agricultural areas of central New South 
Wales, between the two major rivers.  These rivers have extremely low gradients 
and as a result the mean flow of water down these rivers is slow. 
Over two-thirds of the water that would have flowed to the Southern Ocean, is now 
diverted.  Over the last 100 years, the Murray-Darling basin has been transformed 
by construction of major weirs, locks and storages on the rivers. The Snowy River 
Scheme, a major hydro-electrical power system, was constructed over a 25-year 
period beginning in  1949.  The scheme diverts about 1,140 GL (gigalitre: million 
m3)  per year of water from the Snowy and Eucumbene Rivers, which are outside 
the south-east boundary of the basin, into the Murray and Murrumbidgee valleys, 
making more water available  for irrigation.  People  living  in  the Snowy  River 
Catchment are now arguing for some of this water to be returned to them. 
Land degradation of  one form  or another is  present throughout the basin.  The 
problems include loss of biodiversity, wind and water erosion, dryland and irrigation­
induced salinity, soil acidity and soil fertility and structure decline.  Dryland salinity 
is a problem unique to areas of the world where there are naturally occurring salts 
in the soils.  With land clearing and the introduction of European style agriculture 
in the basin, the groundwater levels have risen  bringing the salts to the surface. 
For the rivers, salinity levels have also increased due to irrigation, dryland salinity 
and the drainage of naturally occurring saline groundwater. 
The total volume  of water storage capacity in  the basin is just less than 35,000 
GL. The major storages,' especially Dartmouth,  Hume,  Lake Victoria and  the 
Menindee Lakes and other river regulatory structures have made it possible to store 
water during wet periods and release it as needed during summer or in droughts. 
The basin  has been populated for an  estimated 40,000 years and  there are 
significant sites where cave paintings and artefacts of Aboriginal culture have been 
found.  As well, the basin is important as a place of recreation and tourism.  The 
City of Adelaide with a population of over one million people draws an average of 
40 percent of its water needs from the Murray system.  There are a large number 
of wetlands throughout the basin, some which are considered to be of international 
significance and listed  as  Ramsar Wetlands. The  basin  provides the  breeding 
habitats for many species of water-birds, fish,  invertebrates and plants. 
The importance of the basin to Australian agriculture is evident by the fact that 
43 percent of the total number of farms in Australia are in the basin representing 
45 percent of the crop area.  Within the agricultural sector, crops, pastures and 
grasses are the largest value component of agricultural production in the basin, 
with a gross annual value of $7.9 billion (Australia Bureau of Statistics).  Irrigation 
dominates the landscape in the basin.  Irrigated crops and pastures in the basin 
represent 72 percent of Australia's total area of irrigated land. Irrigation is essential 
for improved dairy, cotton, rice and horticulture (in particular viticulture).  (MDBC 
http.ilwww.mdbc.gov.aultourlirrigation.htm) 
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2. Water resources in the basin 
One" of the more remarkable features of the Murray-Darling basin is the climatic 
variability that is observed.  Within the basin,  rainfall varies from  1400 mm per 
year in  the  highlands to  300  mm  in  the  northwest (Murray-Darling  Ministerial 
Council, 1987).  Australia's climate, compounded by the variability of its rainfall, 
means that virtually all of  Australia's river systems are subject to considerable 
variability of flows from  one  year to  another.  According  to  Brennan and 
Scoccimarro (1998)  annual variations from  maximum to minimum flows range 
from 300:1  to 1000:1  in Australia.  Extremes of 10000:1 have been reported for 
the Darling River.  The northern Darling system is essentially a summer rainfall 
system, while the southern Murray system is essentially a winter rainfall system. 
The  Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers  experience  relatively  more  reliable 
precipitation and as a result stream flow is much more reliable than in other parts 
of the basin.  The largest variability seems to occur with the Darling River and 
its tributaries where massive floods can occur as well as times when the  rivers 
cease to flow.'  The Murray-Darling basin'has a relatively low mean annual 
discharge in comparison with the other river systems in the world; in fact it is a 
small one in terms of discharge or runoff. 
3. Geo-political organisation of the basin 
The previous section highlighted the unique physical characteristics of the Murray­
Darling basin.  Australia is a commonwealth of States and Territories.  Due to ~he 
geographic size of the basin. it crosses the boundaries of States and includes one 
Territory.  The Murray-Darling River basin is managed by individual States but there 
are overarching bodies that co-ordinate many of the efforts of State and territory 
governments at the basin level.  Water resources are largely under the jurisdiction 
of the States and Territory governments.  Rather than amending the Constitution, 
a Murray-Darling basin Commission has been formed to manage inter-jurisdictional 
processes and conflicts in an organised manner. 
The Commonwealth (or Federal) government does participate in water and water 
resource  management through  other means such  as  legislative and  executive 
capacity.  In particular, the Commonwealth government uses financial assistance 
to the States and Territories under section 96 of the Commonwealth Constitution 
(Fisher 2000,  p.35).  However.  these financial  incentives must not be shown to 
discriminate between States.  This is a form of co-operative federalism where the 
Commonwealth  and  State governments come to  agreements  and  the 
Commonwealth relies on the States to implement agreements within their respective 
jurisdictions. 
As a  result of the Constitutional framework,  different bodies of  legislation and 
institutional arrangements have evolved  in  each  of  the States.  To  follow  the 
elaborate layers of committees, management groups and other arraogements that 
are necessary to 
'Water flow  becomes  an  issue later  in  the  report when  we  discuss security of water 
allocations. 
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are  necessary to  manage the· basin  (and  other resources  in  Australia),  it  is 
necessary to  introduce the  key  bodies that  shape Commonwealth,  State and 
Territorial government policy on water.  The institutional arrangements in the basin 
are in a process of evolution as the States and Territories move towards market­
based systems of resource allocation. 
An  over-arching policy, which affects most sectors of the Australian economy, is 
the National Competition Policy.  The States, Territories and the Commonwealth 
have committed themselves to a process of creating a level playing field  for all 
by  facilitating  effective competition.  The  goal  of this process is  to  promote 
economic efficiency and economic growth.  The policies are articulated in  what 
has become known as the Hilmer report on National Competition (Hilmer 1993). 
In order to facilitate these competitive reforms, the Commonwealth government 
has placed funds in a pool to be distributed among States and Territories on the 
basis of progress of implementing reform  (each step  is  known  as a Tranche). 
Thus,  States and Territories have  a financial incentive to  implement the policy 
framework.  The size of payments promised varies among States.  The payments 
are not large enough to finance  reform,  but have been sufficient to ensure that 
serious steps are taken to implement the reforms. 
3.1  Council of Australian Governments 
The Council  of Australian Governments (COAG)  predates the  National 
Competition Policy.  Co-operation among the States to achieve agreed-upon goals 
has  required that entities such  as  COAG  exist.  COAG  is  charged  with 
implementing principles of the Hilmer Report, including water reform.  COAG  is 
composed of heads of Federal (Commonwealth of Australia) and StatefTerritory 
governments plus a representative from local government.  Water is one of many 
sectors that come under the purview of COAG. 
COAG  has  developed  a  national policy called the COAG Water Reform 
Framework for the efficient and sustainable reform of Australia's rural and urban 
water industries.  Many of the States and Territories had been moving in these 
directions prior to COAG.  In developing its framework, COAG adopted a position 
that required a consistent approach to water reform  throughout Australia.  The 
key elements of COAG's water reforms are: 
All water pricing is to be based on the principles of full cost recovery, 
and cross-subsidies must be made transparent; 
Any  future new investment in  irrigation schemes,  or extensions to 
existing schemes, are to be undertaken only after appraisal indicates 
they are economically viable and ecologically sustainable; 
State  and Territory governments, through  relevant agencies,  are to 
implement comprehensive systems of water allocations or entitlements, 
which are to be backed by the separation of water property rights from 
land and  include clear specification of entitlements in  terms of 
ownership, volume, reliability, transferability and, if appropriate, quality; 
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The formal determination of water allocation entitlements, including 
allocations for  the environment as  a legitimate user of water,  is to 
be undertaken; 
Trading,  including cross-border sales,  of water allocations and 
entitlements is  to  be  allowed within  the  social  or physical  and 
ecological constraints of catchments; 
An  integrated catchment management approach to water resource 
management is to be adopted; 
Resource management and  regulatory roles of government are  to 
be separated as far as possible from water service provision; 
Greater responsibility is  to  be  given to local areas for the 
management of water resources; 
Greater public education  about water use and  consultation  in  the 
implementation of water reforms and appropriate research into water 
use efficiency technologies and  related areas is to occur. 
Source:  http://www.affa.gov.aulwater-reformlfacts2.html 
Each  State or Territory was  given the flexibility to adopt its own  approach to 
implementation depending on  its  own  unique institutional and  natural 
characteristics, but it was agreed that the full framework would be implemented 
by  the  year  2001.  A key  feature  of  the  COAG  framework  was the  State and 
Territory agreement to  a tranche  payment system,  where  access to  payments 
was conditional upon delivery of reform milestones. 
COAG Water Reform  process is  being further developed by  the  High  Level 
Steering Group on Water.  This group consists of the Chief Executive of each 
State, Territory and Commonwealth  Department directly responsible for  water. 
The head of MDBC is not represented on the High Level Steering Group on Water 
but its members with  a few  exceptions, are members of the Commission. 
3.2 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council 
The Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC) was established in 1985 
with amendments to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement.  The Ministerial Council 
advises the Council of Australian Governments as appropriate on matters relating 
to the implementation of the framework for water reform.  The Ministerial Council 
consists of the ministers responsible for land, water and environmental resources 
in  each of the signatory or contracting governments, the Commonwealth, New 
South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, and Queensland, with each government 
limited to a maximum of three members. Its prime functions are: 
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generally to consider and determine major policy issues of common 
interest to the Contracting governments concerning effective planning 
and management for the equitable efficient and sustainable use of 
the  water,  land and other environmental resources of the Murray­
Darling basin; and to develop,  consider and,  where appropriate, to 
authorise measures for the equitable,  efficient and sustainable use 
of such  water,  land and other environmental resources  . (Murray­
Darling Basin Agreement 1992, Clause 9) 
Being a political forum, the Ministerial Council has the power to make decisions for 
the basin as a whole because of the presence of Ministers representing each of the 
States and Territories.  Resolutions of the Council are arrived at through consensus. 
This means that decisions taken by the Council represent in theory a consensus of 
governmental opinion and policy across the basin at a point in time.  However, the 
Ministerial Council relies on the States to implement any decisions taken.  An overview 
of the high-level organisation of Murray-Darling basin can be seen in  Figure 3 and 
detail concerning the Murray-Darling Basin Commission is discussed below. 
This organisational chart highlights how the  State and Commonwealth 
governments co-ordinate their efforts to provide a  high-level structure that is 
responsible for the basin.  It is interesting to note that within this high-level 
structure a  place has been made for a  community advisory committee which 
reports to the  Ministerial Council.  The committee serves as a  two-way 
communication channel between the Ministerial Council and communities living 
in  the basin.  In the last few years,  the community advisory committee has 
considered  a  number of controversial  topics such  as  d.ryland  salinity, 
implementation and  monitoring of the Cap on water diversions and floodplain 
management.  The committee was able to communicate the issues to the 
community and provide a "reality-check" concerning the  human dimensions of 
problems. The committee has also been considering issues relating to Aboriginal 
involvement in natural resource management and recognition of cultural heritage 
in the basin. (MBDC 2000)  The first two tiers of the structure have been stable 
{or many years, but the third tier of project boards, policy committees, etc, changes 
regularly.  The Commission's staffing structure was changed radically in  1999. 
3.3 Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
The Commission is the executive arm of the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council. 
It  also works co-operatively with the States.  The Commission is responsible for 
managing the River Murray and the Menindee Lakes system of the lower Darling 
River and advising the Ministerial Council on matters related to the use of the water, 
land and other environmental resources of the Murray-Darling basin. 
TM Commission comprises an independent President, two Commissioners from 
each contracting government (Le.,  the Commonwealth, New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia and Queensland) and a representative of the Australian 
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Commissioners and the Australian Capital Territory has one deputy representative. 
Apart from the President, Commissioners are normally chief and senior executives 
of the agencies responsible for management of land, water and environmental 
resources. 
The Commission is an  autonomous organisation equally responsible to the 
governments represented on the Ministerial Council as well  as to the Council 
itself. It  is a rather unusual entity in  that it is neither a government department 
nor a statutory body of any individual government. 
The Commission has a couple of key functions that include: 
advising the  Ministerial  Council  in  relation  to the planning, 
development and management of the  basin's natural resources; 
assisting the Council  in  developing measures for the equitable, 
efficient and sustainable use of the  basin's natural resources; 
co-ordinating the implementation of,  or when directed by Council, 
implementing, those measures; and 
giving effect to any policy or decision of the Ministerial Council. 
The Commission must balance equity considerations as  well  as manage and 
distribute the water resources of the River Murray in accordance with the Murray­
Darling Basin Agreement.  The Commission began with a mandate to manage 
water quantity that has gradually extended to include water quality issues and, 
to a limited extent, related land resource management issues.  In the late 1980s, 
it  was given  a  mandate to  initiate,  support and evaluate integrated natural 
resources management across the Murray-Darling basin. 
The Commission must work in co-operation with the Contracting Governments, 
committees and community groups to  develop and  implement policies and 
programmes.  This co-operative approach reflects the Constitutional reality and 
the importance placed on  government-community partnerships and brings to 
partiCipants and end-users the benefit of shared concerns and expertise, jointly 
developed and integrated solutions,  and avoids duplication of effort.  (Source: 
http://www.mdbc.gov.aulaboutiabouLmdbclthe_commission.html) 
3.4 Other committees involved in  water reforms 
There are a couple of key ministerial committees2  that have been charged with 
putting the policy framework in place in each State and territory in line with COAG 
reforms.  Two groups in particular, Agriculture and Resource Management Council 
of Australian and New Zealand (ARMCANZ), and Australian and New Zealand 
Environment and Conservation CounCil (ANZECC), have provided policy 
2Under the Australian system of government, ultimate responsibility for policy implementation 
rests with a Minister.  To  be a Minister,  one  must first be  elected to Parliament and then 
selected for a position in Cabinet.  Departments are constrained and guided by legislation 
and are subject to the direction and control of a Minister. 
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of Australian and  New Zealand  (ARMCANZ),  and Australian and  New Zealand 
Environment and Conservation  Council  (ANZECC),  have  provided  policy 
directions in  relation to water needs for agriculture and the environment.  These 
Ministerial committees are supported by Standing Committees of senior officials. 
ARMCANZ and  ANZECC  are  forums  for government ministers to  co-ordinate 
efforts,  The High Level Steering Group on Water, which consists of department 
heads,  provides the ties between government agencies and  the  policy setting 
committees such  as ARMCANZ and  ANZECC.  There are  a number of other 
committees which  involve  lower level  government officials where the  details 
concerning how to implement these policies are worked out.  The committees 
have  been  key  in  implementing  reforms  concerning full-cost pricing and  the 
creation of the environment for the competitive provision of water. 
4. Co-ordination of various agencies 
Co-ordination  is  achieved  via  a constellation  of  CounCils  and  bodies  that often 
involve the same people.  There are links between COAG, ARMCANZ and ANZECC 
through the  ministers who are  members of cabinet.  Agreements entered into by 
the States will necessarily reflect approval by the Ministers who sit in Cabinet. 
The Murray-Darling Basin Commission is also an important point of co-ordination. 
Each  year,  each  State develops a  three-year rolling  plan  that outlines  the 
outcomes to  be  achieved  against basin sustainability objectives  in  the 
management regions.  The management regions correspond to the catchments 
in  New South Wales,  Victoria and  South Australia.  A consolidated three-year 
rolling investment plan, based on  State plans,  then provides a summary of the 
investments being  made across the  basin.  This allows for some evaluation of 
progress towards sustainability goals. 
In  Australia,  there is  a recognition that  States  must work together on  resource 
management issues.  The process works  because of  the  processes embodied 
within  institutions to  resolve issues.  Characteristically, new agenda issues are 
approached by setting a vision and then negotiating the detail once a consensus 
concerning a vision is achieved.  A second feature is the complex web of people 
involved.  It is common for many of the Commissioners to chair subcommittees, 
sit on  the  High  Level  Steering Group for Water,  and  be  the head of a natural 
resource  management department.  These same people also interact through 
Committee processes, like ARMCANZ, ANZECC, etc. 
5. 'How to share the water 
In the Murray-Darling River basin of Australia, water is used for passive. environmental 
and consumptive purposes.  Historically, access to the Murray-Darling basin began 
with a framework that enabled virtually whoever wanted to use water for consumptive 
purposes to do so.  Moreover, most of the infrastructure used to deliver water was 
paid for by governments and supplied at subsidised prices. 
The combination of drought and water quality has become a significant issue for 
water users throughout the basin.  Events such as droughts, algae blooms and 
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increases in  salinity provided impetus for renegotiating how to share the  water 
in  Murray-Darling basin.  Views on the situation are coloured by location in the 
basin.  Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria are upstream States and South 
Australia is a downstream State. 
5.1. Priorities amongst users 
In  general  across States,  the  consumption  of water by  people  and  animals is 
the highest priority, followed by agriculture.  Most water licences and legislation 
indicate that water needed for domestic purposes and livestock production is a 
prior right.  That is, people may not interfere with the rights of others to consume 
water for stock or domestic purposes. 
The importance of the environment has been  underlined through  a number of 
policy statements that have been issued.  However, where in the list of priorities 
the environment  is  actually placed  is  not  always well  defined in  practice.  An 
example is the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on  Corporatisation 
of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority, released by the Commonwealth 
(Department of Industry,  Science and Resources 2000).  The EIS outlines how 
water levels in the Snowy River might be restored through water savings in the 
Murray-Darling but 
[rlather than recommending specific trade-offs between economic and 
environmental interests,  or between competing environmental interests,  the EIS 
has sought to compare and contrast the various advantages and disadvantages 
for each group of stake-holders of  reducing water releases to the Murray-Darling 
basin in order to provide increased flows in the Snowy River.  (Industry, Science 
and  Resources 2000, p. 2) 
This reluctance indicates the difficulties that governments,  communities and 
businesses face in placing the environment in a list of priorities.  However positive 
steps have been taken  as 100 GL has been  set aside for the Barmah-Millewa 
Forest.  The Barmah section of the forest is a Ramsar wetland  indicating that 
this is a site of international importance.  (MDBC 1999) 
All  levels of government have  committed themselves to an  Inter-Governmental 
Agreement on the Environment. This agreement commits them to a set of principles 
designed to ensure that all  resource use and development in  Australia is 
ecologically sustainable.  Indicative of this change in  emphasis, the New  South 
Wales government recently reduced most irrigation allocations by 10 percent in 
the basin so that "allocations" to the environment could be increased.  At this stage, 
however, no formal quantity of water has been allocated to the environment. 
5.2 Allocating water among States 
The basis for allocating water across States is largely the product of historical 
use.  New South Wales and Victoria have engaged in intensive agriculture since 
the turn of the century and growing pattern of use can be seen in  Figure 4.  As 
this indicates, through the 1980s the amount of water being diverted in the basin 
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began to  increase significantly.  In  1993,  a decision was made  by the  MDBMC 
to prepare a water audit.  The audit would: 
establish water use  in the  basin; 
describe current level of development; 
document recent trends; and 
assess the  implications of those trends. 
The MDBMC was concerned about the  health of the basin.  Water salinity was 
increasing,  algal  blooms were  occurring  more  frequently  and  biodiversity 
appeared  to  be  declining.  For the  downstream  State  of  South Australia,  the 
situation was thought to be quite serious. 
It was  acknowledged by  the  MDBMC that water usage could  not continue to 
increase within the basin.  As a result,  an overall Cap on water diversions has 
been introduced, limiting the volume of water to what would have been diverted 
under 1993-94 levels of development. 
Figure 4: Historical use of the Murray-Darling basin water by the 
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Perhaps,  the most dramatic impact of the  Cap  has been  an  increase in  water 
trading.  The ability to  move  water to  its  highest and  best  use  has  resulted  in 
significant increases in the price of water.  Trade in  water has been occurring in 
Victoria and New South Wales since the early 1980s.  Trading became particularly 
important and widespread with droughts, diminished supplies, the Cap on water 
and in  some areas, decreases in  water allocations.  The property-right reforms 
that are underway in the States and Territory will further facilitate trade. 
Most of the states are putting in place legislation that separates title to land and 
water and allows licences to be traded either permanently or temporarily.3  For 
example, in South Australia, it is now possible for a person who owns no land to 
hold a water licence as an  investment and  sell water on an annual basis to any 
interested party.  A system of well-defined property rights is not a requirement 
for water trading though it certainly facilitates more efficient trade. 
5.3 Water trading within and among States 
The development of markets for water is well established  in  some States such 
as New South Wales and Victoria.  In New South Wales, water trading was active 
and total sales amounted to 11  percent of total entitlements to consumptive users 
in  1997-98.  Much of the trade involves temporary transfers of water.  Until the 
new legislation is passed, land and water licences are not separate.  Permanent 
transfers would require cancellation of the licence of the transferor and the issuing 
of a new licence to the transferee.  Temporary trades are essentially "leases" of 
a  licence.  As  well,  the  crops grown in  New South Wales  do  not necessarily 
require high security water rights.  In South Australia, the situation is considerably 
different where the  irrigation of grapes requires a very secure source of water. 
Most trades in  South Australia are permanent. 
In Victoria and the other States, there are significant issues to resolve with respect 
to third party impacts.  The States have been allowing trade to expand slowly in 
order to  assess the impact on  environmental  health  and  water quality.  There 
are also costs associated with allowing water to leave an area.  Irrigation schemes 
and communities are struggling with this issue. 
The  next step in  the  water reform  agenda is an  interstate water trading pilot 
project.  Under a  pilot  project,  trade  in  water in  the  Mallee Region  of South 
Australia,  Victoria and  New  South Wales  is  permitted.  The  geographic area 
covered is the Murray River between Nyah and the Barrages at the mouth of the 
Murray,  and the  licences from  the  Darling  River which  are supplied from  Lock 
10,  near the junction of the  Murray and  Darling rivers.  The  Mallee region was 
selected for two reasons.  First,  the same type of agricultural activity (irrigated 
production  of fruit,  vegetable  and  grapes for wine)  is prevalent in  the  region. 
Second, the  price per megalitre (ML) of water is  relatively  uniform throughout 
the region. 
SAt the time of writing, New South Wales had a new water bill ready which was expected 
to be enacted in the near future. 
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Only high-security entitlement!  holders engaging in the permanent transfer of water 
are allowed to participate.  Holders of private high-security licences in New South 
Wales, of water licences granted under the Water Resources Act of 1997 in South 
Australia,  and  of private diversion licences in Victoria,  are  allowed to participate. 
Even within this region, trading may have an impact on water supply,  as interstate 
trades can have an effect on other users.  If water is coming from a different source, 
such as another reservoir or another river,  there will  be  transmission  gains and 
losses along the system.  As water moves down the rivers and channels there are 
more options for storage and therefore there is increased security.  To reflect these 
security issues, a set of exchange rates have been developed. 
Temporary trading between States, outside the interstate pilot project, has been 
put on hold by the Minister for Natural Resource in Victoria.  The difficulty appears 
to be in  the way each state accounts for water use.  New South Wales has a 
system of continuous accounting and Victoria has a "use  it  or lose it" system. 
Under this suite of arrangements, a Victorian water user could transfer water to 
New South Wales, carry it forward to the next season and bring it back without 
"losing" it.  Victoria was worried about this because its allocations are based on 
the assumption that every year a proportion of the water would  be  lost.  If this 
feature  is  abandoned,  then all  existing  allocations  may  need  to  be  reduced. 
Temporary  interstate trades will  not  be  allowed after February until the  next 
irrigation season. 
There are two types of trade: leases (for the season) and permanent sales.  Prices 
for permanent sales fluctuate around A$1,000  per ML5,  in  a range  that has in 
recent years varied between about A$750-1 ,2006. 
5.4 Water quality issues 
Salinity is too large a problem to be solved by one government.  It requires co­
ordinated interstate action and community co-operation.  The central planks of 
the Murray-Darling Salinity Strategy are: 
salt interception schemes; 
changed operating rules for several  lakes with  a view to  reducing 
evaporation and, hence, salt concentration; 
a suite of land management policies and programmes jointly funded 
by the States and the Commonwealth. 
4A high security entitlement is a licence for which the water will be provided except in severe 
drought conditions.  A low or general security entitlement is  a licence for available water 
which can vary from year to year. 
51  US dollar = 1.92 Australian dollars in October 2000. 
"More information about the price issues can be found at: 
<www.mdbe.gov.au/naturalresources/policies_strategies/projectscreens/pdf/ 
watertrade_2yr.pdf> 
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One of the unique features of this Strategy is the Victorian and New South Wales 
governments' agreement to manage water resources within agreed limits.  These 
States cannot construct or approve any proposal that would increase salinity by 
0.1  EC  (unit of electrical conductivity)1  or more in the River Murray at Morgan, 
unless they have access to salinity credits.  Under the  salinity credit scheme, 
the New South Wales and Victorian governments received an  opening balance 
of salinity credits for 15 EC  each.  These credits reflect their past contributions 
to the cost of salt interception schemes.  States can  earn  more  credits by 
financing schemes that reduce the expected salinity load at Morgan.  the Murray­
Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) maintains a register of works undertaken and 
the salinity credit and debit impacts.  The salinity impact of any proposed irrigation 
scheme must offset by acquitting credits in the register. 
6. Water pricing 
In  the  1990s,  many of the States were  reforming pricing of water for irrigation 
and water for household consumption (and livestock watering in  some cases). 
Basic principles of economics suggest that a resource will be used most efficiently 
where the competitive market would price the resource.  This is usually taken to 
be the long run  marginal cost (or the incremental cost per unit of water).  Water 
and  many other utilities have  large  fixed  or "start-up" costs  which  leads to a 
decreasing-cost industry, where average and marginal costs decrease with the 
amount produced  (at  least over the  relevant  range).  Thus,  there  is  always a 
tendency for a few firms (often only one in a particular jurisdiction) to supply water. 
As well, pricing at marginal cost in a decreasing-cost industry means that average 
costs are not covered  in  the  long  run.  In  the  long run,  firms  must cover their 
costs.  Further, marginal-cost pricing will not allow for covering the costs of future 
expansions as are sometimes required in water systems. 
These economic considerations are in  part covered by the key  elements of the 
water pricing policy of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).  In  the 
case of pricing, the COAG reforms codified many of the policies which had been 
floating in  policy circles at the time.  The COAG pricing regime is to  be  based 
on: 
consumption-based pricing and full cost recovery for urban water and 
rural water supplies; 
the  elimination  of cross subsidies as far as possible and their 
exposure where they exist; 
cost recovery that includes environmental costs (externalities) and 
the cost of asset consumption as well as taking the cost of capital 
into account; 
positive real  rates  of return  on  written-down  replacement costs of 
assets; 
71  EC unit  1 micro-Siemen per centimetre at 25°C. 
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future investment in new schemes or extensions to existing schemes 
to be undertaken only after appraisal indicates they are economically 
viable and ecologically sustainable. 
On a State by State basis, full cost pricing is at various stages of implementation. 
Cost recovery pricing is not a straightforward process to implement.  Some States 
and Territories are further along this process than others.  According  to the 
Progress Report to the COAG,  water sold  in  urban  areas is sold  on  a cost 
recovery basis, though there is some question whether proper account is being 
taken of the environmental externalities. 
New South Wales established the  Government Pricing Tribunal  which evolved 
into the  Independent Pricing and  Regulatory Tribunal  (I PART).  Both entities 
predate the COAG reforms.  IPART reviews information on  costs and revenues 
and makes a determination  regarding  bulk water prices.  IPART considers for 
instance whether the department's costs represent an efficient level of service. 
Revising the price strategy of a resource is unlikely to be painless process.  The 
extractive users in New South Wales, particularly the irrigators, mounted a noisy 
opposition to the potential increases in price.  However"  the triounal conducted 
its  review 'in  a very public forum  and consulted with  interested grdups across 
society.  In  the  end,  IPART was able to develop a set of pricing rules that were 
accepted for  adoption  at  the  national level  by  the  Standing Committee on 
Agriculture and Resource Management.  The rules are currently being used to 
guide the process of price reform across jurisdictions. 
7. Conflict resolution 
One of the key lessons of the Murray-Darling basin is that institutions can serve 
as mechanisms to resolve conflict.  When institutions fail to resolve conflicts they 
must either evolve or be  abandoned.  As  transaction costs amongst economic 
agents increase, in  this case the various entities operating in  the basin, there is 
an  incentive to create institutions to internalise these costs. 
7.1  Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
The Murray-Darling Agreement is a prime example of institutional rules to manage 
conflict.  Early conflicts arose between users of the  River Murray for irrigation 
and navigation.  However, an agreement between the States of New South Wales, 
Victoria and  South  Australia was  not  reached  until  after a  series of severe 
droughts raised  the  cost of  non-co-operation  past the  threshold for the three 
States. 
The existence of the River Murray Commission from 1917 to 1985 speaks of the 
Commission's ability to work co-operatively with the  States and to co-ordinate 
the construction and operation of some of the works on  the  river.  Regulating 
the flows of the river clearly served the interest of the States (e.g., expansion of 
agriculture in the basin). 
The Commission expanded its role over time but was not able to evolve into an 
institution capable of dealing with basin-wide problems such as salinity and the 
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declining health of the riverine environment.  As States realised they could  not 
resolve these issues within their own  jurisdictions, and costs would continue to 
escalate with inaction, there was again the incentive to develop a new institution­
the  Murray-Darling Basin  Commission which  as  discussed earlier has a broad 
mandate to  bring about basin-wide solutions. 
Over the last decade or so,  the Murray-Darling Basin Commission has become 
increasingly aware of the need for the  benefits of community consultation.  To 
this end,  in  1986 it established a community advisory committee that  reports 
directly to the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council. 
Today, virtually all Commission programmes involve a large degree of consultation. 
Most policy reforms are, at least, discussed with the Council and explored through 
transparent media and meeting-based processes.  Draft policies and/or strategies 
are then released and finalised after a period of time. 
7.2 Irrigation schemes 
Within the basin,  most of the large irrigation schemes were  created to deliver 
water and encourage the expansion of agriculture.  The water reform process, 
the expansion of water trading  and the  Cap on  diversions have changed the 
operating environment of these entities.  These entities have evolved over time 
from  being a means to put irrigation infrastructure in place, to  becoming major 
water managers.  One irrigation scheme, Colleambly Irrigation, has been evolving 
into a natural resource  manager at a time when there is a crisis in  confidence 
about the  land  and  water  management planning process and  the  impact that 
irrigation in New South Wales was having on the environment.  The New South 
Wales  government was  moving  to  impose  costly  monitoring and  reporting 
requirements.  Colleambly perceived that it did not have time to wait for natural 
resource outcomes to demonstrate that it was a responsible resource manager. 
Colleambly chose instead to apply for ISO 9002 and  14001  accreditation.s  The 
accreditation process provided a means of resolving conflict between Colleambly, 
non-governmental organisations and  the media about the  health  of  the  river 
environment.  The  accreditation process proved  successful  in  demonstrating 
commitment to the environment and  a  means of differentiating itself in  a 
competitive environment. 
7.3 Catchment boards 
At the catchment level, people are most closely associated with environment and 
the water resources.  Throughout the basin,  there are catchment boards with 
differing levels of experience, expertise and power.  Most boards engage in public 
consultation and  have  varying degrees of community involvement.  This is a 
means of engaging people in the issues and it is also a process in education for 
most of 
BISO 9002 is an accreditation system where a set of procedures ensure a certain level of 
quality is in place.  ISO 14001  is an environmental management system based on the same 
accreditation process. 
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the interested parties.  Through consultation, boards as well as the public learn 
about the state of the catchment and the positions of the various parties with 
respect to what should be done.  South Australia is currently the only state which 
gives boards the power to raise levies. 
The water allocation planning  process and the consultation  process wit'll  the 
community are often cited by catchment managers as useful processes for uniting 
divergent interests.  The chairs of catchment boards which are unable to navigate 
through conflict come under pressure to resign  or not seek a renewal  of their 
position.  The process usually restarts with the appointment of a new chair. 
7.4 The courts 
UI~imately the court system is  Australia serves as a place where remedies for 
conflict can be sought.  Generally this is an expensive process for water users, 
States or Territories to engage in.  These  costs often serve as a  means of 
motivating the different entities to work to solUtions through other means. 
8. Conclusions 
The Murray-Darling River basin by its physical and geo-political nature is difficult to 
manage and is likely always to be a source of conflict due to its economic significance. 
The lessons from the basin can be summarised largely in terms of how conflict is 
managed.  Managing resources sustainably has required innovative mechanisms to 
be  put in  place that will  encourage reform,  in  an  environment of co-operative 
federalism.  The system  of tranche payments has proven to be  a  means of 
encouraging States to move in a consistent manner through water reforms. 
In Australia there is an unspoken philosophy concerning how much room there 
is concerning adherence to rules.  There is generally some tolerance about minor 
deviations from rules but there is a point of no return where payments are frozen, 
governments go to the courts seeking remedies and voters lose confidence in 
their elected officials. 
The myriad constellation of committees and groups of offiCials works reasonably 
well,  despite the  complexity of the  arrangements.  The key is the  continuities 
created by  Ministers and their Deputies by siUing on various committees.  Trust 
between individualS has grown up over the years.  As well, in these settings, moral 
suasion works as a mechanism to encourage States to act in a manner consistent 
with the common good. 
Institutions such as the  Murray-Darling Basin  Commission and  IPART  in  New 
South Wales have tended to use open transparent processes.  The Commission 
operates to create consensus concerning a common vision or broad principles 
and negotiates the details later.  The Commission will use a combination of moral 
suasion and public shaming to force States to honour commitments to the Cap 
on diversions and  salinity targets within the  basin.  IPART  has used the  open 
public setting to prevent interest groups from hijacking the agenda from the goal 
of full cost pricing.  These are the main issues explored in this paper. 
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Australia has done a number of  things well  in  the basin.  Capping water usage 
and  establishing  a salinity credit system  represent  major accomplishments. 
Adherence to  these systems, where not all  States bear the burden  of salinity or 
benefit from enhanced environmental flows, is going to  be the major challenge in 
the short term.  Moving to full-cost pricing and expanding water trade have proven 
to be sources of conflict that are gradually being resolved through the institutions, 
which appear robust enough to survive the demands of water users in the basin. 
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Abstract 
The  development area  of a  river basin involves  an  ecosystem unit,  an economic 
development area,  and an administrative unit.  Development of the river basin 
concerns not only the area based on a hydrological boundary, but also a surrounding 
area.  This concept is needed because development of the river basin may affect 
the surrounding area. Optimum development in the river basin should be followed 
by development of the surrounding area; otherwise the optimum tends to decrease. 
The  Brantas River,  in  East Java  Province,  Indonesia,  plays a  vital role in  the 
economic region,  not only for East Java,  but also nation-wide.  The Government 
has created more than 20 projects that have brought great economic benefit to 
the Brantas river basin, concurrently with national economic development. 
The  President of the  Republic of Indonesia on  February  12,  1990,  issued 
Government Regulation No. 511990 which established a State-Owned Company, 
namely Perusahaan  Umum  (PERUM) Jasa  Tifta  (PJT I:  Jasa  Tirta  Public 
Corporation) to  address water resources management, and facilitate  operation 
and maintenance of finished structures on  the Brantas river basin. 
The  mission of PJT I is to manage the water resources in  the Brantas basin so 
that they can be optimised in order to  promote regional development,  to 
accumulate profits and to contribute to the development of the entire nation. 
1. Introduction 
Life on earth depends upon water,  which maintains and correlates all ecosystems 
within the planet,  continually moving  on  and in the ground surface. Water 
characterises the river resources on which mankind is largely dependent for livelihood. 
A steady increase in population and in both agricultural and industrial activities has 
shown that the idea that water has always been an unlimited commodity is erroneous. 
Excessive use of water resources,  as a  logical consequence of economic 
development,  has induced a  range of national problems.  Not only has the 
shortage of clean water supply become an obstacle for economic development, 
but also an increase in waste discharges has polluted natural water bodies. This 
has worsened with the reduction of forested lands and conversion of agricultural 
areas to settlements that in turn have changed the hydrological cycle remarkably. 
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2. The Brantas river basin 
Indonesia,  straddling the equator,  is  an  archipelago nation with  over  17,000 
islands, of which about 6,000 are inhabited.  It covers an  area of 1,940 million 
km2.  Much of the nation's population of about 220 million people (1997) lives in 
the four main islands, Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Bali.  Although the average 
population density of Indonesia is currently about 104 per km2,  Java, the most 
densely populated island, in area only 6.9 percent of the country, had a population 
density of 926 per km2,  or 110 million in1997. 
The Brantas river basin  in  East Java  Province  has  been one of the most 
productive and advanced granaries  in  Indonesia,  because of ample water 
resources, tropical climate and fertile soil.  This basin holds possibilities for further 
agricultural development.  Industry located in the lower reaches around Surabaya 
port is also promising for future growth. 
The overall characteristics of the Brantas basin can be summarised as follows. 
The length of the river is  about 320 km,  and the catchment area about 12,000 
km2.  Average annual rainfall is 2,000 mm, equivalent to a volume of surface water 
runoff of about 12 billion m3.  The basin's population is about 14 million (1997). 
Brantas river basin development is carried out as an integrated development based 
on a master plan which is reviewed every 12 years, projecting future socia-economic 
conditions and based on  the national guideline goals.  The plan  is based on the 
philosophy of one  river,  one  plan,  one co-ordinated management.  Up to  1998, 
four Master Plans have been worked out.  Facilities that already built are as follows: 
MASTER PLAN  OBJECTIVES  STRUCTURES FINISHED 
MASTER PLAN I  •  Flood control  ..  Sutami Dam (1970) 
(1961)  •  Irrigation  ~  oeloreJo Dam (1973) 
•  Hydro-power 
development 
~  New LengKong Dam 
(1973) 
•  Water supply 
(domestic and industrial) 
~  porong river 
improvement (1977) 
~  Lahor Dam (1977) 
MASTER PLAN II 
(1973) 
•  Irrigation 
•  Flood Control 
~  Brantas middle reaches 
river improvement (1977) 
•  Hydro-power 
development 
~  wllngl Dam (1977) 
•  Water supply 
(domestic and industrial) 
I- New Gunungsan Dam 
(1981 ) 
Bening Dam (1982) 
I- Lodoyo Dam (1983) 
10  Tulungagung Drainage 
(1987) 
I- Sengguruh Dam (1989) 
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MASTER PLAN  OBJECTIVES  STRUCTURES FINISHED 
MASTER PLAN  III  Brantas middle reaches 
(1985) 




•  Irrigation 
•  Hydro-power  · 
Jatimlerek rubber dam •  Flood control 
(1992) 




















Wonorejo Dam (2000) 

MASTER PLAN IV  · 
Integrated Watershed 
(1998) 




3. Benefits of the development 
The benefits achieved due to water resources development in the Brantas basin 
include: 
1. 	 Protection against 50-yea~ flood. 
2. 	 The 233 MW capacity of hydropower plants, producing around 1.0 
billion kWh of energy per year. 
3. 	 Total area of paddy irrigated from the Brantas river system is around 
345,000 ha.  In  the dry season irrigated agriculture consumes 
approximately 80 percent of the available water in  the  river.  East 
Java, since 1989, can supply more than 30 percent of national food 
production. 
4. 	 Supply around 300 Mm3  per year raw  water for  drinking and  for 
industries. 
5. 	 Fresh water requirement for brackish aqua-culture was estimated at 
13.5 m3/s for  11,000 ha in the Brantas delta, but due to limitations 
of water, water supply of brackish aqua-culture depends on the return 
flow from irrigation water use. 
4. Post-construction problems 
After construction,  it is necessary to  maintain the  facilities  in  order to  ensure 
maximum benefit and reach the planned technical life span. Adequate operation 
and maintenance (O&M) activities are necessary, but these activities encounter 
specific problems: 
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Institutions 
To manage the basin, many institutions are concerned, and each has their sectoral 
responsibility.  But co-ordination among sectors may be difficult in some situations, 
because each sector has previously had its own plan, strategies and objectives. 
Management of water quantity and water quality 
Water shortage occurs, if population growth and general economic development 
lead to an increased water demand (agricultural, domestic and industrial), while 
due to deteriorating water quality, the available water becomes unsafe to use. 
Effluent discharges of domestic as well  as industrial wastewater have been 
increasing and hence, the pollution from wastewater is exceeding the assimilation 
capacity of the river. 
Funding 
The investment in new infrastructures, and the operation and maintenance cost 
are too huge to be covered by the government budget.  It is necessary to increase 
participation of beneficiaries and the private sector in water resources investment 
and in the cost of operating and maintaining the infrastructures. 
Conflict between water users and water usage 
Water demands of beneficiaries have not been always fulfilled, especially in the 
dry season.  On  the other hand,  some people use water in  inappropriate ways. 
One of today's issues is that our life-styles tend to be  wasteful of the available 
water resources.  Often they use good quality water for other purposes, which 
actually need only lower quality. 
ConSidering the limited amount of water,  it is  necessary to use available water 
resources wisely,  avoiding conflict, and preserving the environmental capability 
to get sustainable benefits. 
5. Perum Jasa Tirta (Jasa Tirta Public Corporation) 
According to the laws and regulations, beneficiaries of water resources facilities 
are asked to contribute to the  operation and  maintenance of the facilities. 
Contributions from  water users are  not collected  because  projects are not 
authorised to collect these contributions. It is necessary to transfer the operation 
and maintenance of finished structures to a body that is duly authorised to collect 
contributions. 
In Article 4 of Law No. 11  of 1974 on Water Resources, it is stated that the state's 
authority to manage water  resources may  be  delegated to central  or provincial 
governmental institutions or to definite corporate body where the requirements could 
be stated in Government Regulation.  This is intended to give opportunity for public 
and private sectors to partiCipate in developing the benefits of water resources. 
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After about 30 years  of  development,  several  river structures have  been 
constructed  along  the  Brantas  River.  The  subsequent activities  should  be 
operation  and  maintenance  (O&M).  In  the  development cycle O&M  is  one of 






Operation and Maintenance  Evaluation  (25-50 years) 
The Jasa Tirta Public Corporation (PJT I) was established on February 12, 1990, 
by the government regulation No. 5fTh 1990.  The main objective of establishing 
the corporation is to manage operation and maintenance of the faCilities  in the 
Brantas river basin. 
The cost for operation and maintenance activities will be collected by PJT I from 
the beneficiaries.  For the time  being,  the main  source of funds  will  be  from 
electricity,  drinking water and  industries.  There is  no obligation for  farmers  to 
pay water charges, although more than 80 percent of water in the Brantas River 
is  for  irrigation purposes.  The government now  is  introducing a pilot project of 
Irrigation Service Fee  in  several  provinces  around  Indonesia.  The  purpose of 
the pilot project is  to show the farmers  the  importance of adequate  budget to 
support the  operation and maintenance of irrigation facilities. 
6. Main tasks and working area of PJT I 
Main tasks 
Based on  Ministry of  Public Works  Regulation No.  56/PRT/1991 , Article  6,  the 





Performing  operation  and  maintenance of water 
infrastructure; 
Water supply services; 
Management of the  river basin,  including water 
conservation, development and utilisation; 
Rehabilitation of water resources infrastructure. 
resources 
resources 
277 Rusfandi Usman: Lessons from Brantas Basin,  Indonesia 
Working area 
PJT  I conducts  its  activities,  such  as  planning,  construction,  rehabilitation, 
operation and maintenance, supplying, conservation, supervision and control of 
water resources of 40 rivers in the Brantas basin. 
Based on  Article 8 clause  (2),  Government Regulation  NO.5 of 1990, the 
management of other river basins by  PJT I would be decided by the President 
upon the proposal of the Minister. 
7. Integrated water resources management in the Brantas river basin 
Integrated water  resources  management is  taken to mean  the  process of 
formulating and implementing a course of action involving management of water 
and related resources for the purposes of achieving optimum allocation of water 
resources within a catchment area.  With the Ministry of Settlement and Regional 
Development as the lead agency in this effort, this optimisation of water utilisation 
is  meant to contribute to increase human welfare from  improved  agricultural, 
domestic and industrial use of water. 
It is important to understand the need to intensify development efforts in upland 
areas. This is in response to a clear understanding, from experience with flooding, 
siltation and  other downstream consequences of  upstream activities, that a 
complex of  inter-relationships links  upland and  lowland  social  and  ecological 
systems.  There is  ai'  " clear sense that the past focus on  the lowlands has 
been at the expense 01  uflland areas, in terms of policy and programme attention. 
The consensus was,  therefore,  that a  more balanced approach to the 
development of river basins should be adopted for the future. 
This attention to social equity relates to another point on which agreement was 
reached, namely, that answers to problems of river-basin development and water 
resources management cannot be found solely from a technical standpoint, but 
must be reached through close attention to social and economic factors affecting 
use of natural and human resources.  Technical answers to most of the problems 
faced  in  the  case  study basins are already known.  This technical  knowledge 
can  be  made useful,  however,  only if it is combined with  knowledge of  social 
and economic systems to develop viable solutions to problems such as upland 
soil erosion, low incomes of many rural inhabitants, inefficiency in irrigation and 
other water applications, and  so forth.  It was agreed that  such  social  and 
economic knowledge could only be obtained through active participation of local 
residents in  activities of river-basin  development and  water  resources 
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7.1  Maintenance of structures 
Maintenance activity is primarily to  protect water resources  structures (dam, 
reservoir,  weir,  check-dam,  dike,  sluice,  conduit,  etc).  PJT  I implements the 
following categories of maintenance activities: 
Preventive maintenance in the form of routine periodical maintenance and 
small  repairs to prevent serious damage. 
2 	 Corrective maintenance in the form of large-scale repairs, rehabilitation and 
rectification in order to restore or increase the functions of water resources 
infrastructure. 
3 	 EmergEmcy  maintenance is a temporary repair that has to be  done soon 
due to some emergency condition, such as flood. 
The management of the Brantas river basin needs the participation of beneficiaries. 
For example,  farmers playa role  in  operating and  maintaining the  irrigation 
infrastructure, including paying irrigation service fee (ISF), and other beneficiaries 
pay water abstraction fee.  The fees are  used to manage the river basin. 
The management of the Brantas basin follows the concept of sustain ability, meaning 
maintaining the resources.  The concept of sustainability co-ordinates and integrates 
the  river-basin  activities and  environment,  and  is  applied to all  phases of 
development, Le. planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance. 
7.2 Upper watershed management 
The categories and percentages of land use in the whole basin as of 1990 were: 
farm land 57 percent, forest 26 percent, homestead area 14 percent, and others 
3 percent, respectively.  On the other hand, according to the land use map prepared 
by East Java Province, in the year 2008, farm land will have decreased and forest 
and homestead areas will have increased, compared with those in 1990, by 10.2 
percent and 21.8 percent, respectively. 
Sediment yield in the Mt. Kelud basin mainly results from eruption of a volcano, 
Mt. Kelud. Wlingi dam  reservoir,  located at the lower reaches of the basin, was 
damaged by sediment deposition coming from the southern slopes of Mt. Kelud 
after an  eruption  in  1990.  In  order to settle this  problem,  a sediment bypass 
channel  in  the  Putih  River and  sabo (sediment retention)  works are  being 
constructed.  Sabo works  in  the  Konto  and Lesti  basins are also  being 
rehabilitated or constructed, to trap sediment discharge. 
Two dams (Sengguruh and Wlingi), out of six, suffered from  sediment caused by 
volcanic eruptions (Mt. Semeru and Mt. Kelud).  To overcome this problem, besides 
construction of check dams, periodical excavations (dredging) have been done by 
PJT I in  both reservoirs.  Reforestation works are also underway, led by PJT I. 
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7.3 Water quantity management 
A Water Use Right is the right to obtain and use water for a certain necessity.  Water 
use  right is stipulated in the  Indonesian Basic Constitution of 1945, Law No. 11  of 
1974 on Water Resources, and Government Regulation No. 22 of 1982 on Water 
Resources Management.  In principle, water resources are governed by the State 
and utilised as much as possible for the welfare of the people. Based on this principle, 
water use prioritisation is given in the Governor of East Java Decree No. 316 of 1988 
as  follows: (a)  domestic water,  (b)  irrigation, (c) plantation,  (d) fishery,  (e)  industry, 
(f)  hydropower, (g) flushing, (h)  swimming-pool.  In  particular, the Government 
Regulation 22 of 1982 on Water Resources Management, Article 2, states about 
the prinCiple and basis of water rights, that in the water management regulations 
the principles of public utility, harmony and conservation shall be applied. 
Particularly for groundwater, it is stated in Law No. 11  of 1974, Article 5, Paragraph 
2, and the Government Regulation 22 of 1982, Article 6, that groundwater sources 
and hot springs such as power and mineral springs are not under the authority 
and responsibility of the Minister responsible for water resources,  but they are 
under the Minister of Mines and Energy.  However, this division between surface 
water and groundwater is considered inappropriate and will be re-aligned in  the 
reformed policy for water resources development and management. 
7.3.1  Licensing 
Licences for water utilisation are issued by the Local Government, supported by 
technical recommendations from PJT I. 
Technical recommendation from PJT I is important to ensure the balance of water 
supply and demand.  Water in the Brantas River is  used for various purposes. 
The  main consumers are  irrigation (80%).  raw  water for drinking,  industries, 
fishponds,  and  urban flushing  (20%)  and  electricity (which  does not consume 
the water).  Water allocation from PJT I to the users is on a contract basis.  Users, 
except farmers, have to pay a fee  to PJT I to cover operation and maintenance 
cost.  The tariff is decided by  the  Government after discussion between PJT I 
and users. 
7.3.2 Dry season operation rule 
Water management in the Brantas River is co-ordinated by a body called Panitia 
Tata Pengaturan Air (East Java Provincial Water Board; EJPWB) headed by the 
Vice-Governor of East Java  Province.  The water allocation pattern consists of 
two kinds of Operation Rule (OR) that are for the dry season (June-November) 
and the rainy season (December-May). 
The procedure of preparing the dry-season OR is as follows.  In May users submit 
water demands to PJT I.  By simulation and weather forecasting, PJT I prepares 
a draft dry-season OR.  At the end of May the draft OR is discussed in the EJPWB 
and if all agree, it is then signed by the Vice-Governor.  Implementation of the 
OR is done by PJT I with monitoring in 10-day periods.  If there is deviation from 
predictions, or conflict of interest in the field, some members of EJPWB discuss 
and review the OR if needed. 
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7.3.3 Rainy season operation rule 
Preparing the rainy season OR follows the same procedure as for the dry season. 
The important issue in the rainy season OR is flood management. 
PJT I has prepared a Guideline for Flood Forecasting, Flood Warning and Flood 
Fighting on the Brantas River.  Subjects of this book include critical  locations 
along the river (levees), protection methods, materials and equipment available 
for flood fighting in warehouses along the river, names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of staff involved, hierarchy of information to be submitted, etc. 
To monitor rainfall intensity in the basin and discharge along the Brantas River, a 
tele-metering Flood Forecasting and Warning System (FFWS) has been installed, 
consisting of 26 rainfall stations and 31  water-level stations, covering 12,000 km2 
of catchment area, with the Master Station located on the main office of PJT  I. 
Field data are transferred to the Master Station every 30 minutes in real time.  The 
basic concept of flood control is one river, one plan, one co-ordinated management. 
The purpose of establishing a flood forecasting and warning system is to prevent 
or mitigate damage and to  ensure the safety of inhabitants.  Flood-fighting 
activities are performed by flood defence teams.  People living near the river are 
enabled to take necessary actions for flood protection,  by giving them flood 
information with enough time allowance.  Information on a coming flood such as 
scale, arrival time of peak, etc. is to be given to inhabitants well in advance, if 
occurrence of flood is judged to be inevitable. 
7.3.4 Water quality management 
Water quality control plays an important role for sustaining benefits in the Brantas 
River and its tributaries. 
Legally, PJT I should have active participation in supervising and controlling the 
Brantas River water quality.  The task of PJT I on water quality control is to support 
the Central and Provincial Governments.  One continuous activity of PJT is water 
quality monitoring along the Brantas River at 50 sampling points and 41  sources 
of industrial pollution. The samples are tested by PJT I's Laboratory.  These data 
can be used by the Local Government of Eilst Java to control polluting qctivities. 
By using simulation computer programming, it can also develop a strategiC aclron 
plan for pollution abatement in short, medium and long terms to achieve the river 
water quality objective. 
The main pollutant sources in the Brantas River, based on a study in  1989, are 
industry, domestic users and agriculture. 
To reduce pollutants from industries the Government issued a regulation that all 
industries have to install  waste water treatment plants (WWTP).  For small 
industries (home industries), it is difficullto follow the regulation.  For some large 
industries the WWTP are not always operated. 
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More difficult to  control  is  pollution  coming  from  domestic waste.  The  people 
use  the  river water for  many  purposes.  Because  of  low  income  and  less 
awareness of environment protection it takes time to educate the people. 
Pollution from agriculture is not a significant factor causing deterioration of water 
quality. Agricultural activity is done during the rainy season when the flow of water 
in the river is big enough to neutralise pollution. 
Clean river programme 
To minimise pollution discharge into the river, Government initiated a programme 
called the Clean  River Programme  (CRP)  in  1989.  PJT I and other parties 
promote the CRP through several activities.  Pollution control  is carried out by 
the Environment Pollution Control Committee (KPPLH) which  is established by 
the Governor Decree, and consists of all  agencies concerned.  In  KPPLH there 
are  four Working Teams,  for Clean  River Programme,  Clean Town,  Domestic 
Waste Pollution Control and Industrial Waste Pollution Control respectively,  PJT 
I sits as Vice Co-ordinator I of the Team for the Clean River Programme. 
Effluent discharge standards are currently stated in the Governor Decree 136 of 
1994,  however,  this is being  updated involving all  agencies concerned,  co­
ordinated by  the  Provincial  Office  of the  Environmental  Impact  Management 
Agency or BAPEDALDA. 
CRP Campaign 
Public education is carried out in co-ordination with the Department of Home Affairs, 
Universities,  Non-Governmental Organisations and  Moslem  traditional  boarding 
schools,  for the following  groups of people: on  land  and  water conservation,  to 
people in villages and students of Moslem traditional boarding schools in the upper 
reaches; on  water pollution control, to industry managers,  high  school teachers 
and students; on mining and land use in the river corridor, to the people and the 
village officials; on environment protection, to high school students. 
The success of public education programmes is usually constrained by economic 
conditions.  Although no specific assessment has been undertaken, the physical 
condition shows that so far publiC education has a good achievement proved by 
positive social control given by the public. 
Law enforcement 
Law enforcement is focussed on large industries.  Many large industries do not 
operate their WWTP continuously.  Difficulties of  law enforcement include poor 
regulation, poor staff and difficulties of obtaining evidence.  On the other hand, 
maybe,  global co-operation is  needed between  developed  and  developing 
countries.  Many large industries come from developed countries.  What is their 
role to protect the environment? 
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After several years of hard work, the people along the Brantas River have now 
come to the stage of understanding about environment protection, but not yet to 
do it.  Some industries already applied to the  court of justice.  More time  is 
needed,  before environmental  conditions will  be  completely protected.  Public 
campaigns have to be continued. 
8. Stakeholder identification and participation 
8.1  Water resources stakeholders 
Stakeholders in  water resources can be classified into three main groups: 
a.  Government as  the "owner and  regulator" plays the  role  of 
controlling and policing water, and exercising public authority.  It has 
the right to a part of the profit gained by the River Basin Management 
Agency while on the other hand it is obliged to contribute its funding 
for activities towards publiC safety and welfare. 
b.  River Basin Management Agency (RBMA) as the "operator" has 
the concession to manage water and its infrastructures, and develop 
its management system.  It has the right to collect contributions from 
beneficiaries and  receive contributions from  the  Government for 
public safety and welfare activities.  It is also obliged to render prime 
services, promote public and private participation, give contribution 
to  the  owners,  and to be accountable in  performing tasks to 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
c.  Society as the "users" have the right to receive good services and 
participate in decision-making processes.  They are expected to use 
water efficiently,  take part in  sustaining the  environment,  provide 
financial contributions for water resources management (WRM) and 
provide constructive social control. 
The proportion of population below the poverty line (US$ 800/year) in the Brantas 
river basin after the economic crisis of 1998 is about 46.3 percent (1,193.075 
households out of 2,578.139).  Conflict of interest among stakeholders  is still 
manageable, even though during the dry season the available water is not enough 
to cover all sector water demands.  The irrigation water user, as the biggest water 
consumer (almost 80  percent of manageable water during the  dry season), 
receives only 60 percent-80 percent of their water demand. 
8.2 Organising stakeholders 
Stakeholders are organised through the Water Resources Committee (WRC).  The 
Vice-Governor is the chairman and Provincial WRM Office is the secretary. The WRC 
membership consists of high-level provincial officials from  relevant sectors, RBMA 
and representatives of stakeholders I.e. Electricity State-Owned Company, Municipal 
Water Supply Corporation, industries (represented by Industry and Trade Provincial 
Office), farmers (represented by Irrigation Committee), universities, etc.  The WRC 
is supported by  some Technical Work  Groups for specified fields,  such as water 
conservation, water allocation, pollution control, flood control, sand mining, etc. 
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The  role  of the  WRC  is to assist the  Governor in  preparing the  water resources 
management plan (policies, strategies, planning and programming) as well as to co­
ordinate all  regulatory aspects and  to  solve  technical  problems related  to 
implementation  of the  plan.  This WRC  is  responsible  to  accommodate  various 
interests, and to govern the water management rules applied throughout the province. 
8.3 Access to water for poorer people 
Specific water users  (for commercial  uses: electricity,  municipal water supply, 
industries, horticultural estate) should have water use permits from the Government. 
Once the permit is issued. the RBMA should secure the water allocation for their 
utilisation.  The water users are obliged to pay water service tax and fee to the 
Government and the RBMA.  Based on this permit, the RBMA and the user sign a 
Water Service Contract, which specifies the rights and obligations of each party. 
On the other hand, social uses (irrigation water uses, human daily activities etc) 
and non-specific water users (municipalities), are not obliged by law to have water 
use permits.  These users are not obliged to contribute water service tax and fee. 
Most of the non-licensed water users are poorer people in urban and rural areas. 
In dry seasons when available water is not enough to cover all demands, irrigation 
users always have  reduced water allocations.  Irrigation Water User Associations 
distribute water among farmers under the  guidance of District WRM  Offices.  The 
Municipal Water Supply Corporation supplies water for poorer urban people through 
public water-taps (10% of total distributed water).  The RBMA supplies raw water 
to the sector users at their water intake based on an agreed allocation pattern. 
Through the on-going national reform of water resources policies, it is intended 
to develop water use rights for irrigation and maintenance flow in order to have 
equitable access to water for the poorest people. 
9. Institutional and policy issues 
9.1  Institutional framework 
One objective in the establishment of PJT I was to  develop and  implement the 
concept of an  institutional framework  for WRM,  by  establishing a permanent, 
neutral, professional and accountable institution to perform equally the principle 
of a  healthy corporation and  general  utilisation of water resources,  based on 
public, private and community participation  .. 
The main strength is that WRM in the Brantas river basin performed by PJT I is 
a national pilot project for future WRM institutions in Indonesia. The weaknesses 
of the implementation of the system in other river basins in  Indonesia are: 
a.  Limited capacity of the SOciety to contribute to WRM cost; 
b.  Not all of the beneficiaries pay the cost borne for WRM; 
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c.  Price of water does not encourage the private sector to participate 
inWRM. 
d.  Less awareness by the people means less social control on  water 
resources issues. 
After 10 years of the pilot WRM  institution, the Government made the decision 
to implement the management system developed by PJT I in other strategic river 
basins. 
9.2 Water rights 
Based on the Indonesian Basic Law, the water right is in the hands of the State. 
The people have only water use right.  Only specific beneficiaries have permits to 
use the  water and permits to discharge their effluent to the  river.  For social use 
(farmers, etc) and non-specific beneficiaries (municipal) it is not necessary to have 
permits.  In the near future, water use rights will be implemented for all water users. 
For the time being, the permit system does not allow tradable permits. 
9.3 Water allocation mechanism 
Stakeholders' participation in decision-making processes is conducted in the WRC. 
In water allocation, for example, the mechanism can be explained as follows: 
a. 	 The initial concept of water allocation is prepared by the RBMA with 
computer simulation  based on  water demand and  water supply 
projection. The draft water allocation plan  is discussed  in  the 
Technical Work Group and submitted to the WRC for approval. 
b. 	 The water allocation  is  then  conducted by RBMA.  If a significant 
deviation exists,  RBMA makes a review and  prepares the  revised 
pattern, which  will be discussed by the Technical Work Group and 
submitted, to WRC for approval. 
Water distribution among sectors is done by the RBMA, while water distribution 
in irrigation areas is done by Water Users' Associations under guidance of District 
Water Resources Technical Management Units. 
10. Water accounting 
Land utilisation differs in each part of the basin, especially affected by topography. 
Most of the arable land is utilised for productive farming (38%) and the rest of is 
used for  forest,  settlement and  non-agriculture activities.  Critical  land that is 
subject to erosion is estimated 17 percent of the Lesti Catchment and 18 percent 
of the total Brantas upper reach.  Features of the Brantas river basin are shown 
in Tables 2 to 5. 
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Table 2:  Main features of the Brantas river basin 
Main river 
Geographical co-ordinates 
~Brantas (320 km) 
30' - 11255' E and 731' ­ 815' S 
Average temperature  25SC 
Relative humidity  82% 
a)  Total catchment area  11,800 km' (25% of East Java) 
b)  Total reservoir capacity 
•  Gross storage (initiaVpresent) 
•  Effective storage (initial/present) 
525/297 million m' 
378/ 245 million m' 
c)  Water availability 
•  Average precipitation  2,000 mm/year 
· 
Run-off coefficient  about 0.50 
•  Potential flow  11,800 million m'/y 
OJ  Water utilisation  · 
Irrigation 
•  Domestic 
•  Industry bulk supply 
•  Maintenance flow  · 
Fisheries (irrigation retum flow) 
Total 
2,400  million m' (79.9 "!o) 
225  million m' (  7.5 "!o) 
133  million m' (  4.4 'Yo) 
204  million m"(  6.8 %) 
41  million m' (  1.4 %) 
3,003 million m' (100.0 %) 
Table 3:  Precipitation In the Brantas river basin (1995-1999) 
Units: mm 
Source: PJT I (2000) 
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Table 4:  Population 
Description  Java Island  East Java Province  Brantas River Basin 
Area (km)  132,206  47,938  11,800 
Population: 
!.  1980  91,269,528  29,188,852  11,996,000 
•  1990  107,581,306  32,503,991  13,004,000 
•  1995  114,733,486  33,844,002  13,534,000 
•  2000 (projected)  122,611 ,64~  35,570,366  14,224-,370 
Density (person/ km,)  929  742  1,205 
Percent to East Java  125.2  100.0  162.4 
Source: Indonesian Statistical Office (2000) 
Table 5: Growth of Gross Regional Domestic Product in the Brantas 
basin 
Units: %/year 
Sector  1984-1985  1985-1992  1993-1995  1996-1998 
Agriculture  3.1  3.2  0.5  11.6 
Industry  4.7  10.7  12.2  15.4 
Services  7.3  7.3  7.9  13.5 
Gross Domestic Product  5.5  6.7  7.7  9.8 
Source: Final report of Master Plan IV (1998), Indonesian Statistic Office (1999) 
The Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) of the basin amounted to 39,018 
billion Rupiah in  1995 (note: US$1=Rp 2,250 at bank exchange rate during 1995), 
which was 58.9 percent of the GRDP of East Java and 9.4 percent of Indonesia's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  GRDP per capita of the basin was US$1,269 in 
1995, which was 46 percent and 44 percent, respectively higher than the rates for 
East Java (US$872) and a" IndoneSia (US$880).  After the economic crisis in 1997, 
the GRDP of the basin was estimated 45,428 billion Rupiah in 1998 (US$405).  The 
basin's economic growth was led mainly by the industry sector after the mid-1980s. 
10.1 Water resources utilisation 
Sources and  uses of water in  Surabaya Metropolitan Area (SMA: Gresik, 
Bangkalan, MOjokerto, Surabaya and Sidoarjo) in  1998. and estimates of future 
demand, are shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 6: Sources of water 
Units:  m3/second 
Brantas River  47.84 
Treated surface water  1.43 
Spring/well  0.53 
Other surface water  0.12 
Total existing supply  49.92 
Source: East Java Water Balance Team  (1998) 
Table 7: Water use in SMA 
Units: (ma/second) 
1998  2000  2005  2010  2020 
Industry  3.96  4.53  11.58  27.30  90.04 
Irrigation  41.41  41.41  33.28  29.17  20.58 
Domestic  10.69  13.35  19.33  25.74  41.93 
River maintenance  7.50  8.64  11.49  14.34  20.00 
Total demand  63.56  67.93  75.68  96.55  172.55 
Source: East Java Water Balance Team  (1998) 
Table 8: Overall demand and supply in SMA 
Units:  m3/second 
Year  1998  2000 
Demand  63.56  67.93 
Suppl  capacity (1998)  49.92  49.92 





Source: East Java Water Balance Team  (1998) 

Note: The balance does not include brackish water fisheries 

11. Major Issues and Strategies 
11.1  Major issues 
Water resources will be the limiting factor in development of the region.  The water 
demand is  estimated to  be  tripled  in  the  next 20 years,  while water resources 
development is already limited.  Wonorejo Dam, which will be in operation in 2001, 
is the last favourable dam site in the basin. 
Water quality degradation is a problem  especially in  the down  stream  area: 
Surabaya  River and  Porong  River.  The  total  pollution  load  in  the  basin  has 
increased almost threefold during the  last  10 years:  125 ton  BOD/day in  1989 
became 330 ton BOD/day in  1998, of which  62 percent is from domestic users 
and 38 percent from industries. 
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Watershed degradation promotes erosion and sedimentation.  The sediment load 
in Sutami catchment area is estimated about 3.2 million m3/y in 1998. meaning 
an increase by almost threefold during the last 30 years. 
11.2 Strategic plan 
The main strategies for addressing these major issues are: 
Promote stakeholders' participation in the decision-making process 
to get their commitments in the implementation of a WRM plan. 
Public education to promote positive social control from the public. 
Implement economic and other instruments to promote efficient use 
of water, abate pollution load' and develop sources of funds for WRM 
budget. 
Develop and implement consistently Land and Water Conservation 
Plan. 
Projections of future water quantity and water quality under this plan are shown 
in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9:  Water quantity 
Units: ma/second 
Year  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020 
Deficiency (without actions)  (13.64)  (18.01)  (25.76)  (46.63)  (122.63) 
:  Action plan: 
•  Demand efficiency  6.21  7.10  10.22  18.35  58.51 
•  Supply efficiency  ;:S.W  ;:S.W  ;:S.l:!U  ;:S.l:!U  l:!.t:lU 
•  WR development 
- Wonorajo Dam  8.02  8.02  8.02  8.02 
- Umbulan Spring  4.45  4.45  4.45 
- Bang Dam  *)  ~.50  9.50 
- Kd.  Warak Dam  3.50 
•  Final balance  (3.83)  (2.86)  0.13  (3.11 )  (35.85) 
Source: Surabaya Development Programme (1998) 

*) Pumping scheme: Brantas river will be pumped to the reservoir during rainy season. 
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Table 10:  Water quality 
Units:  ton BOD/day 
Year  1998  2005  2010  2020 
Projected load without actions  330  395  442  565 
Domestic load  205  224  234  257 
Industrial load  125  171  208  308 
Maintenance flow (m'/sec)  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5 
Projected load with actions'  330  208  177  118 
Uomestlc loao  205  182  151  92 
InOustnalload  125  26  26  26 
Maintenance TlOW (mO/sec)  f.b  11.5  14.5  20.0 
Source: Pollution Control Master Plan (1998) 
'The water quality objective will be achieved in 2020 if targeted pollution load abatement 
can be realised. 
12. Financial aspects 
12.1  Sources of funds 
In  order to achieve  sustainable WRM,  budget availability for river basin 
management needs to be secured.  This requires that beneficiaries gradually bear 
costs for  river basin management through the  application of the principles of 
Users Pay,  Polluters Pay,  as well as Government 0pligation (for funding social 
services and public safety and welfare measures, such as flood control, water 
pollution control, land and water conservation, and irrigation). 
Funds obtained from beneficiaries are used for operation and maintenance activities. 
Investment budget may be obtained from: 1) Corporate internal funds, 2) Government 
Budget,  3)  Local  or foreign  loans,  and 4)  Other reliable  sources (JOint  ventures, 
Municipal Bonds, etc.).  The major cost components are indicated in Table  11. 
Table 11:  Components of cost 
Direct Costs  Indirect Costs 
•  Operation and Maintenance  •  Personnel expenses (for Head Office) 
· 
Watershed conservation  •  General expenses (for Head Office) 
· 
Personnel expenses (for WSD Offices)  •  Travel expenses (for Head Office) 
· 
General expenses (for WSD Offices)  •  Depreciation  · 
Travel expenses (for WSD Offices)  •  Marketing expenses 
•  HRD expenses 
•  Public Education cost 
Note: WSD Offices: Water Services Division Offices 
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12.2 Fund-collection process 
In principle, PJT I should negotiate the fee tariff with the sector users.  Then the 
agreed tariff is proposed by PJT I's Board of Directors to the Ministry of Settlement 
and  Regional  Development (MSRD).  After getting  recommendation  from  the 
Ministry of Finance and the Governor, the Ministry approves the fee tariff. 
The fee paid by the users is collected by PJT I in collaboration with Provincial Tax 
and  Retribution Offices which already have a well-established collection system. 
The non-fee payer (social and non-specific users) pays to the government in other 
forms of tax (land and building tax etc).  The government then gives subsidy to 
finance activities relating to social services and publiC safety and welfare. 
12.3 Methods of assessment of water service fee 
Based on the Government Regulation No. 6/1981  the fee should be calculated 
to cover: 1) operation and maintenance; 2) depreciation; 3)  interest; and 4) fund 
for further development.  Considering the capability to pay,  the fee is calculated 
only for operation and maintenance cost recovery. 
The water service fee  is calculated  by  the  RBMA based  on  the  following 
methodology: 
(a) 	 Listing of all major water resources infrastructures. 
(b) 	 Identification and calculation of operation and maintenance activities 
of each infrastructure. 
(c) 	 Distribution of cost among functions for multipurpose facilities 
(separable or joint cost). 
(d) 	 Derivation of proportions for allocating operation and maintenance 
cost for each sector user (based on the gross benefits received by 
sector users). 
(e) 	 Derivation of operation and maintenance costs for respective function 
for all facilities. 
(f) 	 Derivation of amounts of power generation (kWh/year) for electricity, 
water used (ma/year) by other sector users (municipal water supply, 
industries). 
(g) 	 Calculation of water service fee  for  each  sector user to  recover 
operation and maintenance costs. 
It is very difficult for the RBMA to make a tariff agreement.  There is no guideline 
issued by the Government in calculating fee. Through the on-going National Reform 
of Water Resources Policies, it is intended to issue a Government Regulation on 
the guideline for calculating water service fee and waste water discharge fee. 
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12.4 Budget approval process 
(a) 	 Four months  before effectiveness  of the following fiscal  year,  the 
Board of Directors prepares the next Yearly Corporate Budget and 
Work  Plan,  based on the  operation and  maintenance work plans 
proposed  by  each Water Services Division,  by  considering the 
recommendation of RBWRC and PWRC. 
(b) 	 Before submitting the Yearly  Corporate Budget and Work Plan  to 
the MSRD and Minister of Finance, it is discussed and approved in 
principle by  the  Supervisory Board.  The  Board  of  Directors and 
Supervisory  Board  hold  several  meetings to discuss both the 
technical and financial  matters. 
(c) 	 Approval of the Yearly Corporate Budget and Work Plan is obtained 
from the Minister of Finance after recommendation from the MSRD. 
12.5  Effects of the financing system 
During the last 10 years, the tariff level of water service fee  has. increased as 
shown  in Table  12.  The progressive tariff and  increasing tariff level  stimulate 
the application of recycling technologies for major industrial water users, such 
as sugar-cane  factories.  For the time being,  it is  difficult to  have  equity  and 
adequate access for poor people.  The Government Obligation Principle cannot 
be  implemented due to the Government's budget limitation.  Equitable access 
to  water could  be  improved  after the  implementation of water use  rights  for 
irrigation  and  for  environment (maintenance flow)  and  commitment of 
Government in  realising Government Obligation Principle. 
Table 12: Tariff level 
Unit: Rupiah 
Water Users 
Electricity State Owned Company 






"Basic tariff level for progressive tariff system 
Note:ln mid-2000,  1 Rupiah =0.0115 US cent at nominal exchange rate 
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13. Present condition of PJT I 
The following is a summary of the main features of PJT I at present. 
Beneficiaries' contribution for operation and maintenance 
Beneficiaries' contribution in  1999 reached  Rp 27 billion (US$ 4 million).  Even 
though this does not cover normal  operation  and  maintenance budget 
requirements, it leads to these results: 
Increasing  regional  revenue  as  the  result of orderliness in  water 
allocation and tariff determination in  Brantas river basin; 
Cost burden  from  government budget  allocation  for  Brantas  river 
basin could be minimised and allocated for other basins. 
Improvementof water resources infrastructure functions 
Improvement of operation and maintenance has resulted in improved functioning 
of  water resources infrastructure,  which  directly contributes to management 
improvement. 
Company performance in  1991-1999 
The company's audit up to the fiscal year 1999 is considered excellent, proving 
satisfactory results from application of the cost recovery principle. 
Public/Private ~lnd community participation in water resources 
management 
Water resources management operated by PJT I makes it possible for public as 
well  as  private sectors to  participate  in  water resources  development and 
management in the basin. 
ISO 9001  Certification 
Certification  of  ISO 9001  for Design,  Operation  and  Maintenance of Water 
Resources Infrastructures in the Brantas river basin issued by SGS International 
Certification Services,  has  proven  professional water resources  management 
practices by PJT I. 
14. Conclusion 
14.1  General view of the Corporation 
The Brantas river basin has been a valuable natural resource for many 
years.  It  was  essential for food  production; to  support national 
economic development, water is considered as a strategic commodity. 
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The development of the Brantas river basin has been carried out since 
1961  as an integrated development through a series of Master Plans 
with  the  basic concept of one  river,  one  plan,  one co-ordinated 
management.  The benefits of development include flood control, food 
production, drinking water,  industrial water,  electricity production. 
In' order to  overcome  the  post construction  problems,  the 
Government of Indonesia established the state-owned corporation 
PJT I on May 12, 1990. 
The management of water resources  in  the Brantas river basin is 
carried out as an  integrated management operated by  PJT I.  The 
scope of activities of PJT I are: water quantity management, water 
quality management, maintenance of water resources infrastructure. 
PJT I has implemented Quality Assurance System ISO-9001, issued 
by Yarsley International Certification Services Limited, London, No. 
Q.9755 on May 12, 1997. 
To operate these activities,  PJT I collaborates with  related  agencies, 
such as: East Java Provincial Water Resources Committee (Panitia Tata 
Pengaturan  Air)  for  water allocation,  Commission  for Environmental 
Pollution Control and Abatement (KPPLH) for pollution control. 
The funding  for  operation and maintenance of water resources  in 
the Brantas river basin mainly comes from the contributions of 
beneficiaries: State Electric Power Company,  Regional  Drinking 
Water Supply Company and Industries. 
In the future, PJT I will be extended to cover other rivers in Indonesia. 
14.2 Management problems 
The formula to compute the unit water rate  is  not established yet. 
This is needed, from the point of view that water revenue should be 
reliable and stable for the long-term sustainability of the corporation. 
The operation and  maintenance contribution from  beneficiaries 
excludes depreciation. In the future it may be necessary to establish 
a water rate formula including depreciation and other factors. 
Up to now farmers do not pay operation and maintenance contribution. 
Most of the irrigation water users still keep the old perception that the 
charge for water used is included in the tax they pay. 
Due to lack of awareness, water taken by the farmers is not efficiently 
utilised.  Some farmers take more water than their actual needs.  As 
a result,  farmers downstream face water shortage problems in  the 
dry season. 
River water quality has seriously deteriorated throughout all  the 
Brantas River.  The reason  is untreated wastewater from  industry, 
domestic users, agriculture and livestock breeding which has been 
drained into the river. 
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At present, the  upstream area of the basin  has been considerably 
devastated and existing reservoirs have suffered from sedimentation. 
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Abstract 
The American State of California is a mature water economy in  which available 
water is nearly fully allocated. The  state has a well-developed hydraulic system 
which enables water to be moved from  areas of surplus to  deficit,  and allows 
trading and sales of water and water rights,  though such  transactions are still 
limited.  The  state is overwhelmingly urban and still growing rapidly,  leading to 
large projected increases in  municipal water demands over the  next 20 years. 
Additional allocations to  municipalities are expected to  come from  allocations 
currently devoted to agriculture. 
Procedures for managing water at the  basin level have  solid,  if complex, 
underpinnings in law and tradition.  Surface water rights are based on both riparian 
and appropriative doctrines.  However, groundwater is only lightly regulated and is· 
currently seriously overdrafted.  Management is pluralistic,  with multiple sources 
of  power and authority.  Many deciSions are negotiated, rather than handed down, 
and then formalised as legally-enforceable agreements among the involved parties. 
Others are litigated, and reliance on the courts for dispute resolution is heavy. 
The  various interests,  including the  natural environment,  are represented by 
capable and well-funded advocates.  Decisions are generally considered in open 
fora with the full range of  interests represented.  Many of the actors involved have 
come to  realise  that past reliance on litigation  to  resolve disputes does  not 
necessarily lead to optimal solutions, and there is a broad interest and willingness 
to experiment with alternative models of decision-making and dispute resolution. 
1. Introduction 
1.1  Basin management 
River basins are managed at two different levels.  At the higher level, the basin 
level, overall poliCies and plans are set, resources are allocated and regulations 
written and enforced.  At the  use level, regulated water deliveries are made to 
users of water, who may be  irrigators, urban  residents, industries, wetlands, or 
natural river reaches.  This paper focuses on the first level of management, the 
basin level, and examines the way  in which basin level  management functions 
are performed in the large interior Central Valley of California.  The Central Valley 
comprises what 8andaragoda (c1999) terms an advanced river basin, one which 
is  already well  developed  in  terms of physical  infrastructure and  effective 
institutions for integrated water resource management. 
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Issues of particular interest here are the interplay of political forces which support 
alternative water uses, the currently changing priorities accorded to alternative 
water uses, and processes and institutions whereby allocational and regulatory 
activities at the basin level are directed and co-ordinated.  One central issue of 
global significance is the extent to which one apex organisation must be in control 
of the highest level of decision-making in a basin.  Berkoff (1997), for example, 
has asserted that "if water is to be managed holistically, all aspects must be co­
ordinated by one ... agency:' The present study suggests that this assertion does 
not apply universally and raises questions about the conditions under which 
different models of basin-level management would be most effective. 
1.2 California's Central Valley 
California's Central Valley is home to millions and one of the premier agricultural 
regions in the United States, containing 6 of the top 10 agricultural counties in the 
country.  California itself has 33 million residents and is the most populous state 
in the nation.  An overwhelming 97 percent of the population live in urban areas. 
The state as a whole has abundant renewable water resources which, in addition to 
meeting environmental, urban, and agricultural needs, generate 42 percent of the 
utility-produced electricity in the state.  Irrigated agriculture generates 81  percent of 
California's total agricultural revenue on 30 percent of the state's farmland.  Agricultural 
also provides  14.4 percent of the state's employment, though only 2.1  percent of 
that is engaged in direct production activities.  The remaining 12.3 percent works in 
input production, marketing and proceSSing,  and  wholesale  and  retail  sales.  The 
state is also blessed with a magnificent and varied natural environment-the Pacific 
coast, the Sierra Nevada Mountains, broad inland valleys, wetlands, and the southern 
deserts.  All  of these features-the environment,  urban concentrations,  power 
generation, and agriculture-require water for their sustenance and operation. 
Several features of California's situation make it especially valuable as a case 
for study.  ' 
Firstly,  California comprises a sophisticated economic environment 
in  which water is used for a wide variety of purposes and is treated 
more as a commodity than as a common pool resource. 
Secondly, intense competition over water has emerged in what Seckler 
(1996) would call· a closed water system - one in which there is little new 
water left to develop.  This competition includes agricultural,  municipal 
and industrial (M&I), and environmental interests and is driving rapid 
change in the institutions which allocate, regulate, convey, and use water. 
Thirdly,  the  responses to changing public priorities have  been 
characterised  by  pragmatic problem-solving behaviour.  This has 
made California a  virtual  laboratory for  innovative  solutions to 
problems of water reallocation  and management,  environmental 
quality, efficient water use, and water quality management. 
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2.  Basin hydrology1 
2.1  Supply 
California possesses abundant water resources, receiving nearly 250 billion2 m3 
of precipitation annually in  average years.  Of this amount about 65 percent is 
used by trees and other natural vegetation.  An  additional  10 percent flows to 
the Pacific Ocean or other salt sinks unchecked and unallocated.  The remaining 
25 percent runoff is available as a renewable water supply for urban, agricultural, 
and environmental uses3 . 
Developed surface water resources in the state total about 80 billion m3,  of which 
nearly half are set aside as required environmental flows4 •  About 12 percent of 
the total has been developed under Federal Government projects, 5 percent by 
the State of California, and 17 percent by local government entities.  An additional 
8 percent comprises water imported from the Colorado River basin under a multi­
state water-sharing agreement using facilities also constructed  by the  Federal 
G~rn~~.  . 
In  addition to surface water sources, an  additional  15 billion  m3 is available as 
renewable  groundwater (see footnote  5).  Present withdrawal  rates  are  higher 
m3 than  this,  resulting  in  an  overdraft of about  1.8 billion  annually,  some  12 
percent of the renewable total.  Furthermore, the rate of overdraft is increasing 
and was 10 percent greater in  1995 than it was in  1990.  To  some extent, this 
overdrafting is a consequence of 1992 federal legislation which reallocated water 
away from irrigators to environmental uses.  This has led to supply deficiencies 
of up to 50 percent for some Central Valley irrigators and caused them to turn to 
lightly regulated groundwater as a replacement supply. 
Most of California's precipitation falls  as snow in  the mountains of northern 
California and in  the Sierra Nevada range,  which comprises the high backbone 
of the state running from  north to  south  along  its eastern flank (Figure 1).  A 
second range of much smaller hills, the Coastal Range, fronts the narrow coastal 
plain in ·the west, creating a broad alluvial valley between the two ranges.  This 
Central Valley  is  an  area of  rich  soils and  favourable  growing conditions for a 
wide variety of crops and is the heart of California agriculture.  In  it,  more than 
200 types of crops are grown and from it comes 45 percent of the nation's fruits 
and vegetables.  Two  major river systems drain the Central Valley and  some 
158,000 km2  of watershed,  the Sacramento River in  the north,  and the  San 
Joaquin River in  the south.  The two  . 
'Data for this section is drawn largely from  DWR  (1998). 
2Billion is defined here as 109• 
3A  portion of the water specifically designated for in-stream environmental use  also flows 
to the Pacific Ocean. 
'The total  of developed surface  and  groundwater is  greater than  the 25  percent of 
precipitation designated as available runoff because of reuse. 
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Figure 1.  California's Central Valley 
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rivers meet in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (the Delta), just inland of San 
Francisco Bay,  from where they flow into the Bay and out to the Pacific Ocean. 
The fact that two-thirds of California's water is in the north, while the bulk of agricultural 
land and the largest population centres are  in  the south has  led to two  massive 
engineering projects designed to transport water from  north to south.  These are 
the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP). 
The CVP was constructed in the 1940s by the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal 
irrigation development agency.  Construction was begun in  1935 as a part of a 
massive depression-era public works programme.  The project is  anchored by 
Shasta dam in the Cascade Mountains in northern California which stores water 
for use in the south.  Water from Shasta and several smaller dams is routed down 
the Sacramento River to the DE: Ita, which it crosses in a network of natural and 
artificial channels.  Some of the water is used to  irrigate land  along the 
Sacramento River to the north, but most crosses the Delta to be lifted 60 meters 
into the Delta-Mendota Canal (DMC). The DMC supplies 32 irrigation districts in 
the San Joaquin Valley with water. 
The second  project,  the  SWP,  was developed in  the  1960s by the  State of 
California. Its backbone, the California Aqueduct, parallels the DMC south from 
the Delta before continuing on  to southern California.  Its primary purpose is to 
convey M&I water to desert cities in the south (70%), principally the greater Los 
Angeles area, though it does supply irrigation water (300;.,,) as well.  Together these 
two projects deliver about 7.3 billion m3 of water annually to the south. 
2.2 Demand 
2.2.1  Current patterns 
Overall demand for developed sources of water is dominated by environmental 
reservations (46.5%)  and by  irrigated agriculture  (42.5%)(Table  1).  Municipal 
demand currently makes up 11.0 percent of the total. 
Table 1: Average water-year water uses, 1995 and 2020 













urban  10.8  11.0  14.8  14.9 
~al  41.7  42.5  38.9  39.1 
ental  45.6  46.5  45.6  45.9 
Total  98.0  100.0  99.3  100.0 
301 Svendsen: Central Valley,  California, USA 
2.2.2 Changing patterns of demand 
Projections for 2020  (DWR,  1998) anticipate only a very  modest expansion  in 
available supply (1 %), but with important shifts in the composition of use.  While 
environmental uses of water are expected to remain  constant, urban5  demand 
will expand by 37 percent and agricultural water use will shrink by nearly 7 percent 
to accommodate this  growth.  Additional developed  supplies will  be  devoted 
entirely to urban use. 
The  federal  Endangered  Species Act,  passed  in  1973,  established the legal 
framework for  protecting species of plants and animals  listed as  threatened or 
endangered and the allocation of water for their preservation where necessary.  The 
listing of winter run Sacramento River salmon as endangered under this act in the 
early 1990s was the first important application of the law in California that had a 
significant impact of water allocation in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley.  A far 
more sweeping change was wrought by the Central Valley Improvement Act, passed 
by Congress in 1992. This act reallocated a portion of the water, which the federal 
government had contracted to  deliver to irrigation districts, to the ecosystems of 
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.  This reallocation has resulted  in  significant 
shortfalls in supplies to many of the irrigation districts in the San Joaquin Valley. 
2.2.3 Urban use 
Driving the growth  in  urban  water use  is  projected growth  in  the California 
population of nearly 50 percent between 1995 and 2020, as a result of continuing 
in-migration from others regions of the country and from abroad.  The demand 
for  water caused by this growth completely overshadows  modest potential 
reductions  in  per capita water use of about 6 percent if  household  level  best 
management practices are fully implemented" 
2.2.4 Agricultural use 
California has more than 3.6 million hectares of agricultural land under irrigation, 80 
percent of it in the Central Valley.  Projections for 2020 indicate a modest reduction 
of about 130,000 hectares (3.6%) in the total  irrigated area,  resulting mainly from 
urban  encroachment,  land  retirement due to drainage problems,  and more 
competitive economic markets for agricultural products7.  In  addition, changes 
in  cropping patterns and irrigation technology and  practices will  yield  small 
reductions in the rate of water use per hectare (an estimated 2.4% of 1995 use levels). 
5Urban  use includes residential, commerCial, industrial, and institutional uses of water 
61f  explicit conservation practices are  not  implemented,  per capita urban demand will 
increase by about 6 percent. 
7There  is potential for much more significant reductions if  major proposed conversions of 
agricultural land to wildlife habitat are implemented. 
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2.2.5 Environmental use 
Environmental water use comprises several categories of flows that have been 
set aside for environmental purposes.  These are: 
Dedicated flows in designated "wild and scenic" rivers (64%) 
In-stream flow requirements in other rivers established by water right 
permits, court actions, agreements, or other regulatory actions (17%) 
Required Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta outflows (15%) 
Wetlands freshwater requirements (4%) 
Note that while there are other environmental uses of  water,  the above uses are 
distinguished by being managed and quantifiable.  Most of this environmental water 
allocation is brought about by legislative and regulatory processes rather than through 
the water right permitting process which authorises agricultural and municipal uses. 
2.3 Summary 
California is well endowed with renewable water resources.  Of the 250 billion m3 
received as precipitation annually, about one-quarter is available for various allocated 
uses.  About half of this allocated water is set aside for instream environmental uses. 
The remainder Oust over 50 billion m3)  is available for withdrawal for agricultural and 
urban uses.  Groundwater, though abundant, is currently overdrafted by about 12 
percent  of the renewable total and exploitation continues to expand. 
Two  major plumbing projects, one Federal and the other State,  transfer water 
from the wet north to the arid south of the state.  Water moving though both of 
these systems must transit the Sacramento-San Joaquin  Delta "in the open", 
where it mixes with water in  the Delta and contributes to it.  The Delta is also 
important environmentally, and it serves as the nexus of the debate over the future 
of California water. 
According to the most recent version of the California Water Plan, urban demand, 
is expected to grow by 37 percent over the next quarter-century, while agricultural 
water use shrinks by 7 percent and environmental use holds constant.  Additional 
allocations to environmental uses are being promoted, however, and if they are 
adopted additional reallocation of agricultural water will be the likely outcome. 
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3 Legal, policy, and institutional environment 
3.1  Water rights 
Water in  California,  as  in  the  United States in  general,  is  regarded  as  a good 
belonging to  all  and  held  in  trust by  the States.  Management of water,  and 
allocation of rights to use water, are responsibilities of the individual states.  Rights 
to use water in California comprise a complicated mixture of types, priorities, and 
levels of security.  Groundwater and surface water rights are treated separately, 
and surface water rights, which are the most important, include both riparian and 
appropriative rights.  Underlying and  articulating the  various elements of  the 
allocation scheme are a number of state and federal  laws and  numerous court 
cases, each of which establishes precedents upon which subsequent cases build. 
Riparian rights to surface stre,ams are available, under common law, to the owners 
of property abutting streams.  Water abstracted under a riparian right cannot be 
applied to plots of land which do not abut the stream and cannot be transferred 
to other uses removed from the riparian land.  They comprise about 14 percent 
of rights to non-imported surface water in California. 
Appropriative rights to surface water are more flexible and comprise the remaining 
86 percent of non-imported surface water rights.  Appropriative rights are granted 
through a permitting process managed by the State of California.  Appropriative 
rights can be for use at points removed from the stream of origin and are subject 
to transfer and change of purpose.  Maintenance of an appropriative water right 
requires continuous beneficial use. and the courts have held that appropriative 
rights can be lost after five years of non-use.  Riparian rights are neither created 
by use nor lost by  non-use. 
Groundwater use  is  only lightly regulated.  There  is  no  permitting process for 
groundwater exploitation. which  is  available.  in  the  first instance.  to owners  of 
overlying land for reasonable beneficial use on those lands.  Groundwater users 
establish  rights  simply by  use.  Rights are correlative with  the  rights  of  other 
owners.  meaning that if the  water supply is  insufficient, the supply must be 
equitably apportioned.  Subject to future  requirements  on  overlying lands. 
"surplus" groundwater may be appropriated for use on non-overlying lands.  Again. 
no permit is  required. 
This very vague and permissive specification of  rights to groundwater has two 
important implications.  Firstly, as pressure on nearly fully allocated surface water 
sources continues to build, users turn to groundwater to make up deficits, leading 
to a serious and growing problem of overdrafting in  many portions of the state. 
Secondly. groundwater is a magnet for litigation as  water users joust over such 
terms as "surplus". "sufficient", "reasonable", "equitable" and "beneficiaL" 
Development of a suitable institutional framework for managing groundwater in 
the state is urgently needed but proceeding slowly. 
"This is the Public Trust Doctrine. derived from  Roman Law. 
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3.2 Actors 
There  are  seven  important groups of actors  involved  in  basin-level  water 
management in California, in addition to the general public.  These are the mangers, 
the service providers, the users, the regulators, advocacy groups, elected officials, 
and the courts.  Some groups, such as regulators, service providers, the courts, 
and elected officials, consist of both  federal  and state  level actors,  while others 
are purely local.  The main actors in each category are discussed briefly below. 
3.2.1  Managers 
The  most  important  managing  organisations  are  two  California  state 
organisations-the Department of Water Resources (DWR)  and  the State Water 
Resources Control Board (SWRCB).  The DWR  replaced the  Office of the State 
Engineer in  1956, assuming responsibility for planning and guiding development 
of the state's water resources.  Over the past 45 years it has grown from 450 staff 
to a level ten times that in  1967 before  dropping back,  and  now  employs about 
2,000.  DWR operates on an annual budget of about $1  billion and is a division of 
the state public administration  under a director who  is  accountable to the  state 
governor.  Its responsibilities are primarily technical and operational, but do include 
some regulatory functions.  Major responsibilities include the following: 
Preparing and updating the California Water Plan  every five years 
Operating and maintaining the State Water Project 
Protecting and restoring the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
Dam  regulation and flood protection 
Public education 
Providing technical assistance to local communities 
The  SWRCB performs functions which are managerial,  regulatory,  and quasi­
judicial in nature.  It thus occupies a special niche in the overall set-up.  Among 
its important responsibilities are the following: 
Allocating rights to appropriate (use) surface water 
Adjudicating disputes over  rights to water bodies,  such  as the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
Establishing water quality standards 
Guiding and overseeing  the  nine  Regional  Water Quality Control 
Boards 
Board appOintments are made by the governor and the make up of the Board is 
as described in the box on the following page. 
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Regional Water Boards  under the  SWRCB do not  allocate  water rights but 
manage and regulate water quality through the following kinds of action: 
Writing waste discharge permits 
Implementing contamination clean up operations 
Monitoring quality and use of regional groundwater and surface water 
Inspecting discharges and enforcing state and federal water quality 
laws 
Regional Boards consist of five members who are also aPPointed by the governor. 
3.2.2 Service providers 
At the  basin  level.  the  most important water service providers are the  United 
States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR or "the Bureau") and DWR.  The USBR is 
an agency of the Federal Government housed in the Department of the Interior. 
The Bureau constructed most of the  federally-financed  water conveyance  and 
control facilities in the  state.  including the pivotal Central Valley Project (CVP), 
and operates the storage and delivery facilities it has constructed.  However, while 
it  retains operating  responsibility for the  upstream portions of the CVP.  it  has 
recently transferred operating responsibilities for the portions of the system lying 
south of the Delta to an association established and controlled by San Joaquin 
Valley  water users,  the  San  Luis-Delta Mendota Water Authority  (SLDMWA). 
Users have proposed that they assume responsibility for the upstream portions 
as well, but action on that step is  more controversial. 
The other major water storage and conveyance project in  the state,  the  State 
Water Project (SWP), is operated by DWR. which constructed the facilities using 
state resources. 
3.2.3 Users 
Principal water users are the various districts which purchase water and deliver 
it to the members or residents in the district.  Districts are generally organised 
to  supply irrigation water to farmers or municipal  water to urban  residents. 
Districts are incorporated as  non-profit entities under state law and  are self­
governing.  The largest share of managed surface water is delivered to agricultural 
users,  most of  whom  are in the Central Valley.  Other users include the state 
Department of Fish  and  Game.  conservation  districts,  hydropower facility 
operators,  and  DWR  and  the  USBR for  flood  control  operations.  Freshwater 
navigation, though significant in the past, is of minor importance today. 
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Evolution of a Water Control Agency 
1940s  Serious water-quality problems emerged  in  California,  including 
outbreaks of water-borne  diseases and  degradation of fishing and 
recreational  waters,  In  1949 a  fact-finding  committee  highlighted 
cumbersome  and  unreasonable laws  and  administrative procedures, 
multiple jurisdictions,  limited and  conflicting interests, and  overlapping 
authorities as roots of the evident problems.  The committee concluded 
that the state's limited water resources could only be extended through 
planning to maintain  water quality while  at the  same time allowing 
maximum economic use and reuse.  It recommended a central focus point 
at the state level to co-ordinate water pollution control activities, 
1949  Legislation created a State Water Pollution Control Board consisting 
of nine gubernatorial appointees'representing specific interests and four 
ex officio state officials.  Its duties included formulating state-wide policy 
for pollution  control and  co-ordinating the actions of various state 
agencies and  political subdivisions of the  state  in  controlling water 
pollution.  The same legislation created nine Regional Water Pollution 
Control Boards in  major watersheds.  These  regional  boards had 
responsibility for administration,  investigation, and  enforcement of the 
state's pollution abatement programme.  Five gubernatorial appointees, 
representing water supply,  irrigated agriculture,  industry, and municipal 
and county government in the  region, served on each  regional board. 
1959  The  1949 law was  revised  and broadened on  the  basis of 10 years of 
experience.  State ex  officio members were  removed  from  the  board, 
increasing its separation from the state administrative machinery. 
1963  The state board was renamed the State Water QualltV Control Board 
and  given the broader mandate of water quality control,  replacing the 
more limited earlier focus on sewage and industrial waste control. 
1967  A proposal to consolidate water-related functions. including water quality 
control functions, within the Department of Water Resources was rejected 
on the grounds that this would create conflicts of interest internal to DWR. 
Instead  quantity and  quality  management functions were  consolidated 
external to DWR by merging the State Water Quality Control Board and 
the State Water Rights Board into the State Water Resources Control 
Board.  The "State Water  Board"  consists of five  full-time  members 
mandated to protect water quality and to determine rights to surface water 
use.  Members are appointed by the governor and fill specialised roles 
on the Board, e.g. attorney versed in water law. two civil engineers with 
expertise in water rights and water supply, a water quality member, and 
a public member. 
1969  A new Water Quality Control Act was  passed which  retained the basic 
structure of  state and  regional  boards but provided  a new  regulatory 
framework for waste discharges to both surface water and groundwater, 
This act served as a model for the federal Clean Water Act, passed three 
years  I~ter. 
Source:, http://wwwdwr.water.ca.gov 
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3.2.4 Regulators 
Water-related  regulation  centres  around  provisions of  federal  and  state  laws, 
protecting endangered species and maintaining drinking water quality.  The federal 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 is the most important of these and is enforced 
by the  national  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA).  Of the  endangered 
species affecting water use  in  California, the most critical are the  listed runs of 
salmon.  Technical regulations and certifications relating to salmon are made by 
the  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  (NMFS)  while  criteria for other animal 
species are set and  supervised by the federal  Fish and Wildlife Service. 
State environmental regulators also list endangered species, and this list includes 
some which are  not on  the federal  list.  The state Fish  and  Game Department 
supervises enforcement of water quality and  quantity requirements  relating  to 
state-listed species. 
The  State Water Resources Control  Board  and  its  subtended  regional  boards 
bear overall responsibility for surface water and groundwater quality in the state. 
The Federal Clean Water Act and the California Water Quality Control Act, both 
aimed at pollution control, are enforced by these boards. 
3.2.5 Advocates 
One of the most dramatic recent changes in  the cast of characters in the water 
drama in California, and in the United States, is the emergence of environmental 
advocacy groups as potent political actors.  Most groups are membership-based 
and supported and often draw on grants from charitable foundations.  Some focus 
on a single issue-a resource or species-while others have a broader range of 
interests.  The group Friends of the River is an example of a resource-focussed 
group which is  largely concerned with  restoring free-flowing rivers in  California, 
while the Sierra Club, based in California but national in scope, is an example of 
a group with  a wide  range  of conservation  interests beyond  water.  There are 
about 20 environmental groups in  California interested in  water issues.  These 
groups are linked through  an  Environmental Water Caucus which  meets every 
couple  of weeks.  Accompanying  expanded federal  and  state  environmental 
regulation over the past 25  years has been  greatly strengthened  requirements 
for transparency in  regulatory processes. 
3.2.6 Elected officials 
Legislators  at  both  the  Federal  and  State  levels write the  laws providing the 
framework for water resource management in the state.  Although establishing 
systems for allocating water resources is in the purview of the state legislature, 
the federal government exerts a powerful influence on water allocation by applying 
the  terms of the federal  Endangered  Species Act.  This act constrains water­
related construction projects in various ways, and can require increased in-stream 
allocations of water for fish species classed as threatened or endangered.  The 
governor is a particularly important figure in the state water resource management 
picture, controllinr I'Ippointments to the State Water Board and the regional Water 
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Quality  Boards and  as  the  head  of  the state administrative  apparatus which 
includes the important DWR.  The US Congress also influences allocation through 
its ability to mandate changes in  water permits which are held on  behalf of the 
US  Government by the  US  Bureau  of  Reclamation.  Water quality is  regulated 
by both federal and state statutes. 
3.2.7 Courts 
Both  State and  Federal  courts  hear cases  relating  to  water.  Where  the  US 
Government is  a party to  the  litigation, a Federal  court must be  the  venue,  as 
State courts cannot have jurisdiction over the Federal Government.  Almost all 
of the cases heard are civil cases rather than criminal cases, involving disputes 
between parties rather than violations of state or federal law. 
A  Federal  judge in  the Central Valley  indicated that about 20 percent of his 
caseload consisted of water cases,  and that the volume of water-related cases 
had increased considerably over the past nine years.  Cases have also increased 
in complexity.  The  introduction of the  Federal ESA and the  listing of a number 
of fish  species  in  important California  rivers  have  played  a major  role  in  this 
increased complexity.  The integration of Public Trust Doctrine into California water 
law9  has also made decisions more complicated.  Throughout this period of 
change, the  NGO sector has increasingly become a "third  presence" in  nearly 
every Significant civil case, seeking to include the environmentalist viewpoint into 
the deliberation. 
Major drawbacks to the heavy reliance on the court system for dispute resolution 
are the often drawn-out nature of proceedings, their expense, and the difficulty 
of reaching sound decisions through adversarial proceedings.  A Federal Judge 
interviewed cited approvingly an  old  adage, "hard  cases make bad  law." 
Increasingly attention is shifting to various modes of alternative dispute resolution. 
3.3 Essential functions 
Burton  (1999)  has  identified  11  essential functions  of  basin  management.  A 
somewhat modified listing of these functions is shown  in Table  2,  crossed with 
the key actors identified in the previous section.  These functions are replicated, 
as appropriate. across four broad categories-surface water,  groundwater, 
wastewater disposal, and agricultural return flows.  Cells are marked to indicate 
an actor which is active in a particular functional area.  Information is drawn from 
interviews, printed materials and Internet postings.  A number of interesting pOints 
emerge from  an examination of Table  2. 
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A comprehensive planning function  rests with the state  Department 
of Water  Resources.  This  responsibility covers  surface  water and 
groundwater in both quantity and quality.  Although technical analyses 
and modelling are done by DWR, extensive interaction with a variety 
of stakeholders  in  the  planning process  makes planning a widely 
shared  activity.  The primary planning document is the State Water 
Plan, which is updated in a process led by  DWR every five years. 
Surface water allocation and water quality assurance are aSSigned 
to  a single  state  agency,  which  is  independent of the  other state 
agencies engaged in planning or system operations.  The WRCS is 
autonomous, though it is political to the extent that the members are 
appointed by the governor of the state.  The U.S. congress assumed 
a certain amount of de facto allocational authority in passing a 1992 
law  which directed the  USSR to reallocate  water from  agricultural 
users with whom it held contracts to environmental uses.  Federal 
and state courts also play important roles in the allocational process 
by  resolving disputes over allocation. 
Enforcement of water quality standards  rests  with  nine  regional 
boards with strong  local ties but under the  overall guidance of the 
state-level WRCS.  The courts also play significant roles  in 
interpreting disputes related to water quality. 
Retail water delivery services are, for the most part, in the hands of 
user-controlled districts.  Such irrigation and municipal water supply 
districts are financially autonomous and self-regulating.  They usually 
obtain water from  wholesale suppliers through  legally-enforceable 
contracts. 
Groundwater is the most lightly-planned and regulated segment of 
the state's water resources.  There is little control over abstractions 
and the state is  in a serious overdraft situation. 
Advocacy groups (environmental NGOs) make up an important third 
presence in  most important disputes  involving water.  This  is  a 
relatively recent development but has profoundly changed the way 
in which decisions are made, and mOdified their outcomes.  These 
groups also play important roles ip joint consensual processes, such 
as CALFED and the American River Water Forum, which are being 
used  increaSingly to develop mutually acceptable plans and 
agreements over contentious water-related issues. 
There is  a certain conflict within the DWR  regarding its  dual roles 
as wholesale supplier of water, water resource planner, and regulator. 
Transparency of process appears to  keep these potential conflicts 
in  cheCk.  Although  not included  in  the  table there is  a significant 
conflict of  interests internal to  the  U S Army Corps of Engineers, 
which  is  charged with  wetland  permitting and  protection,  but  is 
primarily a construction and operating agency with close ties to the 
congressional appropriations process. 
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3.4 Co-ordinating processes 
Managing an important publicly-held natural resource will always involve multiple 
actors, differing interests and perspectives, and relational dynamics.  This is true 
even in situations where a single agency is responsible for all aspects of basin 
water management, as there will be winners and losers among users of basin 
water resources  and factions  within  the  managing agency having differing 
perspectives and interests, 
In California, where there are many discrete actors in the water resource allocation 
and  management picture,  co-ordination  and  decision-making have  long  been 
critically important functions.  Traditionally, the courts, both federal and state, have 
provided a critical  dispute resolution function.  As  the  Sacramento-San Joaquin 
basin has closed and water become relatively more scarce, disputes have become 
more frequent and the number of interested parties has grown, making proceedings 
more complex.  There is presently growing interest in various forms of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, including the use of mediation, arbitration, and special masters. 
There  is  also  growing  reliance  on 
processes of shared consensual decision­
making to replace the more typical  two­ Bay-Delta Problem Areas 
stage process of a technical decision made 
by  a  government agency,  followed  by  Ecosystem restoration 
extensive and lengthy litigation initiated by  Water quality assurance 
unsatisfied  parties.  The  most prominent 
example is the ongoing CAlFED process,  levee system improvement 
which  tackles  some  of  the  most  Water supply reliability 
contentious water-related problems in the 
state, as shown in the box at right. 
CAlFED is  a  consortium of federal  and  state government agencies  with 
management and  regulatory  responsibilities  in  the  Bay-Delta system.  It  was 
formed in  1994 with the mission of developing a long-term comprehensive plan 
that will restore ecological health and  improve water management for beneficial 
uses of the Bay-Delta system, the heart of the Central Valley hydraulic system. 
CAlFED spent its first two years identifying and defining problems and a further 
four years assessing the environmental implications of various actions which might 
be taken.  It is about to begin an  implementation phase that could last 30 years 
and cost $10 billion. 
What sets CAlFED apart from other programmes is the fact that problems and 
solutions are being discussed from the outset in an open forum with participation 
that spans the entire range of water-related interests, and that it is proposing an 
entire basket of  measures which  will  address  the  four  problem  areas in  an 
integrated, complementary, sustainable way.  Fundamental principles guiding the 
process are shown in a second box.  Striking is the commitment of all participating 
parties to  make the CAlFED approach  work.  This commitment arises in  part 
from the fear that if the process fails, years of litigation will follow in a far more 
adversarial process of dispute resolution. 
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CALFED Solution Principles 
Affordable  solution can be implemented and maintained 
with the foreseeable resources of the CALF ED 
stakeholders 
Equitable  solution will focus on resolving problems in all 
problem areas 
Implementable  solution have broad public acceptance, legal 
feasibility and will be timely and relatively 
simple compared with alternatives 
Durable  solution will have political and economic staying 
power 
Reduce conflicts  solution will reduce major conflicts among 
beneficial users of water 
No redirected impacts  - solution will not solve Bay-Delta problems by 
exporting them elsewhere 
3.5 Enabling conditions 
The essential functions and actors' roles depicted in Table 2 provide a static view 
of responsibilities.  Additional attributes of well-functioning  basin governance  10 
systems relate to their dynamics.  We  term these attributes which  provide the 
context for functional performance enabling conditions. 
Enabling conditions are features of the institutional environment at the basin level 
that must be  present,  in  some  measure,  to  achieve good governance and 
management of the basin.  These attributes are not specific to anyone actor, 
but apply to all  actors and their interactions and comprise necessary (but  not 
sufficient) normative conditions for success.  Basic enabling conditions are shown 
in the box at right.  While a full analysis of these factors is well beyond the scope 
of this paper,  a  brief sketch  of each,  in  the context  of California,  is  given to 
illustrate the concepts and indicate broad strengths and weaknesses. 
lOThe term  governance is used is a somewhat different sense here than  in  Burton's list of 
essential attributes, of which it is one.  Here the term refers to the rules providing the context 
for  multi-actor basin  management  and  the  processes and  activities engaged  in  by  those 
actors operating within  this  set of rules. 
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3.5.1  Political attributes 
Enabling Conditions 
Representation  is  generally  well  Political Attributes 
developed, with  groups having similar  Representation of interests 
interests allied into various associations.  Balanced power 
These associations are supported by the  Informational Attributes 
members with  funds for  representation  Process transparency 
and litigation.  Environmental concerns  Information availability 
Information accessibility  are represented  by  NGOs which  have 
Legal Authority grown over the past 25 years in  number, 
Appropriate institutions  resources, and influence.  Supported by 
Adequate powers  protections provided by federal and state  Resources
endangered species laws, they now enjoy  Human 
power commensurate with the other  Financial 
major players.  Institutional 
Infrastructural 
3.5.2 Informational attributes 
The availability of information and transparency of decision-making processes 
in the United States, and in California, has also expanded over the past quarter­
century.  These changes have  been  driven by requirements in  environmental 
protection laws, by the existence of the world-wide web,  and by  growing public 
demand for information and openness.  It is now a rare decision-making process 
that is not characterised  by  ready availability of technical  information,  public 
hearings, and extensive opportunities for public comment. 
3.5.3 Legal authority 
The  system of water rights,  though  complex,  is relatively well specified in  law 
and through cumUlative court decisions.  Rights to surface waters are more clearly 
spelled out than those to groundwater, and the latter area is one where a stronger 
and more appropriate legal basis is required.  There is a sound legal framework 
underlying user-based districts which provide such services as irrigation, domestic 
water supply, groundwater management, and wetland conservation.  Districts are 
self-financing and self-governing and generally work effectively. 
3.5.4 Resources 
Though participants always feel  that financial  resources  are  inadequate,  both 
financing  and  human  resources within the basin  management system appear 
generally adequate.  There is a well developed physical infrastructure for transferring 
water around the  state,  and  from  neighbouring basins,  and  a steady stream of 
additions and improvements to it.  Environmental restrictions and concerns, however, 
make infrastructural design a far more demanding process than  it previously was, 
and have stymied completely some proposed projects, such as the peripheral canal 
around the delta.  New institutional forms (along with a legal basis for them) will likely 
be required in the future to legitimise and implement consensual agreements reached 
by ad  hoc bodies such as CALFED, but the need for these is still evolving. 
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4. Salient characteristics of California basin management 
A  number of important features characterise basin  water management in 
California.  These are summarised below. 
Multiple sources of authority and power.  No single public agency 
manages water resources in  California's  river basins.  Instead, 
decisions are made and enforced by a number of state and federal 
agencies.  Integration is provided by the State Water Plan,  various 
regional  plans and  processes such as CALFED,  the  centralised 
system of surface water rights, and the court system. 
Dynamic interplay of competing interests.  An even broader group 
of actors participate in and influence decision-making.  These actors 
are from both public and private sectors.  They debate in a variety 
of fora to assert their points of view.  These include public hearings, 
the media, and the courts.  Extensive lobbying of public offiCials also 
takes place behind the scenes.  Decisions emerge from this interplay. 
Adequate representation of all interested parties.  Major parties 
in  the  water debate  are  well  represented  and  financed.  These 
include municipal water districts, agricultural water districts,  public 
water supply agencies, state and federal environmental regulators, 
and environmental NGOs. 
Heavy  reliance  on  legally-enforceable  contracts  and 
agreements.  Many of the  water-related  decisions made take the 
form of contracts or agreements between two or more parties, rather 
than  administrative decrees.  This requires confidence on  all sides 
in the enforceability of the agreements. 
Separation of operating and  regulatory functions.  Regulatory 
functions are generally handled  by organisations which  are 
independent of federal, state, and user-controlled operating agencies. 
Adequate databases on  hydrologic processes and capacity to 
research new issues.  Extensive measurement and data collection 
programmes have  created  a  large database of information on 
California water resources and their uses and  impacts.  Equally 
importantly, a strong technical capacity exists in the private sector to 
conduct additional assessments, on a consulting basis, as needs arise. 
Open access to information and generally transparent decision­
making  processes.  Information on  water flows,  water quality. 
wastewater quality, water rights, and so on is available to the public 
and is generally accessible through  the  world wide web and  in 
publications and public records.  Decision-making processes are 
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generally conducted  in  the open  and  include public hearingsll. 
Moreover decisions reached are accessible to challenge in court and 
decisions over controversial issues often are so challenged. 
Self-financing autonomous districts as retail service providers. 
Retail water service delivery is typically handled by irrigation or water 
districts, which are user-controlled, self-financing, non-profit quasi­
municipal entities incorporated under state law.  This vastly simplifies 
the service delivery problem by reducing the number of major "users" 
to several hundred from tens of thousands. 
Important role of an  impartial court system  in resolving 
disputes.  Federal and state courts are regularly called upon to settle 
disputes brought to them as civil suits.  Without this service, the water 
resource management system in the state would be unworkable. 
Well-defined system of water rights (except groundwater). There 
is a clear system of allocating and protecting rights to surface water 
which  provides  reasonable security to  users.  Protection of 
groundwater is presently more problematic. 
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Case studies of shared river basins 
River basins described in  this section 

cross borders between countries, 





Institutional arrangements are  required 

to prevent conflict about water,  and to 

facilitate  orderly and equitable 

procedures for  use  and  development 

of their resources 

These papers describe two cases from 
Europe, the Rhine and  Danube basins, 
and two from southern Africa, the general 
inter-country protocol on  shared water, 
and the specific issues along tbe Limpopo Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
German Experiences in  River Basin Co-operation 
Robert Holiaender 
Federal Ministry for the Environment,  Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
Bonn,  Germany 
Abstract 
Germany has a  long history of gradual development of frameworks  for co­
operation on shared waterways. Germany's geographical location,  with parts of 
several major trans-boundary river basins in its territory, has stimulated the need 
for co-operation with  neighbours.  The  paper· describes the  evolution of co­
operative institutions on  the  Rhine,  and draws the  lesson from  this  that these 
institutions must evolve over long periods of time,  as the partners gradually 
recognise the value of co-operative frameworks. This history also shows that co­
operation may develop  through addressing one issue at a  time,  rather than 
seeking early establishment of a comprehensive framework. 
The latter part of the paper reviews Germany's role in recent years in fostering 
international exchanges of experiences on these issues, and  presents summaries 
of the recommendations of a series of  such international meetings. 
1. Introduction 
Germany has been co-operating with its neighbour countries in various ways for 
a long time. Due to its geographical location and political development it has a 
wealth of experience regarding the management of trans-boundary waters. This 
is based on experiences from water resources management, federal co-operation 
between  individual  Federal  lander'  within Germany, co-operation between 
Germany and other riparian states on trans-boundary waters, co-operation with 
other European Union (EU) Member States and co-operation within the European 
regional organisation of the United Nations, the UN-ECE. 
Various parallel uses of waters are the norm in Central Europe. Multiple utilisation 
of waters can, in principle, lead to conflicts. The fact that such conflicts could be 
largely avoided or resolved  peacefully is  due  only  partly to  comparatively 
favourable climatic conditions. It is mainly due to national and joint efforts to solve 
water pollution  problems.  Preventing  water pollution is  a prerequisite for the 
multiple utilisation of waters by various parties. 
Based on its own experiences, Germany has in the past been involved in a range 
of international initiatives beyond Europe's borders, as a partner and supporter 
of co-operation on managing trans-boundary waters. The issue of co-operation 
on trans-boundary waters is gaining political weight as one of the safety-relevant 
aspects of international co-operation. 
'Germany is a fed~ration of 16 states called Lander. 
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2. Germany's experience 
Germany shares its four biggest rivers-the Danube, Elbe, Oder and Rhine as well 
as a variety of smaller rivers, with its neighbouring countries. Development on the 
Rhine is in many respects characteristic of the joint use of trans-boundary rivers. 
2.1  Historical development of co-operation for the use of the Rhine 
For  a long time,  the  most important trans-boundary use  was the  transport of 
goods. The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (ZKR), which now 
has its headquarters in Strasbourg, dates back to the Vienna Congress (1815). 
With  the  re-ordering of European  politics after Napoleon, the  principle of 
navigational freedom in international waters was also established. A commission 
was set up  to create  the  possibility of monitoring compliance with  common 
regulations for the Rhine and an opportunity for the riparian states to discuss all 
issues relevant to navigation on the Rhine. 
In  1831,  16 years later, agreement was reached on the first standard principles for 
navigation on the Rhine. Another 37 years later, the Rhine riparian states transferred 
sovereign rights (courts with jurisdiction over navigation on the Rhine) to the ZKR 
with the Mannheim Convention (1868). The majority of these rights still exist today. 
Parallel  to  political  development for the promotion of navigation on  the  Rhine, 
extensive river training began on the Rhine at the beginning of the 19th century. 
The aims were to  reduce the  danger of flooding at certain  locations,  and to 
stabilise the  river course. This was the subject of widespread  political debate. 
Many landowners, downstream towns and countries fought the plans, because 
they  would  have  to  reckon  with  loss of land,  they feared  negative  impacts for 
economic development, or because their territory was affected by an increasing 
danger of  flooding. These objections brought a halt to  construction  in  1827. 
Development of the  Rhine to stabilise the  river course and to regulate the flow 
rate  was  continued  between  1842 and  1876  only after difficult multilateral 
negotiations and on the basis of an  inter-governmental treaty. 
However,  negative effects on  ecology and  navigability were  linked  to  this 
development. Further development, to secure  navigation as far as  Basel  (in 
Switzerland) began in 1906, on the basis of inter-governmental agreements, and 
finished in 1960. In 1974 and 1977 the two final weirs, with locks for generating 
electricity, were completed. 
In addition to its uses as a waterway and for supplying drinking water, the Rhine 
and its tributaries were also used for the supply of water to industry (in particular 
the chemicals industry), for energy generation and for draining waste-water from 
rapidly growing towns  and  cities,  from  industry and  mining.  In  the  course of 
development and the  increase of pollution,  one of the  main uses of the  water, 
for  fishing,  which was  still an  important source of protein for  the population  at 
the beginning of the 20th century, decreased. Traditional professional fishing could 
not compete against the newly developed industries. 
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At  the  beginning of the  20th  century,  the  developing  industry and  the growing 
population led to rapidly increasing pollution of water resources in some German 
tributaries of the Rhine catchment area. This led to tough competition for water 
among commercial and industrial users. The discharge of pollutants and untreated 
domestic wastewater resulted in environmental pollution and had negative effects 
on  human  health.  In  order to solve these problems,  industrial enterprises and 
municipalities along these waters formed associations and began to manage the 
water jointly, with the goal of ensuring a good supply of drinking water for the 
population both  in  a quantitative and qualitative sense,  and to meet the water 
requirements of industrial enterprises. These associations still exist today and 
operate water storage systems and extensive wastewater treatment facilities. 
2.2 International co-operation to protect waters 
Co-operation between the Rhine  riparian  states within the framework  of the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR) 
began in  1950, initially without the legal framework. In  1963, co-operation was 
given this legal foundation with a Convention. In 1973, the European Community 
acceded to this Convention. 
A characteristic of the ICPR and other international water protection commissic;>ns 
in which Germany is involved are the relatively small offices with few personnel. 
The ZKR, with its sovereign duties, has more than double the staff of the ICPR. 
In the water protection commissions the Member States work together within the 
framework of action plans and programmes. The programmes are elaborated and 
adopted jointly and subsequently implemented nationally. The focal points of this 
work include the rehabilitation of particularly polluted water hot spots, definition 
of reduction targets for priority pollutants, reduction of diffuse substance pollution, 
warning  and  alarm plans  in  the case of accidents,  flood  protection,  and 
renaturisation. 
These decisions are a matter of recommendations to the negotiating parties, not 
legally binding agreements. Over a period of several years, however, ministerial 
conferences of the Rhine riparian states were also held, the results of which have 
a high degree of political obligation. In  addition, special agreements were also 
adopted for some particularly important issues within the framework of the Rhine 
Protection Commission. Thus in 1976 a Chemical Convention was signed as well 
as  a Chloride Convention,  for which  an  additional convention  was adopted in 
1991. 
To  solve the asymmetrical conflicts brought about by  pollution problems (for 
example the  discharge of salt from  mines on the  Upper Rhine),  it has proved 
very beneficial that the Rhine riparian states not only co-operate with regard to 
waters, but that as EU Member States, they also have a considerably more wide­
reaching interest in co-operation. 
Co-operation on  the management of trans-boundary rivers in  the EU  is to  be 
intensified in future and more strongly formalised with the EU Water Framework 
Directive. 
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2.3 Other forms of trans-boundary co-operation 
As well as the form of governmental co-operation in commissions, there are also 
a multitude of  other forms of trans-boundary co-operation,  both  regionally and 
locally, for example hydro-electric power plants on the  Rhine,  municipal waste­
water treatment plants used jOintly by communities on the border, joint emergency 
drills on Lake  Constance, and co-operation agreements between companies of 
the German chemical industry and port authorities in the Netherlands. 
2.4 River basins as development areas 
In  the  broadest sense, the Rhine  riparian states all had  a comparative level  of 
industrialisation. On the whole, the uses of the water have developed in parallel, 
if not always in agreement. Conflicts and competition for use between the riparian 
states were primarily quality or pollution conflicts, rather than conflicts concerning 
shortages or levels. 
Today, approximately 50 million people live in the Rhine catchment area. Not only 
is the  river one of the  most navigated inland waterways  in  the  world,  but also 
extensive farming  and all  types of industrial production are carried out  in  its 
catchment area. Most German, Swiss and Dutch chemical production occurs in 
this catchment area. No  other river basin  in  the  world  has so  many chemical 
plants.  Numerous water works use  water from  the  Rhine  for  drinking water 
production to supply around 20 million people; industry uses water for production 
and cooling processes. 
After many years  of trans-boundary co-operation,  the  Rhine  river basin  has 
become a closely linked, highly developed economic area. Co-operation among 
the riparian states, regions, municipalities and citizens now comprises all forms 
of business and cultural exchanges. 
3. German initiatives for river basin co-operation 
Beginning with the Round Table on global water politics and co-operation for trans­
boundary water management, at  Petersberg,  Bonn in  March  1998, a series of 
conferences  has  been  organised,  to  promote  river basin co-operation,  by  the 
German Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and  Nuclear Safety and  the  Federal  Ministry for  Economic Co­
operation and  Development,  together with  the World  Bank.  Following  the 
Petersberg Round Table, these continued with a Round Table on the experience 
of international river and lake commissions, at Villa Borsig, Berlin, in September 
1998, and a regional meeting on  co-operation  in  river basins in the Baltic Sea 
region, at Vilnius, Lithuania, in June 1999. 
As well  as this series of conferences, Germany hosted a workshop on  the role 
of  bi- and  multi-national  commissions  in  trans-boundary waters in  Bonn  in 
September 1999 within  the framework of the  permanent Water Management 
Working Group of the UN/ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans­
boundary Watercourses and  International Lakes (ECE Water Convention). The 
principal outcomes of these meetings are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
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3.1  Petersberg Round Table, 1998 
The Petersberg Round Table produced the following recommendations: 
Water should be seen as a catalyst for co-operation. Water alone is 
not the cause of conflicts. Potential conflict arises only in conjunction 
with other causes. 
Critical factors for successful co-operation are 
(a) 	 a shared vision, 
(b) 	 sustained political commitment and broad-based public support, 
(c) 	 broad-based partnerships, and 
(d) 	 environmental management. 
Integrated approaches are  required.  which should focus on  co­
operation at the regional level. International river basin commissions 
are to be  supported as facilitators of communications, as a forum 
for  establishing shared goals and for proposing steps to  achieve 
these goals. 
It is important to strengthen institutional frameworks by 
(a) 	 enhancing confidence-building measures, 
(b) 	 strengthening legal instruments both  regionally and globally, 
(c) 	 strengthening the  capacity of government,  in  particular in 
transition and developing countries, and 
(d) 	 using economic instruments. 
3.2 Villa Borsig, Berlin, 1998 
Representatives of international river and lake commissions from different regions 
with  varying  tasks,  methods of working  and  structures were  invited  to  the 
exchange of experience at Villa Borsig. The fundamental lessons from the wide 
spectrum of experience presented included the following: 
A realistic view of the  development and environment context is 
required. 
Commissions are  not static in  their  nature. Conventions and 
agreements must give consideration to the possibility that the role 
of commissions could alter or be extended. 
There is no single model or approach to c"l-operation. 
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The  development process of conventions and  legal instruments is 
as  important as their substantive content. 
Common  institutions and  administrative structures should  be 
developed in a step-by-step process, corresponding to growing trust 
and increased experience. 
The representatives listed inter alia the following points as challenges and issues 
for the future: 
Changing the paradigm of supply-side management and shifting to 
integrated water resource management, which incorporates incentive 
for  demand-side management and  which  can  open  up  new 
opportunities for trans-boundary co-operation; 
Sharing benefits rather than  sharing water,  while  recognising that 
agreements on such  equitable sharing cannot be static; 
Promoting  efficient  water  use,  incorporating  the  aquatic 
environment's  need  for water,  taking  measures  to  prevent 
environmental pollution and to  minimise waste-water; 
Considering the effects of development projects on the lower course, 
estuary and  coastal  areas,  as  well  as  the particular ecological 
sensitivity of lakes and reservoirs: 
Relations  in  a  catchment area can  be  disrupted by  national 
development plans of riparian  states for exclusive use  of common 
water resources. Consideration should be given to the fact that the 
capacity to analyse and inform policy pOSitions and deCisions varies 
from country to country; 
Acquiring  and  sharing  information are fundamental  and critical 
factors for the development of trans-boundary waters. 
The participants recommended strengthening co-operation of commissions within 
the framework of the Global Water Partnership (GWP). 
3.3 Vilnius, 1999 
The  Round Table  at Vilnius,  on  experience of trans-boundary  co-operation for 
water management in the Baltic Sea region,  served the regional  reinforcement 
of the principles of co-operation elaborated in  Bonn and Berlin. 
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3.4 Bonn, 1999 
Representatives of river basin commissions from the  ECE  area took part in  the 
workshop of the joint commissions of the Water Management Working Group of 
the ECE Water Convention in Bonn in 1999. The conclusions included the following: 
Co-operation is possible only when parties recognise the principle 
of a balance of interests,  rather than  making their own  interests 
absolute priority. 
It is general experience that interests often appear incompatible for 
individual points. In such cases it can be helpful to deal with several 
problems together (package solutions). Incorporating issues outside 
water management is thus possible here. 
Building confidence by dividing more complex amendment processes 
into stages and small steps is very important. Every goal reached 
jointly increases the community feeling and makes subsequent co­
operation easier. 
With agreements, it sometimes makes more sense to choose a form 
of  regulation  which  is not necessarily  legally or internationally 
binding. POlitically binding arrangements in  a more compliant form 
lead to the development of greater confidence  when  these 
arrangements are complied with,  although they are not binding in 
the strictest sense of the word. 
4. Conclusions and theses 
Our own experiences domestically and the results of German initiatives for river 
basin co-operation raise the following points for discussion: 
The development of co-operation on trans-boundary river systems 
requires patience and perseverance. Co-operation in the Rhine basin 
has a tradition of almost 200 years. 
Co-operation in  river basins opens up  new,  additional  economic 
opportunities. The  founding  members of  the  European  Economic 
Community  (now the  European  Union)  are  all  countries from  the 
Rhine catchment area. 
Co-operation in  river basins should  not be  restricted only to 
government level. Co-operation on  many different levels supports 
economic integration and is beneficial to all riparian states. 
It is important to promote willingness and capacity for comprehensive 
information exchange between riparian states. 
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Various approaches can  be  used  to promote willingness to co­
operate among  riparian  states.  In  the  area of water management, 
approaches can  include jOint  projects for  water protection  (e.g. 
wastewater treatment), traditional water uses (e.g. fishing, transport) 
or regional development of new  uses (e.g.  dams for  generating 
energy or developing new irrigation projects). Successful  co­
operation projects are essential for further co-operation. 
The existence of a comparable level  of development is helpful for 
co-operation between riparian states of a trans-boundary water body. 
This  is not only for economic and  social aspects,  but  also for the 
strength of state institutions and the capacity to implement provisions 
and legal conditions included in the field of water management. 
Joint planning processes tend to be initiated for individual goals. This 
speaks well for step-by-step development. Area-wide and extensive 
water management planning contains more potential for conflict and 
is made easier by  incorporation into an  existing  area-wide and 
extensive co-operation framework. 
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Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,  Environment and Water Management, 

Vienna,  Austria 

Abstract 
Co-operation among the countries of the Danube basin has developed gradually 
over the past two centuries.  Navigation  was  an early subject of collaboration, 
because of the  river's  status as a major route  across much of southeast and 
central Europe.  Since the political changes in east Europe around 1990, a new 
era  of intensive collaboration has occurred,  with  the  focus  now largely on  the 
control of pollution, although navigation remains also an important concern.  The 
paper describes  the  various agreements,  implementing organisations and 
mechanisms, through which the countries of the basin are currently arranging to 
institutionalise their responses to  these shared concerns. 
1. Basic information 
The River Danube has the second largest catchment area in Europe, and in yearly 
flow it is equal to the Volga.  Along its 2,870 km long course from the Black Forest 
in Germany to the  Black Sea it touches 10 countries, and a total of 18 countries 
(Figure 1) contribute to its catchment area of 817,000 km"  (old planimetry).  About 
83  million  people  live  in  the  basin.  The  ethnic,  socio-economic and  religious 
background of the Danubian people is also quite diverse.  In  order to show the 
spread of the socio-economic side, Romania contains somewhat over a quarter 
of the  people  living  in  the  Danube basin,  but can  presently only contribute 5.7 
percent of the  GDP  (Gross Domestic Product,  expressed  in  hard currency,  on 
an exchange rate  basis) created in the basin.  In contrast to this,  Germany and 
Austria  have  11.0 percent and  9.3  percent,  respectively of the  Danubian 
population, but create at present 39.4 percent and  32.5percent,  respectively of 
the Danubian GDP.  Expressing the GDP in hard currency and on  an exchange 
rate  basis does not show the true picture, and a purchasing-power comparison 
would in certain respects give a better insight. 
Table 1 gives a general overview of key statistics of the basin, and their distribution 
among the  13 principal flow-contributing countries.  The ''flow at mouth" is shown 
as 6,860 m=/s.  It originates predominantly from high precipitation in the Alps, the 
Dinarian ridge (between the Adriatic Coast and the Sava River) and the Carpathian 
Mountains.  The  areas in  the  upstream states,  Germany and  Austria,  contribute 
strongly to  this  flow;  the  runoff "at  mouth" from  Austria alone  is  22  percent, 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Stalzer: International Co-operation in the Danube Basin 
The use of water as a basis of life and economic well-being for 83 million people 
has always been in  the forefront.  In  regard to the River Danube per se,  its 
dominant use as a waterway and the harvesting of its hydropower potential have 
gone hand-in-hand.  Along the main river this potential is big in its upper reach­
till downstream from Bratislava, and where the river carves its way through the 
Carpathian and Balkan mountain chain (the "Iron Gates"). 
Along the German  part of the Danube,  22  power-generating plants have  been 
erected,  with a total average capacity of 1,912 GWh per year;  betWeen  Austria 
and Germany 1 plant (850 GWh/year); along the Danube in Austria 9 plants (14,274 
GWh/year); downstream from Bratislava 1 plant (2,024 GWhlyear); and the 2 plants 
along  the  Iron Gates (between  Romania and Yugoslavia)  can  generate  11,400 
GWhlyear. Thus a generating capacity along the main river course of 28,546 GWh/ 
year exists, and more along the tributaries to River Danube. 
Inland navigation on the Danube had strong yearly increases, before the Kosovo 
Conflict. In Austria the transported load was 23 million tonnes/year.  Since the spring 
of 1999, transport along the whole river (between Kehlheim in Bavaria, Germany, 
and  the  Black Sea)  is not possible,  as three wrecked  bridges hinder inland 
navigation at Novi Sad (Yugoslavia).  Assuming that the transport route will be free 
again, it is predicted that by 2010, 35 Mtlyear will  be transported in Austria. 
2. Development of bi- and multi-lateral co-operation in  water 
management 
The River Danube has for millennia formed an element that has both separated, 
and acted as a border, but it has also united.  The Danube was, for example, the 
north-eastern border of the Roman Empire; the Sava-Danube line formed for more 
than two centuries the border between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires; the 
division of Europe during the time of the Cold War split the Danube basin; and 
the Kosovo Conflict has again shown it as a separating element. 
An uniting element of the River Danube has always been its capacity as a waterway. 
This fact entered into international treaties quite early.  During the Congress of Vienna 
(1815), free navigation on the Danube, as an international waterway was demanded. 
The Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, which controlled large parts of the river, were 
not happy about this demand, and it was not fully covered.  The transport volume 
started to increase only with the advent of the steam engine (and  later the diesel 
engine).  The actual internationalising of the Danube as a freely accessible waterway 
occurred after the Crimean War  in  1857.  In  1948, the  Soviet Union,  Romania, 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,  Hungary and  the Czechoslovak Republic signed a further 
international treaty covering inland navigation along the River Danube.  It is valid for 
the  whole navigable course of the river.  Since then the seat of the  Danube 
Commission (formally, the Danube Navigation Commission) has been at Budapest. 
The aims of the Danube Commission have been and are the following: 
Assuring free access to navigation on the River Danube, in line with 
the interests and sovereign rights of the riparian states; 
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Creating conditions favourable for navigation; 
Ensuring that the Contracting Parties to the Convention keep their 
national courses of the  River Danube navigable; 
Checking and unifying nautical, legal and technical norms. 
The number of Contracting Parties has increased since 1948, and it also changed. 
Austria became a Contracting Party. Then, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
first  Ukraine and later Moldova (after having  bought 900  m of  shoreline from 
Ukraine) joined, as well  as Germany, and with  the disintegration of the former 
Federation  of Yugoslavia,  Croatia.  The  separation  of  Czechoslovakia into the 
Czech Republic (non-riparian along the  river Danube) and Slovakia transferred 
Czechoslovakia's rights to Slovakia. The accession of Germany also brought a 
re-definition of the navigable part of the River Danube.  It now begins at Kehlheim 
(in Germany) and goes via the Sulina Channel in  Romania to the Black Sea. 
With the  opening of the Main-Danube Channel,  (connecting the Danube to the 
River Main  which  in  turn  flows into the  Rhine),  a waterway  now  exists that 
stretches from the North Sea to the Black Sea.  As soon as the three wrecked 
bridges at Novi Sad are cleared (which will be undertaken with European Union 
money) it will again be fully navigable. 
Issues of floods  and  flood protection,  irrigation and drainage,  and  river 
engineering have usually been dealt with bilaterally (or small-scale multilaterally) 
between th~ neighbouring states concerned.  The treaties, therefore, were called 
"border treaties; and  relevant commissions were  charged to deal  with  such 
"border issues;'  One of the first such treaties in the  Danube basin was  set up 
between the  Kingdom  of Bavaria and the  Austrian  Monarchy in  1820.  Such 
bilateral treaties were, since 1945, systematically transformed into state treaties 
to be implemented by Joint Commissions.  The relevant "frame" for such treaties 
varies- they could refer to the  border section of a river,  to  parts of the states 
concerned,  but also to  parts of catchment areas.  Examples  include treaties 
between  Austria  and Czech  Republic,  Austria and  Slovakia,  Slovenia and 
Hungary, Hungary and Romania, Slovenia and Croatia, and Croatia and Hungary. 
For hydropower uses specific bilateral treaties, dealing with a relevant power station, 
have been established.  Examples of this include hydropower use along the border 
section  of the  River Inn,  a tributary between  Austria  and  Germany,  or  the 
hydropower stations along the Iron Gates between Yugoslavia and Romania.  One 
such international treaty,  namely the one between Hungary and Slovakia on the 
hydropower use below Bratislava and  above  Nagymaros in  Hungary,  became 
internationally known by the one-sided unwillingness of Hungary to fulfil it. 
The sufficient quantitative availability of water resources initially limited bilateral and 
international co-operation to questions of navigation, flood protection and forecast, 
defining of state borders and marking them in nature, irrigation and drainage, alerting 
in  case of accidents and other emergencies,  etc.  Only  with  increased economic 
growth, that was linked with increased material fluxes and an increased input of 
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matter into the environment, the trans-boundary issues of water pollution control 
and the protection of aquatic life have been recognised. 
In 1991, a trilateral treaty between Austria, the European Community and Germany 
entered into force.  This treaty was the first one in the  upper Danube basin that 
actually covered issues of water pollution control and the protection of aquatic life 
through a type of "basin  approach" and  by  co-ordinating the  objectives to  be 
achieved by means of emission limitations, the fixing of in-stream targets in flowing 
water-bodies,  the  agreeing  of  the  validity of the  combined approach,  and  by 
introducing an assessment of polluting discharges via an inventory. 
3. International co-operation in water management 
3.1  Initial period 
Regional multilateral and basin-wide international agreements did not come into 
being due to the geopolitical cleavage during the period of the Cold War.  With 
the exception of  navigation on the River Danube.  international co-operation in 
the field of water management was confined to the scientific level, such as the 
International Association on  Danube  Research  (lAD),  and the  International 
Hydrological Decade under UNESCO. which gave rise to the IHP/OHP-Danube. 
lAD was founded  in  1956,  under the  umbrella of the  Societas Internationalis 
Limnologiae (SIL:  International Society for Fluvial  Studies); it  enabled the 
exchange of experience and views across the "Iron Curtain." 
The co-operation in the frame of IHP/OHP-Danube came into being after the end 
of the International Hydrological Decade, 1965-1974; it  is bound into the work 
of the UN  system  (UNESCO; WMO).  This international programme links 
colleagues from the water field working in administration, universities and SCientific 
research institutes, and in their co-operation they cover issues of hydrology, flood 
forecasts, the riverine regime and sediment transport in the whole Danube basin. 
Further initiatives came after the geo-political changes accompanying the dissolution 
of the Soviet  Union.  Examples were the Arbeitsgemeinschaft  Donaulander,  an 
association of provinces or states along the Danube (the driving forces were Bavaria, 
Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Vienna and regions along the River Danube) in 1990, 
and Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wasserwerke im Donau-Einzugsgebiet 
(IAWD). a co-operating body of the water works organisations, in  1993. 
Initiatives started at  national  level just before,  during or after 1990, are 
summarised in the following sections. 
3.2 Bucharest Declaration 
The Bucharest Declaration was signed in 1985; its aim was to arrive at multilateral 
co-operation along the  main course of  River Danube.  The activities 01  the 
Bucharest Declaration foresaw the following issues: 
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The assessment of water quality at "border profiles," which may be a 
crossing of the river by the border, or, where the border is in-stream, 
at the beginning or the end of such in-stream border stretches; 
The development of and agreeing on methods for arriving at national 
River Danube-related water balances, and using the associated data 
to arrive at a water balance for the whole Danube basin; 
The exchange of national predictions for floods and ice hazards. 
The Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and  Sustainable Use of the 
Danube River (Danube River Protection Convention, DRPC)-presented in detail 
in  section  4,  below-stated that the work achieved  in  the  framework of the 
Bucharest Declaration would be taken over into the framework of the DRPC, and 
this has been undertaken in 2000. 
3.3 Helsinki Convention 
Based on  agreements reached  in  the CSCE  (Council  for  Security and  Co­
operation in Europe) Conference on the Environment at Sofia (Bulgaria) in 1989, 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-boundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (known as the Helsinki Convention) was signed  in  1992 at 
Helsinki (Finland).  This is a Framework Convention, and  it holds all the kernel 
elements of a modern tool for water (quality) management, such as the combined 
approach between the emission and the in-stream principles, combating polluting 
discharges at source,  the  preventive  principle,  the  non-allowance of shifting 
pollution from  one environmental sector (for example,  water)  into another (for 
example, air), and the need for applying, for example, best available practice in 
agriculture.  This Helsinki Convention is thus a framework that urges the states 
riparian to international river basins or bordering international lakes to arrive at 
Conventions for international co-operation, applied to the respective river basin. 
3.4 Environmental Programme for the Danube River Basin (EPDRB) 
The formulation of the Danube  River Protection Convention (DR PC)  started in 
1990.  Parallel  to this the  multilaterally active  donors (knowing that,  with  the 
geopolitical changes of 1989/90, a large amount of work was to be undertaken) 
agreed to bundle their activities, and  they thus created  at an  operational level 
the Environmental Programme for the Danube River Basin (EPDRB). 
The main  donors were the  European Union,  through  the  Phare-Multicountry 
Programme and the Tacis Programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth 
of Independent States: the ex-members of the Soviet Union), the UN 1World Bank 
System,  through  the Global  Environmental  Facility  (GEF),  and  smaller donors 
supplemented.  EPDRB started work in 1992. The EPDRB Task Force was the formal 
decision-making forum on activities to be undertaken, and it united the donors (EU; 
UN-WB-GEF; European Investment Bank; European  Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development; and others), the states from the Danube basin and NGOs.  The states 
eligible for donor funding were all the "statesin transition:'  The implementation 
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of the programmes, which had also to be agreed upon by the donors, was in the 
hands of the  Programme Co-ordination  Unit (PCU),  initially based  at  Brussels 
and from August 1994 to the end of October 2000 at Vienna. 
The activities initiated covered: 
support for  the  setting-up of institutions charged with  in-stream 
monitoring (including related quality control and data management) 
and the setting-up of the warning system; 
preparation and  implementation of  regional studies, feasibility and 
pre-investment studies; 
writing of and agreeing on  the  Strategic Action  Plan  (SAP)  1994, 
which introduced water pollution control strategies and was signed 
at a Ministerial Conference at Bucharest; 
implementation of the SAP via selected projects; 
funding of the PCU. 
The  SAP  itself has the following  core  elements,  in  line with the  Danube River 
Protection Convention (DRPC), which in 1994 had not yet entered into force: 
improving of aquatic ecosystems and  biological  diversity in  the 
Danube river basin,  including reduction of the pollution discharged 
through the River Danube into the Black Sea; 
preserving and improving of deficits in  the  fields of water quantity 
and water quality in the Danube river basin; 
avoiding negative impacts of accidents; 
improving regional co-operation in water management. 
In the period 1992 to 2000 about US$50 million were donated to eligible states, 
with the biggest donor being the PharefTacis programmes,  followed by UNDPI 
GEF, and other donors.  With the entry into force of the International Commission 
for the  Protection  of the  Danube  River (ICPDR: see  section 4),  all  the  work 
achieved under EPDRB  has been transferred to the  activities of the  ICPDR; it 
will have to be fully integrated in the years in front of us. 
3.5 UNDP/GEF: River Danube Pollution Reduction Programme 
As mentioned above, UNDP/GEF also participated in the EPDRB.  In the period 1997 
to 1999, and also in implementing parts of the SAP 1994, the River Danube Pollution 
Reduction Programme (RDPRP) was funded by UNDP/GEF in eligible states; these 
eligible states were all the "countries in transition" (including the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia),  but not Austria and Germany.  The  main  items of this work related  to 
the assessment-by means of national  review  workshops,  and  with  donor 
support to national experts-of polluting discharges (separately for municipal, 
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industrial and agricultural point-source discharges), their allocation in project files, 
and the specifying of the relevant socio-economic frame, including the possibilities 
of funding the implementation of projects. The files contain information not only 
on point-source discharges, but also on wetland projects, and hints on how the 
efficiency of national administrations in the water field could be improved through 
capacity building.  The involvement and integration of national experts and  of 
active NGOs into the whole process was carefully considered. 
All states in the basin participated in  a Trans-boundary Analysis Workshop; the 
aim of which was the prioritising of the projects according to agreed criteria, such 
as efficiency,  impact on  uses or wetlands or protected areas,  and  also trans­
boundary transfer of pollution.  The Danube Water Quality Model, set up in this 
project,  with all  its  remaining  deficiencies, was a first trial to utilise such  tool, 
and thus to contribute to the decision-making process. 
The  RDPRP was finished in  1999, with the following  results: 
A  knowledge base for  priority issues of pollution  loads and the 
environment in the Danube river basin, including a list of hot spots 
from the main pollution sources; 
The Danube Water Quality Model to give a first estimate, and thus 
to evaluate the flow of nitrogen and phosphorus through the Danube 
basin into the Black Sea; 
A revised Strategic Action  Plan, prepared as a review of the policy 
for the Protection of the Danube river basin on the basis of existing 
analytical  documents-National Review  Reports and  National 
Planning Workshop Reports; 
A feasibility study on  possible new regional financing mechanisms, 
resulting in a proposal for the creation of a Danube Environmental 
Financing Facility; 
A project Database containing 421  projects, covering 246 hot spots 
in the Danube river basin, comprising 192 municipal, 113 industrial, 
67 agricultural,  29  wetland-restoration projects and  20  projects 
classified as general  measures,  available for financing  institutions 
and donor organisations. 
4.  Danube River Protection Convention 
Based on the UN-ECE-Helsinki Convention of 1992, it was possible at the end of 
June  1994 to sign the Convention on  Co-operation for the 'Protection and 
Sustainable Use of the Danube River (Danube River Protection Convention: DRPC) 
in  Sofia, in the context of a Ministerial Conference. 
The  DRPC  entered into force  on  22  October 1998,  after  receiving  the  required 
nine relevant ratifications.  The DRPC is directly open to all the states in the Danube 
basin that hold areas above 2,000 km- of the Danube's catchment area and  are 
internationally recognised, plus those international bodies to which those Danube 
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internationally recognised, plus those international bodies to which those Danube 
basin states have transferred matters of competence contained in the DRPC.  By 
autumn of 2000,  the following states have  become Contracting Parties (CPs): 
Austria,  Bulgaria, Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Hungary,  Moldova, 
Romania,  Slovakia,  and  Slovenia.  The European Community  is  also a  CP. 
Ukraine is a signatory, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is an observing state.  Yugoslavia 
has asked for access to the convention, and the granting of this will depend on 
further political developments.  This in the end will mean that 13 of the 18 states 
that contribute to the catchment area of the River Danube will hopefully be co­
operating in the future under the common roof of the DRPC. 
The objectives of the DRPC can be summarised as follows: 
Striving towards sustainable and equitable water management in the 
Danube river basin; 
Co-operating on  fundamental  water management issues in  order to 
maintain and improve the aquatic environment in the Danube river basin; 
Combating water pollution with the aim of sustainability; 
Utilising the water resources potential for municipal, industrial and 
agricultural needs, and also taking care of the aquatic ecology; 
Maintaining and improving the status of aquatic ecosystems. 
In  order to achieve these objectives, the following  general clauses have been 
introduced: 
Prevention, control and reduction of trans-boundary impacts; 

Specific water resources protection measures; 

Emission limitations and water quality objectives and criteria; 





Obligations of reporting; 

Exchange of information; 





The operational implementation of the DRPC is in the hands of the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (lCPDR), which was created 
with the entry into force of the DRPC.  Every Contracting Party has full power to 
participate in the decision-making process of the ICPDA.  The ICPDR has also 
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given access to its meetings to accredited observers.  The Chair in the ICPDR 
rotates yearly, according to the alphabet (in English).  The permanent supporting 
body of the ICPDR is the Permanent Secretariat, led by the Executive Secretary. 
The Secretariat has to support all the bodies, i.e. the ICPDR, Expert Groups, etc. 
At present the ICPDR has the following Expert Groups: 
AEPWSJEG: Accident Emergency Prevention and Warning System Expert Group. 
It was installed initially under the EPDRB. The main issues it has to cover relate 
to the assessment and prevention of accidental risks and alerting in case of trans­
boundary accidents and emergency situations. 
MLiMlEG: Monitoring Laboratory and Information Management Expert Group.  It 
had also initially been installed under the EPDRB.  The thrust of its work is on in­
stream water quality, I.e. it has to deal with the Trans-national Monitoring Network 
(TNMN), related analytical questions, and related data handling and assessment. 
EMIS/EG: Emissions Expert Group.  Its core tasks are the assessing and 
documentation of polluting discharges (point source and non-point source) and 
follow-up  of the  list of projects stemming from the River Danube  Pollution 
Reduction Programme. 
SJEG: Strategic Expert Group.  It is charged to deal with legal and special issues, 
in order to prepare decisions by the ICPDR. 
Ad hoc EG  WFD/RBM.  This is the Group charged to deal with the preparations 
needed for the implementation of the EC Water Framework Directive (see section 
5). 
In order to ensure an optimal link between the  EPDRB and the community of 
multilaterally active international donors. the ICPDR suggested that the former Task 
Force of the EPDRB be re-instituted as a special supportive body under the DRPC, 
and that it be called Programme Management Task Force (PMTF).  Its membership 
comprises nationally delegated members (Head of Delegation; representative of 
the state charged to co-ordinate national funding issues). the representatives from 
the donor community,  IFls and NGOs.  The tasks of the  PMTF comprise co­
ordination  and implementation of multilaterally fundable activities, and the 
development of funding schemes for project implementation. The chair of the PMTF 
has, as yet, been with a representative of the donor community. 
After having already co-operated in the interim period,  i.e. before the DRPC 
entered into force,  and having had the chance to utilise work funded by the 
EPDRB, the following results have been achieved: 
Full operation of the Trans-national  Monitoring Network.  The first 
yearbook of the TNMN covering all quality data of the year 1996 was 
prepared. 
Preparation of Emission  Inventories of municipal and industrial 
discharges, allocated by states and by river sub-basins. 
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Recommendation concerning treatment of municipal wastewater with 
suggestions to  implement the  EC  Urban Wastewater Directive, 
including nutrient removal. 
Guidelines for the monitoring of wastewater discharges, with a view 
to  develop a  harmonised approach for future  monitoring.  The 
guidelines cover monitoring by Authority, self-monitoring, the storing 
of samples, the use of standards for sampling and analysis, including 
data management and reporting to the ICPDR every five years. 
Operation of the  Danube accidental  emergency warning  system 
(AEWS).  In  1999 the AEWS  was  working over almost the whole 
Danube basin,  except the territories of  Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Yugoslavia. The  AEWS  transmitted  information on five  serious 
accidents in  1999. 
Installation of the information systems of the ICPDR with a basic level 
of water-related information from countries situated in the Danube river 
basin. The homepage of DANUBIS is http://www.icpdr.org/danubis. 
International Co-operation. 
Implementation of the UNDP/GEF Pollution Reduction Programme. 
EU PHAREITACIS multi-country programme with main components 
like a feasibility study for regional centres for training of managers 
and operators of wastewater treatment plants, support of action for 
MLiM-EG and technical assistance to  EMIS-EG and so on. 
Co-operation with the UNEP/OCHA Balkan Task Force,  initiated and 
guided by UNEP and ICPDA.  An international expert team conducted 
a sampling campaign  in  the vicinity of the war-damaged sites along 
the Danube.  On the basis of this campaign, conclusions concerning 
the sources of pollution, the effects on environment and human lives, 
and the necessities of reducing the pollution were adopted. 
Co-operation between  the  International Commission for  the 
Protection of the Black Sea (ICPBS) and the ICPDR with an ad hoc 
technical expert group set  up  from  both  organisations,  and the 
development of a memorandum of  understanding covering several 
strategiC goals including: restoring the ecosystems of the Black Sea 
states to the condition of 1996; the long-term goal in the whole Black 
Sea  basin to  reduce  the  loads of nutrients and hazardous 
substances; to assess the ecological status of the Black Sea; and 
to increase the comparability of the data base. 
5. The legal frame of the European Community: The EC Water 
Framework Directive 
Within the European Union (legally: the European Community) agreement about 
a revision of the legal framework in the field of water protection policy has been 
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achieved by the passing of the  EC Water Framework  Directive in the European 
Parliament, and by the agreement of the Council of Ministers.  By the same token 
the enlargement of the  European  Union  relates to six states (Bulgaria,  Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) that hold substantial territories 
in the Danube basin, and Poland is the Th  riparian state of the basin.  Thus the 
territorial frame of the European Union, within which the existing rules have to be 
applied will be greatly expanded.  As yet. only Austria, Germany and Italy, out of 
the  18 states within the  basin,  are  European  Union  member states,  but if the 
accession of all the states that have applied for membership proceeds, more than 
75 percent of the catchment area of the River Danube-will fall under the jurisdiction 
of the European Union.  Other states, for example,  Switzerland,  hold association 
agreements with the European Union.  This in the end will  mean that the already 
existing binding legal obligations at the level of the European Union will over time 
expand into the Danube basin.  They will for sure determine future developments 
in the field of water management and river basin management in the Danube basin. 
European water policy  is in  process of being  reorganised  via the  already 
mentioned  EU  Water  Framework Directive.  It is  the  aim  of this  Directive to 
establish a framework of order for achieving a good status in  European waters. 
By  doing so,  further deterioration  is  to  be avoided  and  the  protection  and 
improvement of the situation of aquatic ecosystems, and of terrestrial ecosystems 
directly depending on  them with  regard to their water regime,  is to be achieved. 
The sustainable use of water based on long-term protection of existing resources 
is to be  promoted, and the effects 'of floods and droughts are to be  reduced. 
The  EU  Water  Framework  Directive  defines by  the term "good status" a 
comprehensive protection of water resources, which 
in surface waters, comprises a good ecological status, involving the 
quality of the structure and the functioning of aquatic ecosystems, 
and  good  chemical  status,  which  respects the quality aims to be 
defined, and 
in groundwater, corresponds to the quantitative and physico-chemical 
quality criteria. 
In artificial or heavily modified water bodies, however, not a "good status," but a 
"good ecological potential" has to be  guaranteed.  Artificial or heavily modified 
water bodies can  be  made known  by  EU  member states,  where changes of 
artificial or altered characteristics of the water-body have effects on the broader 
environment, on shipping, on recreational areas, on the purposes for which water 
is stored-such as, for example, power generation, drinking water supply or other 
type of use-on regulations, on flood protection, on irrigation, on  land drainage 
or on human development. 
With this definition-and thus for waters characterised by excessive human activity­
feasible quality aims can be formulated.  Thus, particularly in areas and landscapes 
with  intensive  human  use in  water resources  management,  future-oriented 
improvements in  the ecological  sector can  be  articulated,  and  for this reason, 
systematic maintenance or improvement of aquatic ecosystems can be expected. 
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Consequently, from  the point of view of water resources management, the 
implementation of the targets of the Water Framework Directive is to be adjusted 
to the relevant  river basin, and thus is to be co-ordinated accordingly within this 
river basin.  Although every EU member state is responsible for the implementation 
of the Framework Directive, the activities relevant for water resources management 
are to be harmonised and co-ordinated in  trans-boundary river catchment areas. 
The instruments for such co-ordination can be chosen by the states concerned; 
however, relying on existing bilateral or multilateral treaties is possible.  The ICPDR 
might be, for instance, the international co-operation body, but before deciding upon 
this future function the structure of the River Basin Management Plan  has to be 
developed, including defining the national duties according to the international level. 
Via the establishment of river management plans, in which-apart from a presentation 
of the characteristics of the  river basin  unit-there also has to be an  analysis of 
anthropogenic activities and a documentation of protection areas as well as of control 
and monitoring networks, a uniform planning instrument for European water systems 
is to be developed.  For the implementation of measures to achieve the agreed quality 
targets or other criteria,  relevant programmes of measures have to be  developed 
and must be presented in  the management plans as well.  The Water Framework 
Directive, however, also provides that there has to be participation of the public in 
this process of planning water resources management.  This requires relevant 
documentation, which must also indicate the competent authorities.  Homogeneous 
monitoring of surface water, groundwater, and of protected areas has to be developed. 
The results of this not only have to serve the respective national levels; they also 
have to serve the  European  Union level,  in  striving for agreed-upon targets. 
Additionally, the principle of recovery of cost and the polluter-pays principle are not 
only to be incorporated, but also implemented accordingly.  Use has also to be made 
of the combined approach-i.e., reducing the emissions and at the same time striving 
to reach quality targets as steering instruments. 
Practically,  the Water Framework Directive represents a generation treaty with 
its present deadlines for presenting management plans and targets for a good 
status,  which,  in  the  long  run,  is intended to guarantee sustainable water 
resources management, characterised by maintaining a possibly near-natural in­
stream quality, and respecting the natural water resources. 
The European Community tries to support non-members by association agreements 
and other measures with a view to the administrative situation of these states in their 
struggle towards European harmonisation.  With regard to the Danube river basin, 
this holds particularly true for various EU  PHARE and TACIS programmes, which, 
so far, have been administered through the Environmental Programme for the Danube 
river basin.  The development in  the  Danube basin thus is  supported not only by 
legal instruments. but also by politically driven spending of financial means. 
6. What else to come? 
In the Danube basin there are a lot of ideas and stimuli in order to arrive at a co­
ordinated approach in the field of water pollution control and water management. 
The geo-political changes in the period 19a9 to 1990 and the expansion of the 
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European Union have opened new dimensions for co-operation.  This co-operation 
will have to be well targeted in  regard to the support it gets and how it should be 
developed.  The main  legal  framework  for  this  co-operation  will  be  that of the 
European  Union, and  in  this the  EC Water Framework Directive (WFD)  is  in  the 
forefront.  The WFD is addressed to EU member states.  It seeks to arrive within a 
set timeframe at a River Basin  Management (RBM)  Plan,  where "River Basin 
District" covers the basin of a river that discharges into a receiving sea.  The water 
bodies, which such RBM  Plans will have to deal with, comprise all surface water 
bodies, including transitional waters and a part of the relevant shelf area, plus all 
groundwater.  After acceptance by the Commission of the European Communities, 
the contents of this RBM  Plan will be legally binding, and will subsequently have 
to be implemented within a set timeframe.  One important task contained in  the 
WFD is to ensure the needed co-ordination. In international river basins-like the 
Danube river basin-this co-ordination will be very demanding. 
The EC WFD will not only bring obligations; it will also bring new challenges and 
new chances.  This refers primarily to the assuring of truly sustained availability 
of the resource "water" within the given aquatic ecological frame for the people 
in  the  Danube basin,  and,  by  the same  token,  agreed economic development 
under sustained environmental conditions. 
Referring to the Berlin  International Round Table,  the following challenges can 
be formulated for the Danube river basin: 
The state of knowledge on the relations in aquatic ecosystems, from 
the  river corridors to the receiving  rivers,  apart from  proven  water 
protection measures such as the reduction of point loads, requires 
new strategies and approaches for reducing diffuse loads. 
The pathways and  the transport mechanisms of pollution  loads in 
large river basins, such as  the Danube river basin, are active for a 
long  time,  sometimes  for  decades.  Thus,  aiming at  sustainability 
requires long-range planning, oriented far into the future. 
Trans-boundary water management must consider the changes of 
socio-political values and  has to be adjusted to  the sustainable 
treatment of the resource water.  Individual interests, such as claims 
for utilisation and needs for protection, have to be adjusted through 
integral water resources management. 
International water commissions offer themselves as the bodies to 
deal with trans-boundary water resources management.  In order to 
guarantee the necessary co-ordination, however, they require 
•  careful shaping of administrative structures; 
•  sustainable financing of the necessary administration; 
•  national and external support. 
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International co-operation for guaranteeing sustainable water 
management, however,  needs 
agreement  on the meaning of terms, and use of language 
by which it can be made sure that each partner understands 
the same; 

trust and openness on  the part of all partners to establish 

monitoring and information systems; 

a definition of common criteria for data, their 

interpretation and the measures to be taken, derived from 

agreed data interpretation. 

Trans-boundary water management must be based on  harmonised 
targets such as sustainability and  safeguarding  of the natural 
framework conditions as regards quantity and quality.  The necessary 
basic  principles like the  precautionary principle, the polluter-pays 
principle, the willingness to cover the costs and cost efficiency, etc., 
have to be incorporated.  Water resources management itself has 
to move from the supply side to the management of actual demand. 
A modern water protection policy needs participation of the public 
and related transparency. 
Water protection  is a task of the community and  serves public 
welfare.  Its implementation needs a levelling out of burdens,  and 
national as well as international support. 
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Abstract 
The  paper describes  recent progress by states of the  Southern African 
Development Community towards  establishing an agreed set of rules and 
institutions for the management of trans-boundary river systems.  A protocol was 
established initially among 10 states of the region in  1995, and was further revised 
in 2000.  The paper presents the general principles underlying the protocol, and 
the special provisions incorporated into the revised version. 
Institutions established in connection with the implementation of  the protocol are 
discussed, in particular the role of the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit.  The paper 
ends with a short presentation of progress in  formulating a  Regional Strategic 
Action Plan. 
1. Background 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional grouping 
of 14 sovereign member states with one common goal of regional integration on 
the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit for all peoples of the region.  The 
grouping was formalised by the signing of the declaration and treaty (the SADC 
Treaty) on 27 August 1992Jn Windhoek, Namibia by the then 10 member states, 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The other four member states,  Mauritius, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Seychelles and South Africa joined later by accession to 
the treaty.  The treaty is  the  single most important document that outlines the 
vision, overall objectives and institutional framework of SA  DC. 
Article 22  (1)  of the Treaty provides for member states to  conclude a series of 
protocols to spell out the objectives, scope of and institutional mechanisms for co­
operation and integration.  These protocols are developed, negotiated and agreed 
upon, covering various areas of co-operation, identified in article 21  (3) of the treaty. 
Each protocol, after negotiation by member states and approval and Signing by a 
summit, becomes an  integral part of the treaty.  The SADC Protocol on  Shared 
Watercourse Systems is based on this provision and it takes its power from it. 
This protocol was developed as an offshoot of the development of one of the SADC 
projects under a  broad programme called the Zambezi  River Action  Plan 
(ZACPLAN).  The programme is made up of 19 projects caned ZACPLAN Projects 
(ZACPROs in short).  Project number two of the programme, ZACPRO 2 was the 
343 Mokuoane: Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community 
Development of an  Institutional and Legal Framework for the Management of the 
Zambezi  River  Basin.  It  was  during the process of developing this  project that 
member states felt that it would be improper to  develop legal instruments for one 
basin,  when  there was no  over-arching legal  framework for the  management of 
shared river basins within the SADC region.  This was  done in  consonance with 
the provisions of the then newly signed treaty establishing SADC, as outlined above. 
After several consultations and negotiations, starting in  1993, the protocol was 
finally signed by  10 member states, Botswana, Lesotho,  Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia,  South  Africa,  Swaziland, Tanzania,  Zambia and Zimbabwe,  in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, on 28 August 1995. The development process had 
also included the carrying out of an analysis of national water legislation in SADC 
member states.  The process of ratification was then initiated and the protocol 
came into force on 29 September 1998, after being ratified by the two-thirds of 
the Signatory member states. 
In  the interim  period  other developments took place which  will  have a lasting 
impact on  the protocol  and its  implementation.  The  most important of these 
developments was the establishment of a distinct and  dedicated Water Sector 
Co-ordinating Unit by Council and Summit at their meeting in Maseru, Lesotho, 
in  August  1996.  Prior to the  establishment of the Water Sector Co-ordinating 
Unit, regional water resources issues were carried out under the auspices of the 
SADC Environment and Land  Management Sector. 
The second development was the adoption of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in April 1997. 
These and other developments have led to significant amendments to the protocol 
as will be highlighted in the following paragraphs and sections below.  A Protocol 
Implementation Programme was also developed during the process of ratification, 
was approved by the Water Resources Technical Committee in  1997, and has 
been included within the context of the  Regional  StrategiC  Action  Plan on 
Integrated Water Resources Development and Management. 
2.  Provisions of the protocol and their implications 
2.1  Outline 
The  SADC Protocol  on  Shared Watercourse  Systems,  the first-ever-sectoral  legal 
instrument in SADC, was greatly influenced by various international water law instruments 
such as the  Helsinki  rules,  the Dublin  Principles,  and  Agenda  21.  It recognises the 
international consensus on  a number of concepts  and  principles  related  to water 
resources development and management in an environmentally sound manner. 
The SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems covers all uses of surface 
water, including agricultural, domestic, industrial, and navigational uses.  It follows 
principles laid out in international rules and conventions and is premised on  the 
effort to maintain a balance between development needs in the national interest 
of member countries, and the needs for conservation al'ld sustainable development. 
It aims to achieve and maintain close co-operation between member countries. 
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The protocol sets out rights and obligations of member states in respect of shared 
watercourse systems in the SADC region.  The protocol can be divided into four 
main sections composing a total of  17 articles.  These main sections are: 
Interpretation of terms and concepts; 
General principles; 
Institutional framework for implementation; 
Monitoring and dispute settlement. 
2.2 Interpretation of terms and concepts 
This section interprets the various terms and concepts that are used in the body 
of the protocol in order that there can never be  misinterpretation of these terms 
as they are read  in  the  protocol.  About  14  concepts  and  terms are  defined, 
covering areas of uses, and physical and management aspects of the protocol. 
These form  a very  important part of the protocol  especially  in  relation  to  its 
implementation and dispute settlement. 
This section was a subject of long and  serious discussions and  negotiations 
during the development of the protocol and during the subsequent amendment 
process.  To  this effect. three negotiations and consensus-building workshops 
were held, to try to come up with a set of definitions that would be acceptable to 
all parties, and would  portray the meanings of concepts and  terms,  capturing 
the spirit of the protocol and the treaty.  As has been mentioned above, some of 
the concepts take cognisance of and bear a strong influence of international legal 
instruments on the subject. 
As  a result of the amendment process,  several  terms  have  been  enhanced  or 
replaced  by  others that give  a  better representation  of the  provisions  of the 
protocol.  For instance the terms "basin", "basin state", and "drainage basin" have 
been  replaced  by  the  new  concepts of "watercourse" and  "watercourse  state" 
which by definition covers the intended meanings ascribed to them.  Other new 
terms have  been  introduced or their meanings expanded and  subsequently 
defined, such as "environmental use." 
2.3 General principles 
The following is a summary of the general principles that guide the protocol and 
its implementation arrangements. 
Respect  for the  sovereignty of member states  in  the  utilisation of 
shared watercourse. 
This principle  recognises the  right  of  member states to develop 
resources of shared watercourses within their territory.  The principle 
stipulates, without necessarily being restrictive, the uses to which these 
waters can be put.  These include agricultural, domestic, industrial, 
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and navigational uses.  This differs slightly from the United Nations 
Convention,  in  that  it  includes  navigational  uses.  Other uses are 
introduced, such as "environmental use" to enhance the practicality 
of this principle, especially for implementation. 
Application of rules  of general  or customary  international  law, 
community of interest and equitable utilisation. 
Member states party to the  protocol  undertake to  apply in  their 
respective water laws existing rules of customary international law, 
as well as respecting the community of interest in equitable utilisation 
of the shared watercourses.  This is an important recognition of the 
responsibility of member states towards equitable utilisation of the 
resources of shared watercourses. 
Maintaining a proper balance between development and environment 
protection and conservation. 
This is a principle that recognises the importance of member states 
developing their resources in  order to uplift the livelihoods of their 
citizens,  while on  the  other hand protecting the  environment that 
yields the resources.  Member states here undertake to apply the 
principle of sustainable development. 
Co-operation on joint projects and  studies. 
This principle is  in  support of  the  overall  objective  of  SADC  of  co­
operation in various fields of economic development.  This is important 
to prevent potential conflicts that might arise as a result of uncoordinated 
development of shared watercourse systems and competing demands. 
Information and data sharing. 
This is strongly related to the above principle and is aimed at levelling 
the  playing  field  and  creating  an  enabling  environment for 
negotiations for equitable utilisation of  shared watercourses.  The 
development of the SADC  Hydrological Cycle  Observing Systems 
(SADC-HYCOS) will  go a long  way  in trying to address this issue. 
Information  sharing  is  central  to the co-operation and  economic 
integration envisaged by the treaty. 
Equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared watercourse systems. 
Here member states undertake to use  the  resources of shared 
watercourse systems in  an  equitable and reasonable manner.  This 
is in  line  with  international water law principles such as the Helsinki 
rules  and  the  UN  Convention.  Several aspects  must  be taken  into 
consideration  in  order to  achieve equity  and  reasonable sharing. 
Some  of these  are the  natural  physical  characteristics of the 
watercourse, social and economic needs, existing and potential effects 
of the intended use, and guidelines and agreed standards of use. 
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Use of discharge and abstraction permits or licences. 
This confers some responsibility on  member states to  regulate the 
use of the watercourse to ensure that adequate protection is given 
to  the  resource.  This is  already a practice in  most member states 
although the level of enforcement differs from one state to the next. 
This principle supports the  pOlluter-pays  principle that is gaining 
acceptance in  the  global water sector.  Monitoring for compliance 
and enforcement at the  national level  is very important for this to 
have any significant impact at a regional level. 
Obligation  to  notify about emergency situation,  protection against 
pollution and use of installations for peaceful purposes. 
Signatories to  the  protocol  have  responsibility to  notify potentially 
affected states about an emergency that originates in their territory 
and to take any necessary measures to ameliorate the impact of the 
situation. 
The principles are covered under the last paragraph of the Article 2 
of the protocol.  If the above principles are adhered to,  the protocol 
will be easily implemented at both national and regional levels. 
2.4 Institutional framework for Implementation of the protocol 
The  protocol  sets  out an  institutional framework necessary for effective 
implementation of the various provisions such as the ones mentioned above.  The 
member states, signatories to the protocol and those that subsequently acceded 
to it,  undertook to establish the institutions.  These are: 
a) 	 A Monitoring Unit based at the Water Sector Co-ordination Unit; 
b) 	 River Basin Commissions between Basin States and in respect of each 
drainage basin (e.g. the Zambezi River Basin Commission, ZAMCOM); 
c) 	 River Basin Authorities or Boards in respect of each drainage basin. 
The protocol elaborates ,objectives and specific functions of the  proposed river 
basin management institutions.  The objectives cover issues of monitoring, policy 
development,  promotion  of equitable  utilisation,  formulation  of strategies and 
monitoring execution of joint development plans in shared watercourse systems. 
This is the functional part of the protocol and  is the most important to  address 
in the implementation of the  protocol, both at national and  regional  levels. 
2.5 Monitoring and dispute settlement 
Monitoring for compliance in  the implementation of the protocol is entrusted to 
the various institutions that will have been established. 
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The settlement of disputes, when they occur, was to follow the spirit of the treaty, 
that is amicable settlement, failing  which  arbitration can  be  pursued.  Disputes 
that cannot  be  settled  amicably will  be  referred  to  the  SADC Tribunal  for 
adjudication under Article 16 (1) of the treaty.  Council can also be  requested to 
render an advisory opinion in accordance with Article 16 (4) of the treaty.  In the 
case of disputes being referred to the  tribunal,  the  tribunal shall  render a final 
and binding opinion. 
3. Revisions of the protocol on  shared watercourses in the SADC 
Region 
3.1  Background 
Following recent developments in the implementation of the protocol or in preparation 
for its implementation, substantial amendments have been made to it,  which have 
implications for its implementation.  The SADC  Protocol  on  Shared Watercourse 
Systems has undergone several amendment workshops.  This was to address the 
concerns expressed by Angola and Mozambique during the time of signing. 
The Council  then  directed the  SA  DC  Secretariat and  SADC Water Sector Co­
ordinating  Unit to  solicit more concerns  from  member states,  if any,  and  hold 
workshops to  address them.  Member states submitted their comments  as 
requested and they were discussed on three different workshops.  Consensus 
on  the document was  reached  in  the fifth and  last workshop that was  held  in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in  March 2000. 
Two documents were produced during that workshop, namely: The Amendment 
Protocol and  the  Consolidated Version  Containing  Original  Provisions and 
Proposed Amendments. 
3.2 Outline of the revised protocol 
The revised protocol has six major sections: 
Interpretation of terms 
General principles 
Specific provisions 
Institutional framework for implementation 
Shared watercourse agreements 
Settlement of disputes 
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3.3 General principles 
The principles still convey the same message as in  the original protocol, but in 
this document they have been elaborated further for better understanding.  The 
following  is  the  list of principles and  it will  be  recognised  that they have  the 
similarity with the original document. 
The state parties recognise the principle of the unity and coherence 
of each  shared watercourse, and in accordance with  this principle, 
undertake to harmonise the water uses in the shared watercourses 
and to ensure that all" necessary interventions are consistent with 
the sustainable development of all watercourses' states and observe 
the objectives of regional  integration and  harmonisation of their 
socio-economic pOlicies and plans. 
The utilisation of shared watercourses within the SADC region shall 
be  open  to  each  watercourse state,  in  respect of the  watercourses 
within  its  territory and  without  prejudice to  its sovereign  rights,  in 
accordance with  the  principles contained  in  this protocol.  The 
utilisation of the  resources  of the watercourses shall  include 
agricultural, domestic, industrial, navigational and environmental uses. 
The state parties undertake to respect the existing rules of customary 
or general  international  law  relating to the  utilisation  and 
management of the resources of shared watercourses. 
State parties shall  maintain proper balance  between  resource 
development for a higher standard  of living  for their people and 
conservation  and  enhancement  of the environment to promote 
sustainable development. 
State parties undertake to pursue and establish close co-operation 
with regard to the study and execution of all projects likely to have 
an effect on the regime of the shared watercourse. 
State parties shall exchange available information and data regarding 
the hydrological, hydro-geological, water quality, meteorological and 
environmental condition of shared watercourses. 
3.4 Specific provisions 
The specific provisions in the revised protocol are: 
3.4. 1 Planned measures 
(a)  Information concerning planned measures 
State parties shall exchange information and consult each other and, 
if necessary, negotiate the possible effects of planned measures on 
the condition of a shared watercourse. 
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(b) 	 Notification concerning  planned measures with  possible  adverse 
effects 
Before a state party implements or permits the  implementation of 
planned measures which may have significant adverse effects upon 
other watercourse states,  it shall  provide those  states with  timely 
notification thereof.  Such  notification  shall  be  accompanied by 
available technical data and information, including the results of any 
environmental impact assessment,  in  order to  enable the notified 
states to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures. 
(c) 	 Period for reply to notification 
(i)  Unless otherwise agreed,  a  state  party providing a 
notification  under paragraph (b)  shall allow the notified states 
a  period of six months within  which  to  study and evaluate the 
possible  effects of the planned measures and communicate the 
findings to it; 
(ii)  This period, shall at the request of a notified state for which 
the evaluation of the planned measures poses difficulty, be extended 
for a period of six months. 
(d) 	 Obligations of the  notifying state during the period for reply 
During the period referred to in  paragraph (c), the notifying state: 
(i)  shall co-operate with the notified states by providing them, 
on request, with any additional data and information that is available 
and necessary for an accurate evaluation; and 
(ii)  shall  not implement or permit the  implementation of the 
planned measures without the consent of the notified states. 
(e) 	 Reply to notification 
The notified states shall communicate their findings to the notifying 
state as early as possible within the period applicable pursuant to 
paragraph (c).  If  a notified state finds that implementation of the 
planned measures would  be  inconsistent with  the  provisions of 
Article 3 (7)  or (10),  it  shall  attach to  its findings a documented 
explanation setting out the reasons for the findings. 
(f) 	 Absence of reply to notification 
(i)  If, within the period applicable pursuant to paragraph (c), the 
notifying State receives no communication under (e), it may, subject to 
its obligations under Article 3 (7) and (10), proceed with implementation 
of the planned measures, in accordance with the  notification and any 
other data and information provided to the notified states. 
(ii)  Any claim to compensation by a notified state which has failed 
to reply within the period applicable pursuant to paragraph (c) may be 
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offset by the costs  incurred by the  notifying state for action 
undertaken after the expiration of the time for a reply which would 
not have been undertaken if the notified state had objected within 
that period. 
(g)  Consultations and negotiations concerning planned measures 
(i)  If a  communication is  made under paragraph (e) that 
implementation of the planned measures would be inconsistent with 
the provisions of Article 3 (7) or (1O), the notifying state and the state 
making the communication shall enter into consultations and,  if 
necessary,  negotiations with a  view to  arriving at an equitable 
resolution of the situation. 
(ii)  The consultations and negotiations shall be conducted on 
the basis that each state must in  good faith pay reasonable regard 
to the rights and legitimate interests of the other states. 
(iii)  During the course of the consultations and negotiations, 
the notifying state shall,  if so required by the notifying state at the 
time it  makes the communication,  refrain from  implementing or 
permitting the implementation of the planned measures for a period 
of six months, unless otherwise agreed. 
(h)  Procedures in the absence of notification 
(i)  If a  state  party has  reasonable  grounds to  believe that 
another watercourse state is  planning  measures that  may have  a 
significant adverse effect upon it,  the former state may request the 
latter to apply the provisions of paragraph (b).  The request shall be 
accompanied by a documented explanation setting forth its grounds. 
(ii)  If the state planning the measures finds that it is not under 
an obligation to provide a notification under paragraph (b),  it shall 
so inform the other state, providing a documented explanation setting 
forth  the  reasons for such finding.  If this finding does not satisfy 
the other state, the two states shall, at the request of the other state, 
promptly enter into consultations and negotiations in  the manner 
provided in  sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph (g). 
(iii)  During the course of the consultations and negotiations, 
the state planning the measures shall, if so requested by the other 
state at the time it requests the initiation of consultations and 
negotiations, refrain from implementing or permitting implementation 
of those measures for a  period of six months unless otherwise 
agreed. 
(i)  Urgent implementation of planned measures 
(i)  In the event that the implementation of planned measures 
is of the utmost urgency in  order to protect the public health,  public 
safety or other equally important interests, the state planning the 
measures may, subject to paragraph 7 and 10 of article 3 (7) and (10), 
immediately 
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proceed  to  implementation,  notwithstanding the  provisions of 
paragraph (d) and sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph (g). 
(ii)  In  such  case,  a formal  declaration of the urgency of the 
measures  shall  be  communicated  without delay to  the  other 
watercourse  states referred  to  in  paragraph  (b)  together with  the 
relevant data and information. 
(iii) 	 The state planning the measures shall, at the request of any of the 
states referred to in paragraph (ii), promptly enter into consultations 
and negotiations with it in the  manner indicated in sub-paragraphs 
(i) and (ii)  of paragraph (g). 
3.4.2 Environmental protection and preservation 
(a) 	 Protection and preservation of ecosystems 
State parties shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect 
and preserve the ecosystems of shared watercourses. 
(b) 	 Prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
i.  State parties shall,  individually and,  where  appropriate, 
jointly, prevent,  reduce and control the pollution and environmental 
degradation of shared watercourses that may cause significant harm 
to other watercourse states or to their environment, including harm 
to human health and safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial 
purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse. 
ii.  Watercourse states shall  take  steps  to harmonise their 
policies and  legislation in this connection. 
iii.  State parties shall, at the request of  anyone or more of 
them, consult with a view to arriving at mutually agreeable measures 
and  methods to prevent,  reduce  and  control  pollution  of  a shared 
watercourse, such as: 
•  setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; 
•  establishing techniques and  practices to  address pollution  from 
point and non-point sources; 
•  establishing lists of substances in  the introduction of which,  into 
the waters  of a shared  watercourse,  is  to  be  prohibited,  limited, 
investigated or monitored. 
(c) 	 Introduction of alien or new species 
State parties shall  take all measures necessary to  prevent the 
introduction of species, alien or new, into a shared watercourse which 
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may have effects detrimental to the ecosystems of the watercourse 
resulting in  significant harm to other watercourse states. 
(d)  Protection and preservation of the aquatic environment 
State parties shall  individually and, where appropriate,  in  co­
operation with other states, take all measures with respect to shared 
watercourses that are necessary to protect and preserve the aquatic 
environment,  including estuaries, taking into account generally 
accepted international rules and standards. 
3.4.3 Management of shared watercourses 
(a)  Management 
Watercourse states shall,  at the request of any of them, enter into 
consultations concerning the management of a shared watercourse, 
which may include the  establishment of a  joint management 
mechanism. 
(b)  Regulation 
(i)  Watercourse states shall co-operate,  where appropriate, 
to respond to needs or opportunities for regulation of the flow of the 
waters of a shared watercourse. 
(ii)  Unless otherwise agreed,  watercourse states shall 
participate on an equitable and reasonable basis in the construction 
and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of such regulation works 
as they may have agreed to undertake. 
(c)  Installations 
(i)  Watercourse states shall, within their respective territories, 
employ their best efforts to maintain and protect installations, facilities 
and other works related to a shared watercourse. 
(Ii)  Watercourse states shall, at the request of any of them, 
which has reasonable grounds to believe that it may suffer significant 
adverse effects, enter into consultations with regards to: 
•  the safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities or 
other works related to  a shared watercourse; and 
•  the protection of installations, facilities or other works from wilful 
or negligent acts or the forces of nature. 
(iii)  Shared watercourses and  related installations, facilities and 
other works,  shall enjoy the protection accorded by the prinCiples and 
rules of international law applicable in international and non-international 
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armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of those principles 
and rules. 
3.4.4 Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions 
(a) 	 State parties shall individually and,  where appropriate. jointly take 
all appropriate  measures to prevent or mitigate conditions  related 
to a shared watercourse that may  be harmful to other watercourse 
states,  whether resulting from  natural causes or human  conduct, 
such as floods,  water-borne diseases,  siltation, erosion, salt-water 
intrusion, drought or desertification. 
(b) 	 State parties shall require any person  intending to  use the  waters 
of a  shared watercourse  within  their respective  territories,  for 
purposes other than domestic or environmental use, or who intends 
to discharge any  type  of waste  into  such  waters,  to  first obtain a 
permit,  licence or other similar authorisation  from  the  relevant 
authority within the state  concerned.  The  permit or other similar 
authorisation shall be granted only after such state has determined 
that the intended use or discharge will  not cause significant harm 
to the regime of the watercourse. 
3.4.5 Emergency situations 
State parties shall, without delay, notify other potentially affected states, the SADC 
Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit and competent international organisations of any 
emergency situation originating within their respective territories,  and  promptly 
supply the necessary information to such  states and competent organisations 
with a view to co-operating in the prevention, mitigation, and elimination, of the 
harmful effects of the emergency. 
4. Role of the Water Sector of SADC 
4.1  Goals 
The vision of the water sector is: 
To  attain the sustainable.  integrated planning,  development,  utilisation and 
management of water resources  that contribute to the  attainment of  SADC's 
overall objective of an integrated regional economy on the basis of balance, eqUity 
and mutual benefit for all member states. 
The overall objective is: 
To promote co-operation in all water matters in the SADC region for the sustainable 
and equitable development, utilisation and management of water resources,  and 
contribute towards the uplifting of the quality of life of the people of SADC region. 
354 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
4.2 Functions of the Water Sector Co-ordlnatlng Unit 
The  role  of the  SADC  Water  Sector Co-ordinating  Unit is primarily one  of 
stimulating and facilitating development and co-operation in the region.  In order 
to achieve this, the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit: 
(a) 	 Co-ordinates water resources research and development, including 
appropriate technological development,  data and  information 
collection, processing and dissemination among member States; 
(b) 	 Facilitates integrated planning,  development,  management and 
utilisation of water resources at both the national and regional levels; 
(c) 	 Monitors the implementation of the protocol and assists in resolving 
potential conflicts on shared water resources; 
(d) 	 Facilitates identification and preparation of regional water resources 
programmes and projects; 
(e) 	 Mobilises resources (financial, human and institutional) including the 
appointment of Technical Assistance and Consultancy services for 
the implementation of approved regional programmes; 
(f) 	 Co-ordinates the  implementation, operation  and  maintenance of 
regional projects; 
(g) 	 Provides  advice  and  guidance on  equitable  water resources 
allocation among riparian countries; 
(h) 	 Facilitates human  resources development,  capacity  building  and 
institutional strengthening at both national and  regional levels; 
(i) 	 Promotes joint and cross-border water resources development and 
investments, and provides guidance on cost-sharing arrangements; 
(j) 	 Advises on  policy and cross-border water resources development 
and investments; 
(k) 	 Promotes the participation by  all  relevant stakeholders in  water 
resources development and  management at both  national and 
regional levels; 
(I) 	 Provides strategic leadership in the development and management 
of water resources, including the development of appropriate policies 
and strategies at regional  level; 
(m) 	 Facilitates the establishment of shared river basin institutions where 
required and strengthening of their capacities where they do exist. 
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5.  Regional strategic action plan 
The Regional Strategic Action Plan (RSAP) is a programme consisting of several 
regional projects.  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funded 
this programme for the Water Sector to be in a position to hold the first Water Round 
Table Conference. 
UNDP funded the consultants to assist the member states to prepare Country Situation 
Reports and to come up with the projects that they wanted.  The Water Sector Co­
ordinating Unit engaged a consultant to propose a comprehensive programme, the 
RSAP.  This consultant was funded by the UNDP. There were many projects that the 
member states submitted to the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit (WSCU),  and the 
consultant produced a list of 31  priority projects of regional nature.  Out of these 
31  projects, 10 were fast-tracked to level the playing field for the remaining 21. 
UNDP funded the Water Round Table Conference in  Geneva,  Switzerland, in 
December 1998. This Round Table Conference was very fruitful, since most of the 
co-operating partners attended it and showed their interest in the various projects. 
At the moment, all these projects are in the form of Project Concept Notes (PCNs) 
for anyone interested to have an understanding of what they are about.  The Co­
operating Partners in collaboration with the Water Sector prepared these PCNs. 
Some of the PCNs are in a process where terms of references are being prepared' 
in  order to come up with fully-fledged project proposals. 
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Overview of Experiences in the Limpopo River Basin 
Thomas Schild 
Team  Leader,  German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ), 

Windhoek,  Namibia 

Abstract 
The  paper presents a  summary of the  findings  of a  German mission  to  four 
countries of Southern Africa, in which many people at different levels were asked 
to  give  their views  about water issues  in  two  trans-national river basins,  the 
Limpopo and the  Orange-Senqu.  The  principal common  factors  in  people's 
responses are identified.  Various  sources and types of inequity are described. 
In  conclusion,  it is  found that external assistance could be  especially useful in 
areas of information and communication, and in  organisational development for 
river-basin management. 
1. Context 
A mission  by  a project appraisal  team  of the  German  Agency for Technical  Co­
operation (GTZ) was carried out in September 2000, for the support of regional water 
management in the SADC (Southern African Development Community) region.  The 
team talked to stakeholders of the Limpopo and the Orange-Senqu river basins. 
The mission had the following major tasks; 
Map the scene; 
Capture the expectations and issues of concern of the stakeholders 
with regard to the establishment of river basin commissions; 
Identify possible areas for technical co-operation; 
Make preparations for the planning workshop. 
2. Procedures 
Between 14 and 29 September 2000, the group visited Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Botswana and  South  Africa and  held  discussions with  relevant  government 
institutions,  parastatals and  donor organisations involved  in  water resources 
management of the Limpopo and, where applicable, of the Orange/Senqu.  Other 
resource  persons,  such  as  representatives of water users' organisations, 
researchers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and consultants were met. 
Similar talks will be  held in  Namibia in  October 2000. 
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3. Purpose of the presentation 
The purpose of this presentation is to address the first two major tasks.  Emphasis 
is laid on the presentation of voices captured from stakeholders in the Limpopo 
basin.  The audience is asked to respond. 
4. General observations 
The mission recorded the following general observations: 
A  broad consensus exists  about the  principles  of common 
management of shared watercourses. 
There is a high degree of solidarity among the riparian states. 
The authorities acknowledge that in future regional prerogatives will 
be given higher priorities than national interests. 
It is expected that the creation of river basin commissions will 
enhance further co-operation and contribute to avoiding conflicts. 
There is a felt need to build up trust and confidence amongst the 
institutions involved in the water sector of the  riparian countries. 
In spite of their different historic backgrounds, and socio-economic 
and political conditions, the riparian states share a common vision 
with regard to the development of their national water sectors. 
5. Mapping the scene 
5.1  Problems in the catchment areas 
In all the riparian countries visited by the mission, the contacted institutions and 
resource  persons mentioned problems that  reflected  their specific  interest in 
sharing the water resources.  Nevertheless, there was a great similarity among 
the issues raised. 
The natural conditions found in the shared river basin and the capacity imbalances 
with regard to technical and managerial issues lead to stresses, which cause particular 
impacts.  The main items in each of these categories are shown in Table 1. 
5.2 Stresses in the catchment areas 
The following stresses were mentioned: 
low flow or dry rivers during long drought seasons 
unexpected high floods in the lower parts of the basins 
increasing water pollution 
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Table 1: Capacity imbalances in the riparian countries 
Natural conditions  Technical problems  Managerial problems 
High temporal and spatial  Uneven standards of  Unequal economic 
variation of rainfall  infrastructure  standards 
Areas affected by saline  Different degrees of  Unequal negotiation skills 
, groundwater  exploitation (development) 
of the water resource 
I potential 
Variation of climate from  Unequal potential for water  Lack of early warning 
humid to arid  use  system (quantity and 
Qualitvl 
Unequal physical potential  Water use withQut  Deficiency of exchange of 
for water use (hydrological,  considering trans-boundary  data and information 
morphological)  impacts (dams, intakes,  between member states, 
outlets)  e.g. gauges, water 
resources development 
Unequal water resources 
management capacity 
access to data 
monitoring capacity 
(quantity, aualiM 
No common management of 
dams (flood protection, 
drouaht orevention) 
5.3 Impacts 
Informants mentioned the following impacts of water, on the people and on their 
environment 
negative impacts on the environment,  especially in  those parts of 
the rivers,  which become dry during some time of the year and on 
the ecosystems of the estuaries (affecting clam and prawn cultures) 
through salt-water intrusion 
further degradation of biodiversity 
flood damages with high destructive power causing high costs to the 
economy 
reduced potential for economic development 
unequal access to water resources for 
•  human consumption 
•  irrigation 
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•  animal production 
•  industrial development 
6. Voices from stakeholders 
This section presents some quotations from the people who provided information 
to the mission.  These individual statements seem to capture some more general 
views. 
6.1  Statements recorded 
"On  the  South African  side,  64 commercial farmers are  drawing 
water from  the  river.  On  our side  there  are  only 6 commercial 
farmers left, all not paying to the council anymore, and thousands 
of people who hope for water for income generation projects. 
"We don't really know what to do. We want to talk to the other water 
users in  South Africa and Mozambique and  raise our concern." 
Chairperson,  Lower Mzingwani Catchment Council,  Beitbridge, 
Zimbabwe 
"If no mechanism exists, you are thrown into the conflict, and guess 
who wins? The one who flexes the muscles best." 
CEO,  Water Utilities Corporation,  Gaborone, Botswana 
"We  seriously fear for our ecosystem  downstream. Our coastal 
resources, our clams and prawns, are threatened, if the river does 
not flow." 
Executive  Director,  Environmental Working  Group,  Maputo, 
Mozambique 
"In  spite  of  our different historic,  socio-economic and technical 
background,  we  all  share a common vision with  regard to the 
management of shared watercourses." 
Chief Engineer, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.  Pretoria, 
South Africa 
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6.2 Main Issues addressed 
The voices quoted above address the  following main issues: 
Obvious imbalances of water use 





6.3 National voices 
A not too serious attempt is made to frame the voices heard in the four riparian 

countries into national categories. 

Botswana seems to be  relaxed about the issue and interested to participate. 

Zimbabwe is rather concerned and poses questions. 

Mozambique seems to be a bit alarmed and does not want to lose out. 

South Africa is self-confident and hopeful that things turn out well. 

7. Areas of intervention 
In  the  discussions  held  the  following  activities were  identified,  which  could  be 
carried out by GTZ: 
To act as an  honest broker between  member states 
To facilitate access to international experience 
To provide specific expertise on selected subjects 
To  support the assessment of existing reports, studies and data 
To  help to  identify gaps  and deficiencies in  the  existing  reports, 
studies and data and define areas for further activities 
To  assist in  capturing of data,  processing of data and their 
dissemination 
To provide equipment for improvement of the database 
To help to improve negotiation skills 
To assist in the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms 
To  act as a catalyst for the organisational  development of the 
commission 
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To  give managerial support to the secretariats of the commissions 
To  assist  in  co-ordinating  and  streamlining  technical  and 
administrative processes 
We,  at GTZ,  feel  that external assistance could focus on  the following  points, 
among others: 
Support for the organisational development of the  riVE~r·tlasin 
organisation 
Strengthening communication routes 
Facilitating access to information 
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Reports of working groups 
During the Workshop,  the participants 
divided on  three  occasions into 
smaller working  groups,  to  discuss 
and  report on  key  aspects of 
management of water resources  in 
river basins 
This section presents the reports of 
these working groups 
The first set of reports discusses issues 





The second set discusses the operational 





The third set of reports focuses on  issues 

of special concern, and on  the role of 

river-basin management in  addressing 

these issues: cost-effectiveness in 

management, poverty alleviation and 

agricultural growth, and incentives for 

responding to water scarcity by improving 

efficiency of water uses 
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Group Work 1: The Start-up Phase of 

River-Basin  Management 

Wednesday 18 October 
In these sessions the workshop broke  into 
four groups,  each of which was asked  to 
address an  aspect of the  initiation of river­
basin management, and  to present a report. 
The topics assigned to the four groups were: 
Group 1 Enabling Conditions 
Group 2 Identifying Stakeholders 
Group 3 Constraints 
Group 4 Start-up Processes 
365 Group Work  1: The  Sta~t-up Phase of River-Basin Management 
Group report 1.1: Enabling conditions 
This group considered two questions: 
1. 	 What conditions indicate the need for river-basin management? 
2. 	 What characteristics will  make the introduction of river-basin 
management more likely to be successful? 
Prior conditions 
The group said that the key pre-condition for river-basin management was scarcity 
of water.  Scarcity could have  various dimensions: it  could be global (affecting 
users of all kinds) or it could be sectoral.  It could be actual, or projected for the 
future.  It could be  due to  insuffiCiency of water quantity,  or it  could be due to 
reduction of water quality, making some part of the resources unusable. 
The  key  word  is scarcity,  which  leads to  the demand and  need  for basin 
management. 
Causes of scarcity,include: 
Hydrological changes 
Pollution coming from anthropologic activities 
Resource capture 
Flooding 
The impacts of scarcity include: 




Growing insecurity of supply 
Complaints and social unrest 
The group then considered the processes that may occur in response to scarcity. 
First, who acts? 
There are different sets of people involved, some of which take actions, and some 
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while the pressure for management change comes from: 
society in general; 





The  group noted the  role  sometimes of a "trigger event;' such  as  a drought or 

flood, in bringing the pressures and the actors together to "kick-start" the process 

of establishing a river-basin management system. 

They  also observed that the  impetus for  river-basin  management sometimes 

comes from top downwards, but may also come from bottom upwards, in which 

case it may be possible to build on existing organisations as the starting point. 

Not every river basin needs a river-basin organisation.  In assessing the need, 

we  should think of the  functions that need to  be  performed,  and  what  means 

are  required for performing them  adequately,  rather than  thinking  of  the 

organisation first.  There may be a fashion for river-basin management; this could 

seem to give rise to a need. 

The group noted two basic shifts or changes that are generally needed,  if  it  is 

clear that river-basin management should be established: 





and secondly, a boundary shift, from management within local administrative units 

to management within basin boundaries.  . 

Success factors 
The group then  turned to  their second  issue,  the  characteristics that are 
associated with  success in  the introduction of river-basin  management.  Their 
response to this was in the form  of some checklists: 
Political factors:  Governance 
Rule of law 
Legislation 
Political will 
Participation by all  int~rested parties 
Awareness 
Champions of reform 
Social pressure 





Perception of water as an economic good 
Awareness of the need for integrated water 
resources  management 
Social acceptance 
Adaptive capacity 
Good practices in the managementot  -public funds 
Money available 
High cost of non-participation 
Full  stakeholder representation 
Successful models 
Culture of subsidiarity 
Real issues that require top level action 
Trigger events 
Hydraulic bureaucracy committed and convinced 
Human resources 
Data available and uncontested 
Transparency 
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Group report 1.2: Identifying stakeholders 
Group 1.2 focussed on two critical questions: 
1. 	 Who are the  stakeholders in  the  start-up phase in  river-basin 
management? 
2. 	 How can they be  reached and involved? 
Identifying Stakeholders. 
The group began by discussing the notion of stakeholders.  In  a broad sense, 
anyone who benefits from the river basin and who plays a role in the management 
can be called a stakeholder.  But such a conception is unclear and does not help 
in  clarifying who  are .the  stakeholders.  It  was therefore  agreed that although 
everyone in the river basin could practically be a stakeholder, it is  necessary to 
come up with some categories.  The notion  of using the physical boundary of 
the river basin  in  identifying stakeholders was  rejected  by the group,  because 
there are some complex issues involved; for example, the impact of the river basin 
on neighbouring states, provinces or even countries which are not geographically 
covered by the river basin. 
The group dwelt on possible ways of categorising the stakeholders, for example 
according to: 
1) 	 aims and issues; 
2) 	 functions; for example, users, providers, regulators, managers. 
3) 	 status; for  example,  public entities such as administrators or 
politicians,  or private such  as commercial enterprises,  non­
governmental organisations or traditional leaders. 
Finally. the group decided to classify the stakeholders in river-basin management 
according to their aims and  issues or concerns.  Accordingly,  the following 
categories were identified: 
1) 	 Poverty alleviation: Stakeholders include  rural/urban  communities, 
subsistence farmers,  deprived groups and  other interest groups 
whose aim  is to alleviate poverty,  such  as churches and  non­
governmental organisations.  This could  also include government 
ministries and public bodies. 
2) 	 Wealth creation: This would cover those whose primary objective is 
to make  profit.  for example, commercial entities  and  industries, 
including power plants. 
3)  Recreation: All those interested in using river-basin management for 
recreational purposes, fishing and boating. 
4) 	 Regulation: This would include groups of people whose  aim  is to 
regulate the river basin such as government agencies, community 
structures, municipalities, traditional leaders and chiefs. 
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The  above  sets of stakeholders could,  at  any  time,  play different roles,  for 
example,  as  managers,  service providers,  regulators,  mediators in  case  of 
conflicts, as  well as supporters or advocates. 
Reaching and involving Stakeholders: 
Having identified the stakeholders, the next task is to involve them in river-basin 
management.  To do so,  it is  necessary to know and define the river basin first, 
and then the following steps could be followed: 
1.  Inventory collection 
Guided by these questions: 
"Who are they?" 
"Where in the river basin are they located?" 
"What are their aims and objectives?" 
"What  roles  and  functions  can  they  assume  in  the  river-basin 
management?" 
Make an  inventory of a wide range of groups of stakeholders within the 
river basin.  This could  be  done by  dOing  a  surveyor by  checking 
secondary sources of data.  In this regard, the support and assistance of 
non-governmental organisations,  research  institutions  and  government 
agencies can be sought. 
2. 	Conduct a stakeholders' forum. 
The aim would be to promote joint efforts in  river-basin management. to 
motivate people to get involved in the river-basin management.  This forum 
could also be the venue for clarifying issues, airing concerns and "worries", 
settling conflicts of interest, etc. 
3. 	Organise stakeholders with the aim of building capacity.  Some ideas 
in this regard are: 
Personal contacts: need to speak to stakeholders to know their 
concerns; 
Participatory approach; 
Learn to speak their language; 
Actively involve women and other deprived groups; 




An important guiding principle when involving stakeholders is to make sure that 
representation  in  the river-basin  management organisation is  from  the bottom 
up. This,  however,  does not exclude the possibility of promoting  participation 
through laws and  regulations. 
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Group report 1.3: Constraints 
The group addressed the following tasks: 
1.  Identify possible constraints in establishing river-basin management 
2.  Identify priorities among this set of constraints 
Pre-conditions 
Questions emerged immediately concerning whether there should be a river-basin 
organisation at all, because there may be no infrastructure or supply facilities or 
there may be a small level of use.  In some cases, it may not make sense to set 
up an  organisation such as a river-basin organisation.  [See also the  report of 
Group 1.1  on  enabling conditions] 
Constraints 

In  no specific order, clusters of constraints were identified as follows: 

Legal Constraints 
In  some countries,  existing  legislation  related  to  water and  its uses might be 
fragmented, contradictory or conflicting with each other. 
There is also lack of enabling legislation for a river-basin organisation  in  many 
countries. 
Institutions 
Existing  institutions may be  ineffective and  thus  represent  a constraint to 

managing a basin. 

Lack of human resources is another constraint. 

Lack of administrative will and inertia can also act as an  impediment. 

Political Constraints 
Water has to be  on  the  national agenda,  in  order to  set up  a  river-basin 
organisation and give it the resources to do its job. 
If this is  not the case,  then  popular pressure must be  brought to  bear on 
politicians.  Without political commitment, the river-basin management concept 
cannot materialise. 
Information 
There needs to be hydrological data, and data of various kinds (political, socio­
economic, financial,  legal,  environmental and  cultural)  must  be  available, 
transparent 
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and accessible.  In  many cases these data are not available,  or not accessible 
by stakeholders other than the implementing agencies. 
Stakeholders 
It is important for stakeholders to participate in decision-making and management 
of the use of the river basin.  However, most of them lack awareness of issues. 
The willingness and capacity of each stakeholder to participate also varies and 
may represent serious impediments. 
A  large number of diverse interests can present  problems for stakeholder 
participation. 
Stakeholders also vary in their power and influence. 
Strategy 
There must be an  effective strategy to  launch the  river-basin  management 
concept. 
Financial 
Finance can  be  a big  constraint in  establishing  river-basin  management. The 
perennial question was asked: where will the money come from? 
Priorities 
The group opted to describe a process rather than setting priorities, preferring 
to turn the constraints into positive statements concerning what was necessary. 
There was discussion about designing a matrix of how constraints interacted with 
each other, but no consensus was reached. 
The process begins only when the basic pre-conditions of need for this type of 
management exist.  There must be political will, and a strategy. 
When  these  basic conditions  exist,  then  the legal,  institutional and financial 
constraints must be overcome. 
Stakeholders need to be involved all through the process and information must 
be available at various pOints along the  way. 
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Group report 1.4: Start-up processes 
The question put to this group was: 
What are appropriate processes and procedures in establishing new 
river-basin organisations? 
Processes 
Each group member wrote down the five processes he or she thought were the 
most relevant  in  creating  a river-basin  organisation.  Eighty-nine cards were 
produced (some wrote more than five), and then cards were clustered into groups, 
each  group defining a specific compound or complex process,  that generally 
involves several sub-processes, or approaches or mechanisms. 
The ten clusters were: 
Process 1  Identify the need 
The need for a river-basin organisation has to be  established as a first part of 
the process.  The group agreed that a preliminary information assessment was 
necessary to support the possibility of creating a river-basin organisation.  Certain 
data would already be collected; a baseline assessment of technical aspects and 
information available would be needed. 
Process 2  Gain political support I commitment 
Having political support from the earliest stages will prove crucial for sustainable 
implementation of a river-basin  organisation.  Furthermore,  political support is 
obligatory for a  healthy and  fruitful  environment within  which  a  river-basin 
organisation can develop and become useful. 
Process 3  Gain stakeholder participation 
Stakeholder participation as a process supports many other processes needed 
to create and maintain a river-basin organisation.  The main discussion centred 
around whether the political support should exist before stakeholder participation, 
or should political support rather be the  result of stakeholders' original interest 
to  partiCipate. 
Process 4  Identification of need (bottom up) 
As well as the initial need-identification process mentioned above (Process 1), it 
is necessary to identify whether the major stakeholders groups felt a need.  This 
affects the process of establishing the river-basin organisation. 
Process 5  Establish a policy framework 
It is necessary to establish proper legal frameworks for river-basin management, 
and for the duties and responsibilities of the river-basin organisation. 
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Process 6 	 Consensus-building and conflict management 
These are key roles of the river-basin organisation. 
Process 7 	 Establish financial arrangements 
Proper arrangements are  needed for financing the river-basIn  organisation. 
Examples  of problems with  river-basin organisations,  where  financing 
arrangements had not been satisfactory, were discussed. 
Process 8 	 Develop human resources 
Training and capacity-building are key components of river-basin management, 
especially if these processes and organisations are relatively new. 
Process 9 	 Identify functions, structure and implementation 
arrangements 
The functions,  structures and  implementation arrangements for the  river-basin 
organisation and  for associated agencies and  stakeholders in  river-basin 
management,  should  be  defined.  The duties and  responsibilities of each 
stakeholder need to be delineated and the communication pathways identified. 
Process 10 	 Identify who drives the process 
It is crucial to identify who is driving the creation of the river-basin management 
approach and the formation of a river-basin organisation.  The process is  more 
likely to succeed if it is  an  internal process (as  in  the case of Mexico),  rather 
than an external process driven by donors or funding agencies (such as the World 
Bank). 
Procedure 
Having identified these ten sets of processes, the group made several conclusions 
and recommendations about the procedure to be followed: 
River-basin organisations have processes that might occur in stages. 
The chronological  order in  which  processes  appear,  or should  be 
addressed, is different from case to case. 
Could we be generic on sequencing these processes. 
Policy definitions come first; legal framework definitions and decisions 
come later, 
Assessment of technical aspects is  mandatory. 
Technical aspects represent a continuous process.  The same goes 
for information of any kind: demography, economy, social structures, 
institutional arrangements, etc. 
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Awareness  and  involvement are not the  same.  Awareness  is  a 
necessary condition to obtain public participation. 
There  is  no  way  to  advance  realistically  in  the  long  run  without 
political support.  Probably,  it is an indispensable component in the 
earlier stages as well. 
Implementation approaches are many; they can be roughly classified 
into: top-down, bottom-up or mixed approaches. 
Some river-basin organisations are born by a decree or by a political 
deCision at executive levels. 
Some river-basin organisations are born of demands derived from 
severe problems: water scarcity and/or water quality degradation. 
Some others are born almost simultaneously by political decisions 
that correspond to severe problems and social demands. 
Inertia has to be overcome.  Overcoming old structures is essential, 
when  opposition emerges from  those strongholds.  Resistance to 
change is a common factor, and should be taken into consideration 
within the processes that will facilitate a river-basin organisation to 
be born. 
Conflict management is a paramount engine that drives river-basin 
organisations' activities. 
A question to  be  answered continuously is: What are  the  specific 
information needs, and how can they be satisfied in a cost-efficient 
manner? 
Why should we change,  is  it necessary? 
How to operate and manage a river-basin organisation efficiently and 
sustainably? 
How  much  power should  a river-basin  organisation  have:  is it  a 
nominal monitoring and  evaluation body  reporting to  others,  or do 
we want it to possess decision-making capabilities? 
Knowing who  will  drive the  process of  creating and establishing  a 
river-basin organisation is crucial. 
Do  not attempt to  drive a  river-basin  organisation  externally. 
Experiences in this direction have been ill-fated. 
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Group Work 2: The Operational  Phase 
of River-Basin  Management 
Thursday  19 October 
In  these sessions the workshop again  was 

divided into four groups. 

Each group was asked to address an  aspect 

of operational management in  river basins. 

The groups were  asked  to  address four 

factors,  in  each of their reports: these factors 

were information,  management processes, 

resources,  and allocation. 

The topics assigned to the four groups were: 

Group 1 Governance 
Group 2 Finance 
Group 3 Laws and Institutions 
Group 4 Managing Water 
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Group report 2.1: Governance 
The  group  defined  governance as  a mechanism,  arrangement or process  by 
which an  organisation or a social system  regulates or controls itself.  Amongst 
the first things discussed was: how do we tell good governance from bad? Four 





Basin Management Strategy: 
What strategies and structures might be useful to promote and ensure good river­
basin governance?  Several themes were identified on ideal strategies for basin 
governance: 
Over-arching policy environment: 
This will be  reflected in 
(a)  a clear statement of water policy; 
(b)  enabling legal and regulatory framework; 
(c)  clear delineation of the roles of government and other 
players or stakeholders; 
Transparency: 

This will be obtained through 

(a) 	 information network; 
(b) 	 strong emphasis on communication; 
(c) 	 wide sharing of information about stakeholders and their 
outstanding concerns; 
Subsidiarity: 
(a) 	 sharing of responsibilities; 
(b) 	 minimal government role; 
(c)  privatise all functions that are amenable to privatisation; 
Participatory approach: 
(a) 	 bottom-up approach; 
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(b)  strong emphasis on public involvement at all stages; 
(c)  accent on empowering the stakeholders; 
(d)  balancing competing interests, especially of the weak and 
the powerful, with a view to ensuring fairness and equity; 
A system of checks and balances should be instituted at all levels; 
and 
The  river-basin  management strategy with  most likelihood for 
success will be building creatively upon opportunities offered by the 
unique political culture of the country rather than foisting  a model 
strategy in all contexts. 
Structure for river-basin management 
Several structures were identified at different levels. Three over-riding aspects 
were that: 
As far as possible, the government should focus on  playing the role 
of facilitation and regulation effectively, while depending upon private 
sector or users' organisations for service delivery; 
The river-basin management structure should be culture-appropriate; 
The  structures  at policymaking  levels  should  be  underpinned by 
intermediary organisations, such as private service-providers, users' 
organisations, and stakeholder forums, which can mediate between 
the river-basin management and the ultimate water users. 
Given these over-riding considerations, the structures and mechanisms identified 
for river-basin management were: 
A basin-level governing and co-ordinating body or mechanism: to be 
designed so as 
(a) 	 to ensure representation to the widest range of "conflict drivers" 
specific to each basin; and 
(b) 	 to ensure optimal balance of power amongst competing 
interests and stakeholder groups; 
Technical support structures or mechanisms: 

to ensure steady supply of high-quality expert input into the process 

of river-basin management; 

Structures for stakeholder participation: 

to operationalise effectively both and subsidiarity and participation. 

379 Group Work 2: The  Operational Phase of River-Basin Management 
Structures for control and accountability: 
these should  include  monitoring for  g·enerating  and  disseminating 
information on  a wide  range  of variables as well  as periodic social, 
environmental and policy audit of the river-basin management process. 
Structures and mechanisms for conflict mitigation and resolution: 
in  order to  support effective  basin  governance,  given that conflict 
mitigation is one of the primary governance tasks_ 
Over-arching principles 
The group proposed the  following  seven  over-arching principles that might be 
useful to any country embarking upon a new strategy of river-basin management. 
1.  Participation: 
Continuing emphasis on stakeholder participation at all levels is the 
cornerstone of a good river-basin management strategy. 
2.  Role Clarity: 
Early in  the  process,  the  river-basin  management strategy should 
produce a high level  of clarity about the  roles to be  played  by  the 
government and other actors,  regardless of the  scale  of  role 
envisaged for the government. 
3.  Subsidiarity: 
A river-basin  management strategy with a high chance of success 
entails government delegating and sharing responsibilities for specific 
roles,  tasks and functions to other organisations. 
4.  Culture-appropriateness: 
The  river-basin  management strategy and  structures should  be 
designed to suit the political culture of the target country or region. 
5.  Transparency, credibility and legitimacy: 
River-basin management strategies and structures succeed only to 
the  extent that they  command  credibility and  legitimacy through 
sustaining  high  levels  of  transparency in  decision-making  and 
implementation. 
6.  Checks and Balances: 
Effective checks and balances at different levels are the hallmark of 
an  effective river-basin management regime; and 
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7.  Equity and Fairness: 
A river-basin  management strategy will  attract broad  participation 
from all stakeholder groups only if it successfully fights the pressures 
from  powerful  and  influential groups from  the mainstream and 
engages weaker groups in the society in evolving ways to address 
their priorities and concerns. 
The group considered also that the following three issues deserved more discussion: 
Trans-boundary basins which pose complex issue of hydro-politics 
and diplomacy; these need a totally different approach and strategy; 
Ways  to  integrate water  management in  a broader strategy  of 
integrated  natural  resource and environment management as  a 
second-generation issue; and 
Redefining the relationship between the state and the water users. 
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Group report 2.2: Finance 
This group selected three questions for discussion: 
1.  What principles should guide the  mobilisation of funds? 
2.  How should  costs of river-basin  management be  allocated to  the 
stakeholders? 
3.  What mechanisms can be identified to control the cost? 
Mobilisation 
Prior to answering the question, agreement had to be obtained about the functions 
of the river-basin organisation so that the purpose of fund mobilisation could be 







The extent and  intensity of the. various functions differs according to the 
organisational model.  Four models were considered by the group as reference: 
Basin Authority: example,  Brantas,  Indonesia 
Diffuse authority: example, Central Valley,  California 
Council-directed agency: example, France 
Co-ordinating Council 
All  these  models  need  money for their operations.  Mobilisation of funds is 
necessary for two types of processes: 
seeking loans for investments and development 
seeking funds to recover the cost of operations and investments 
Principles that should guide the cost recovery are: 
users and beneficiaries should contribute; 
the  contribution  should  be  based  on  objectively  measurable 
parameters (discharge, area concentrations, etc.); 
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polluters pay  in  proportion to their pollution; 

differential unit prices should enable  allocation  to  and  use  by 

financially marginal but socially important uses and users; 

cross subsidies within the tariff structures of the basin should cover 

the costs of differential unit pricing; 

payment should give the payer a say in the decision-making process. 





scarcity pricing could be introduced for groundwater management; 

the charges should be educational, collectable and predictable. 

Allocation of costs 
First, a list is made of stakeholders who can or should contribute: 
environment (user is not the payer); 
smallholder  irrigated agriculture; 
large-scale irrigated agriculture; 
rain-fed agriculture; 
manufacturing industry; 






Different mechanisms can be applied 
direct payment; 
direct tax system (especially environment and small farmers); 
additional charges to be  added  on  service bills and  forwarded  to 
river-basin organisation; 

land-tax  (though not very educational). 
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Mechanisms for cost control 
The group made the following list of cost-control policies 
External audit; 

Payers' control through budget approval; 

Functions on as-needed basis; 





Run  on  sound business principles. 
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Group report 2.3: Laws and  institutions 
The group posed for itself the following question: 
How should laws and institutions be designed, in order to maximise 
voluntary compliance in river-basin management? 
The group addressed first the law and then discussed institutions.  Remarks for 
law seem valid for institutions as well. 
Meanings: Law-policy- regulation-informal rules 
There are  various forms  and  levels of regulation,  for example,  laws passing 
through the parliaments,  or through  lower levels;  by-laws  and  regulations,  or 
informal rules.  Water policy made by a minister may have legal status as  well. 
Law  is pluralistic; it is  wider than just state  law,  and  encompasses customary, 
traditional, local,  religious and other forms or sources. 
Motivation to formulate new law 
There are three main "triggers" for formulation of new law: 
Scarcity of water and  problems in  allocation among multiple users. 
This is a sensitive  issue.  For example,  the  Ministerial  Declaration 
during the World Water Forum did not accept the concept of sharing 
water.  Sharing is accepted at the small, local scale,  but the larger 
the  scale,  the more  delicate.  Current  laws  still  emphasise the 
appropriation aspect; heterogeneity  in  society  is  still  weakly 
addressed.  It  is  very  rare,  probably only  in  South  Africa,  that 
protection  of water  users  who suffered  from  racial  and  gender 
discrimination in  the  past  is an  explicit goal  in  allocation  law. 
However, implementation in  South Africa will be a tough next step; 
the negotiations during compulsory licensing especially fit those who 
are  already organised.  None  of  the Latin  American  initiatives for 
legal  reform  had  this  goal.  The  Indonesian case also calls for 
recognition  of the  water  rights  of  (poor)  former  users,  and  legal 
measures to prevent expropriation. 
Environment issues, like pollution or preventive measures to protect 
the environment. 
This was a common reason in the past two or three decades. 
Gaps, inconsistencies, or overlaps in existing legislation. 
Some countries still do not have  a water law,  but refer to water in  a 
fragmented way in other laws, such as laws on land use.  South Africa 
had the advantage of being able to start from scratch in formulating a 
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new law.  Brazil now also has opted for a comprehensive new water law. 
There are also cases, like Turkey, in which it may be counter-productive to touch 
upon  water legislation now.  In  other situations it is just not needed to change 
law. 
New law should build upon felt needs and thus gain legitimacy and compliance. 
It should prevent conflicts.  There should  also be  court institutions where 
complaints and disagreement can be expressed.  One should be able to enforce 
new law; otherwise it does not make much sense. 
The process of law design 
There is experience in the appropriate process for law formulation, e.g. starting 
with general principles, white papers, refinement etc. 
Steps include the following: 
Any new formulation should start with a thorough inventory of existing 
laws  and  institutions,  including customary law  and  other legal 
systems.  It  is crucial that this information on  institutions and laws 
is  also widely made accessible,  besides all  technical data. 
Databases on  institutions need to be built up. 
Public participation and capacity building are  needed.  Networking 
also  between  non-governmental  institutions is  to be  encouraged. 
Leadership needs to be identified and built.  Existing local institutions, 
such as traditional men and women leaders, are to be pro-actively 
tapped and brought into the process.  Drafts of legislation are to be 
widely discussed for public reactions.  Lawyers are instrumental and 
most effective in the final stages, when the purposes of the new law, 
in  all  their technical  and  hydrological complexities,  have clearly 
crystallised. 
The 'product' 
Governmental institutions and non-governmental organisations and civil society 
institutions co-exist in  river-basin management.  All  are  needed for  river-basin 
management. Internal (hierarchical)  relations  between  government institutions 
should be clarified.  Representation from the proliferation of public organisations 
is  important.  Purposive efforts are  needed to include groups who  tend to fall 
outside the existing networks and contacts, and to address their specific interests. 
The character of the basin-level institution can  vary as  widely as  from  a body 
with  legal authority,  if  not state powers,  as South Africa  is  pioneering.  to  a 
facilitating agency aiming at consensus building or co-ordination.  It also depends 
upon the varying relations between basin-management law and institutions versus 
national water law. 
The resulting basin law and institutions depend upon many parameters that largely 
vary between countries, but also between sites within the same basin. As a follow­
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up  to  the  workshop,  the  International Water Management Institute could  do a 
comparative and  benchmarking study of existing basin-level institutions. 
Finances and other resources 
There  should  be  provisions for financial  and  other resources  of  river-basin 
management institution, modest as they may be. 
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Group report 2.4: Managing water 
This group decided to focus its discussion on the case of river-basins that are at 
or near "closure" (meaning that the available water resources of a normal year are 
fully committed for uses).  They identified three specific challenges in this situation. 
1. 	 What measures can be adopted when a river basin is  approaching 
closure, or has gone beyond closure, or experiences periodic water 
shortages? 
2. 	 What criteria can or should be used for selection and implementation 
of these measures? 
3. 	 What data and other information are needed to manage the process? 
The group noted that it was difficult to analyse these questions in general terms 
it would be better to look at individual case studies and draw out generic lessons 
from them. 
The first requirement is a database, which helps to define the scale of scarcity. 
Further data-collection may be needed to understand the situation fully.  Factors 
in planning for these data needs can include: 
type and quantity of data; 
frequency of collection; 
users and uses of water; 
groundwater and environmental variables; 
drainage outflows. 
The data must be converted into performance indicators, regularly recalculated, 
in order that managers can  understand the situation. 

The root causes of basin closure or scarcity must be understood.  Categories of 

differing kinds of scarcity could include: 

physical water scarcity; 
economic water scarcity; 
new demands (new uses, or new users); 
problems of quality, as well as quantity; 
short-term and long-term scarcity. 
People should be told about the problem at an early stage.  Information about it 
should be disseminated at an early stage, and discussion should be  promoted 
about proposed and possible measures, among users, local authorities, and other 
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stakeholders.  Criteria will be needed for selection of intervention measures.  This 
is a key but difficult process.  Possible basis for these criteria include: 
prioritising uses; 
degrees of urgency; 
stakeholders' support; 
costs (implementation cost,  and benefits foregone); 
sustainability of the solution; 
external obligations; 
adequacy of resources. 
The measures chosen will  usually be  site specific,  and will  usually aim at a 
mixture of supply management and demand management. Management of supply 
and  demand needs a variety of approaches,  which the group clustered  under 
the following five sets: 
Technical measures: 




additional infrastructure for harnessing resources; 

identify opportunities for water saving; 

promote crops that need less water. 

Social measures: 
involve all key  partiCipants. 
Policy measures 
define and implement supporting legislation; 
identify and classify priorities; 
develop inter-departmental co-operation; 
institute regulations and control measures on the use of the river; 
formulate zoning plans. 
Financial measures 
restructure tariffs (for example, tiered structure, with differential rates); 
develop incentives for water saving. 
389 Group Work 2: The Operational Phase of River-Basin Management 
Information measures 
inform people about the nature of the closure (quantity, quality, etc); 
hold meetings with all  interest groups; 
build public awareness; 
inform  people  of  the  possible consequences  and  impacts of 
proposed measures. 
A critical issue is the question of resources for implementing these management 
policies and procedures. Concern  was expressed that,  in  some developing 
countries, there are significant constraints that would inhibit these procedures. 
Can management influence these resource constraints?  There must be a political 
will to address the problem, and the management strategy must be designed to 
match available resources, especially human and financial resources. 
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Group Work  3:  Management Strategies 
Friday 20  October 
For the third and  final  round  of group work, 

the participants again formed four groups. 

Each  group was  asked to formulate 

recommendations on  appropriate management 





Two  of the groups were asked to address the 

same topic,  in  view of this topic's importance 

to many developing countries. 

The goals assigned to  the four groups were: 












Groups were  invited to address the strategic 

issues at three practical levels: 

What needs to be done? 
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Group report 3.1: Cost-effective models of river-basin management 
Cost-effectiveness concerns  both  benefits and  costs.  The  idea is to  try and 
identify some cost-saving  measures,  while  achieving  benefits.  The  group 
developed a process by which these cost-effective solutions may be found,  and 
gave  some  ideas on  how costs could be  saved.  The  process described 
summarises much of the discussion during the workshop. 
River-basin management does not necessarily mean one organisation managing 
the  river.  This was brought out in  the  German and Californian cases.  Some 
management models listed by the group were: 
Information sharing:  different groups linked directly to a co-ordinating 
body, whose role  is to ensure flows of information among them; 
Linked model:  existing structures (organisations) are linked together 
with some kind of co-ordinating body, which in this case participates 
in the formulation of policy and decision-making; 
Directive model:  a unified structure,  carrying  out many aspects of 
basin management. 
Three essential features of river-basin management are: 
it is based on  hydrologic boundaries, 
it is cross-sectoral in nature, 
it aims at broad inclusion of stakeholders. 
It  is cost-effective  to focus  on  one,  or a small  number,  of principal functions. 
Typically in  water-stressed basins, with agricultural uses dominating, we  would 
select between: 
allocation, 
pollution,  or 
flood control. 
Concerning stakeholders' participation, it was Observed in the European example, 
that many stakeholders did not know about river basin management organisations, 
and this was not necessarily bad.  In this case, local-government structures were 
used for representation.  In developing countries, these means of representation 
may not be effective, so other means of stakeholder participation were necessary. 
If there  is a certain limited amount of money,  where should  it be spent?  The 
group listed in order of importance: 
Stakeholder forum 
Data collection 
392 Intersectoral Management of River Basins 
Communication infrastructure 

Further problem identification 

Principal steps for start-up: 
Establishment of a stakeholder forum to guide the processes.  This 
group would  be  instrumental in  figuring out how to  allocate water, 
and how to spend funds to accomplish this task. 






The above steps would have the following two important outcomes: 
Shared vision and 
Quick pay-off action-the idea is to try to show some kind of benefit 
quickly, to gain acceptance. 
Principal steps in  the operational phase: 
Stakeholder forum 

This would stay in  place to guide the process 

Data collection and monitoring 

In  perhaps a more extensive way than during the start up  phase 

Actions taken on  primary problem(s) 





This would  include supply and  demand  projections,  and plans on 





For all steps one should look at most cost-effective means. 

Stakeholder representation in governance. 
In this case, the main idea to save costs was to use existing structures to quickly 
and cheaply get stakeholder representation.  These structures could include: 
Government representation 
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Traditional leaders 




There  are  various concerns about using  existing  structures for river basin 
management.  There can be conflicts of interest, or using these structures may 
perpetuate social imbalances. 
Everyone should have the possibility of giving an  opinion, and a chance to join 
the discussion, but the power of decision-making may not be given to everyone. 
An  idea of merit is to use opinion polls.  Some stakeholders would be  used to 
set a direction, and then opinion polls would be used to verify the direction taken. 
Technically,  there  are  now  many cheap means of communications,  such  as  cell 
phones.  Care should be taken that poor people have access to these technologies 
too. 
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Group report 3.2: Poverty alleviation and  agricultural growth 
The task of this group was to make recommendations about strategies of river-basin 
management,  for  achieving  the  twin  goals of poverty alleviation and  agricultural 
growth. [See also the report of Group 3.3, who addressed the same subjects.] 
Summary of Recommendations 
As water emerges as an economic good, under integrated river-basin 
management,  developing country river-basin  management  regimes 
can  use water allocation and  pricing  mechanisms to  generate 
resources for supporting small-holder communities and other poorer 
groups.  Economically dynamic sectors-such as commercial farming, 
mining,  electricity companies,  and  industry  in  general-which use 
water intensively in wealth creation, should contribute a development 
levy,  which  would  be  used  to  create  social  infrastructure for  poor 
communities. 
2 	 Planned  investment should  be  directed io capacity-building  and 
human-resource development initiatives in  poor rural  communities, 
formal education, vocational training, public health, water supply and 
sanitation, and other such social overhead capital. 
3 	 While poorly designed subsidies can  be  dysfunctional or counter­
productive, carefully designed "smart" subsidies can provide powerful 
incentives.  For  example,  in  societies that lay  great emphasis on 
privatisation of service provision, dispersed poor communities may 
prove costly to serve, and therefore, it may take generations before 
they become viable demand systems for privately delivered services. 
In such situations, smart subsidies can create the required incentives 
for private service-providers to serve dispersed poor communities. 
4  Critical to making smallholder farming communities in underdeveloped 
river-basins viable are value-added farming and marketing.  Poor rural 
communities tend to be short on capital but long on family labour and 
care.  If these are supported to switch from field crops to high-value 
crops, their livelihoods can be stabilised even if their holdings are tiny. 
However, this necessitates support in terms of money,  management, 
and  marketing.  If the communities are organised and provided with 
resource support, their livelihoods can be improved. 
5  New institutional models need to be forged to link poor smallholder 
communities with more dynamic sectors of the economy.  In countries 
like South Africa, there exists enormous scope for a mutually gainful 
collaboration  between smallholder farming  communities and  large 
commercial farmers.  These, however, need to be actively catalysed 
and promoted through innovative approaches by  the  government. 
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Group report 3.3: Poverty alleviation and agricultural growth 
This group addressed the  question of strategic recommendations towards the 
goals of poverty alleviation and agricultural growth.  [See also the report of Group 
3.2, who addressed the same subjects.] 
The physical unit of analysis is the river basin.  Water is the primary focus of the 
strategic actions to be considered. 
Definition of the target group 
The group spent some time  in  defining who "the poor" are,  and  whether they 
should discuss the two issues, poverty alleviation and agricultural growth, together 
or separately.  The target groups were defined as: small farmers, landless people, 
urban poor (unemployed, piece workers, etc.).  The group also decided to discuss 
actions for poverty alleviation independent of agricultural growth.  They felt that 
most actions for poverty alleviation would fit agricultural growth as well. 
Need 
The group considered that one should not go for river-basin management unless 
it is necessary.  Money for river-basin management could be  spent for poverty 
alleviation.  If it is needed, basin management must be based on real basin issues 
and not go beyond those limits. 
Empowerment 
All poor groups need to be empowered.  Their dignity and confidence must be 
built among themselves.  Various self-help organisations should  be  promoted. 
These must represent their interests and ideas in decision-making processes. 
Income generation 
Income-generating activities, especially individual entrepreneurs, must be developed, 
targeted to the poor, and water-sustainable.  Crop diversification should be introduced 
and should be based on economic, ecological and social comparative advantage. 
Infrastructure 
There  are two kinds  of infrastructure,  hardware and software.  The  hardware 
includes roads, water-delivery systems, health centres, sanitation facilities, market 
places and  facilities,  while the software  includes education,  access to credit, 
information,  extension  services,  and  development of  new markets (locally for 
consumers, and externally for farm producers). 
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Capacity-building 
This is meant for both parties, the agency staff and the water users.  The agency 
managers must  have  right  understanding of poverty (through training  and 
exposure) and they must be able to perform new, facilitating roles, not the leading 
roles any more.  The users must also understand the water issues in the basin. 
Appropriate water uses for different purposes must be taught to users. 
Policy and institutions 
Land  reform  is  needed, to improve the management of resources and equity 
issues.  Access to water should be linked with access to land to allow growth of 
agricultural activity (not rights only, but service provision simultaneously).  Other 
water policies needed  include water pricing that takes cognisance of socio­
economic circumstances and security of water allocation for small-scale farmers. 
Incentives and catalysts 
Watershed  management must be  promoted that takes cognisance of the 
ecological limits for development towards poverty alleviation.  Other incentives 
and targeted subsidies may be needed at the beginning, to help the poor people 
to survive. 
Due to time constraints, the group could not address the questions "by whom" and 
"how." 
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Group report 3.4: Incentives for efficient use of water 
The group proposed sets of mechanisms, first for overall management, and then 
for specific stakeholders and users of water. 
Broad mechanisms might include: 




Scarcity pricing and water economics (costs and cost pricing) within 





Tax incentives and fiscal instruments, in general designed to trigger 

efficiency in  water use; 

Social shaming and rewarding; 

Information, education and research; 





It  is better to target major items, not to waste effort on  smaller matters that will 

produce small gains. 





For specific stakeholders, the group proposed: 

Regulatory Authority, or River Basin Authority 
International pressure can lead to changes in behaviour (e.g. Turkey 
and  the  EU).  There  are  also a series of  international forums or 
international normative order (agenda 21,  etc) 
Price signals, tax mechanisms, water trading and the establishment 
and maintenance of water rights. 
Service priorities and policy guidelines shape efficiency. 
Water Supply and Sanitation 
Objectives:  Good clean water leads to poverty alleviation and health benefits. 
There are  social and cultural aspects that enter this issue.  Public 
consciousness has to  be  raised.  The  price  of  water or tariff 
structures can  be  used to ensure that a lifeline supply is available 
and thereafter the price increases. 
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Adoption of water re-use technologies seems sporadic or restricted 
to developed countries. 
There  is  a role  for  regulation,  metering and  benchmarking in this 
industry.  . 
There is considerable room for carrots and sticks for efficient water 
use. 
Water Audit Exercises such as targeting the youth (20-20 Vision). 
Irrigation service providers, commercial farmers, small-scale farmers 
Objectives:  Soil conservation, water efficiency 
This topic has a two-fold analysis: the first one is related to poverty 
and farmers whose production is for survival or self-consumption in 
a water scarcity context; the second part of such analysis includes 
commercial  farmers and enterprises for whom  incentives and 
efficiency adopt a different meaning. 
The mechanisms will  be  different even  though  all  are  involved  in 
agriculture.  The capacity of human resources is different. 
With the small-scale farmers,  many of the  incentives may be non­
monetary.  Access to credit (maybe even bartering), forward trading 
of crops, and access to markets can lead to higher farm income and 
then farmers can invest in  simple technologies that save  water.  It 
may  be  necessary to develop proxies when  water metering  is 
impractical. 
With large-scale farming, tax mechanisms and volumetric charges 
can be effective means. 
Guaranteed crop prices may be useful  for  providing  incentives to 
save water for small farmers. 
Promote efficient farm  storage, switching  of  different agricultural 
crops. 
Hydro-power, industrial use and mines 
Objectives:  Low pollution levels,  flood  reduction,  soil conservation, and  water­
use efficiency 
Benchmarking, self-monitoring and social shaming. 
Creative use  of tax mechanisms  and,  in  a broader sense,  fiscal 
incentives per se. 
May be some room for leveraging clean up and water-use efficiency 
along watercourses. 
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Fisheries and forestry 
Objectives: 	Flood reduction, soil conservation and positive social reactions 
Water-efficient species can  be introduced. 
Water-price elasticities are radically different from  those  of  other 
sectors. 
Environment 
The environment is often low on the priority list; thus, incentives that 
address this topic in  terms of efficient water use are scarce in  the 
realm  of countries and  regions where  poverty and  water scarcity 
prevail. 
Environmental benefits are often unevenly distributed: the poor bear 
the  burden  with  health  problems and environmental degradation 
(mosquitoes) and,  in  contrast,  recreation  and  tourism for the  rich, 
for whom  in  emerging countries few  incentive  mechanisms have 
been implemented to contribute  for poor people to  have  a better 
environment within the water resources realm. 
Other mechanisms 
Offsets 
The concept itself deals with  the commitment of  certain  high-value 
economic uses of water that should when entering as users clean up 
not only their environmental  impacts but contribute to cleaning  up 
those pre-existing.  Offsets represent a creative incentive mechanism 
for certain uses like industry, hydropower generation and mining. 
Water pricing should take into account 
price elasticity 
scarcity 
differential tariff and water pricing structures 
measuring: volumetric or proxies 
practical realities 
Water policy 
a general water policy 
policy guidelines 
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water-trading regulations 
water is an economic good, as well as a social and environmental good 
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